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Harold Cherniss has charged that Aristotle is guilty of 
unfairness in both his reports and criticisms of Presocratic 
philosophers. These charges--with reference to Democritus at 
least--are without any real foundation. It can reasonably--in 
the light of other ancient information which we have about 
Democritus--be held that Aristotle's reports of his teachings 
were accurate and that his criticisms were justified. 
Aristotle's reports and criticisms of Democritus are 
taken up in terms of four major issues which divide these two 
men: the existence of permanent atomic units, the existence 
of a void, a knowledge of reality by correspondence, and his 
treatment of the four 'causes'. 
Taking these points up in order, we observe that Aris-
totle rightly points out that on none of these four issues was 
Democritus' teaching warrented by the empirical facts. As to 
the existence of atoms, Aristotle points out that there is no 
' 
reason why division must stop at a given degree of smallness, 
that atomic doctrine is an unwarranted denial of the empirical 
evidence which we have for continuity, and that atomism is 
founded on a mistaken notion of the meaning of 'what is'. 
2 
Secondly, although void was posited to account for.mo-
tion, it fails to do so. The existence of void as that which 
is absolutely intactible cannot in principle be supported by 
any real evidence. Void--like the atoms--was proposed because 
. . 
of a mistaken notion of what 'what is' and 'what is not' 
means. 
Furthermore, if our knowledge of the real world of 
atomically structured physical objects is by a correspondence 
which is both vague and inconsistent, we are after all reduced 
to relying on the very phenomena which the atomic theory had 
rejected. 
Finally, Democritus' atomism, since it recognizes only 
an infinite series of absolutely determined forced motions, 
makes of all the universe an utterly mechanical device with 
absolutely no distinction between mechanical and natural 
even.ts, between animate and inanimate objects--a distinction 
which seems obvious. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Problem 
In 1935 Harold Cherniss published his well-known book, 
Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy. 1 Its general 
tendency is to show that Aristotle's reports of the teachings 
of the Presocratic philosophers are not to be implicitly and 
naively trusted, because Aristotle is guilty of verbal misrep-
resentations of texts which we possess, guilty, in fact, of 
conflicting passages on the san1e point, of "wilful misrepresen-
tation" (page 352), of trying to twist and distort Presocratic 
theories in order to set them into bold relief and thus more 
firmly establish his ovm theory. 
But this is no new discovery on Cherniss' part; the prob-
lem had been recognized for at least some thirty years at the 
time of the publication of his book. 2 Cherniss' work is in 
that respect merely the systematic culmination of those earlier 
efforts. But the mere fact that Cherniss has had predecessors 
in his serious doubts about Aristotle's reliability in regard 
1Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic 
Philosophy (reprint, Nevi York: Octagon Press, 1954). 
' 2The reviewer of Cherniss' book in Revue de Tiletanhysiaue 
et ~ Horale, XLIV (1937), supplement to the April issue, pp. 
11-12, points out that Rivaud was the first to recognize the 
problem. Others who questioned Aristotle's reliability in this 
respect likely go back even further in time, but that is not 
important. 
1 
• 2 
to the Presocratics has not yet and is not likely to lessen the 
impact of this work in the area of Presocratic scholarship. 
Much is to be said for its insights, for its exhaustive schol-
arship, and for its relentless adherence to its central thesis. 
It is not likely soon to have a rival of the same scope. 
Indeed, Cherniss' efforts to cast into bold relief the 
tendentiousness of ancient literary reports of the Presocratics 
has already long since found imitation and continuance in the 
work of J. B. McDiarmid.3 The latter contends in substance 
that Theophrastus is not to be trusted either as an independent 
source of information on the Presocratics, but that he rather 
uncritically repeated what Aristotle had said and has at times 
conflated two distinct reports by Aristotle. Thus, instead of 
helping us better to understand Presocratic teachings and the-
ories, Theophrastus only confuses the issue and is "even less 
trustworthy than Aristotle,. (page 133) himself. 
But this approach has implications not only for the re-
ports of Aristotle and Theophrastus themselves, but also for 
the bulk of the doxographic tradition, which in one way or an-
other seems to be basically dependent on Aristotle and Theo-
phrastus. Thus, to cast doubts on the reports of Aristotle and 
Theophrastus is to cast that same sort of--and perhaps even 
more serious-~doubt on the'doxographic tradition as a whole, 
in which, if conjecture on that score is correct, there are 
3John B. r.IcDiarmid, "Theophrastus on the Presocratic 
Causes, 11 Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, LXI (1953), 
85-156. 
3 
further corruptions due to the influence of Stoic and Epicure-
an teachings. In the face of such doubt and distrtist we could 
do little in most cases but despair over the prospects of any 
insight at all into Presocratic philosophy;4 we would in many 
cases be relegated to guessing about fragments snatched out 
of context. 
But, to return to Aristotle himself, these are indeed 
serious charges to lay at the door of a philosopher of the 
caliber of Aristotle, especially since he himself is so acute-
ly aware of consistency and of the varying meanings of words. 
It is true that in many cases the terminology of the· report 
does not belong to the predecessor in question but to Aris-
totle himself, and that to one who is not aware of this prac-
tice of Aristotle such usage of Aristotelian terminology may 
indeed be misleading. But this is not the major charge which 
is made against Aristotle; he is charged rather with present-
ing a wrong teaching, with deliberate alteration of the theo-
ries of the Presocratics, with setting up 'straw men' to 
knock down, with giving conflicting reports about the same the-
ory. Such charges even under ordinary circumstances are only 
to be made for grave reasons, and not on the weak and conjec-
tural evidence presented by Cherniss; but in Aristotle's case 
one ought reasonably be doubly hesitant to make such charges. 
4This is substantiated by many and was pointed out in 
particular by A. E. Taylor in his review of Cherniss' book in 
~' XLVI (1937), 247-250; if one discredits Aristotle and 
considers the Theophrastan doxographical tradition as infect-
ed, there is too little to go on. 
4 
Furthermore, Jaeger, in his review of Cherniss' book,5 
points out that Cherniss is making the same sort of error that 
he accuses Aristotle of making: he measures Aristotle by a 
standard alien to him; Cherniss' attitude itself becomes unhis-
torical; and the only difference is that Aristotle does it not 
unconsciously in behalf of a philosophical world view, while 
Cherniss does it consciously and in behalf of a historical 
truth. 6 Thus, paradoxically, Cherniss fails to consider ade-
quately Aristotle's own view-point, fails basically to consider 
the question of whether or not Aristotle's remarks were justi-
fied apart from the question of whether by our modern philo-
sophic and scientific standards Aristotle was right or wrong. 
There is, on the other hand, a growing tendency to revive 
some trust in Aristotle's accounts of Presocratic philosophers 
while taking into consideration the criticisms which Cherniss 
has offered. One general attempt in this direction is that of 
w. K. C. Guthrie, both in his general account, "Aristotle as 
Historian,"7 and in his particular accounts of the Presocratics 
in his~ History of Greek Philosophy. 8 He does point out that 
5werner Jaeeer, in his review in American Journal of Phi-
lology, LVIII (1937), 350-356. ~ ~ 
6Roughly this same criticism is taken up by w. K. c. 
Guthrie, "Aristotle as Historian, 11 Journal of Hellenic Studies, 
LXXVII (1957), 35-41. ' 
?Ibid. 
8w. K. c. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosonhy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962--); the first three 
three volumes deal with the Presocratics. 
5 
Aristotle is usually quite careful to indicate where his·report 
ends and his criticism begins, to distinguish his reports from 
the logical conclusions he draws from the teachings of the Pre-
socratics, to distinguish secondary in.formation from what he 
has learned about the teachings more directly. Thus Aristotle 
is represented as being a better source of information than 
Cherniss had given him credit for; and Aristotle is indeed to 
be trusted, if only we take the trouble to read him carefully. 
This is substantially the point at which the problem of 
the reliability of Aristotle as a witness to the teachings of 
the Presocratics stands. No one thus far has attempted to do 
Cherniss' work again and subject all of his remarks about Ar-
istotle's reliability to closer scrutiny; that would indeed be 
an awesome task! 
Nestle has suggested that there are two feasible ways to 
approach this problem: one is to concentrate on individual 
thinkers, and the other is to concentrate on the main problems 
which Aristotle raises.9 It would seem to be equally reason-
able--if not more reasonable--to combine both methods, to exam-
ine Aristotle's criticisms of an individual author in terms of 
the philosophical issues that Aristotle sees as being at stake. 
This approach would have the advantages to be gained by both 
methods; it wo~ld allow a !omewhat closer scrutiny of the re-
ports and criticisms of Aristotle; it would concentrate on 
9wilhelm Nestle's review of Cherniss' book in Philolog-
ische Wochenschrift, LVI (1936), cols. 1329-32. Nestle says 
iliat Cherniss was right in chosing the second alternative. 
6 
fundamental and specific issues between Aristotle and the phi-
losopher involved, and thus not suffer from having to jump 
back and forth from one philosophical school to another, as 
Cherniss is forced to do; it would avoid the mistake of 'lump-
ing philosophical schools together' without a precise indica-
tion of the respect in which their teachings are different. 
Indeed, there is a prospect of a clearer and fairer account of 
Aristotle's reports and criticisms of the Presocratic philoso-
phers to be gained by using this approach. 
In more recent years the atomic theories of modern phys-
icists have centered an increasing amount of interest on the 
relative contributions of two imposing figures of ancient 
Greece--Democritus and Aristotle--to this modern system. So, 
perhaps because of Democri·~us' advocacy of atomism in the an-
cient world, there seems to be a natural tendency to sympa-
thize with his position and perhaps also a latent inclination 
to read into its ancient form some of the modern aspects of 
atomism and to assume in the light of modern science that in 
some instances Aristotle's criticism of it 1vas wrong or mis-
guided. Because of this a closer examination of the issues 
which Aristotle sees as dividing his position from that of De-
mocritus and his reasons for rejecting the latter's atomism 
would seem to be particula~ly interesting and profitable. 
But there are also further reasons for chosing to re-
examine Aristotle's reports and criticisms of Democritus in 
particular. Aristotle on several occasions makes a point of 
praising Democritus not only for the broad scope of his the-
ory10 but also for his consistency in including all things 
1 
into a single, unified, rational system, and beginning with 
nature just as it is. 11 This certainly implies that Aristotle 
was well acquainted with Democritus' theory and considered it 
as a unified whole, and that particularly in Democritus' case 
Aristotle was not likely guilty of picking at individual doc-
trines without at least a fundamental glance at the place of 
such doctrines in the context of the whole system. It indi-
cates in Aristotle a high degree of respect for the teachings 
of his rival, teachings which we thus have every reason to ex-
pect that Aristotle will treat fairly. 
Thus Aristotle's criticism of Democritus might be in a 
sense considered critical. For, if on closer examination we 
do indeed find Aristotle's reports and criticisms reasonably 
fair and justified, it becomes more likely that this will also 
be the case with other Presocratics; if, on the other hand, we 
tend to find Cherniss' charges of unfairness substantiated, his 
case for similar treatment of the other Presocratics will re-
ceive even more support. 
It seems therefore both feasible and reasonable to exam-
ine more critically the reliability of Aristotle over against 
't 
lOGen. e.t Corr. 1.1, 315a35: ne;pi a'ITavrrwv c.ppovrr(oal. 
1.8, 324b35-325al: ne;p\ navrrwv. 
11Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 325al-2: ev& A.oy41 ••• 6.px-f)v 
---~ ' # .\(, I , no,r.ouµcvol xa'Ta ~OOlV , 1nep eo~Lv. 
the teachings of Democritus: the issues between them are 
rather clearly drawn; and we have on Aristotle's part an im-
plicit claim for the honorable treatment of his rival. There 
is every reason to expect that charges like those of Cherniss 
can thus be profitably investigated. 
Furthermore, what is undertaken in this paper is only a 
beginning, for it would seem both reasonable and profitable 
8 
to continue this sort of an investigation in two further di-
rections. First of all, in regard to the teachings of Democ-
ritus himself, it seems equally important to examine the re-
ports and criticisms of his teachings i.n other ancient philo-
sophical authors who contribute substantially to the informa-
tion which we have about Democritus--primarily, Theophrastus, 
Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Simplicius. Their own 
treatment of Democritus and his teachings is likely to reflect 
a changing concern with the various philosophical issues that 
were current during the lives of these ancient authors. What 
can be learned from such a chronological investigation may 
well run parallel to and illuminate the development of the 
doxographical tradition. At any rate it will put us in a bet-
ter position to understand and appreciate the information that 
they do give us about Democritus. 
Secondly, it seems e~ually appropriate and necessary to 
examine Aristotle's reports and criticisms of other major Pre-
socratic authors, for, though it is not likely, Democritus may 
be a special case, and what is found to hold true in regard to 
Aristotle's use of Democritus' teachings may not hold true 
with regard to other Presocratics. There is also too much 
danger in gathering philosophers into schools, for a specific 
criticism may apply in different respects to different indi-
viduals of the same school. These men need to be treated as 
distinct individuals as much as possible in order to be prop-
erly understood. This is not to deny any similarity of doc-
trine between individuals--such similarities will be inevi-
table when a number of men approach a problem in the same way 
--but only to insure that we understand precisely in what re-
spects they are similar and in what respects they are differ-
ent. Only so can Aristotle's accounts be more fairly judged. 
The Method 
More specifically, the format to be followed here will 
be to examine Aristotle's treatment of Democritus in terms of 
the major philosophical issues which divide them; and Aris-
totle himself can best tell us what these issues are. There 
are, as seems evident from reading Aristotle, three such fun-
damental issues: the meaning of 'what is' and of 'what is 
not', the problem of sense-perception and knowledge, and the 
question of the adequacy of Democritus' explanation of physi-
cal objects and events. The first of these is readily broken 
' dovm into two ·sub-problems: the existence of permanent atom-
ic units and the existence of a void. The second issue will 
9 
be seen to involve as well the problem of the soul, of the 
reality of •secondary qualities', and of the mutual generation 
of the elements. The third is more readily recognizable ·as 
the question of the 'four causes'. 
10 
Within each of these major issues it seems reasonable to 
review and check the teachings of Democritus as they apply to 
that particular issue. Wherever possible and appropriate this 
will be done with reference to Democritus' own terminology, 
being careful to distinguish it and the teaching it involves 
from any limited and technical meaning which is peculiar to 
Aristotle. It should thus be possible to avoid the trap of 
letting Aristotle's arguments carry without any real justifi-
cation for them. 
In connection with this examination of original termi-
nology there is to be a more detailed examination of Aris-
totle's report of the teachings involved in each issue. This 
is to include as well some acknowledgement of the background 
and basis of the particular doctrine, the philosophical issue 
to which Democritus was speaking, and then a reasonable ac~ 
count of the doctrine along with any obvious implications. 
Then, on the basis of the above, 'there is to follow in 
each instance an examination of the criticisms which Aristotle 
directs against the teaching involved in the issue at hand. 
This examination will be primarily concerned with the question 
of whether or not Aristotla's criticisms are justified, wheth-
er or not they are warranted by the teaching he is opposing 
and by his basis for judgment. As interesting as the question 
may be, there will be no primary concern with the matter of 
11 
whether either Aristotle or Democritus is right or wrong.in 
terms of advanced modern science or in terms of the unique 
philosophical issues of modern philosophy--indeed, there may be 
no definitive answers to those sorts of questions at all. 
Nor, for that reason, will this paper be primarily con-
cerned with what Democritus might have said in reply to these 
criticisms unless there is some substantial evidence to sup-
port such a reply. To proceed otherwise would be to read into 
the teaching of Democritus something which is not in fact 
there; it would lead us into pure speculation and conjecture, 
and that is of no real help. 
Finally, this paper is written under several assumptions 
and specifications Vlhich will become more apparent as one 
reads on. But it may not be out of place here to forewarn the 
reader. First of all, there will be no attempt made here to 
distinguish in fact the teachings of Leucippus from those of 
Democritus. Though there has been sone debate on the question, 
one may on the whole safely take their teachings together.12 
The few instances in which Leucippus alone is cited in Aris-
totle can be shown from parallel citations to involve teach-
ings which apply to Democritus as well. Nothing can really be 
gained for our purposes by entering into the problem of sepa-
rating and distinguishing ·t,lhese two men. 
Secondly and obviously, there will be no treatment of a 
12Following Guthrie, 4.History of Greek Philosophy, .21?.• 
.£.!...!., vol. 2, p. 382, note c 
12 
teaching or criticism by 'schools' without a clear specifica-
tion of the respect in which Democritus is to be classed or 
criticized in that way. In this connection the term •atomist• 
is intended to refer specifically to Leucippus and Democritus, 
and thus for all practical purposes to Democritus himself, un-
less a broader use of the term is specifically indicated. 
Finally, the problem will be approached without assuming 
with Cherniss that Aristotle is unfair. This is to be a cau-
tious attempt to read what Aristotle has to say about Democri-
tus carefully and without prejudice, hesitating without grave 
reason to find Aristotle guilty of gross misrepresentation. 
Aristotle likely had access to the works of Democritus, could 
read him in context, and knew what he was talking about much 
more so than we do who have no such complete or coherent pri-
mary source available. This seems to be the only way of deal-
ing effectively with the problem without getting involved in 
the circularity of checking Aristotle by a doxographic tradi-
tion which is in turn dependent on Aristotle's own accounts. 
Thus, what is proposed here is a re-evaluation of Aris-
totle's criticisms of Democritus, one written to show that 
this position of trusting Aristotle is not only just as ten-
able as that of Cherniss, but even more reasonable; it is 
written to demonstrate in fact that Aristotle is after all 
basically reliable, if only we take the trouble to read and 
understand him and to assess precisely what it is that he is 
saying in regard to Democritus. 
CHAPTER I 
WHAT CONSTITUTES A REAL UNIT? 
The Problem 
As was specified in the Introduction, it will be the ap-
proach of this paper to examine Aristotle's accounts of Democ-
ritus in terms of the basic issues which divide the teachings 
of the one from those of the other. Now one of the most ob-
vious and fundamental issues which separate them revolves 
around the question of what constitutes a real unit. In gen-
eral, it is quite obvious that it was Democritus' position 
that the only real unit was a permanent, impassible, and mi-
nute body of matter which he called an 'atom'; whether consid-
ered alone or as a part of a physical object this atom re-
tained in eternal actuality its character as the only real, 
unit. Aristotle contends, on the other hand, that there is 
not sufficient justification for positing such an indivisible 
atom as a true and permanent unit, that such a theory runs 
counter to both logic and empirical evidence. 
This issue is truly a fundamental one, for Democritus 
explained eve~ything else in terms of such atoms as real units 
in specific positions and motions in the void. So herein lies 
as well the foundation and roots of the issue of the structure 
of physical objects (whether they are as individuals a contin-
13 
14 
uum and so an actual unity, or composed of atoms and thus an 
actual multiplicity), of the types of motion that are pos-
sible, of the operation of the sense-organs and the intellect, 
of the types of definitions and explanations that are possible, 
and thus of the whole system of Democritus' thought over 
against that of Aristotle. The further implications of this 
fundamental issue will become more evident as we proceed and 
consider these other problems separately; but, for the time 
being, we might simply note that Democritus applied this ex-
planation in terms of atomic units throughout his system with 
an extraordinary consistency, and Aristotle praised him for 
it.1 The atom as the real unit was fundamental to and consis-
tent with the whole system of Democritus. Thus the issue 
raised by Aristotle is a vitally important and critical one. 
Furthermore, intimately involved in the question of what 
constitutes a real unit is the important question of the di-
visibility of physical objects, the question whether such di-
vision can be carried out indefinitely or not, whether it can 
be carried out until it reaches an infinite multitude of di-
mensionless points or must stop short of this. But it is-
precisely in connection with this question that a problem of 
interpretation arises, the problem of whether Democritus' atom 
is mathematically or intellectually as well as physically in-
divisible, with the majority of recent writers holding that 
1Gen. ~ Corr. 1.8, 324b35-325al: oo~ Be µaA&o~a xa& 
nepl m1;rwv evi 'Aoycv 01wp(xa.01 At:UXl1l'Tt:Os xa'l t;T)µoxpl~Os• 
15 
they were likely indivisible in both respects. 2 There is no 
disagreement on the fact that Democritus held his atoms to be 
physically indivisible, and so the current issue lies only 
with their mathematical indivisibility. And this question, as 
Sinnige rightly points out, 3 is answered basically in terms of 
the philosophical heritage within which Democritus spelled out 
his answers. 
2r.1uch has been written on this problem. Among the most 
significant works are the following: Ingeborg Ha."'Dlner-Jensen, 
11 Demokri t UI1d Platon° in Archi v fur Geschichte der Philosonhie, 
XXIII (1910), 92-105, 211-229; V. E. Alfieri, Atonos Idea: 
l'origine del concetto dell' atomo !!.§:1 pensiero greco (Flor-
ence: Le Honnier, 1953);S. J..iuria, aDie Infinitesimaltheorie 
der antiken Atomisten 11 in Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte 
der Mathematik, Abteilling B, Band ~Heft 2, 1932, pp. 106-185 
(Luria contends that there are 'atoms' in two senses~ that is, 
that there are 1) physically indivisible atoms and 2J 'atoms' 
which are., theoretical parts of the physicall;y indivisible 
atoms); Jurgen Eau, Zu:n Problem des Infinitesimalen bei den 
antiken Atomisten (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957); David J. 
iurley, Tv10 Studies in the Greek Atomists: Study I, Indi vis-
ible Marnitudes; Stud~ II, Aristotle and Enicurus sz.g Voluntary 
Action Princeton, Hew Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1967). 
Beyond these Guthrie, History, II, 503-507, believes that 
the evidence points to the fact that the atoms are both physi-
cally and mathematically indivisible; :hurley agrees. Gregory 
Vlastos (cited by both Guthrie and Purley, though not in print 
as nearly as I knovr) contends that the atoms are mathematically 
divisible. G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philos-
ophers (Cambridge: University Press, 19'b'OT, p. 408, likewise 
indicate that they were divisible in thought, though not in 
fact. Theo Gerard Sinnir;e, Watter and fnfinitr ig the Pre-
socratic Schools and Plato (Assen: Van Gorcum and Company, 
1968), holds that Der:tocritus' theory was basically Ionian in 
character and was thus concerned with physical, not mathemat-
ical divisibil~ty; he furtllermore contends that the Eleatic 
context in which this question is raised is introduced by Aris-
totle in order to criticize Democritus; therefore, he would 
contend, it is misleading to rely on the context in Aristotle 
in attempting to determine Democritus' own answer to this most 
important question. 
3.QE. c~., especially pp. 164-167. 
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Any attempt to answer this question must come to grips 
with the account of Aristotle, for he is our chief witness to 
the teachings of Democritus in matters regarding the problems 
both of mathematical divisibility and of Democritus' philo-
sophical heritage; and Aristotle's testimony is pivotal,4 if 
the question is to be answered with any sort of ~robability 
at all. At any rate, we may tentatively·make some general re-
marks about Aristotle's account of Democritus' teaching on the 
matter of divisibility and indivisibility. There seems to be 
no doubt that Democritus' atoms were physically indivisible; 
Aristotle calls the atom anae~~ (Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 326al); 
and the general agreement on this point is so wide that we may 
use this as our starting-point in the examination of Aristot-
le's account of Democritus with respect to mathematical divis-
. ibility. As we do, it will prove highly probable--any higher 
degree of certainty on this moot question does not seem pos-
i ble--that Democritus held that his atoms were mathematically 
divisible, that physical division is largely an illusion (all 
atoms are and remain distinct); and so mathematical division, 
although it is conceivable, simply does not in fact apply to 
physical objects. 
~ Terminology 
' It will "be helpful, before entering upon an examination 
4Mau, .2J2.• £il., p. 24, seems quite right when he states: 
11 Wenn wir dieser Frage von Aristoteles abweichen, dann wagen 
wir uns auf das Gebiet der reinen Konjektur. 11 
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of Aristotle's accounts and criticisms of Democritus, to ·con-
sider some of the more essential terminology which was used by 
Democritus for his 'atoms' as true physical units. This will 
help us to clarify in a preliminary way the position of Democ-
ritus and to focus our attention on its uniqueness. Where both 
Aristotle and Democritus use a single term in different ways, 
there will be an attempt to indicate such essential differ-
ences. 
First of all, there is, according to the witness of Plu-
tarch, a usage of the term {ofa for an atom, 5 emphasizing 
rightly the 'shape' of atoms, which, we shall see, is important 
for the structure of physical objects. 6 Although this term may 
have been used by Democritus, Aristotle tends to avoid it in 
reference to the atoms of Democritus--likely because of its 
moaning in Plato--and prefers instead to use the term ax~µa, by 
which he also translates Democritus' ovm term pucrµo<,;. 
. 
5Plutarch Ad versus Coloten, llllA: e ( va ~ 6 e: n:av'ta 'ta<; 
a'toµou~, loea<,; un' au'tou xa~ouµevat;. This would ~ive us the 
feminine form <hoµo<; ( l5 ta , •undivided. shape'. fut, since 
.Aristotle, as we shall see, regularly connected the adjective 
ci:toµo<; with a neuter noun, for the sake of consistency the neu-
ter form a'toµov will here be used to indicate the •atom'. 
6compare Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomist.s and E,picurus 
(reprint, New York: Russell and Hussell, 196'4J, p. 118. The 
consideration of the importance of 'shape' will be taken up 
more fully in chapter three of this paper. 
I shall in this papc:rt be using the term 'physical object' 
to desienate that external being which is confronted by the 
senses, and the term 'phenonenal object' to indicate that same 
object as we perceive it. r..rhus for Democritus the 'physical 
object' nay be a mass of atoms and void, while the same object 
as phenomenal might be a continuous, hard, brown desk. This 
distinction between 'physical object' and 'pheno~enal object' 
is of utmost importance in considering :Der.iocritus' teachings. 
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How, aside :from the emphasis on shape or :form in the ter-
minology, there are in Democritean usage several adjectives 
which indicate that the atom was a three-dimensional shape 
which was packed solid and full. Simplicius, for instance, 
gives witness to a fragment of Aristotle's work, On Democritus, 
in which the term vao't6v ('closely pressed and packed') is 
attributed to Democritus. 7 Likewise, Democritus evidently also 
used the term ~A~pec; ('full') to indicate this same fullness 
and solidity; 8 and Aristotle himself says that Democritus used 
this latter term to signify that which truly is, 'to ov,9 and 
to indicate thereby one of his basic elements, cr'to1xerov •10 
Thus Democritus• atom is to be taken as 'solidly full'. 
There is another term with related significance which 
goes back at least as far as Democritus, 11 the term otv; it was 
7simplicii in Aristotclis de Caelo Co::nmentaria, vol. VII 
of Corrunentaria in--Xristotelem Graeca, ed. by I. L. Heiberg 
(Berlin: GeorgeReimer, 1894), p. 295, line 5. 
8John Burn.et, Early Greek Philosophy (reprinted in Cleve-
land and New York: World Publishing Company, 1957), p. 337, 
believes that Leucippus used it in this sense and that he had 
borrowed it from itielissus. 
9Lieta. 4. 5, 1009a28-29: oJ'toc; 'to xevov xa) 'to 11:Atipet; 
& ( ---:::-re ~ - .1 ,L I!. ( ' , ,., .f 01!0 CJ)t; xa O'HCUV u1Lupxq._v µt;pOt;, xa 'tOl 'tO µ.ev ov 'tOv'tWV 
e(va' 'tO oe µl] ov -- 11 He LOemocri tus] says that 'the empty' and 
'the full' are likewise at any given part, and yet that one of 
these 'is' and the other 'is not•. 11 
.. 
10r,Ieta • .J..4, 985b5: , ~T}µoxp,-i;oc; a'to,xeia. µev 'to 'K/..fipet; 
xa\ 'tO XEVOV d VUI • 
11Kurt von Fritz, Philosonhie und spracb.licher Ausdruck 
bei Demokri t, Plato u....-1d Ari stotcles (Darmstadt: Wissenschaft-
liche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), p. 18, claims that the term goes 
back to Leucippus; 13ailey, .£:£• .£.il., p. 118, traces it back to 
Democritus. 
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obviously quite artificially and consciously created for ·its 
sheer contrast to o6~~v, 'nothing•--a term for 'void' or 'empty 
space'. Thus, if oev is to have any unique significance at 
all, it must be the direct contradictory to 'nothing', and so 
it must be that which is fully and simply a thing, pure matter, 
packed solid and full. 
Furthermore, the very term 'element' (o'Tolxerov) is one 
that goes back to Democritus, as von Fritz remarks; 12 the ·term 
was used by Democritus in a sense noticeably more primitive 
than the meaning it has for Aristotle, in a sense that is much 
closer to that of the individual and distinct 'elements' of the 
alphabet. Aristotle's use of the letters of the alphabet to 
illustrate the shape, position, and placement of the atoms13 
very likely goes back to Democritus himself, as the latter drew 
out this metaphor to illustrate, for one thing, the varying 
shapes that his elements were to have. Thus, in the light of 
the Democritean use of this term for the atomic unit, we may 
further safely attribute to the atoms of Democritus the fact 
that they, while distinct and separate from one another, differ 
quite specifically from one another in shaue and are used in 
conjunction with one another to build physical objects. 
12op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
o-i;olxefO\i"' for Aristotie is a primary constituent of 
tbings, which i"s in kind not divisible into another kind: et; 
OU ouyXEL'Tal ~pCrt-ou evunapxov~oc aolalpe~ou 'TQ el5El el, 
~'T epov d eo<, --I:Teta. 5. 3, 1014a26-27; it is something whose 
continued bisection results only in something of the same kind, 
as water is only divisible into smaller bits of water. 
13r.reta. 1.4, 985bl5-19. 
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Likewise, in this connection, von Fritz traces and· ex-
pounds another Democritean term, this time one much more 
unique in Greek philosophy, puoµo<.;; 14 its meaning may be taken 
to be roughly 'form' or 'shape'. The use of this term in 
Herodotus 5.58 for the 'shape' of letters is very interesting 
for its appropriateness to the use of o'to&xef'ov, though it is 
iess metaphoric than the latter. Its use is quite appropriate 
to the atoms of Democritus, for it does not signify the 'per-
ceptible form'--as does e{oo,--but the 'objective law or prin-
ciple of the atom's form' as it realizes itself in its own 
motion, quite apart from any outside influence; it is a unique 
combination of forr~ and movement. And this is the term which 
Aristotle regularly translates or interprets as oxfiµa, or 
'shape 1 ; 15 and, in so doing, he has abstracted from it--as he 
. does also with 'tpo~~ and o&a8&y~--the idea of motion; he has 
taken it in the isolation of an instant and thus proposes to 
examine it simply inasmuch as it is a 'shape', or, if you will, 
t h . 1 't 16 as a perr.ianen p ysica uni • 
Finally, there is the term most usually connected with 
14
.QE • .£!..!., pp. 25-26. 
15:weta. 1. 4, 985bl5: 't'OU't(uv a E d µ'Ev puoµo, axiiµa ta'!:, v. 
16This is not to imply that Ariototle does an injustice 
to Democritus' ato:n in thi~ respect; he certainly does recog-
nize and deal vii th the asnect of its motion. Indeed, immedi-
ately following his exposition ,of puoµo<.; as oxii1-1:a., he raises 
the qu~stion of wotion: 1Cep'• Oe XlV~OE:W<;, o8ev Tl 'Jl:W<.; \.htap.;el 
-ror, oua,, xa.'• OU't'Ol ••• pq8uµw<; O.cpcf'oa.v --I.Ieta. 1.4, 985bl9-
20. But we shall be dealine with that question separately in 
the second and third chapters. 
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the name and teaching of Democritus--' the atom' ( a-r;oµov) •· It 
indicates not only that Democritus' unit is and remains 'un-
cut', but also that it is at least physically indivisible. 17 
Aristotle uses the term quite often of Democritus' unit, 18 but 
he usually distinguishes the term as it applies to Democritus' 
atoms from his own meaning of that term by adding the noun 
oWµa or µtye8o<; or both to this adjective •19 And this usage 
of the term a-r;oµov, Bailey feels, can be traced all the way 
back to Leucippus, 20 and it is in fact attested by the frag-
ments of Democritus. 21 
Thus, in the light of the above Democritean terminology, 
we may reasonably give a preliminary description of Democritus' 
physical unit. It has a given shape or form (Cota, ~uoµoc; ); 
l7It is described by Aristotle as a~aet~ (~. et Corr. 
1.8, 326al); see also above, p. 16. 
18see H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus (Graz: Akademische 
Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, reprinted 1955), p. 120. There may 
be implicit here a certain amount of 'question-begging' on the 
matter of mathematical divisibility in that Bonitz' list of 
uses of this term as applied to the atons of Democritus is 
entered under the heading 'mathematice'. 
l9For example, Physics 8.9, 265b29, Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 
315b29, and Caelo 3.4, 303a21. The Democritean terminology ( totq ~uoµ6~ nA~pec; ,vaa-r;6v) certainly indicates that this 
is a justified addition. 
20
- . t r-73 
.2.:2. • .21:_. ' p • • 
21rt is tn a frag.nen~ quoted by Sextus Empiricus, frag-
ment 6889 in Hermann Diels and V/alther Kranz, Die Fragmente ~ 
Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhand-
lung, 1960-1961). 
Guthrie, Iiistory, II, 395, note 2, seems to have over-
looked that passace and asserts that 3.'t"oµo~ in its feminine or 
neuter form "does not occur in any actual fragment of Democ-
ritus." 
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various atons have a variety of shapes and are used in the 
construction of physical objects (cr~olxeiov ); these shapes are 
not simply outlines, but are solids and fully packed (1tA.~pec.;, 
vaa~ov), and thus have extension and are in fact minute bodies; 
they are, furthermore, the simple and absolute antitheses to 
•void', and, as such, are 'what is' (O~v, ~o 3v); they are and 
remain undivided and are physically indivisible (a~oµov ). 
It may at this point be both appropriate and helpful to 
indicate briefly Aristotle's own use and application of the 
term a~oµ.ov, not only because it will help clarify and keep 
distinct the teachings of these two men on the matter of divis-
ibility, 22 but also because Aristotle's own use of that term 
will indicate the major areas in which he criticizes the 
teaching of Democritus on what is the true physical unit. 
Bonitz, evidently quite correctly, distinguishes two fun-
damental meanings of the term a~oµ.ov for 1'!..!'istotle. 23 First of 
all, there is a sense in which Aristotle uses the term in ref-
erence to physical division. It is Aristotle's position that 
every magnitude is constantly divisible into magnitudes; 24 
and thus the only things that can remain undivided in this 
22sinnige, on. cit., p. 145, conflates Aristotle's mean-
ing with that of Democritus, and thus he makes nonsense of it; 
he defines it, as used by Aristotle of Democritus' atoms, as 
"indivisible np,gnitudes wh~ch are the result of a process of 
infinite division." (Italics mine.) 
23 S22.. cit. , p. 120, under <hoµ.o~ • 
24Physics 6.2, 232a23-25: 1r0'.v µ€yt:8o~ d<. µ.t:y€8T) Olalpe-
~ov (0€6e~x;a•, yap o~L aOuva~ov t~ &~oµwv elva( ~' ouvex€~, 
µ~ye80~ 0 t:O~lV ~nav OUVeX€~). 
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sense are the instant in time, the 'instantaneous now', and 
the dimensionless point. 25 In this sense the a~oµov is not a 
•unit', for one can never by conjoining such a~oµa produce 
either an extent of time or an actual physical magnitude; it 
is the point §:.!which one divides something and not that into 
which one actually divides something. 
In this respect, as we shall see, Aristotle's criticism 
of Democritus' a~oµov will be that as a magnitude it will 
reasonably be further divisible, that physical division can 
only end in a 'point', which is no unit at all. 
Aristotle's second fundamental use of the term a~oµov is 
a logical one. In this sense the term refers to individual 
members of a species; 26 these a~oµa are described by Arist·otle 
in the Categories as simple units and numerically one, and 
they are that of which genus and species are predicated. 27 
And this sense of the term is also carried through by Aristotle 
25 Caelo 3.1, 300al4: ~O yap VUV ~O a~oµov O~OV O~Lyµ~ 
ypaµµi'jc;; ~o~(v--"for the indivisible 1 nov1 1 is like the point on 
a line." Here Aristotle makes the same point about the 'indi-
visible now' as he makes in On Generation and Corruntion 1.2 
about the 'indivisible point'"; that is, that continuous time, 
like a continuous magnitude, vlill be annihilated if one could 
succeed in carrying out the division igi£ 'nows•. 
26The term is also used in other senses, for example, of 
species which are not capable of further division, but none of 
these other usages seem critical or important to the issue at 
hand. . ' 
272, lb6-7: ·~d7rt-w<; Oe ~~ Cl:rcoµa xa\ tv dp&Sµlil • Also 5, 
3a38-39:, ~o ~EV doo, xa~a ~ou a-r6µou xa~T)yoper~a&, ~o Oe 
ytvo, xa L xa-i;a ~ou e'{ l:·ou<; xa'L xa~a ~ou 6.~6µou. Such indi vi d-
ual things, as &-i;oµa, are never predicated of a subject, though 
genus and species are predicated of them. 
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in the Itletaphysics. 28 Thus, for Aristotle, the real a~oµa in 
this universe are basically the primary substances, the indi-
vidual objects such as Socrates; it is the individual which is 
numerically indivisible: ap1t8µ~ p.ev oJv ~0 xae' 'txao~ov aot -
a(pE~ov (Meta. 10.1, 1052a31-32). 
With regard to this meaning of the term a~oµov in Aris-
totle, Aristotle's criticism of the position of Democritus is 
that, since Democritus' a~oµov remains an actual unit, he de-
nies the unity of that which we perceive to be a unit, the 
individual primary substances. This criticism, as we shall 
see in the second chapter of this paper, applies as well to 
the positing of a void, inasmuch as the void in an object is 
that which actually separates it and keeps it from being a 
continuous unit. 
Democritus Posits the Atom as the Unit 
But, before elaborating on Aristotle's criticisms, it 
will be necessary to look more closely at the teachings of 
Democritus as they apply specifically to this issue of what 
28E.g., 3.3, 999al5-16: ex µev oJv ~ou1wv µUAAOV ~a(-
VE~at ~a ~n\ ~WV a~oµwv xa~DyopouµEVU apxal E(Vat ~WV yevwv--
"and so of these that which is predicated of individuals seems 
more of a principle than the genera. 11 See also W. D. Ross, 
Aristotle's Meta~hysics, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
~958), I, 224, ~ 7; II, 30~. Other passages in which the term 
is so used are.~. 3.1, 995b29; 3.3, 998bl6, 999al2; 10.8, 
l058al8, 19, 20. 
I shall not be entering into the ontological signifi-
cance of an individual patch of white which is present in an 
object. For a recent discussion of that question see James 
Duerlinger, "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Catego-
ries" in Phronesis XV, 2 (1970), 179-203. Such individuals 
seem to depend for their existence on primary substances. 
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constitutes the real unit in the world of physical objects. 
First of all, it seems quite evident from Aristotle--and 
we have no real reason for rejecting his witness29 __ that 
Democritus' positing of the atons had its basis in empirical 
evidence, even though in some respects he had made some con-
cessions to Eleatic arguments; his theory was one vn1ich, he 
felt, did not do away with the validity of appearances. 
This empirical foundation is indicated by Aristotle in 
his Ii!etanhysics, 4.5, 1009a22-30.30 There Aristotle asserts 
that Democritus, among others, caTJle to his view "as a result 
of what is percei ved 11 (ex i;wv a{ 08TftWV --1009a23), as a result 
of the appearance of contraries in the same phenomenal object 
(1009a23-25). But such contraries did not lead Democritus to 
deny the witness of the senses altogether, but rather to claim 
that both such contraries are true and are in fact due to the 
existence of atoms and void at any given part of the object 
(1009a25-30); ator.is and void then are posited because of empir-
ical evidence and are intended as well to explain empirical 
29still Paul Hatorp, _Forschungen ~ ~schichte des 
Erkcnntnisuroblcms im Al tertu::.i C.-iildcsheim: ~eorg Olms Ver-
lagsbuchhandlung, reprinted 1965), p. 165, note 1, v1ou1d re-ject it; he clair:lS, 11 von allcr Sinnesvrahrnehi11ung· ausdrucklich 
wird die yvria(ri yvc4tri unterschieden." 
Bu·t; there is no real discrepency betv.reen the witness of 
Aristotle and that of Sextus E~piricus on this point; Aristotle 
is quite justified in his re'marlcs on the empirical foundations 
of atonis.:n, as vlill be shovm in chapter three of this paper. 
30rt is iater in the s&~e chapter, at 1009bl3-15 (~o 
,a,v6µEvov xa~a ~~v a1aeriaiv i~ dv6~xri, &Arie~, E[va( ,aotv) 
that Aristotle vii tnesses to the 'truth' of sense-perception for · 
Democritus. 
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facts. 
The empirical foundations of Democritus' atomism are 
again taken up in Qg Generation~ Corruution 1.2; quite 
early in that chapter the Democritean dictum regarding truth 
in appearances is mentioned by Aristotle (315b9-10) precisely 
in connection with the atoms (~a ox~µa~a--315bll), the appear-
ance of contraries in a physical object (315bl2), and the con-
struction of physical objects out of atoms, which in this 
respect act just like the letters which make up words (315bl4-
15). A number of lines later in this same chapter (316a5-14) 
Aristotle indicates two basic approaches to the positing of 
atomic bodies, the approach through logic and the approach 
through observation and the study of nature:31 
"The reason why vrn have not the power to comprehend 
the admitted facts is our lack of experience[D ane&p!~. 
Hence those who have lived in a more intimate com.>nunion 
with the phenomena of nature are better able to lay down 
such principles as can be connected together and cover a 
wide field; those, on the other hand, who indulge in 
long discussions without taking the facts into account 
are more easily detected as men of narrow views. One 
can see, too, from this the g-reat difference v1hich exists 
between those whose researches are based on the phenom-
enon of nature and those who inquire by a dialectical 
method. 1!,or on the subject of atomic magnitudes one 
school maintains their existence on the ground that 
otherwise the 'ideal triangle 1 will be many, \Vhile Democ-
ritus would appear to have been convinced by arguments 
germane to the subject and founded on the study of 
nature. 11 
Democritus is obviously put'into the group of those who formu-
3lThe translation is that of E. s. Forster in Aristotle 
Qg Sonhistical Hefutations, On Co:ning-to-be ~ PassinG-away:, 
On the Cosnos, edited by .b. S. .Porst er and D. J. .Purley 
TCarnbridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 175, 177. 
lated their theories on the basis of a study of the natural 
objects of the world; and what follows in the chapter is an 
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account of Democritus' reasons for positing indivisible bodies. 
Thus precisely the indivisibility of these atoms, Aris-
totle indicates, was posited because of empirical evidence. 
In the discussion of divisibility that follows in the chapter 
(316al4-317a31) a physical object with extension is in ques-
tion (o~a ~' efva' xa) µtyeeo, --316al5); and exactly where 
the argu.~ent is to lead to atomic bodies, the term for divi-
sion(~ 8pd~,,--316b30) has strong physical and empirical 
overtones; and, indeed, the reason given for positing atomic 
bodies is to avoid reducing the physical object to a total 
' ' N \ I ' I I '' ..,# 6 illusion: xal ~o ~av oe ouoev aAA ~ ~a,vuµevov --31 a29; also 
316b30-32: ou~e ~µa o~ov ~e OlalpEO~Vai xa~a ~av o~µELOV (ou 
yap ouva~ov) aAAa µ~XP' ~ou. 
Again, in On Generation and Corruution 1.8, the empiri-
cal foundation of the indivisible atom is in evidence. At the 
beginning of the chapter Aristotle remarks that Leucippus and 
Democritus made their principle accord with nature just as it 
is;32 and again the reason given for the indivisibility of the 
atoms is one apparently based on sense-experience: larger 
objects are broken up (Bpade~a,, compare 8pd.,, at 316b31) 
more readily th.an small one~ (326a26). Also in this chapter 
Aristotle makes the statement: nBut Leucippus thought that he 
had accounts which agree with sense-perception and do not do 
av1ay with generation or corruption or with the movement and 
multitude of things. 1133 It was thus a consideration of the 
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phenomenal world that led Democritus to his theory of indivis-
ibles, a theory which, incidentally, also involved accounts 
which did not utterly deny the validity of sense-perception, 
but vrere in agreement ·with it. 
How, in addition to considerations of empirical evidence, 
the other major factor which led Leucippus and Democritus to 
posit atomic bodies was the arguments of the Eleatics on divi-
sion. There is a hint of this in On Generation and Corruntion 
1.8, 325al-29; there first the fact that Leucippus and Democ-
ritus made their principle accord with nature is mentioned 
with praise; immediately thereupon Aristotle presents a sum-
mary and critique of general Eleatic teaching (325a2-23), 
including their teaching of the necessary unity and impass-
ibility ( 6.x(vryi:ov) of that which is ( -i;o ()v), the lack of void 
and hence of motion, and including especially the argument: 
"For if ('r1hat is] is everywhere divided, nothing is one, and 
so there are not even many thin.:;s, but the sum total is 
empty."34 This reasoning, Aristotle says, brought them to dis-
reeard sense-perception and sinply to follow their reasoning, 
and brought them to the point of madness of denying any real 
' 
331.8, 325a23-25: AeOXl~~o<;; 5' exelV ~~ST) Aoyou~ Ol~lVe~ 
' '\ " t .l ~ I ' .,, ,, 1tRO<;; 'l:T)Y ato8T)atv oµoA.oyovµ.eva A.t..yoV'l:eC oux avatplJoouotv ou'l:e 
y€veoiv ou~e ~8opav ou'l:e x(vT)alv xa\ -i;o ~A~8o~ ~wv ov-i;wv. 
34325a8-9: el µev rap nav~~ Btatpe'l:ov, o68ev elVal ev, 
l:xJ'l:e o6ee no'A.A.a, a'A.A.a XeVOV '1:0 OAOV. 
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difference betv1een ice and fire. Aristotle then goes on·to 
mention the argu.111ents of Leucippus in agreement with sense-
perception (325a23-25, cited in note 33, above). The extreme-
ly strong implication is that Leucippus (and .Democritus) for-
mulated their teaching as in some sense a reply to the Eleatic 
position, for, Aristotle says, Tiemocritus held that what real-
ly exists is an absolute plenum (325a28-29: ~o yap xup(w~ Sv 
x aµ 7C A. T)8 e ~ 3 v ) • 
And it is evidently to this reply that Aristotle refers 
in Physics 1.3, 187al-3, when he says: "But some gave in to 
both argu:nents, both to the argument that everything is one, 
if 'what is' has [only] one meaning [an absolute one J, and to 
the argument from 'dichotomy', replying to the former that 
'what is not' exists, and to the latter by positing atomic 
magnitudes."35 But there is no further mention in this pas-
sage as to what this argur.aent from 'dichotomy' is. 
One possible identification of this argument from 'di-
chotomy' is the first of Zeno's paradoxes described at Ph;z_sics 
6.9, 239bll-14, that one cannot move because, before reaching 
one's goal, one must first reach the half-way point, and, 
before reaching that, one must first go half that distance, and 
then first half the latter distance, ad infinitum. This argu-
' 35evtot o·• ~vtl:iooav ~oi'<. t..oyot' t'tµq>o-r~po1~, ~Q µev o-r1 
~ 'L I ' 1\ .!\ ( !I'. I/_ ' \ 11 - ' I -nuv~a cV, EL ~o ov cV ODµa VEL, u'tl cO~L ~o µT) ov, 't~ OE EX ~T)' 
lhxo-roµ(c:c, (hoµa 1Co1fioav'te:<, µ£y€8D. Por recent agreement 
identifying the 'E.v Lo 1 vii th the ato:nists see Cherniss, .2.12.• cit., 
p. 75, note 303; David J. .Furley, .21?.• cit., p. 81; W. D. Hoss, 
Aristotle 1 s Physics (Oxford: Clarendon I-Tess, 1955), p. 481. 
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ment is twice referred to by Aristotle as involving 'dichot-
omY' (rcb o•xorcoµei'v--239bl8-19; and ref,) o&xo'l:"oµ(q. --239b22). 
3ut a more likely candidate is the argument identified 
by Purley as 'Argu,~ent A' of Zeno; 36 it seems much more appro-
priate to the account given by Aristotle in _Qg Generation and 
Corruution 1.8, especially 325a8-9, and to the argument as 
outlined in the same work at 1.2. The argument is roughly 
this: if 'what is' is many, it must be both infinitely small 
and infinitely large. If it has magnitude, it may be infi-
nitely bisected into parts with magnitude, and an infinite 
number of finite magnitudes is infinitely large; but, if it 
consists of indivisible units, what is indivisible has no mag-
nitude, and so the unit has no mae;nitude. 
This argument of Zeno's depends for its force, as Furley 
himself points out, 37 on the practical applicability of mathe-
matical division to physical objects, one which results in 
physical division; otherwise Zeno's argument might apply as 
well to any Eleatic beine with magnitude; and it depends as 
well on the complete and simultaneous exhaustion of this divi-
sion. It is Zeno's point that the practical application of 
divisibility everywhere raises specific difficulties with phe-
nomena: if 'what is' is everY'vhere divided, then either the 
whole object i~ reduced to'nothings and is nothing but a sheer 
36.£2. • .£.i!., pp. 63-69. This is substantially the same 
one that :aoss, Physics, pp. 479-480, suggests. 
37 2.:!2.· cit., pp. 67-68. Furley further states that Zeno 
was responding to Anaxagoras in uarticular (p. 76). 
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illusion, or each magnitude is inf'initely large--and this too 
is directly contrary to empirical evidence. 
Democritus basically accepted these Eleatic consequences 
for the phenomenal object and agreed to its illusory charac-
ter. But his foundation in the study of nature would not let 
him agree to the actual, physical application of such division 
to the physical object. 
So it seems evident that it is precisely the impossibil-
ity of physically carrying out mathematical divisibility on 
the physical object that Democritus posits as a response to 
Zeno's dilemma. The physical object only seems to be contin-
uous, he would say; but it actually is and remains divided 
into atoms; any apparent division of that object is in fact 
illusory, for it is not continuous in the first place. But 
the atoms themselves, although they have actual bulk and are 
full (TIA~pe~, naµTIA~p£~, vao~6v ), are and remain 'uncut'; 
mathematical division has no practical application to the 
atoms; division there may be conceived in that one might men-
tally trace li.nes on atoms at which these atoms may be mental-
ly divided. But such division cannot be physically carried 
out. That this was likely the nature of Democritus' response 
will become more evident as we further examine Aristotle's 
account of Dem-0critus' tea~hings on the atom. 
The major passage in which Aristotle accounts for Democ-
ritus' response to Zeno's dilemma is to be found at On Genera-
tion and Corruntion 1.2, more specifically at 316al4-317a31. 
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It is precisely immediately prior to this passage that Democ-
ritus is praised for his being persuaded by arguments 11 found-
ed on the study of nature" (cpuotxoi<; A.6yot<; --316al3) rather 
than being simply led by a "dialectical method" ( A.oytxw<; 
oxonouv~£<;--316all); and what follows this purports to illus-
trate exactly that point--more consideration of the study of 
nature than of logical argumentation (316al4). 
It will be helpful first to sketch generally the argu-
ment of the passage as a whole (316al4-317a31), including as 
well Aristotle's criticisms--and thus see the passage as a 
whole--and then go on to take up the individual parts of the 
passage, reserving Aristotle's criticisms for separate consid-
eration later. 
The passage begins with what amounts to a recapitulation 
and elaboration of what Furley has designated as Zeno's 'Argu-
ment A' (316al4-316b9), along with a special _variation sup-
plied by Aristotle (316b9-14).38 Then follows what is evident-
ly Democritus' response to this argument, that since a physi-
cal object cannot be composed of dimensionless points, there 
must be undivided bodies with size; but this, Aristotle says, 
involves difficulties taken up elsewhere (316bl4-18). So 
Aristotle says that the problem will have to be examined in a 
new light; and.this he doeStby introducing the concepts of 
'potency' and 'act' to help clarify the situation, this time 
38Furley, .£.12.• cit., pp. 84-85, and Ross, Physics, p. 
480, both identify this 'Argument A' with 'the argument from 
dichotomy'. 
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reaffirming the infinite divisibility of any magnitude into 
smaller magnitudes (316bl8-29). Thereupon he reintroduces the 
argument for atomic magnitudes, stating that, since physical 
division cam1ot go on forever, it must end, in order to pre-
serve the phenomenon of generation and corruption (316b29-
317al ); thus, Aristotle says, the position of the atomists 
rests on a logical error, for they have taken the •everywhere• 
in 'divisible everyi.vhere' collectively instead of distribu-
tively, only in the impossible sense of 'everJ~vhere at once', 
but have overlooked the possible sense of •at any of all pos-
sible points' (317al-12). Thus there is no division into what 
is indivisible, but only into increasingly smaller magnitudes 
(317al2-17). But generation and corruption are events which 
happen to the object as a whole, while the atomists claim that 
what happens to all--no more or less--of the physical object 
(that is, shifts of the atoms in that physical object) is 
alteration (317al7-31). 
Thus, what we have in the first portion (316al4-b9) of 
this whole passage is basically Zeno•s39 argument on the divi-
39since we posses neither Zeno's argiL~ent intact nor any 
other independent witness to Democritus' formulation o:f it, it 
is impossible to distinc;uish precisely the contribution of each 
of these three au.t11ors to its presentation in Aristotle. But 
that is not of major importance; it is generally agreed that 
this was essentially the ar~nent considered by Democritus and 
the one to which he responded b;y" positing ato:uic mae;ni tudes. 
Cherniss, .2..2• cit., :p. 113, expresses some hesitancy, but ad-
mits that it is consistent with other reiriarks by Aristotle 
about Leucippus a.."1.d Dem.ocri tus. Even Sinnige, .2.E.• cit., who is 
quite concerned to separate Dcnocritus from the :Sleatic tradi-
tion, ad!ni ts Eleatic influence on Democritus. 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. 
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sion of any magnitude into dimensionless points, as received 
and considered by Democritus and reformulated by Aristotle. 
The basic argument is clear enough and is stated at the out-
. . .. if one should posit that any body with magnitude set: II 
is divisible everY'vhere, and that this is possible. For what 
will there be which escapes division?1140 If it is divisible 
everywhere, the object will be constructed out of 'nothings' 
and be nothing but an appearance ( £x µ~ocvo~ • • • xa) 'to ~av 
'1' LI~ ,L Oc ouocv uAA 11 ~atvuµcvov __ 316a28-29), or it will consist of 
dimensionless points which again can constitute no magnitude 
(316a29-30). AQ~it division everywhere, Democritus says, and 
there will be no physical object at all. 
Thus far the argu.~ent as considered by Democritus has 
placed strong emphasis on the actual, physical carrying out of 
the division and on the difficulties engendered by it. 41 Now 
Aristotle introduces his ovm variation of the difficulty 
(316b9-14), in which he considers the object as divided every-
where in potency ( TCUY'tr.J apa Ot ~prytal ouvaµcl --316bll-12). 
Even so, Aristotle says, the same difficulty is encountered; 
nothing is left but the (points of) division: 
~apa -r~v Oia(pcatv; --316bl2. The physical object cannot be 
constructed out of these nor be dissolved into them, for there 
' 40 . ,, ~ ' 316al5-17: ct 'tt<; 8c(D oG:µa 'tl c(vat xat µtyt:So<; 
~ S<. ,L ' - "" ,L ( ' ,, " ' Xuv-i;v. ulalp£1:uV, xat 'l:OU'tO uuva-ruv. 't yap co-rat oncp 'tDY 
ota(ptatv ota~cuyct; 
41one might note: x6.\v d -i;oiho yevo1-ro (316al9); &.'v 
61atpe:8f.l (316a21); oq1p~aew (316a24); oq)p~µtvov (316a25)-- all 
of which stress the actual carrying out of the division. 
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is no way in which one can actually separate out such points 
or qualities from continuous extension. Also, in the process, 
.Aristotle has already made so~e progress toward answering the 
difficulty by hinting that such an infinite division may be 
reached in potency, and that one cannot divide a magnitude 
into points. 
--
This brings us to what is apparently Democritus' re-
sponse to the difficulty (316bl4-16), along with Aristotle's 
remark about other difficulties which this response generates 
(316bl6-18). The argument in which the response of Democritus 
is formulated is an enthymeme: "And so, if indeed magnitudes 
cannot be constructed out of contacts or points, (and if mag-
nitudes raust be constructed out of something with magnitude), 
it is necessary that there be undivided bodies which are still 
magnitudes. 1142 
Furley claims that Democritus' response was also con-
cei ved by him as being a solution, something \Vhi ch would block 
the argument of Zeno, namely, a conceptually indivisible magni-
tude. 43 :But it is a bod~,r with magnitude that Democritus claims 
is indivisible, not a sheer magnitude without any substance to 
it (although even the latter would still fail to block Zeno's 
42 wo~' El~EP aOuva~ov es d~wv D O~lyµwv elval ~a 
µEytS~, UVayx~ ElVUl oWµa~atao&a(pe~a XUl µeye8~. 
I have taken cio& a(pe~a as 'undivided', in the sense that 
what it qualifies remains physically indivisible, as that 
which hn.s no proper parts into v:hich it can in fact be further 
divided. The use of 'magnitudes' here certainly implies that 
what rcl:1ains after the physical division has stopp9d is at 
least conceptually or mathematically divisible. 
43.QE.. cit., pp. 85-86. 
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argument, which ·would apparently hold for any magnitude); and 
hoW Democritus could have followed Zeno's arguments at all 
and supposed that such a body with magnitude is conceptually 
indivisible is itself beyond comprehension. Lloreover, those 
atomic bodies of De~ocritus have specific shapes--angular, 
round, straight-edged (Physics 1.5, 188a25-26)--and they do 
come in various sizes (Caelo 3.4, 303al5); and to suppose that 
such atoms could be conceptually and mathematically indivis-
ible seems to be stretching things too far. Thus Furley seems 
to be wrong about their 'conceptual indivisibility 1 ; 44 but his 
contention will be discussed a little more fully lat~r. 
The physical object, Democritus felt, cannot itself be a 
sheer illusion, really reduced to nothing at all; he was com-
pelled by the study of nature rather than by dialectic, by 
theory. His study of nature, his consideration for natural 
phenomena, forced him to reject 'divisible everywhere'; so he 
rejected it where it counted as far as he vms concerned, in 
the sense of the physical division of the physical object. He 
saw no way out of the difficulty but to seT'arate the two kinds 
of division, the physical from the conceptual. 
Zeno's argument, along with the appearance of contraries 
in the same phenomenal object, may well have convincea. Democ-
ritus that th9 phenomenal ~bject is not after all the physical 
object as it really is. The phenomenal object appears contin-
44This, as we shall see later, is further supported at 
316b29-32, where Democritus' response to 'divisibility every-
where' is repeated. 
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uous; and conceptual division may well apply to it without 
affecting the physical object at all. On the other hand, as 
far as the atomic magnitude is concerned, Democritus apparent-
ly simply denied that it had any practical application there, 
and so he rendered it, he felt, totally innocuous. And he 
might very well have said that conceptual division is onJ.y 
that--conceptual, that it exists only by convention (voµy). 
The next section in this passage (316bl8-27) is a diffi-
cult one as it stands in the text. If we take the text as it 
is, one must adrnit that here Aristotle is doing two things. 
First of all, he is doing precisely what he says he is doing; 
he is reviewing the difficulty about 'division everyv1here'--a 
difficulty which led to the positing of atomic magnitudes--
from the beginning: Bto ~UAtV Es apx~~ ~DV a~op(av Aex~eov 
316bl8-19. As was the case with his previous presentation of 
this difficulty, he begins with a perceptible body which is 
divisible (316bl9) and ends with the body vanishing into no-
thing (316b25-27). 
But there is then a problem with the interpretation of 
this passage, for it is generally taken to be Democritus' own 
restatement of the difficulty with division, a difficulty 
which led him to posit atoms. And this is basically the posi-
tion of Verdenius and Waszink; for they take this whole pas-
sage from 316bl8 to 34 to be a Democritean argu.~ent for atoms; 
but in interpreting the passage in that way they rightly feel 
obliged to delete significant portions of the text--all those 
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dealing with 'potency• and 'act'.45 But such deletions should 
only be used as a last resort. Sinnige too takes the passage 
through 316b34, along with this section--apparently without 
deleting the references to 'potency' and 'act•--as a unit and 
concludes that Aristotle is only demonstrating the existence 
of atoms in the framework of his own thinking. 46 But this too 
is unsatisfactory, for the empirical considerations of 316b29-
34 do in fact seem to be those of Democritus. 47 Furley admits 
that it is basically Aristotle's reformulation of the diffi-
culty, but that Democritus might well agree with him; 48 but it 
is pure speculation as to what Democritus might do with the 
'potency' and 'act' which is introduced in the passage. Thus 
the only reasonable course to take is to assume that 316bl8-27 
is, for one thing, a sur.nmary statement by Aristotle of the 
difficulty. 
45w. J. Verdenius and J. H. Waszink, Aristotle On Coming-
~-be and Pass.:~.11€£-away: Some comments (Leiden: .ti. CBriil, 
196bJ, pp. 11-14. This is really the only reasonable alterna-
tive if the passage represents only Democritus' analysis of 
the difficulty. 
46
..QE. • .£.!.!., p. 147. 
47see H. H. Joachim, Aristotle On Coming-to-be ~ 
Passin_g-awa_y (Reprint, Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms 
Verlag, 1970), p. 84. Joachim does not explicitly say that 
316bl8-27 is Aristotle's reformulation of the difficulty about 
division, but he seems to imply it. If he does in fact intend 
that, then I be.lieve that h~ is right. 
48.Q.E.. ci~., pp. 90-91. He also claims that Aristotle is 
introducing 'potency' and 'act' to show that they cannot solve 
the problem; but, as we shall see, they are precisely the 
means by which a solution to the problem is reached. 
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But it is obviously more than that. Aristotle is not 
merely restating the difficulty, he is also taking us a step 
closer to its solution. He had already brought us the first 
step of the way to a solution at 316b9-14, where he had intro-
duced 'potential division everywhere•, and pointed out that 
one cannot actually divide a magnitude into points. He now 
takes us the second step toward a solution by using 'potency' 
and 'act' to show that there are two distinct meanings for 
1t:UV'tlJ. 
But, before beginning an analysis of Aristotle's reason-
ing here, it will be necessary to clarify the meanings of 
01a1pe:'to~ and aoia(pe'to~ in this passage; these apparently 
cause some obscurity. 49 The difficulty is noticed immediately 
in the first sentence, where a magnitude is said to be aoia(-
pe'toV at any point in actuality; if 6.01 a(pe'tov there means 
'indivisible', either the formulation belongs to Democritus and 
not to Aristotle, and one must then attribute a distinction 
between 'potency' and 'act' to Democritus; or Aristotle himself 
believes that there is some point at which a magnitude is not 
divisible. Neither alternative is acceptable. 50 Furthermore, 
the disjunction (oux ••• lip.a ••• EV'teA.e:xe(q. ' aoia(pe'toV 
xal 61~p~µevov __ 316b23-24) seems to support the meaning 'undi-
' 49Joachi~, op. cit., p. 83, recognizes the problem, for 
instance, in the conjunction of ouvaµe1 with o&aLQE'tOV. But 
his solution--to take ouvaµe1 more_ closely with e:(va1 --does not 
really solve the problem. 
50Hence Verdenius and Waszink felt justified in excising 
portions of the text. 
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' vided'. .And So, in this analysis, 6talperco<;; and a6La(pc:'t.oc; --
especially when qualified by OUVaµtl--Will be taken in the 
sense of 'divided' and 'undivided•. 51 This has the advantage 
of making sense of the passage as a whole and of making that 
sense more apparent. 
The difficulty, Aristotle strongly implies at 316bl9-27 
already, with 'divisible everywhere' is that 'everywhere• has 
two distinct meanings. These two meanings are distinguished 
and specified in the first two sentences of the passage: ' 'to 
' µev • • • • • • ~µa 'Jt<.1V't1J (316bl9-
22). And the concepts of 'potency' and 'act' are applied to 
both meanings to show that they are indeed different. The 
first meaning of 'Jtav't~ is xae' d'tLouv o~µeiov , 'at ~ of all 
its points'; and, by applying 'potency' and 'act' to this 
meaning, Aristotle shows that there is absolutely no diffi-
culty engendered by it at all (oooev a'to'Jtov--316b20); indeed, 
a magnitude may be both divided and undivided at any point, as 
long as the first applies potentially and the latter actually. 
51compare Liddell, Scott, Jones, Mckenzie, Greek Knglisfl: 
Lexicon under 'a6La(pe'to<;;, I' and 'oLalpe'toc;, I'; both 'divid-
ed' ana 'undivided' have at least some precedent in Aristotle. 
The transfer from one meaning to the other is quite easy in 
Aristotle, because before an object is 'actually divided' it 
must be 'potentially divided', that is, 'divisible'. 
Thus ouvaµ El o i alp t'tov, which is frequently translated 
as 'potentially divisible': that is, 'able to be divisible', 
which at best is redundant, simply makes better sense as 
'potentially divided' or 'divisible'. 
This view has even more support when one considers that 
Aristotle hinself refers specifically to the ambiguity of this 
word, aota(pe~o<;;, in On the Soul 3.6, 430b6, where he says: 
'to 0' aoLa(pE'tOV ErC£,l0t~ TfO'UvaµE:l 1)' evepye(q,. 
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Indeed, the whole difficulty with 'divisible everywhere' 
is engendered by the second meaning of naV't'l;J, aµa nav't~--'at 
all its points at once'. That meaning does not even seem to 
apply 'potentially', much less 'actually'; for, if it did ap-
ply 'potentially', that potentiality might be actualized: el 
yap Buva'tov, x~v ytvot't0--316b23. But that potency is one 
which cannot be actualized in such a way that the magnitude 
remains both undivided and divided (for these are contradic-
' tions), so as to save the magnitude from annihilation: oux 
~o'te aµa e{Val aµcpCJ) ~V'tef.exe(q:, 6.01a(~e-i;oV XUL 611;JpT)µtvov 
316b23-24. (The only sense in which the potency 'ITUV'tr.J 
' 01atpe'tov can be actualized is the first sense of 'at any 
point': at.t.' Olr.JpT)µevov xae' O'tlOUV OT)µerov --316b24-25.) 
Thus it is more precisely aµa naV't'l;J o La' p e'l:bV which raises the 
difficulty that was so puzzling at 316al4-b9; and this is what 
reduces the body to nothing and seems to force us to recon-
struct it out of points or 'nothings'; this is what was not 
possible (316b25-27); and the application of 'potency' and 
'act' have made this quite evident. 
This brings us to another statement of the problem of 
'divisible everywhere' and Democritus' response by positing 
atomic magnitudes (316b28-34). 52 In the previous statement of 
the problem and Democritus'' response the division was viewed 
as complete and then ruled impossible; now the problem is 
52Joachim, .2.E.· cit., p. 84, specifically identifies this 
as reproducing "the experiential basis of the Atomists' the-
ory. 11 
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viewed from a different vantage point--before tho division is 
actually completed. It is evident that an object is divided 
into constantly smaller and distinct magnitudes (316b28-29). 
But, Democritus claims, this infinite division cannot in fact 
be carried out to its end, .!.!2£ can it actually take place at 
all the points of the object (note that Democritus uses xa~a 
nav o~µErov in contrast to Aristotle's xae' d~louv o~µEiov ). 
Thus actual division must only go to a certain magnitude 
(316b29-32), and so there must necessarily be undivided magni-
tudes (a~oµa µ£y€e~) which make up the physical object; and 
generation and corruption will take place by the separation 
and association of these atoms (316b32-34). 
It is noteworthy that in the above passage there is a 
strong emphasis on physical division. The introduction of the 
term n epuwl' (316b30) 53 contributes noticeably to this empha-
sis. Furthermore, the statement that a magnitude cannot be 
divided at all its points (316b31) seems to admit that there 
are points on it at which it cannot in fact be divided. Thus 
all of this as well argues against Furley•s contention that the 
atom of Democritus is conceptually as well as physically indi-
visible. 
Excursus: Against 'I!lathematicallx Indivisible' 
" It may be appropriate here to say a few words about 
Furley's proposal that Democritus• atoms are conceptually (or, 
53see Joachim, loc. cit. 
mathematically) indivisible as well as physically indivis-
ible.54 Furley's arguments are basically three: 1) only a 
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mathematically indivisible atom would block Zeno's argument; 
2) Aristotle a~~onishes the atomists for coming into conflict 
with mathematical sciences (Caelo 3.4, 303a20-24), and this 
can only refer to their positing mathematically indivisible 
magnitudes; and 3) Simplicius says that the atom of Democritus 
has no parts and thus must be conceptually indivisible. 
54on. ~., pp. 85-101. Guthrie, History, II, 503-507, 
had independently come to the same conclusion. Furley's ac-
count is the most complete and so will be used here •. 
T..richael C. Stokes, ~ and T.:1any i.n Presocratic Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), basically accepts 
Furley's analysis, although he does find inadequate Furley's 
answer to the question why the atomists emphasized so heavily 
the hardness of the atom (p. 232). 
It seems evident that there may be some confusion in re-
gard to the terminology used; and this may be generating some 
of the difficulty. Thus I shall specify the following us-
ages: 1) 'conceptually divisible'--in the mathematical sense, 
one can conceptually divide any magnitude; 2) 'theoretically 
divisible'--that which has distinct parts into which it can be 
divided (as a chair is divisible into legs, seat, and back); 
and 3) 'physically divisible'--that which can in fact be phys-
ically divided (water, for example--if we neglect molecules 
and such--can be so divided, although it does not appear to 
have proper parts into which it can be divided), 
It is, I contend, in senses '2' and '3' that atoms are 
indivisible, hence the emphasis both on their hardness and on 
their lack of parts. 
Qua atom, the atom is not 'divisible' into further parts, 
for the atomic body is defined as the lowest physical part. It 
seems to be indivisible qua atom rather than™ magnitude. 
In :.Ietaphysi cs 5. 6, 1016b3-6 Aristotle speaks of things 
which do not a&nit of division in thought (ooa µ~ 'lxu ot-
a(peotv ); thus.man aua man 'does not admit of division, nor does 
magnitude~ magnitude (i.e., what is a single magnitude; if 
that were divided, it would no longer be a sinele maenitude). 
~his i,s particularly true of primary substances (xa't ri;o1hwv 
ooa ouo(c.t). And Aristotle says that Democritus' atoms are 
identifiable as substances (~. 7.13, 1039all). 
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As to Furley•s first argu.ment, that only a matheoati-
callY indivisible atom would block Zeno's argument, one must 
admit that it has the merit of simplicity. But there are 
factors which weigh against such an answer. Some of these 
factors have already been mentioned: there is the fact that 
Democritus is supposed in-this respect to have been swayed by 
a study of nature rather than by dialectic, and the fact that 
the atoms have specific varieties of shapes and come in dif-
ferent sizes; there is a strong and conscious emphasis on phys-
ical division, not only throughout the passage as a whole, but 
particularly noticeable at 316b29-34, where the argument is 
more evidently Democritus' own (where it also seems implied 
that there are points on objects at which they cannot be 
divided). 
Let us consider first the only statement in the passage 
which really seems to say that there are mathematically indi-
visible magnitudes; this is to be found at 316bl5-16: avayxD 
elval owµa~a UOla(pE~a xat µEy~8D. The problem here is not so 
much with oWµa~a a6La(pe~a, for this obviously means bodies 
which are physically indivisible, such that one cannot in fact 
divide them. But what meaning are we to give to a~)la(pE~a 
µEy~8D? Its most apparent meaning is 'indivisible magnitudes'; 
and here is wh?re the diffi'culty lies. 55 Magnitudes are prop-
55sinnige, .££• .£1!., p. 146, claims that this is cer-
tainly not Democritus' view, but Aristotle's erroneous opinion 
of what Zeno concluded fro:r.i his ovm argument. 
But, let us assume, as we have thus far in this paper, 
that it is basically Democritus' response. 
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erties of bodies; physical division applies to bodies; so.in 
\ 
what sense are we to take n6ta(pe~a as applied to magnitudes? 
Are the minute physical bodies physically indivisible because 
there are mathematically indivisible magnitudes? Or are there 
some maenitudes which remain undivided because the physical 
bodies of which they are properties cannot be 'theoretically' 
or 'physically' divided? The latter seems to be the case for 
Democritus; he was more influenced by nature than by dialec-
tic. 
But, even so, let us assume for the moment that a6ta(-
pe~a µEyes~ is still a~biguous; yet, when it becomes more evi-
dent in the passage that the argument is Democritus' own, the 
term used there is less ambiguous: a~oµa ••• µeyte~ 
(316b32), 'uncut magnitudes•. 
The question may then be raised as to whether Democritus' 
response was really intended to block the argument of Zeno 
after all. Aristotle nowhere says that it was. We need to 
return to a consideration of Physics 1.3, 187al-3. All that 
Aristotle says there is that the atomists made some concessions 
to the argument from 'dichotomy' when they proposed 'uncut 
magnitudes ( eveoooav ••• ~~ Oe ex~~~ ClXO~oµ(c~, a~oµa 
TIOlDOUV~E~ µeyte~). 
But Physics 1.3, 187a1-3 also mentions a second argument 
to which the atomists 'made some concessions•. It may be help-
ful to consider briefly that second argument and the response 
of the atomists; there may be some similarity between the vmys 
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in which the two responses of the atomists were made. The 
second Eleatic argument is roughly: if 'what is' has one 
meaning, then 'what is not' (the void) does not exist, and 
that is is one; there is no multiplicity or motion.56 What 
then is the atomists' response? They argue (as was evident 
all 
also in the argument for atoms) from empirical evidence to the 
impossibility of the conclusion: there obviously is motion; 
and, if motion, then the void exists. They allow the premise, 
but avoid the evidently impossible conclusion by adding an-
other sense of 'what is', though still retaining the absolute 
sense of 'is'--the void is simply and absolutely 'what is 
not'. They concede that 'what is' has one meaning, but feel 
compelled by empirical evidence to admit that 'what is not' 
also 'is'. This does not block the argument, it hedges on it 
by claiming two absolute senses of 'is'. 
Something similar appears to happen with the response to 
the argument from 'dichotomy': if an object is divisible ev-
erywhere, the object is reduced to nothing. As above, empir-
ical evidence will not allow the atomists to deny the reality 
of the physical object. Again, they apparently allow the pre-
mise, but argue for two senses of 'divisible': 1) there is a 
sense in which things are divisible everywhere, and in that 
sense it appli~s to the phenomenal object, and if that is di-
visible everywhere, "then the whole thing is nothing but an 
56r have added the consideration of motion here from On 
Generation and Corruption 1.8, 325a27, which seems to refer~ 
to a similar argument. 
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appearance; 1157 2) there is also a separate and distinct sense 
of 'divisible' which applies to the physical object, and in 
this sense 'divisible everywhere' does not apply. This like-
wise does not block the argument of Zeno, but only hedges on 
it by claiming two senses of 'divisible'. 
So, not only is it equally possible that Democritus' re-
sponse was not intended to block Zeno's argument, but in the 
light of the distinction which Democritus obviously made be-
tween the physical object and the phenomenal object it is also 
more likely that he did not intend to block it. 
Furley's second argument, from the conflict with mathe-
matical sciences, is equally doubtful. On the assumption that 
atoms were only physically indivisible, mathematical science 
would have no real, practical application; their only applica-
tion would be to phenomenal objects--which arc not in fact 
real. This would seem to be as much a fight against mathemat-
ical science as the conceptually indivisible atom; indeed, the 
passage quoted above (Caelo 3.4, 303a20-24) mentions the re-
jection of phenomena almost in the same breath with the con-
flict with mathematical science. Democritus• physically indi-
visible atom thus robbed mathematics of its real significance; 
and it is .Aristotle's continuing contention, especially in Qg 
Generation and Corruption i.2, that mathematics does indeed 
apply to reality in a practical way. So, not only is Furley's 
57Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 316a29: xa'1 'to nav DD ouoev aA.A. 1 +,' 
~a1v6µev~ Sinniee, ou. cit., p. 145, rightly marks this as 
applicable to Democritus' teaching on sensation. 
contention here not necessary (it is not the only feasible 
alternative), but neither is it the more likely one. 
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Furthermore, Furley cites Democritus' 'Cone problem', as 
mentioned in Plutarch, to support his claim. 58 But this too 
might simply show that mathematical division applied only to 
phenomena, and not to any real objects; it says nothing at all 
to substantiate Furley•s claim. 
Furley's third argument is equally indeterminate. Sim-
plicius' claim that Democritus' atoms are partless is countered 
by another claim, again in Simplicius, that they have parts. 59 
Furley recognizes this, but prefers to believe that they are 
partless and for that reason mathematically or conceptually 
indivisible. But even this does not follow; that they have no 
parts likely implies for Democritus that there are no proper 
parts into which the atom can be divided; they were not to be 
like the 'elements' of Anaxagoras, which always could be fur-
ther divided into proper parts (Zeno's arguL'lent may well have 
convinced Democritus that Anaxagoras was wrong in this re-
5B.9.:P.• cit., p. 100. The problem is cited in Diels-Kranz 
at 68Bl55. If""'a cone is divided parallel to its base, the 
circle a·t the bottom of the top section will be either equal or 
unequal to the top of the bottom section; if equal, the cone 
becomes a cylinder; if unequal, the side of the cone is not a 
continuous straight line. 
59simnlicii in Aristo'telis Phvsicorum Libros Quattuor 
Priores Co:nmentaria;- vol. IX, and Simnlicii in .Aristoterrs-
Ph;;rsicorum Libros Quattuor Posteriores Comi~entaria, vol. X in 
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, both volumes ed. by Hermann 
!hels (Berliii: George iteirner, 1882-1895). Simplicius says 
that the atoms have no parts at vol. X, p. 925, lines 13ff ., 
and that they do have parts at vol. IX, p. 82, line 1. 
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spect). That Democritus' atoms had no parts most likely meant 
for him precisely that they were 'theoretically' and 'physi-
cally' indivisible. Thus there is no real contradiction to 
the other statement by Simplicius that atoms do have parts, 
for Aristotle points out that, since they have magnitude, they 
do indeed have parts of a sort and, as such, they are for an 
Aristotelian that which can at least theoretically be divided. 
Again Furley's argument is shown to be ineffective; he has not 
supported his contention that they were mathematically indivis-
ible. Thus, in this respect too Democritus' atoms were more 
likely 'physically' indivisible but 'conceptually' further 
divisible. 
Hore on Democritus' Atom as the Unit 
--- -----
Thus driven by Zeno's argument on divisibility and by 
empirical considerations--contraries in the same phenomenal 
object--to deny that the phenomenal object is real and to hold 
that the physical object is composed of physically indivisible 
bodies, Democritus posited his atomic bodies as that which 
really exists, as ~o ov. Although his response is in terms of 
Eleatic 'being' (and 'not-being'), and although Democritus 
still uses 'is' in an absolute sense--like the Eleatics in this 
respect--yet the meaning of 'what is' for Democritus is differ-
' 
ent enough that he nay also be considered apart from the Eleat-
ic tradition, in that his 'being' has body, is in motion, has 
bulk, and is in fact perceptible (although not actually seen 
or, perhaps, felt in isolation). Democritus' being is in fact 
constitutes physical objects and ac-
objects. 
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It is in this respect that Aristotle at Metaphysics 4.5, 
1009a27-30 rightly puts Democritus in the tradition of Anaxag-
oras, for, like Anaxagoras, he had attempted to account for 
such contraries in the phenomenal object. But Democritus ac-
counts for them by referring them to the prime contraries, 
•what is full' and 'what is empty•, that is, 'what is' and 
•what is not'. Precisely as such contraries these elements 
are present at any given section of the physical object: xae' 
d~lOUV UTIUPX£lV µepo~--1009a28-29. 
Aristotle describes a little more fully the way in which 
the atoms accounted for the varieties of contraries in phenom-
enal objects at Physics 1.5, 188a22-26. Here again, according 
to Aristotle, Democritus proposed 'the full' as 'what is' (~o 
TIAnpe~ ••• ~~ ov--188a22-23); and the atoms are there de-
scribed as having different shapes (crx~µa~o~ yeywv1wµevov 
ayWVtOV, £08U TIEpl~Epe~--188a25-26) in terms Of contraries. 
These then are some60 of the prime atomic and physical contra-
ries which help accotint for contraries in phenomenal objects. 
Aristotle once more says that Democritus specifies 'the 
full' as 'what is' at netaphysics 1.4, 985b4-10; this time he 
adds the term cr~epeov ('so~id')--obviously a reflection of 
vacr~ov--to describe the atom. The atom is thus to be consid-
60others, such as those contributed by the relative po-
sition of an atom, will be more fully discussed in the third 
chapter in connection with the structure of physical objects. 
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ered as more than merely being 'full' or 'full being' in the 
abstract sense; it is an absolutely solid physical substance; 
it is full (and undifferentiated) matter. Such atoms (along 
with the void) are the physical matter which constitutes phys-
ical objects: a'l-ria oe -rwv ov-rwv rcaurca We; uA.T)V--985b9-lO. 
The varying size of these atoms also contributes to an 
explanation of phenomenal characteristics of physical objects. 
Aristotle cites the fact that the atomists made the distinc-
tions between water, air, and other objects ones due to size 
(aepa Be xal uowp xal rcdA.A.a µeye8e1 xat µ1~po'tT)'tl OLeiA.ov--
Caelo 3.4, 303al4-15), with the distinction being obViously 
the size of the atoms constituting these objects. Furthermore, 
the generation of one such object from another is due to the 
. \ 
separating out of the largest atoms: 'ta µey10-ra o4i.a-ra EXXpL-
voµeva, ~ao\ 6 1 OU'tW y(yveo8a1 uowp xa1 depa xa~ y~v e~ alA.~-
A.wv--Caelo 3.4, 303a27-29. This evidently means that water, 
for example, is composed of a variety of atomic sizes, with 
more larger atoms than, for instance, air. This accounting 
for differences between objects by the sizes of atoms they 
contain is supported by a similar account by Aristotle of 
Democritus' theory at .Q!1 the Heavens 3.7, 305b22-26. 
So every other thing that there is is composed of these 
atoms with their varying shapes and sizes: ex owµarcwv UOLa1-
percwv rcdA.A.a ouyxeio8a1 --~. et Corr. 1.1, 314a21-22. But be-
cause of the apparent infinite variety of phenomenal differ-
ences, they proposed an infinite number of atoms: aTie1pa rc~ 
cpa' vop.eva, 't"U oxfiµa'i;a 3.1tE:l pa e1tOlT)OUV --Gen. et Corr. 1.2,. 
315b9-l0. 61 
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These atoms themselves are and forever remain the same, 
whether as part of a physical object or apart from it in iso-
lation. There is no change in the atom itself, not even to 
account for change in the physical (or in the phenomenal) ob-
ject; the atom~ none of the 'secondary qualities' (e.g., 
color, heat, relative hardness) nor can it receive one. It is 
thus described by Aristotle as being a1ta8e~ (~. et Corr. 1.8, 
326al). The only 'motion' that is possible for it is locomo-
tion, the movement of the other~Tise changeless atom through 
the void. 62 
All other motions are explained by the atomists simply 
and solely in terms of that locomotion. The generation and 
corruption of a physical object for them amounts to no more 
than the addition and substraction of atoms of that group that 
constitutes the object in question; alteration is explained 
simply by the shifts of those atoms already in the object. 63 
61For their infinite number see also Physics 3.4, 203a20 
and Caelo 3.4, 303a6. Leo Elders, Aristotle's Cosmology 
(Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 1966), p. 301, note 1, suggests 
that we should rather speak of an indeterminate number. But, 
one wonders, if the number of different shapes--as a sub-set 
of atoms--is also infinite, might not 'infinite' after all be 
quite appropriate? 
. ' 62 . ' ' ' ' ' See Physics 8.9, 265b24-26: xal yap ou'tol 't"T)V xa'ta 
't"OTIOV x(VT)OlV XlVeroea, 't~V q>UOlV AEYOUOlV (~yup Ola 't"O xevov ( ,(.I '-t I') x VT)Ot~ cpopu eO'tlV XUl w~ EV 't"OTI~ • 
63Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 315b8-9: otaxp(oet µev xal ouy-
xp(oel ylvea,V-xa1 cp8opav, 't"Uset OE xat 8EOel aAAO(WOlV. 
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,, Thus, for instance, the generation of air from water takes 
' place by the separating out of the largest atoms (Caelo 3.4, 
303a27-29). The coloration of an object actually takes place 
by change in the position of the atoms in that object (~. ~ 
corr. 1.2, 316al-2); and the change from a fluid state to a 
----
solid state in the same object similarly takes place only by 
such shifts (~. et .2..2..!:£• 1.9, 327al6-19). Thus, in the 
midst of all phenomenal change, the atoms themselves remain 
absolutely unchanged. 
Indeed, it is because these atomic shapes retain the 
function of their various shapes that the characteristics which 
we ascribe to the physical object are explained. Fire is ex-
tremely mobile and penetrates objects quite readily and so 
breaks them up precisely because the spherical shapes which 
constitute it have and retain those characteristics even when 
they are parts of the physical object which we call fire; and 
soul is extremely sensative to motion and thus is also able to 
set other things into motion for the same reason (Ai.~ima 1.2, 
404a2, 6-8). Objects appear to us black or white, they appear 
to have particular flavors because the atomic shapes in such 
objects are of a certain variety (~. 4, 442bll-14). Thus it 
is an essential part of Democritus' system of the explanation 
of the charac~eristics of phenomenal objects that the atoms 
retain their shapes and the specific functions of those shapes, 
that they remain impassible, that they remain always the same. 
Thus, the atoms themselves can have no potency. Charac-
rterized by being simple 
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and unqualified matter, by having a 
specific shape and size and, perhaps, weight, 64 they simply 
are, in an Eleatic absolute sense of 'is'; they are one of 
those things which always is ('tl a{ e\ ••• 'eo'o v --Physics 8.1, 
252a33), and to which as a sufficient principle Democritus 
refers as the causes that explain nature. 65 These physical 
atoms are therefore in eternal actuality. 
Furthermore, since it is and remains such a physical uni-
ty and theoretically indivisible, Democritus' atom is identi-
fiable as the real substance. This, Aristotle claims at :Weta-
Ehysics 7.13, 1039a9-10, is what Democritus taught; the pas-
sage in which this citation is found (1039a7-ll) may be trans-
lated as follows: 66 
"And so, if the substance is a single thing, it will 
not consist of substances existing in it, and in this way 
·Democritus is right, for he says that it is imP.9ssible 
for a unity to be generated out of two things &,toms] or 
64'£he question whether the atoms have weight will be 
discussed in chapter two. 
• 
65PfJ.YSics,8,.l, 252a)2-35: voµ(se&v apx~v e(va& iaO'-tT)V-l~av'f)v,, el.~'Il a&£~ ; • . E:O'IlV • • • ecp' d' 6T)µOXpl't'O<; avayel 
~a<; ne:p& ~uoe:wc; Ul~la,. 
,, •6~1039a9-10 reads: aouva't'oV ye\p e(va( ~TJOL\I EX ouo tv 
T) ~~ e:vo, ouo ye:v€o8at. The uoint that Aristotle makes here in 
citing Democritus is that two~actual atoms as substances can 
not constitute a new unity, nor can a single atom contain two 
(or more) ac·t;ual •sub-atoms'. See Hoss, I:Ietaphysics, II, 209, 
211. . ' 
Cherniss, ou. cit., p. 341, note 18, savs that Aristotle 
is reading into the physical doctrine of atomism his own meta-
physical principles. But, if Democritus had not held precisely 
the position that _Aristotle here attributes to him, had he ad-
mitted either that atoms ::nay merge to form a unified physical 
object, or that they may actually be divided into 'sub-atoms' 
the physical object would be reduced to nothings, an illusion. 
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for two things to arise from what is one Lan atoraj~ for 
he makes his atomic magnitudes substances." 
Aristotle here makes at least one point quite clear about De-
mocritus' atoms, that is, that they intentionally and by defi-
nition do not consist of further atoms as actual parts. This 
may very \Yell mean that Democritus 1 atom was indivisible in 
somewhat the same sense that a substance for Aristotle was in-
divisible, that there are no actual substances as parts in it 
into which it can be divided, that the atom was thus not indi-
visible because its magnitude was mathematically indivisible, 
but simply because it had no proper parts into which it could 
be divided. 
But the point about aouva~ov • • • I S::. # t\ E:X uUO E:V • • • ye-
v~aeaa (1039a9-10) is not quite as clear. Ross evidently takes 
this as meaning "a single atom cannot be produced out of two 
atoms. 1167 But that does not seem to be quite the point that 
Democritus was making with this statement; and that Aristotle 
evidently did not take it that way becomes clearer from the 
two other instances in which Aristotle.quotes this teaching of 
Democritus. The first of these is from On Generation and Cor-
FUPtion 1.8, 325a34-36: 68 
11
• • • and when they [the atoms] are set together and 
involved with one another, they produce physical objects. 
And a multitude would not arise from what is truly one, 
nor would ·what is one' arise from those things which are 
67noss, hletaphysics, II, 209. 
68 ' e L s::."' ' "\ -' - I >; ~ XU& OUV~& ~µe:va uE XUl ne:p&X~Exuµe:va yEVVav. eX u~ 
~oG xa~'aA~8E&aV ~Vos oux €v YEV{o8al ~AD80~ ouo' lx ~WV aA~8Ws 
noAAWV ev, aAA 1 e:(vaL ~ou~' aouva~ov. . 
truly many, but it is impossible that they would."· 
The second passage is at .Q!1. the Heavens 3.4, 303a6-8:69 
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11
• • • and [they claim] that max1y things are not gen-
erated out of what is one [the atom] nor is one thing 
generated out of what is many (the atoms], but all 
things are produced by the invOlvement and scattering 
around of these atorns. 11 
In both these passages the generation or structure of physical 
objects is connected with Democritus' claim, and it is most 
likely that to which this second part of Democritus' claim is 
to be connectea. 70 The claim then is that when atoms congre-
gate to form a physical object they do not in fact form a uni-
ty. Here then is lik~ly an explicit denial on Democritus' 
part that the physical object is a real unity, a claim, there-
fore, that the phenomenal unity of the object is nothing but 
an illusion. 
Thus now, taking both parts of Democritus' claim togeth-
er, inasmuch as the atoms cannot be further divided in them-
selves, and inasmuch as these atoms, when they form a physical 
object, do not in fact form a real unity, these atoms are the 
only true and physical unit that there is. 
60.. ' It I 1 - j, ' "I "I' ' ,, I .., Ill. ~at OU~ £~ ~vo, TIOnna YlYVE09at OU'r£ EX ~OAAWV ~v, 
aA.A.' -i;ij 'tOU'rWV ouµ'Jt/...oxij xa't 1t:£plnaA.<iC.:El 'JtUV'ra yEvva'.o8at. I 
follow ~lders, op. cit., p. 300, and Kirk and Raven, Sl!?.• cit., 
p. 418, in tranSTatingnEplrraA.asEt as 'by scattering around 1 • 
70Joachim, ou. cit., p. 163 rightly identifies the -i;o 
xa-i;, aA.~O E~ av tv With -:ni'e individual atom and the 'IQ a/...T)8W<; 
n:oA.A.~ with an aggregate of atoms, which, though forming a per-
ceptible body, never constitute a real unit. And, if this is 
the meaning of Democritus' clair::t here in On Generation and 
9orruption 1.8, 325a34-36, then tnis is evidently the way in 
Which this same claim of Democritus is to be taken in the pas-
sage at LletaEhysics 7.13. 
Aristo_t}_e 's Cri ticisr:i: Against t~ jjenial of the Unity of the Physical Object 
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In the world of nature for Aristotle it is the individ-
ual physical object, the primary substance, which is 'one' 
thing in the strictest sense of the term; upon its unity de-
pends not only accidental unity (~. 5.6, 1015bl6-36), but 
also unity in species, in genus, and by analogy (1016b31-
1017a3). It is this primary substance which is 'one' by con-
tinuity: ~wv oe xae' tau~a ~v AEyoµevwv ~a µEY Aeye~al ~Q 
auvex~ elva, (1015b36-1016al).71 And it is this which is 'one' 
in the primary sense, for its o6a(a (substance, informed mat-
ter) is one; and it is 'one' because it is continuous, because 
its form is one and its definition is one: ~a oe xp&tw~ AEyo-
"' ~ .J.. I ( # # ' J\ ( 1\ \ µeva ~v wV ., oua a µLa, µLa OE n ouvexe q n ef6El ~Ady~ 
(1016b8-9). And this is the first major point on which he 
criticizes the teaching of Democritus on·the atom as the real 
physical object and unity. 
But it is not only the teaching that there are atomic 
shapes in reality that negates the real unity of the physical 
object, but also the doctrine of the void, which in the physi-
cal object separates those atoms which constitute that object. 
And there are in Democritus' teaching a number of phenomena 
which are explained more fr~m the point of view of the void--
such as, expansion, contraction, growth, and motion. And, 
71Two thines are continuous when they have a single 
boundary in common (Physics 5.3, 227a21-23). If two parts are 
to become a unity in the strict sense, it is necessary that 
they have this boundary in common. 
although these explanations too involve an unnecessary and 
unreasonable denial of the unity of the individual physical 
object, they will be considered in chapter two of this paper 
in connection with the doctrine of the void. The discussion 
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here in this chapter will be limited to those of Aristotle's 
criticisms which trace this denial of the unity of the physi-
cal object more immediately and directly to the teaching that 
there are atomic shapes. 
Specifically, Aristotle's criticisms of atomic shapes in 
this respect is that such atoms not only deny obvious and evi-
dent unities, 72 but also do not, and cannot in principle, ac-
count at all for all the facts. 
First of all, if one argues from empirical evidence--and 
the atomists evidently did--Aristotle claims in On ~ Heavens 
3.8, 306b3-5, 9-15, that a doctrine of differentiation of sim-
ple bodies by basic shapes is unreasonable. This criticism 
seems to be directed not only against Plato's views, but also 
against any attempt in general to reduce the simple bodies to 
shapes: OAW~ OE 't"O ne:1pffo8a1 't"U d:n:A.ff a 0Wµarca axT)µa't"(l;;e:iv at..oyov 
eo't"1--306b3-4. Such attempts are cited as being unreasonable 
in the first place because, in that case, the simple bodies 
cannot fill up a whole or constitute a material continuity 
(306b4-5). Bu~, more impo~tantly, in the second place, we have 
empirical evidence (~a(ve:'t"aL --306b9) that simple bodies do 
72That such a denial is, furthermore, unnecessary and 
thus unwarrented will be shown in the latter part of this 
chapter. 
adjust their form to suit their container, especially water 
and air. If the basic shape of the element remains, it will 
certainly not fill its container as a whole: 73 06 yap ~v 
~~~E~o nav~ax~ ~ou nEp1£xov~o~ ~6 OAOV--306bl2-13; and that 
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would be contrary to empirical evidence.74 Thus, to account 
for simple bodies in terms of specific shapes is to deny the 
wholeness and continuity of such a body and to deny empirical 
evidence. Aristotle reasonably chose empirical evidence: ~o~E 
~avEpov 0~1 oux EO~lV ~p10µ€va ~a ox~µa~a a6~wv --306bl4-15. 
A second basic unity which Democritus by his atomic the-
ory denies is the real unity of the individual animate crea-
ture. This is a unity of a higher order, for it is one sup-
plied by nature itself and is not artificially imposed on the 
creature. 75 It was Democritus' view that soul consists of 
spherical shapes; 76 this, by itself, strongly implies that soul 
73Elders, .2..E.• cit., p. 323, remarks on OAov: "It signi-
fies a coherent and substantial unity (Aristotle's outlook is 
fro.:n the outset different from that of the atomists). 11 
It is precisely such a OAOV which is at issue with De-
mocritus, and thus the argument here applies to Democritus' 
position as well. 
74Ibid., p. 322, where Elders rightly remarks: "Aris-
totle makes here a very important criticism on a point over-
looked by Plato, viz. of how space, not informed by figures, 
can be real." 
I do not doubt that this criticism is directed primarily 
against Plato; but it involves the citation of empirical evi-
dence against any view tha~ holds a reduction of simple bodies 
to specific shapes that is significant. 
75r1Ietaphysics 5. 6, 1016a4: µaAAOV tv 't"a qnfo E 1 ouv EXTi t) 
'tlXV'l'J. 
~6 see~ for, example, Anima 1.2, 404a2: ~~oµwv ~a o~aLpo­
El5~ nup xaL ~uxnv ~fyEL. 
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is not a continuum and cannot itself be a unified thing. Fur-
thermore, if, as Democritus seems to hold, this soul is scat-
tered throughout the percipient body (Anima 1.5, 409b2), and 
soul is taken to be some sort of body itself, then there will 
actually be two bodies in the same place; the animate creature 
itself will really consist of two bodies (409b3-4). It will 
not be a unity at all. 
Furthermore, Aristotle objects specifically to Democri-
tus' theory of alteration on the same grounds at Q!! Generation 
and Corruption 1.9, 327al5-22. The example cited there is the 
-
change of the same body (~o a~~o oWµa--327al6) from a liquid 
to a solid;77 this, Democritus claims, occurs by the shifting 
of positions of the constituent atoms: 
anep AEyet ~Y)µoxpt~o~--327al8-19. Here Aristotle appeals to 
empirical evidence (opwµEV--327al6) for the continuity of the 
physical object before and during and after the change: 
ouvexe~ ov o~e µ~v uypov o~e oe ~eTIY)yo~ --327al7. 78 The object 
was and remained a continuous whole throughout the process of 
change; empirical evidence again contradicts the position of 
77r take the most reasonable referents to be the xp6o~aA­
Ao~ at 1. 8, 325a22 and the uou)p at 326a34, al though it is not 
essential to the argument that they be so identified. 
I 78Also 327a22: anav ~ypov, O'CE OE OXAY)pov xa) 'ITETIY)yo<;: 
EO'r l V • 
Cherniss, .2.E.• cit., p. 105, contends that here Aristotle 
seems quite naive in that Aristotle should expect to~ the 
atoms moving. But Cherniss' emphasis is wrong; Aristotle says 
that we have empirical evidence for the continuity of the ob-
ject during alteration, not that he fails to see the atoms mov-
ing. This makes a great deal of difference, for thus the bur-
den of proof is on Democritus, not on Aristotle. 
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Democritus. 
The same thing is true with regard to Democritus' theory 
of generation and corruption, for he taught that generation 
and corruption occur by the addition and subtraction of atoms 
from the mass of atoms \'lhich constitute the physical object 
(~. et Corr. 1.2, 315bl6-17); this means that for Democritus 
a new object is generated whenever a single atom is added to 
the original group. This too is contrary to empirical evi-
dence, for, as Aristotle points out at ~ Generation and Cor-
ruption 1.4, 319bl4-17, generation and corruption occur pre-
cisely ·when the physical object changes ~ .e_ whole, ?9 and 
nothing :perceptible persists as an identical substratum--as 
when seed changes to blood, or water to air. When a physical 
object changes, it is obvious that the kind of change which 
involves generation or corruption is a change of the object as 
a whole, and not just some (perhaps minute) part of it. 
Furthermore, not only does Democritus' theory negate 
phenomena, but also, Aristotle points out, precisely in connec-
tion with the mutual generation of the simple bodies the theory 
of atomic shapes cannot even in principle account for the facts 
of phenomena, although they were supposed to do exactly that. 
Aristotle's criticism of this inconsistency in atomism is 
' 79see Joachim, .£1?.· cit., p. 108, and Verdenius and Was-
zink, £E· cit.' p. 17' on the meaning of oA.ov here. 
'..lhe pas~aae is as follows: O'l:QV o' oA.ov µc:1:af3aA.A.1jl WO 
un:oµtvovrco<; UlCJ.gT)TOU 1:1VO£; W£; U'T[OXEl!-LeVoU 'T.OU QU't"OU at..A. 01'ov 
tx 't"~' yov~, a~µa naari, ~ ~~ ~Oa1:o£; d~p ~ ~~ dfpo' nav'l:~' ~Owp 
ytvc:a,, ~ori 'to 1:01ou1:ov, 't"ou oe ~eopa. ' 
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to be found at .Qg ~Heavens 3.4, 303a24-29. The atomis·ts 
are there said to have differentiated the •traditional ele-
ments•--earth, air, and water--by the size of the atoms which 
constitute those elements: µEy€8EL xa\ µLxpo~n~L 6La~€pELV 
aepa xal YDV xa& UOWP--303a25-26. This is not to say that 
water, for example, is composed of atoms all of one size, but 
rather that one particular size of atom predominates in the 
group, which is composed of all sizes of atoms. One of these 
•elements', they further claim, is generated from another when 
the largest atoms are separated out; for example, 'earth' be-
comes 'water' when the largest atoms are separated out from 
the 'earth'; and this is the way in which the mutual generation 
of 'elements' takes place (303a27-29). 
But this, Aristotle rightly points out, generates an in-
t 1 t d • t • ' , "I. L I '\ -~ ""' 1. erna con ra ic ion: Evav~1a A~YElV au~ou~ au~oi~ uvayxn --
303a24-25. 80 The contradiction obviously lies in the fact that 
when the largest atoms separate out from the earth, and water 
is thus forned, there are evidently no such 'largest atoms' in 
the water which results from this process so that 'earth' can 
again be generated out of it. If these 'largest atoms' are an 
essential constituent of •earth', and if 'earth' can in turn be 
generated from 'water', then the water must contain them; but 
' 80Elders; .2.E.· ill·, fails to point out \vhere the contra-
diction lies. Cherniss, .2.E• cit., p. 6, assumes that it lies 
with contradicting the fact that the process of change is eter-
nal, and that on atomist grounds it must cease; but this is not 
an internal contradiction in the atomiots' system. 
Cherniss concludes from this fact that the refutation 
rests on a false account of the atomists' theory. 
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they will be lacking to the 'water' because they have beeri 
separated out. Here is where the contradiction lies, and this 
is exactly where Aristotle says that it lies: unoA.c:(\lfel yap 
ae'l 't"U µey1o'ta owµa17a exxp1 voµevu --303a27-28. 81 Thus the atom-
ists, although they claim to account for the mutual generation 
of the elements, in fact cannot do so without self-contradic-
ti on. 
Thus, in summary, although Democritus had begun with 
phenomena and indeed tried to preserve them with accounts of 
reality which were in harmony with them (A.oyou, Ol't&ve, np6, 
\ ,, t .t ~ 
't"DV UlOGDOlV oµoA.oyouµeva A.cyov'te' --Gen. et~· 1.8, 325a23-
24), he ended by negating many of the opinions and facts of 
observation: noA.A.a 't"WV evooswv xa) 't"WY ~a1voµevwv XU't~ 'tnv 
a'{o8Do&v O.va&pet\L--Caelo 3.4, 303a22-23. Not only did he deny 
the real and empirical unity of the physical object, but also 
in some cases his theory did not even fit the admitted facts 
as it was supposed to do. 
But the denial of phenomena and empirical evidence in it-
self is not so serious a charge, if that denial is justified in 
some respect. But Democritus' justification of that denial was 
made on two grounds: 1) the problem of 'division everywhere' 
81Both Cherniss, loc. cit., and Simplicius, On~ Caelo, 
612.26-613.4, s~e the point~the criticism as being that of 
the 'ceasing of generation', evidently in anticipation of the 
criticisill offered by Aristotle at On the Heavens 3.7, 305b20-
26. But Aristotle's criticisms differ in these two places; at 
On the Heavens 3.4 the point is made that unoA.e(\lfe:t ••• 'ta 
~ytori;a. owµ,a'ta, while at On the Heavens 3.7 it is uTioA.e(nc:iv 
't"DV ts a'A.A~AWV y€veOlV. ~ ----
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seemed to Democritus to indicate that the continuous appear-
ance of phenomenal objects was an illusion and that this 'di-
vision everywhere' simply did not apply to the real physical 
object at all; and 2) since empirical evidence must be basi-
cally reliable, the problem of contraries in the same object 
indicated that the physical object must be distinguished from 
the phenomenal object. 
But Aristotle does in fact show that Democritus' assump-
tion was not really justified, that Democritus' conclusion 
about atomic magnitudes was not a warrented one, because it 
was not necessary. He does this by showing that Democritus' 
solution to the problem of 'divisible everywhere' was based 
on a mistake in logic and by showing that the problem of con-
traries in the same object can reasonably be settled without 
resorting to an extreme and unwarrented rejection of empirical 
evidence. This demonstration by Aristotle that Democritus' 
rejection of phenomena on two counts was not justified will be 
discussed in the next two sections of this paper, the first 
dealing with the problem of 'division everywhere', and the 
next with contraries in the same object. 
Aristotle's Criticism: 
'Division :t;verywhere' Holds 
Democritus had baseJ his rejection of phenomena partly 
on the problem raised by Zeno involving 'divisible everywhere'. 
Aristotle, in reply, points out that Democritus' conclusion is 
not warrented by his premises, that the positing of indivis-
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ible atoms rests on a mistake in logic, and that thus Derilocri-
tus' rejection of phenomena is not justified in this respect. 
And the passage in which Aristotle's reply to Democritus' 
position is most direct and explicit is at On Generation~ 
porruEtion 1.2, 316bl9-317al7. In the first portion of this 
passage (316bl9-27), as we have already pointed out, Aristotle 
shows that there are two distinct meanings of ;rav'tr.J ('every-
where' ) in 'divisible everywhere', the one distributive and 
the other collective--'at any of all the points' and 'at all 
the points at once'. But it is only the second of these mean-
ings which generates the difficulty, the meaning 'divisible 
everywhere at once', for this is the only one which actually 
reduces the body to 'nothings'. 
So, having rightly established the two senses of 'every-
where', Aristotle is now ready to show that Democritus' conclu-
sion (that there must be atomic magnitudes) does not follow 
from the premises he accepts, that it involves an unnoticed 
mistake in logic (Aaveavel napaAoytsoµevo, --317al-2); and it is 
precisely this mistake that he points ~ut in 317a2-12: 82 
82 tnel. yap oux 'E:o'tt O'tlyµ~ O'tlyµ-j'), exoµtv11, 'tO miV'tr.J E{vat 
OtatpE't~V 10'tl µ~v w, ~Tidpxet 'tor, µEyE9EOtV, 1o'tt o' w, Q~. 
ooxer 5'' O't"aV 't"Q.U't"O 't"E9f.l, xa\ om;iouv xa\ 'JIQV'l:TJ O'rlyµ-fiv e(va&' 
WQ't 1 avayxarov ElVat 01atpE8~va1 'tO µ£yeeo, ~,, µ11otv--naV1:TJ yap 
dvat O't1yµ~v, Wa't"E Tl Es dcpwv fi' EX O'l:tyµwv dva1. 'tO o' 'E:o'ttY 
w, 1.hrapxet 'ITQV'tTJ, O'tt µ(a °'7lr.JOUV EO'tl xa'l naaat w, exaO'tT)' 
1tAElOU~ ok µtff~ oux ela(v (e~E~~' yap oox eio(v), ~O't 1 OU naV'tr.J. 
I\ 'L. 1 ' II 1 '11 
et yap xa'ta µ~aov otalpE'tov, xal xa~ sxoµevT)v O'ttvµT)V ea'tal 
F.. L I', l.f' - , h: \ uta&pE~uV' OU yap EO~lV EXoµEVOY OT)µElOV OT)µElOU ll O't&yµT) 
O't t yµ i')' • 
Verdenius and Waszink, £12.• cit., pp. 14-15, point out 
that T. W. Allen's conjecture at 317all 'otnlpE'tov· (oux 'E:a'tl 
t> e ~ 06 yap ' was not necessary and ma;y be omitted without 
changing the meaning of the passage. 
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"Since one point is not next to another point, 'divis-
ible everY1vhere' is in one sense a property of magni-
tudes, and in another sense it is not a property of mag-
nitudes. 
"Whenever it is proposed [that 1 divisible everywhere' 
is a property of magni tudesJ , it is thought that there 
is a point both anywhere and everywhere [on that magni-
tude at which such di vision is to occur], and thus that 
'divisible everY1vhere' necessitates the division of the 
magnitude into nothing, for there is a point everywhere 
[collectively] on it. So, on that assumption, the mag-
nitude must be composed of either contacts or noints. 
"But there is another sense of 'everywhere•,""namely, 
that there is one point at any given place on the magni-
tude, and so all the points of 'everywhere' are taken 
distributively, one at a time. 
"But there is no more than one [point at a time which 
one can take for such divisiozj), because the points are 
in fact not next to one another; and so [in this sense 
again, since one can never in fact arrive at a point next 
to a point and thus take them collectivelyJ the magni-
tude is not 'divisible everywhere'; for, if the magnitude 
is divisible ['everywhere' collectively, and] if it is 
divisible at its middle, it will also be divisible at 
the point right next to that; but it is not, for moment 
is not next to moment, nor is one point next to another. 11 
Thus Aristotle rightly points out that the mistake in 
logic83 rests on the ambiguity of the term rcavi;r.i ('everywhere') 
as it was used by Democritus in formulating his conclusion; it 
has both a distributive and a collective sense. So, to put the 
atomists' argument into the form of a syllogism: A) 'what is 
"divisible everywhere 11 (collective sense) can be resolved into 
nothing'; B) 'any body is "divisible everywherett (distributive 
sense)'; therefore C) 'any body can be resolved into nothing'. 
83Furleyl ££· .£_:ij_., p~ 92, translates the wo~e 06 xav~r.i 
at 317a9 as 11 and so they are not everyvrhere." His "they" evi-
dently refers to 'points'. But Aristotle would hardly admit 
that, for it would mean that the magnitude is not in fact di-
visible everywhere in either the collective or the distributive 
sense and would drive him to admit that Democritus was right 
after all and did not commit an error in logic. If this is 
what Furley means, he seems to be wrong. 
r 67 The middle term, 'divisible everywhere', was used equivocal-
ly.84 But, since Democritus' rejection of a real 'divisible 
everywhere' for physical objects was grounded on the validity 
of this argument which Aristotle has now shown to be falla-
cious, and since Democritus' relegation of the phenomenal ob-
ject to 'illusion' was at least partially based on the valid-
ity of this argument as well, Aristotle has quite rightly 
shown that Democritus had no adequate reason in this respect 
either for the positing of atoms or for his doubts about phe-
nomena. 
Indeed, Aristotle goes on to say (317al2-17), there is a 
division of a body (and a reconstruction of that body out of 
its parts), but it is a division which neither results in in-
divisible bodies nor exhausts all the points of the body, but 
one which simply and constantly results in smaller and smaller 
magnitudes: UAA 1 el, µ1xpa xa1 EAa~~w ea~( --317al6. There is 
no adequate reason for stopping the division at some specific 
magnitude. But the reason, according to Aristotle, that such 
division may continue without exhausting all the points is to 
be found in the very nature of 'infinite', which he takes up 
elsewhere. 
Now it is in the third book of the Physics where Aris-
' 84so Joachim, .2.E.· cit., p. 84. Sinnige, .2.E.• cit., p. 
148, sees the 'inconsistency' as lying in the incompleteness 
of the di vision, for the atom--like the 'cxnp t cµa of 316bl--
must be still further divisible, if it has magnitude, and if 
it is to be reduced to something mathematically indivisible; 
this is certainly a valid criticism of Democritus' position, 
but it is not the one which Aristotle makes here. 
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totle takes up the nature of the infinite, more specifically, 
in chapters six and seven. His definition of the infinite is 
•such a quantity that one can always take as part of it some-
thing outside of what. has already been taken•. 85 This means 
that what is infinite is by its very nature something which is 
never really attained, because it is never stationary, it al-
ways stays outside of our grasp; it is simply its nature to be 
always in process: 060£ µEVE' ~ ane,p(a aAAU y(ve~a' --3.7, 
207bl4. This means that by its very definition it is only 
potential, never actual: Ae(nE~a' oJv cuvaµEl elva' ~b 
1~:ITElPOV. OU od' oe ~o ouvaµEl o'v AUµ(3civE,V ••• o\hw XUl 
~nEtpov t ia~ai lvepyE(q--3.6, 206al8-21. 86 
The most obvious application of such a notion of the 
infinite is to numbers--what Aristotle would call 'infinite by 
addition' (npoaeeaE,--3.6, 206al5). Numbers have a lower lim-
it, the unit, but have no upper limit, because one can always 
exceed in thought any number, no matter how high (3.7, 207bl-
3, 10). 
In this respect the infinite by bisection resembles that 
by addition, for in any given magnitude every assigned magni-
tude is surpassed in the direction of smallness (3.7, 207b3-4). 
This means that there is by definition always a smaller magni-
' 
, 
85Ph~sics 3.61 207a7-8: &netpov µcv oJv la~tv oJ xa~h noaov AUµf VOUOlV UlE( ~l AU~erv io~lV ~~w. 
86There is, however, Aristotle admits, a sense in which 
we can speak of the 'actuality' of an infinite, but only in 
the sense that a finite extension actually contains an infi-
number of progressively smaller parts--206bl2-15. 
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tude than any assigned small magnitude. And the bisections of 
............... 
any magnitude are infinite; so, as the infinitely high number 
is always only potential, never actual, likewise the infinite-
ly small magnitude will be always potential, never actual; it 
can always be exceeded in the direction of smallness. 87 Hence 
such division can never 12.;z:: definition be exhausted. 
Thus also Democritus was not justified in stopping the 
actual division arbitrarily at a specific magnitude; his fears 
about the actual exhaustion of the 'division everywhere' were 
by the very nature of the case unfounded. 'Division every-
where', while it is nossible, is precisely such a potency as 
cannot in fact be actualized. 
Furthermore, since Aristotle has now shovm that Democri-
tus has no adequate reason for stopping actual division at a 
specific magnitude, there is no reason why Democritus' atoms 
themselves should not be subject to further (infinite) divisi-
bility. Any given Democritean atom is certainly 'continuous'; 
it is defined as being 'full' or 'absolutely full' (nADPE,, 
~aµnA~p£,); it also has magnitude; and as such it itself is 
divisible infinitely: "And it is evident that everything con-
tinuous is divisible constantly into further divisible parts" 
Physics 6.1, 23lbl5). 
87Physics 3.7, 207bl0-13: aneLpoL yap a( oLxo~oµ(al 
~OU µey£8ou~. ~~E ouvaµEL µev EO~LV, EVEpyE(q o' ou• UAA 1 
acl ~nEpPUAAEL ~~ AaµpavdµEVOV nav~b, ~plaµfvou TIA~8ou,. 
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This means that the atom is indeed no better off than the 
'borp,oµa described at On Generation and Corruntion 1.2, 316a34-· 
b2. This 'particle' is conceived as having resulted from the 
division of a body with magnitude; and so, if this 'particle' 
is a body of some sort, the same argument applies to it as ap-
plied to the original body; it too should be divisible in the 
same sense: 
au~o~ Aoyo~--316bl-2. 
Again, Democritus had likely argued that his atoms were 
physically indivisible in that they had no proper parts into 
which they could be divided, that is, parts like those of the 
'elements' of Anaxagoras. But Aristotle points out in Qg ~ 
Heavens 3.4, 303a29-b2 that as geometrical shapes the atoms do 
indeed have parts of a sort into which they could be divided; 
they can be divided into further and simpler geometrical shapes 
as their parts, 88 for instance, into a variety of pyramids: 
~a be ox~µa~a nav~a OUYXEl~a' ex nupaµ(owv, ~a µev EU8uypaµµa 
88The argument is directed primarily against Democritus' 
theory of an infinite variety of atomic shapes; and Aristotle 
shows that by dividing atoms into a finite nwnber of simple 
shapes, the variety of shapes of atoms would not be infinite. 
Furley, .£.:£• cit., p. 98, believes that since Aristotle 
applied this argun1ent against the atomists "with hostile in-
tent 11, the atomists must not have conceived of their atoms as 
being reducible in this vmy. But, even so, that does not es-· 
tablish Furley's conclusion of a mathematically indivisible 
atom. ' 
Cherniss, .2.E• cit., p. 7, objects to the use of this argu-
ment by Aristotle on the grounds that he is using a doctrine of 
Plato--that material body is constructed out of discrete and 
imi~aterial form--to refute Democritus. But the source of the 
argument is immaterial; its applicability is the only real 
issue. 
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i e~ EU8uypaµµwv, ~ OE o~arpa e~ OX'l:W µop(wv--303a31-bl. Thus 
the atoms themselves may very well have parts, and there is no 
reason why they could not be divided into these parts. 
Furthermore, Aristotle says at On Generation and Corrun-
tion 1.8, 326a24-29 that Democritus' physically indivisible 
-
atoms were quite small, but there were no large ones; and this, 
Aristotle says, is quite reasonable, because larger things are 
broken up (8paue1:al--326a26) more easily than small things. 
Indeed, it may very well be this empirical consideration that 
the degree of breakability depends on size that contributed to 
Democritus' notion that the atoms' indivisibility is partially 
a function of their size. Again, there is a strong emphasis 
on physical divisibility. But, Aristotle points out in reply, 
such physical divisibility is relative; it is only a matter of 
the comparative ease or difficulty with which it can be carried 
out. This, it seems, is already implied in o&aAUE1:a& pqo(W<;--
326a27. Democritus, he says, thus gives no adequate reason 
why indivisibility is a property of small things but not of 
" $:. \ , $:. , u ' , - ·' large ones: 1:0 vE av&a&pE1:0V OAW~ Ola 1:l µaAAOV vnapxel '"!:WV 
µc:yaAwv -i;ot<,: µ&xpor<.:; (326a28-29). 89 Thus, again, there is in 
atomic theory no real reason why atoms could not in fact be 
89on Furley's hypothesis of mathematically indivisible 
units (Furley ~oes not con~ider this passaGe) for Democritus 
Aristotle would be saying that Democritus has given no adequate 
reason for there not to be larger mathematically indivisible 
units as well as smaller ones! 
But the passage is evidently directed against physicall~ 
indivisible atoms; and Aristotle is right in saying that there 
is no adequate reason for physical indivisibility to be a 
property of one magnitude rather than another. 
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further divided. 
And so, in summary, Aristotle has quite consistently and 
rightly shown that Democritus was not justified in positing 
indivisible atoms; Democritus had dravm unwarrented conclusions 
from the problem of 'divisible everywhere', and thus he had no 
adequate reason for making his atom indivisible. And this 
means, further, that in this respect at least Democritus' re-
pudiation of phenomena was also unwarrented. 
Excursus: On Aristotle's Jilinimae Partes 
It may be objected that Aristotle too has limits to which 
actual division can in fact take place, and that thus his ob-
jections to atornism are weakened. Such a doctrine of limits in 
minimum size or in division is his teaching on minimae partes. 
And the passages in which this teaching is found follow. 
Physics 1.4, 187b20-30:90 
"Clearly, then, neither flesh nor bone nor anything of 
that sort can proceed indefinitely far either in enlarge-
ment or in diminution. 
"Again, if all such things are already present in one 
another, and do not come into existence, but are merely 
separated out after being there all along, objects get-
ting their appellation from whatever is present in most 
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abundance; and if anything can come to be out of any-
thing, for instance water be separated out from flesh, 
and flesh from water; and if only a limited quantity of 
stuff is needed to do away with a limited quantity of 
stuff: it plainly follows that everything cannot be in 
everything. For suppose that some flesh is removed from 
some water, and then more flesh extracted from what re-
mains: even if the yield is lower each time, there will 
still always be some quantity smaller than any yet 
yielded." 
Aristotle is here replying to the teaching of Anaxagoras which 
implies that there is no minimum size for things like flesh 
and bone. What Aristotle has established in the first sen-
tence of this passage is that for any part of an animate body 
(such as flesh or bone) there is a maximum size above which 
~~minimum size below which it cannot go and still be the 
flesh or bone of an animate body. In the direction of large-
ness, he contends in effect that we cannot suppose that there 
is, for example, a hundred-foot bone which is still the bone 
of an animal, for there is obviously an upper limit to the 
size of any given animal. That is clear enough. But there is 
also a lower limit--and this he uses against Anaxagoras. What 
Aristotle evidently has in mind is that as one continually bi-
sects a piece of bone, eventually one will reach a point at 
which the two halves resulting from the bisection will be too 
small to be bone. Likely the latter two halves will be simple 
or elemental bodies--earth, air, fire, and water. 91 But here 
' 
91Ross, Physics, p. 486, says that this is not to be 
taken as a contradiction of the doctrine of infinite divisibil-
ity, but only that there is a lowest limit to the size of a 
portion of flesh. Charlton, .212.• .£!_!., p. 65, suggests--I be-
lieve rightly--that there is a point in division at which one 
arrives at elemental bodies. 
there is no hint that the bisection might not thereafter.be 
able to continue, ~infinitum. 
Physics 6.10, 24la33-b2:92 
"The limit of increase is the complete magnitude an-
swering to a thing's proper nature; the limit of dimi-
ution is the loss of this." 
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This passage makes approximately the same point that the pre-
vious passage from the Physics made: a man, for example, can 
only increase or decrease within upper and lower limits and 
still retain his essential nature as a man. 
Q£ the Soul 2.4, 416al5-18:93 
"For the increase of fire is indefinite as long as 
there is material to be burned, but of all the things 
formed by nature there is a limit and a [proper] ratio 
of both their size and their increase; and these are 
marks of soul, but not of fire; they belong to ratio 
rather than to matter. 11 
Here Aristotle is replying to the view that the nature of fire 
is simply the reason why nourishment and·growth take place; 
and he says in reply that we must also have a reason for growth 
into a certain form and limit, and fire alone as matter does 
not supply an adequate reason for growth in a certain way. 
Fire alone as matter has no limit on size or increase, whereas 
complex (ouvLo'taµtvwv--416al6) natural substances do. 
In none of these passages is it supposed that any magni-
92 1 J:;'./. \ ' " L - " ' I , 1 au<:.110E.Wt;; µc:v yap 'tO 1r1;;pat;; 'tO\) xa'ta 'tT)V OLXelUV Cj)UOLV 
'tEAE(ou µc:yf9out;;, cp8(oe~t;; 6~ ~ 'tod'tou ixo~aoLt;;. The 'trans-
lation' is Ross' 'analysis' in his Aristotle's Physics, p. 418. 
93~ µev yap 'tOU nupot;; aul;T)OLt;; Ett;; U'Jl:Etpov, EWt;; tv ~ 'tO 
XUUO'tOV, 'tW\I 0 e cpuo EL ouv L O'taµ BVW\I 'J[aV'tWV 1EO't' 'Jr fpac xa\ \oyo~ 
µey€8ou~ ~c: xat aos~oewi;· ~au-r;a oe wuxl)~, n\A' 06 ~upo~, xa& 
AO"(OU µUAAOV ~ UA~t;;. 
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tude is physically indivisible at some point. The only thing 
that they do seem to indicate is that for some things--complex 
physical objects--there is a lower limit to their size, if 
they are indeed to remain what they are. And it seems as well 
implied that there is no such limitation on the 'simple bod-
ies'. And this is substantiated by a passage from On~ 
Heavens 3.3, 302al5-18; there Aristotle defines the nature of 
an 'element'. It is 11 that into which other complex bodies 
are divisible and is present in the latter either potentially 
or actually; ••• but the element itself cannot be divided in-
to parts differing from itself in kind. 1194 This certainly im-
plies that such a 'simple body' can indeed be constantly divid-
ed into progressively smaller parts without limit. 
Aristotle's Criticism: 'What~' has many meanings 
Aristotle has thus quite rightly shown that in one re-
spect Democritus' reasons--the problem involved in 'divisible 
everywhere'--for positing atoms and relegating phenomena to an 
illusion were totally inadequate. But Democritus also had a 
second reason for his rejection of the phenomenal object as 
real, and this was the appearance of contraries in the same 
phenomenal object. This had led him to accept an Eleatic ab-
solute sense of 'is' for his atoms (along with a similarly ab-
' 
94 'eo'tw O~ O'tO t XE: i OV 'tWV owµchwv, d c; o' -i;ciA.A.a a~µa'ta <5 & -
0.l pE:i'Cat, evuTiapxov ouvaµt:& 1)' lve:pye:(q. ••• O.U'tO 0 I EO'tt v 
6.01a(pe:rc;ov de;. £rc;epa 'tQ e:'loet. Similarly at I.ietanhvsics 5.3, 
1014a31-34, where Ross, r.I.etanhysics, I, 294, rightly says: 
",the p1:!;Ysical elements • • • are only divisible into µop& a 
oµo El OT)." 
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solute sense of 'what is not' for his void). 95 The atom is 
the only thing that really exists; it simply always is and re-
mains the same, not in itself subject to any change. And on 
this count too Aristotle shows that Democritus' positing of 
atoms and rejection of the phenomenal object was completely 
unwarrented. 
To take up first the atomist acceptance of an absolute 
sense of 'is', Aristotle points out at Physics 1.3, 187al-10 
(the very passage in which he had said that the atomists yield-
ed to Eleatic arguments) that this not only unduly limits the 
meaning of 'is', but also makes it unintelligible • .Aristotle 
points out here that 'is' may be used in two senses, an 'abso-
lute' and a 'particular' sense--'x does not exists• and 'xis 
not some particular thing'--and there is a real difference be-
tween the two senses. "For, 11 Aristotle says, 11 even though 
'what is not' cannot ~without qualification [simply exis-ii}, 
there is no reason why it might not refer to something which 
'is not some particular thing'. 11 96 Indeed, Aristotle goes on 
to imply, 'what is' in itself is unintelligible apart from 
being some particular thing.97 
951,Ietaphysics 1.4, 985b5-7; 4.5, 1009a27-30; Physics 1.5, 
188a22-23. 
9 6 3 8 '6 I 8 \ \ "\ .t \ • "\ - I. "\ 'a' Physics 1 •• 1 7a5- : ou ev yap xwl\uel, µT) aTil\W<;;, Ul\I\ 
\. n 1 \ ' II µT) ov ~' e1vat ~o µT) ov. 
97 8 8 ' ' L I \ ' 1\ I 
, Physics l.}, 1 7a -9: 'tl<;; yap µaveuvet au~o ~o ov el 
µTj 'to 011 c:p ov ~ l d va1; "For who understands 'what is' by it-
self except precisely in the sense that it is some particular 
thing?" 
Aristotle again takes up the meaning of 'is' with more 
specific reference to Democritus in Metaphysics 4.5. There, 
im.,~ediately after his statement that Democritus posited 'the 
full' as 'what is', Aristotle takes up this two-fold meaning 
of 'what l.'cilo iCJ • "in one way they are correct, but in another 
77 
way they are in error, because 'what is' has two meanings. 11 98 
These two meanings evidently refer to the two senses of 'what 
is' referred to in Physics 1.3, that is, 'simply exists' and 
'is a particular thing•. 99 Thus there is one way in which 
something can come into being out of 'what is not', in the 
sense that something can come into being out of 'what is not 
that particular thing', but is some other thing. For example, 
a red apple can come into being out of what is not a red apple, 
but is a green one; or, air can come into being out of what is 
not air, but is water. On the other hand, this is not true of 
the other meaning of 'is' ('simply exists'), for nothing can 
come into being out of what does not exist at all (1009a32-33). 
Thus Aristotle has shown that there is no need or justification 
for restricting the meaning of 'what is' to only one meaning; 
and in the sense of 'what is some particular thing' it has as 
many senses as there are things to which it can refer. 
Thus, having established the two meanings of 'what is' 
' 
98Netaphisics 4.5 1009a31-32: '1"p6nov µcv '1"tva 6pew, 
A.cyooot '1"pO'JtOV 6e '1"lVU 6.yvooifotv• '1"0 yap o'v ACY£'1"Ut OlXWt;. 
99Ross, Eetaphysics, vol. 1, ad loc., says nothing in his 
commentary about the two meanings of 1vn1at is'; his 'Analysis', 
p. 273, indicates that he believes the two meanings are 'is 
potentially' and 'is actually'. 
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thing'--to the phenomenal world, Aristotle goes on to intro-
duce the concepts of 'potency' and 'act' and use them to help 
clarify the difficulty about contraries in the same object 
(1009a33-36). For, he says, using the former sense of 'what 
is', the same thing can simultaneously both be and not be; 
for example, a green apple can both be (a green apple) and not 
be (a red apple); it cannot, of course, both 'be' and 'not be' 
simultaneously in the same respect. For the same apple cannot 
be both a green apple and a red apple at the same time in ac-
tuality; but it can at the same time be actually a green apple 
and potentially a red apple. Thus it is quite reasonable for 
the same object to be two contraries, as long as it is not ac-
tually both at once. This also meansf Aristotle implies, that 
the atomists had no good reason for contravening empirical ev-
idence because of the appearance of contraries in an-object. 
Concluding Remarks 
The atomists, Aristotle says, had rightly started with 
empirical evidence and had indeed attempted in some degree to 
account for it and preserve it. But, in spite of their proper 
beginning, they felt compelled to relegate the phenomenal ob-
ject to the realm of illusion and to posit indivisible bodies 
' 
as that which really is. The grounds on which they felt jus-
tified in making these claims were that they felt that such a 
claim was the only reasonable way to solve two problems: the 
problem of 'divisible everywhere• and the problem of •contra-
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rieS in the same phenomenal object•. Both problems seemed to 
them to point to the fact that the phenomenal object was to be 
distinguished sharply from ~he physical object. The problem 
of division led them to posit atomic bodies in order to save 
the physical object from the same sort of annihilation which 
they felt the phenomenal object had already suffered by being 
divided to nothing. The problem of contraries led them simi-
larly to posit atoms and void as that which 'is' and that 
which 'is not' to account for the contraries in phenomenal 
objects. 
But Aristotle, as we have now seen, has quite cogently 
pointed out that both their reasons were not valid ones. 
Division everywhere does not annihilate anything; and contra-
ries in the same object can be quite reasonably explained 
without resorting to unwarrented speculation. In regard to 
both these problems the concepts of 'potency' and 'act' had 
shown the way in solving them. These concepts had clarified 
the distinctions between the two meanings of 'divisible every-
where'; and Aristotle had shown that the 'infinite' in 'infi-
nite bisection' is a potency which in the very nature of the 
case cannot be actualized. 'Potency' and 'act' had likewise 
provided a reasonable solution to the problem of contraries in 
the same object. ' 
CHAPTER II 
THE PHOBLE::I OF PLACE 
Introduction 
A direct corollary to the assu.~ption that there are im-
mutable atomic bodies, that is, that there is no true unity in 
physical objects, is the theory that there is a void, an empty 
place in which and into which these atomic bodies can move, a 
void which keeps them wholly distinct from one another, even 
when they congregate to form physical objects. Both theories, 
both of the atoms and of the void, together were formulated in 
response to Eleatic doctrine; ai.~d so, in a certain sense, the 
two theories are really two aspects of the same theory. And 
we might thus have considered them together under a single 
topic, for there are difficulties which Ari.stotle raises which 
both these theories share. But, on the other hand, there are 
also certain problems and difficulties which attach to each of 
these theories and concepts as distinct from one another; and 
in this respect Aristotle is quite right in giving separate 
consideration--at Physi~s 1·6-9--to the problem of the void. 
And so we may also deal separately with this theory and with 
Aristotle's objections to it. 
We have already dealt with the vocabulary of the void to 
a certain extent when we dealt with the terminology used for 
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the atoms, for the atoms and the void are defined and de.:.. 
scribed as absolute contraries to one another. The atom is 
that which is solid and full ( O't e:p E:O V 1 11:~.T)p €{. ) ; it is, in the 
absolute sense of the term, 'what is' ( ' " ) 1 'to ov ; it is the only 
thing of which we can really have any direct and positive ex-
perience. The void is the only other 'thing' which, according 
to Democritus, there is in the same, absolute sense 9f 'what 
is'. And it, in contrast to the 'full' atom is that which is 
•empty' ( rco xevov). 2 This void, as a 'thing', is intended to 
be a direct contrary to the atoms; whatever the atoms are, it 
is not that. As the atom is absolutelx solid, full, and im-
passible, the void is absolutely empty and passible. Whatever 
else one might say about Aristotle's going out of his way to 
search out contraries in the Presocratics and finding them even 
in Eleatic doctrine,3 he is certainly right in finding them 
here in Democritus, for here they are quite distinct and quite 
primary. And, inasmuch as the atom is 'what is', the void is 
'what is not' (rco µ~ ov)--a term which was very likely used by 
Democritus himself, in that his atoms and theory of the void 
were both formulated in response to Eleatic thought. He also 
probably used the pair of contrary terms cited in the first 
chapter (pages 18-19): 'thing' and 'no-thing' (otv, ouotv). 
Democritus' quite consistent claim is that both of these 
1Physics 1.5, 188al9-24; I·Ietanhysics 1.4, 985b4-10. 
2Ibid, 
3cherniss, .2.E.• cit., pp. 52-52, makes this charge. 
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'things' exist equally, the one as much as the other. 
And this is certainly a consistent claim, for the one implies 
and almost necessitates the other, so much so that, as we shall 
see, Aristotle's arguments against the void at times overlap 
and duplicate his argui~ents against Democritus' atoms. 
In suJn.rnary, Aristotle's primary objection to a void as 
some separately existing 'thing' is that of making a noun or 
substance out of what is obviously an adjective or attribute, 
a property of body--extension. We might tentatively distin-
guish the ways in which Aristotle proceeds to raise this basic 
objection and in this way organize what he has to say about 
the problem. In the first place, Aristotle objects to the void 
as something internal to physical objects; as something inter-
nal to them it not only keeps the parts of the object separate 
and keeps them from forming a true unity, 4 but also, although 
the void was supposed to explain the expansion, compression, 
and weight of physical objects, it fails to do this adequately. 
Secondly, the void, as something external to physical objects, 
offers only a 'material' explanation of the motion of atoms and 
nothing more than that; it leaves unanswered the question, im-
portant to Aristotle, as to whether their motion is natural or 
constrained; 5 it offers nothing but a mechanistic explanation 
'l 
4rn this .respect we have already considered Aristotle's 
objections in connection with the concept of the atom--a fail-
ure to account for the true unity of any physical object. 
5This question, as we shall see, will only receive some 
kind of satisfactory answer when we consider the question of 
'cause' and 'necessity' in the fourth chapter. 
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of the proper place and motion of physical objects, and, at 
that, an inadequate explanation. And finally, but most impor-
tantly, the assumption of its existence rests on an intrinsi-
cally unverifiable supposition that one can abstract qualities 
from bodies and assume that such qualities can exist apart 
from the body from which it was abstracted; and this, in turn, 
is connected with a misunderstanding of what meanings 'what 
is' and 'what is not' can have. 
Criticism of the 'Internal Void' 
---~~~- ~ ~ ----
Now, as we take up these objections individually, we may 
consider first the difficulties which Aristotle raises against 
a void that is considered as 'internal to physical objects•. 
By a void 'internal to physical objects• we shall mean that 
void, that empty space, which is within the outer limits of 
what we call a physical object--the empty space in the object 
in which its constituent atoms move and clash and rebound. 
That void may be considered a 'part' of the whole physical ob-
ject, and thus, in a sense, not separable from that object. 
For one thing, such a void would keep the object from 
being a truly unified object. The principle of atomism by it-
self, as we have seen, provides sufficient grounds for raising 
this objection; and now the,principle of the internal void 
provides even further grounds. 
At Physics 3.4, 203a20-23 Aristotle attributes to Democ-
ritus (and to Anaxagoras) a teaching which amounts to saying 
that that which is boundless is continuous by contact: 'tlJ d.cpf.) 
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' ~ ,, , 6 ouvexe~ 'to ane,pov ~aa,v. This is obviously meant by Aris-
totle as a Democritean description of the universe as a whole, 
without any specific reference to physical objects. Rut the 
situation in the universe as a whole is no different in prin-
ciple from what is true of physical objects,? for the latter 
also have void within them. 
And that this void is there within those objects is 
shown by the fact that Aristotle explains at On Generation and 
- -
Corruption 1.8, 326al-3 that for the atomists 'being affected' 
(naoxe,v) occurs to a physical object only through the void. 
Furthermore, all the atoms in a physical object are obviously 
not everywhere in contact with each other; if they were, Aris-
totle would not in this same work (1.9, 327a8-10, 24-26) have 
6cherniss, .££• cit., p. 27, note 104, uses this citation 
to show that Aristotle was presenting arguments against atom-
ism both at .Qn the Heavens 1.7, 274bl8-22 and at Physics 3.5, 
204a34-b22. But this hardly seems likely. In the former pas-
sage Aristotle is talking about corporeal elements (o~ia is 
used at both 274a30 and bl9); each of two or more such corno-
~ elements, he says, cannot be infinite. In the Physics 
Aristotle is again talking about cornoreal elements (enloxo-
nouµev nept -i;wv a{oeryrwv--204b2--and~the constant repetition 
of owµa seems to bear this out); indeed, in the whole course 
of this particular argument he is not considering the void at 
all, for at least at one point in the argument (205a35-bl) one 
of the unthinkable alternatives would be: 1) yap xevov '£0-i;ai 
-i;,. The void presents special difficulties of its own, since 
any void can be filled with a body. 
Aristotle does indeed object to infinite extension it-
self, but primarily on the,grounds of its being beyond any 
comprehension;· but this is another matter. 
7uan, or any living creature, is apparently described by 
Democritus as a 'universe in miniature'--compare Diels-Kranz 
68B34. The same is likely to hold for any and all physical 
objects: they are alike in that they are a composite of atoms 
and void; and it is in this respect that they resemble the 
universe. 
r raised the 
f' 
objection to the atomism of Democritus that with 
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such atoms the physical object does not change 'as a whole'--
that is, when one atom is affected, they all are. 
Indeed, the void in physical objects is precisely that 
which keeps the units or atoms separate and distinct, and thus 
keeps the physical object from being a true unity. And in 
fact Aristotle at Physics 4.6, 213a33-34 explicitly attributes 
to Democritus a concept of the void which does exactly that: 
it divides (or, 'takes apart') any whole physical object and 
keeps it from being a continuous whole. 8 The refutation of 
the void as having this characteristic (that of breaking up 
the unity of things), which is essentially the same as that 
characteristic which it has for the Pythagoreans, does not lie 
in the general objection which Aristotle raises against the 
concept of the void at 4.7, 213b31-214all,9 but in the argu-
ments which he raises against those atomistic thinkers who 
would deny the essential unity of physical objects, the very 
arguments we have already examined in the first chapter of this 
80' oiaA.aµf30.ve:t -ro nuv oWµa oo'te: e:fvai µil ouve:xtc. It is 
interesting to note at this point that, as the teachings of 
Democritus and the Pythagoreans were indeed alike inasmuch as 
they constructed objects out of the smallest possible units 
(atoms, numerical units), so their doctrine of the void is 
alike inasmuch as it separates things both in the universe at 
large and in individual ob~ects. See Physics 4.6, 213b23-29, 
especially 26-27, where void for ~he Pythagoreans separates 
the numerical units: xa', -ro{h' dvat npwrnv £v -roi'<;; &pieµoi<;;· 
\ ' \ J.:i. # ' ~f I 
'tO yap XE:VOV ulOplsE:lV 't~V ~vOlV aU'tWV. 
9compare Cherniss, .2.1?.• cit., p. 148, who says that this 
is the only criticism involved; he further says that this 
criticism holds only aeainst the Pythagoreans; but their view 
is like Democritus' in this respect; hence both are liable. 
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paper. 
At Physics 4.6, immediately after mentioning Leucippus' 
and Democritus' theory of the void as that which is internal 
to physical objects and as that which thus breaks up their 
unity, Aristotle presents three (or, perhaps, four) arguments 
which they10 use to support the positing of such a void, and 
then he adds a special Pythagorean version of the doctrine of 
the void, which in certain respects is quite like that of the 
atomists. The first of these arguments is that the void is a 
necessary condition for locomotion. 11 
Immediately thereafter there follows at 4.6, 213bl4-18 a 
second argunent for the void based on empirical evidence, that 
physical objects obviously do compress and contract. The pro-
ponents of the void hold that the ability of objects thus to 
compress is due to an internal void <~a evov~n XEVU) in the 
object to be compressed. The illustration cited is that of 
wine taken from a jar, put into skins, and then put back into 
the jar along with the skins--there now being room for both 
lOApparently Leucippus and Democritus primarily are meant 
here, although they are not specifically mentioned. Cherniss, 
~· cit., p. 150, assu,~es that the reference is to these atom-
ists, and there seems to be no compelling reason for saying 
that he is wrong. Indeed, as we shall see, though Cherniss 
feels that at least one of the arguments in Aristotle's refu-
tation does not really affect the atomist position, all--ex-
cept those directed agains~ a sort of void which is substan-
tially air--are quite appropriate. 
11This matter will be taken up presently as a separate 
item, although the foliowing arguments taken up here do in-
volve the locomotion or positioning of the atoms within phys-
ical objects. 
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wine and skins in the sane amount of space; there is no appar-
ent qualitative change in the wine and no apparent change in 
the a.,~ount of wine. 
Against this Aristotle argues at 4.7, 214a32-bl that it 
is not a necessary explanation, 12 that other explanations of 
this phenomenon are certainly possible without resorting to a 
non-empirical void. Aristotle's own explanation of this phe-
nomenon is that part of the contents are squeezed out of the 
wine when it is compressed, just as when water is compressed 
and extrudes some of the air in it. 13 And so there is an 
explanation just as reasonable--and more reasonable, Aristotle 
would likely say--than that of a void. Hence, in this case, 
the void is not necessary. 
A third argument, presented next at 4.6, 213bl8-22 to 
support the contention that there is a voia, 14 is that the 
observable process of the body absorbing food and growing by 
12214-a32-33: E:vo£xe'tal 0€: xat nuxvouo8ai µ-f} de;. 'to 
' I ~ \ • 
xevov aA.A.a cSia. • • Compare the reformulation of this refu-
tation by Simplicius, in Physicorum, p. 660, lines 2ff.: oux 
avayx~ • • • OUVU'tUl yap . . . . 
l3r am not sure what sort of empirical evidence, if any, 
Aristotle had for this latter example; all that we can say 
about it is that for him it very probably was formed on the 
analog'/ of squeezing the pits out of olives. 
14we may indeed have here two separate arguments, each to 
be considered o.n its own me~its. They will here be treated 
together, though hopefully without neglect of the distinctness 
of each. ~enri Carteron, Aristote Physique, 2 vols. (Paris: 
Societe d'.Edition 11 Les Belles Lettres 11 , 1956-1961), I, 137, 
presents them as a single argument. Besides, Aristotle him-
self takes up the reply to both at once; his answer to one he 
takes to be a sufficient refutation of both: d o' au~0, 
A.oyoc; xa't en\ 'tfjc 'te(j)pai;;--215b9-10. 
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means of it seems to require empty spaces in the body into 
which the food can go in order to provide increase in size in 
the nourished body. First there is presented the empirical 
fact of the growth of the physical object. That this takes 
place through the void is supported first formally on the 
grounds that, since both the nourishment and the nourished ob-
ject are corporeal and the former must penetrate the latter 
for growth to take place, this penetration and subsequent 
growth must take place through the void, for two totally cor-
poreal substances cannot occupy the same place at the same 
time. 
This formal argument for the void is then further sup-
ported by an appeal to empirical evidence (µap1:upLov 0 {;--
213b21): a jar containing some substantial amount of ashes 
(or, perhaps, some powder or chemical)15 will receive as much 
water as if the ashes were not there; obviously, the argument 
would continue, the water was absorbed into the void in the 
ashes--or, vice versa. If, as seems to be the case, this lat-
ter argtunent is part of the general argument from 'growth', 
then it is probably intended as a more apparent illustration by 
analogy of what likely goes on inside the body, showing how the 
food is first absorbed into the body before (or, as) it brings 
about actual increase. 
l5The solution to the problem by Eudemus, as cited by 
Simplicius, in Physicorum, p. 662, lines 25-29, seems to indi-
cate that Some chalky powder (1:(1:aVo(;) WaS involved, US well 
as a process of burning ( xa( Ea) ·with some resultant vapor 
( a'tµ ( c; ) • 
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Aristotle takes up the reply to this argument at 4.7, 
214b2-10, showing that, of the two kinds of increase in size, 
the void is totally otiose in explaining the one and involves 
itself in further difficulties in explaining the other. In 
the first place, he contends, not every instance of increase 
in size need be attributed to the addition of some matter to 
the physical object; and one very clear case in point of this 
is the generation of air (vapor, steam) from water. Assuming 
that this increase in size takes place in an enclosed contain-
er and that there is thus no question of the entry of void 
from the outside to produce the expansion nor of the entry of 
anything solid,16 then there is also no question of the neces-
sity of corporeal interpenetration through a void, for nothing 
new at all enters into the expanding object. Thus, for this 
·kind of increase in size the void is not necessary; there is a 
better alternative explanation, better because the void is 
utterly useless here to explain this phenomenon. 
Now at 214b33ff. Aristotle takes up the argument proper 
for the void in that he takes up specifically the question of 
growth by means of some nourishing substance, and, along with 
it, the question of the 'water and the ashes'; he sees both of 
these as parts of the same question and, in effect, answers 
them together •. 
' 
16some of these assumntions are taken from On the Heav-
~ 3.7, 305bl0ff., where there is a parallel accOUn.t of the 
phenomenon of the chanee of water into air. The additional 
point is made there that the expanded vapor will burst its 
container--evidently an appeal to empirical evidence. 
r 
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Aristotle says, first of all, that these arguments for 
the void involve even further difficulties. 17 Assuming, he 
asserts, that void is to help account for the growth of a phys-
ical object by means of nourishment, one is forced to accept 
what amounts to one of the four alternatives which he lists: 
1) the whole body does not grow, 2) the nourishment is not 
corporeal, 3) two bodies can be in the same place, and 4) the 
whole physical object is empty and void. 
Cherniss18 sees in this refutation by Aristotle a para-
dox: if growth is to be explained by means of void in the bo-
dy, then the whole body is void. And for the paradox to hold 
Cherniss says that Aristotle must assume three conditions, 
which he identifies with the first three of the above-mentioned 
alternatives: the body grows as a whole, nourishment is cor-
poreal, and two bodies cannot occupy the same place. Cherniss 
then rejects the validity of Aristotle's argument by pointing 
out that the atomists do not accept the first condition--that 
the body grows as a whole. But this is to miss the point of 
Aristotle's criticism. 
Simplicius' account of this passage is quite helpful not 
17cherniss, .2.l2.• cit., p. 150, argues that Aristotle says 
that this type of an explanation by means of a void is self-
contradictory. But there i~ no self-contradiction until one 
also assumes along with the theory of the void 'growth every-
where• for the physical object. But Aristotle does not say 
that the account is self-contradictory, but only that it is a 
hinderance, that it 'gets in its own way': au~o~ au~ov 
eµnoo(sel--214b5. 
18
.Q..E.. cit., p. 150. 
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onlY in outlining the argument, but also in showing preci'sely 
what is at issue in the arguement, that is, the question of 
the nourishment and growth of a physical object as a whole. 19 
Indeed, the atomists could not on principle accept any of the 
latter three of Aristotle's alternatives and would likely have 
had no qualms about identifying the first with their position. 
But this first alternative, as Simplicius aptly points out, is 
a matter of empirical evidence; the object does grow as a 
whole. 20 So the argument against the void as accounting for 
l9rn Physicorum, p. 661, especially lines 31-32. Accord-
ing to his analysis the argument seems to resolve into a se-
ries of alternatives thus: 
I. Either food is not body (Aristotle's second item), or 
II. Food is body; but then either 
A. Growth and nourishment do not take place everywhere 
(Aristotle's first item), or 
B. Growth and nourishment do take place everywhere; but 
then either 
1. Body passes through body; two bodies can simul-
taneously be in the same place, or 
2. Body passes through nothing; the nourished object 
is void. 
Presented thus one sees Aristotle's alternatives rather as 
pairs of alternatives. 
20100. cit., p~ 661, lines 32-33: ~nep eo~~ nap~ ~~v 
evapyEl<i'V':""° - · 
Cherniss, .212.• cit., p. 150, points out that Aristotle's 
argument against the atomist position can only hold if the 
body increases everywhere, but that Aristotle's own theory was 
that there was no material increase everywhere; and he cites 
in support of this On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 32lb22-
322a4. He is quite---r'ight in this--respect, but there is in fact 
no discrepancy between Ari~totle's argument and his teaching 
here. There is by Aristotle's theory growth everywhere, but 
only in one of two senses, in the sense that the whole object 
everywhere (assuming a simple object) grows. But there is not 
increase everywhere in the sense that the particular piece of 
matter added to the object is distributed everywhere in that 
object; inasmuch as that piece of matter is distinguishable at 
all, it may remain as matter in one part of the object. This 
is not to say that the whole object does not grow everywhere, 
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growth reduces to an argument against those who would deny the 
real, continuous unity of a physical object; and precisely as 
such it is uniquely appropriate to the atomists' position at 
its very foundations; it certainly does not fail, as Cherniss 
says it does, to take into account those who assume minimal 
quanta. 
The second aspect of this argument, the argument from 
the water poured upon some ashes, shows exactly the same weak-
ness as the first. 21 Neither Aristotle nor Simplicius write 
their reply out in detail; they do not specify their argument 
against the positing of the void to explain this process of 
absorption. Hence, if we may put it into the form of the sets 
of alternatives suggested by Simplicius, it goes like this: 
I) either the ashes are not body at all (in which case the 
but only that the piece of matter as such may not be every-
where in the grown object. -
But Cherniss has neglected to cite the sense in which 
increase everywhere in a growing object does take place, and 
this might well have shown him how the theory and argument of 
Aristotle are not inconsistent with one another. The whole ob-ject does grow in 'form'; its form may.increase like the in-
crease in size of the arc of a circle (to use Aristotle's own 
example) or like a balloon being inflated or like water when 
more water is added; the continuous mass of matter in the ob-ject grows as more matter is assimilated to it; there is no 
portion in it or on it at which this growth is not evident, 
even though the piece of added matter may remain somewhat lo-
calized. When more air is blovm into a partially inflated 
balloon, the whole balloon jncreases in size--so too does the 
air inside--as.a continuous whole. Atomism, along with its 
doctrine of the void, cannot on principle account for such 
growth everywhere in a physical object. 
21Although Aristotle had a constructive solution to the 
example cited in the first aspect of the argument from growth 
to the positing of the void, he has no physical solution to 
the difficulty cited here; but Simplicius does provide one. 
~\ 
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argument for the void is destroyed), or II) the ashes are· body; 
but, if they are body and the jar receives an amount of water 
equal to the amount received when the jar was totally empty, 
then A) either the water does not penetrate everywhere in the 
jar (which is contrary to evidence), 22 or B) it does penetrate 
everywhere; but, if the latter is the case, then either 
1) there can be two bodies in the same place, or 2) water is 
not body, but empty and void; and neither of these latter two 
are acceptable alternatives. Thus, as in the first part of the 
argu,~ent 'growth everywhere' was the key issue, so it is that 
role which is taken up by 'penetration everyv1here 1 in this 
second phase of the argument. Both are central, both seem for 
Aristotle to be a matter of empirical evidence, and both raise 
the central issue of the essential unity of the physical ob-
ject; and it is on these grounds that Aristotle thus criticizes 
those who hold to a void--it contravenes. empirical evidence. 
At Physics 4.6, 213b15-18 the problem of compression was 
raised in connection with the difficulty about the wine, the 
skins, and the jars; this was a specific problem in that there 
was no change of quality or essence involved, and Aristotle had 
answered it as such and in those terms (4.7, 214a32-b2). Then 
22That this is also a matter of empirical evidence seems 
to be supported by a passage at On the Heavens 3.8, 306b9ff. 
Aristotle is there talking about the elements having specific 
sha~es, and he refutes this notion by claiming that evidently 
(~alve~al) water accommodates itself to the shape of its con-
~,ainer and fills_ it _everywhere as ~ continuo:-is v1ho~e: OU yap 
v ~n~e~o nav~ax~ ~ou nepL€xov~o~ ~o oAov. Water is also used 
to illustrate the unity of parts in a true combination as a 
continuous whole at On Generation and Corruption 1.8, 326a33ff. 
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immediately thereafter the specific problem connected with 
•growth' and the void had been raised (4.6, 213bl8-22); and 
Aristotle in his reply and analysis of this problem had first 
raised and then given a preliminary answer to what he felt was 
the more general problem--that of increase in general (4.7, 
214b2-3)--before replying (214b3-10) more specifically to the 
argument that had been raised; and at that point he does not 
say much more about the general problem of change. 
But Aristotle rightly sees that there is considerably 
more at stake here than specific answers to specific argu-
ments, for these specific answers and arguments have not yet 
really gotten to the heart of the matter. Indeed, these spe-
cific argu.~ents do in principle raise the larger question of 
the role of void in the expansion and contraction of physical 
objects in general, and it is this larger question which Aris-
totle takes up at Physics 4.g. 23 And the specific form that 
this larger question takes is whether recourse to the void is 
the only feasible one of a set of alternatives, that is, 
whether void is necessary to explain expansion and contraction: 
i \ -
'I XEVOV E(Val l~ &v&yx~,· ouµn1AEroeal y~p xai OUVEXEWCE(-
VE08a1 OU'X. evotxe'tal aA.A.w,. 24 Now for Aristotle the basic 
meaning of 'necessary' seems to be that there is no other 
" 23Chernfss, ~· cit., pp. 153-154, argues that Aris-
totle's criticisms do not actually meet the special arguments 
for this thesis, but falls back on the fact that the void does 
not explain natural motion. As we proceed it will hopefully 
that Aristotle does meet them and how he meets them. 
24216b28-30. 
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feasible alternative, that it simply cannot be otherwise and 
still make sense: \ \ 1 s:;. ~ 'L " 25 'l:O µT) eVuexuµevov u'A'Aw' EXEL v. And this 
is precisely what Aristotle intends to show about the 'neces-
sity' of the void, that, as an explanation, it involves fur-
ther serious difficulties and that it is not the only reason-
able alternative; that there is indeed another alternative 
which is, besides, consistent with the essential unity of phys-
ical objects. 
The first argument (216b30-33) against such an explana-
tion of expansion and contraction in terms of the.void is that 
internal void, inasmuch as it is conceived as something sepa-
rate and distinct, labors under the same difficulty as the void 
in general does, namely, that it is--as pure extension--an un-
warrented abstraction of a property that we perceive only in 
connection with physical objects. This criticism is an impor-
tant one and will be taken up separately later. 
Secondly, if the void here is, on the other hand, not 
conceived of as something separate from physical objects, not 
something distinct, but is still in and part of physical ob-
jects in some sense, 26 then it cannot explain any kind of 
change at all, including expansion and contraction, for it will 
25rietauhysics 5. 5, 1Ql5a34. This Aristotle says is basic 
to all the other senses in which 'necessary' is used: xa'l:a 
'l:oG~o ~b dvayxafov xa; 'l:d'A'Aa 'Afye'l:a( nru, axav~a ~vayxara--
1015a35-36. 
26simplicius, in Physicorum, p. 684, lines 24-25, de-
scribes this as that which disperses throughout the object in 
' small 9its, but is still nQt separate from the object: xa'l:a 
µtxpa evecr~apµevou ••• xat µ~ xwpto'l:ou. 
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thus not be that in which (or, into which) movement occurs: 
- -
'Kl vfioewt;; a'{ri;,ov oux o\hw 'CO XEVOV ~ ev ~ --217al-2. Indeed-, 
under those conditions there is only one type of change that 
it could explain, and that with a little more reasonableness, 
and that is the upward motion of physical objects: ou nao~t;; 
J. ,, 
X l V qO E Wt;; a L 'C l 0 V 
• • • And, as Aristotle goes on 
to point out, it does not even do a sufficiently adequate job 
of that. 27 Aristotle is here certainly not simply falling 
"back upon the thesis that it cannot explain natural mo-
tion.1128 He insists that the argument is part of a disjunc-
tion:29 either the void is conceived of as something separate 
or not. Under the first alternative there is the difficulty 
about void being an unwarranted abstraction, and in the second 
there is the difficulty that it fails to be able to explain 
that which it was intended to explain. 
Having thus shown that the theory of the void is unten-
able on either one of the two alternatives just mentioned, 
Aristotle now proceeds to show that it is indeed not necessary, 
that it is not the only feasible alternative to account for 
expansion and contraction. These can be explained much more 
reasonably, Aristotle feels, in terms of a single matter cap-
27This criticism wil~ be taken up separately in the next 
section in conjunction with the question of the void as an 
explanation of motion. 
28ch . . t 154 erniss, .2.£• ..£!._., p. • 
29 el µEV • • • d 0 t-..216b30-33. 
r 
! 
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able of contrary qualifications and in terms of potency and 
act. There will in this way be change, the universe will not 
absurdly bulge (as some had apparently supposed would be the 
only alternative to the void), and there is thus no need for 
an unwarrented void. This sort of account which Aristotle 
offers as a counter-proposal will then more fully and adequate-
ly explain the expansion of water into air and the contraction 
of air into water. Water, actually of a given volume, is 
potentially larger; and it is quite evident (O~AOV oe--217a27) 
that this must be the case, for when water changes into air, 
it does so by retaining the same matter, by not taking on any-
thing else in addition.30 And not only does this do a better 
job of explaining the phenomenon without encountering the 
above difficulties, but it also has the added advantage of 
accounting as well for the real unity of the physical object 
and the real identity of that whole object as it undergoes some 
change in quality (e.g., becomes hotter): , ~ " , ' ' ecr~l ~o au~o nuxvov 
xa& µavov. xa1 µ(a DA~ ao~wv--217al0-ll. And both the unity, 
as we have seen, and the identity of such a physical object 
are given in empirical evidence. 
The Internal Void and Locomotion 
~~~~ ~~ ----
Aristotle has thus fa; shovm that void is not necessary 
to explain the types of 'motion' which, by Aristotle's own 
30217a27-28: o~av y~p Es uoa~o~ aDp yev~al, ~ a6~D 
UA~ ou npoaAa~oGoa ~l aAAo • Evidently this means taking on 
neither additional matter nor any additional void. 
standards, ~ay be classified as not directly involving the 
locomotion of physical objects, primarily increase and de-
crease. But it is of the essence of ato::.nism to reduce all 
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types of movement to locomotion. imd so Aristotle must deal 
specifically with that question. And this he takes up early 
in his discussion of the reasons for positing the void to 
explain movement in general. 
The Eleatics had argued that there is no real motion, 
for 1vn1at is' is 'one and immoveable' and that motion is im-
possible without a void. 'Void', they argued, is 'what is not' 
and hence does not exist at all. The atomists conceded to the 
Eleatics that motion is impossible without a void, but pro-
posed that 'what is not' does nevertheless exist.31 Motion, 
for the atomists, was a matter of empirical evidence and could 
only, they felt, be explained by positing an existing void. 
Thus the atomist argument for the existence of the void rests 
basically on the empirical fact of motion: since there is ob-
viously motion, there must be void. Void is a necessary con-
dition for motion and is precisely that in which such motion 
must occur: ev ~ XlVCi'tal --Physics 4.7, 214a25. 
But, as Aristotle rightly points out, void is not a nee-
d •t• f t• 11'.. , J;I I L I , essary con i ion or mo ion: ouveµta v avuyx~, et xLVDOt~ 
,, 
corr' v, ' et vat , ' ~evov __ 214a26. And in this respect the Eleatics 
3lGen. et Corr. 1.8, 325a25-28: [Aeux&nno~ oµOAQy~oa~ 
••• -roi'ZQ£ ~ 7V'Xarraoxeuaz;:ouot v w<;; oox 6.'v x(VDOL v oJoav 
~v - _t ' ' ,, ' - ,, I ' "' II u,eu XeVOU 'tu 'Te XeVOV µDov, xa& 'TOU OV'TO~ ouoev µDov ~DOJV 
etva1. For evidence of a similar nature of the influence of 
Eleatic arguments, see Physics 1.3, 187al-3. 
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--and Helissus in particular--were wrong ( Me)d ooov 'f>..ae e: 
--214a27-28) when they argued that motion was imposeible with-
out a void. And so the atomists' justification for positing 
a void is weakened. 
In the first place, Aristotle points o~t, motion in gen-
eral (not restricted to locomotion) certainly does not require 
a void, for 'alteration' is quite possible without B.void: 
a A AO l ouo8a& yap 'tO nA.i)p e:c; EVO exe:tta1 --214a28. Secondly--and 
here the argument specifically affects the atomists' position--
void is not even a necessary condition for locomotion; it is, 
he argues certainly possible to explain locomotion without 
resorting to the positing of void or empty space; one can ex-
plain locomotion simply by positing a circular interchange of 
parts in motion. 32 And so void is not necessary to explain 
either motion in general or locomotion in particular• 
Furthermore, Aristotle claims, there is empirical evi~ 
dence ( oi)Ao\l--214a31) for the occurence of locomotiotl in full 
and continuous substances (-cwv ouve:xwv--214a3l-32); }'1.e cites 
the exa....'D.ple of liquids. Liquids are seen to be cont:inuous 
substances, filling every part of their containers. Eddies, 
circular movements, evidently occur in such continuot.lS liquids. 
And so in these cases at least we have evidence of ttie occur-
rence of locomotion without entailing a void into wh~Ch the 
32214 29 31 • 0' ' .. , , ' 
, a - : OU c 'tT)V XQ'tQ 'tOTCOV Xl Vi")OIV• aµa yap e:vo~xe:~al ,une:sieyai a>..>..~Aotc;, ouoe:voc; OV'tOt; OlQO't~µc'tOC xwptO'tOU 
napa tta owµa-ca -ca x1vooµe:va. 
It might be validly contended that motion coulil not begin 
in a plenum, but it can certainly~ there. 
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f moving parts of water must move. Thus empirical evidence con-
firms the fact the void is not necessary for locomotion. And 
the atooists' positing of void as a necessary condition for 
motion is thus unwarrented. 
In what sense then is the void to explain the locomotion 
of physical objects? It may do so, as was pointed out earli-
er, only in one of two conceivable ways: as something sepa-
rate from corporeal substance (as that in which movement takes 
place), or as something internal to physical objects (in some 
sense not conceived as apart from them). Since we have been 
dealing thus far ~ith the 'internal void', we take up the ex-
planation of locomotion in terms of it first. 
There are two major sections in which Aristotle deals 
specifically with this problem: Physics 4.9, and.£!! the Heav-
~ 4.2.33 An internal void can account for the locomotion of 
a physical object only as an explanation of its weight. And, 
since the void by definition has absolutely no heaviness, 34 it 
can explain only either the 'natural upward movement' of phys-
ical objects or their relative lightness--that is, the fact 
that object A is lighter than object B. 
The case against the former of these two views Aristotle 
33cherniss, 22.• cit., p. 211, note 253, rightly points 
out that On ~ Heavens 4.~, 308b30-309al8 is talking primari-
ly about complex bodies, and that the question of the weight 
of the individual atoms is not specifically mentioned at this 
point. 
- 34Physics 4. 7' 214a2-3: X£VOV, EV ~ µ T)O tv eo-i; l {3apu fi 
XOU<pOV • 
35 presents first at Physics 4.9, 216b35ff. If an internal 
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void explains the natural upward motion of objects, as inflat-
ed skins raise nets in the water,36 then void must have a mo-
tion of its own (which is impossible) and a distinct void to 
which it (the void) naturally moves (which is absurd); it will 
leave unexplained a natural downward motion (since, in that 
case, all things are moving upward at different speeds). 
Furthermore, at On~ Heavens 4.2, 309bl7ff. Aristotle 
raises the objection that, if the internal void is like the 
external, all void would then move upward and all solid down-
ward; and so there is nothing to keep the solid and the void 
from being and staying totally separate. Indeed, if the void 
is to have natural movements and, as the proportion of void in 
an object increases, its speed increases, it follows then that 
separate void ought to move at an absolute speed (which is in-
conceivable and thus again impossible).37 Thus it is in this 
sense that void cannot explain locomotion. By itself this 
argument of Aristotle's does not render the supposition of a. 
void untenable, but it has at least shown in Aristotle's view 
that void fails to explain motion and weight in one way. It 
35Although this apparently does riot directly affect De-
mocritus, still it seems best to include it, for the argument 
against Democritus' void g~ins effectiveness by its inclusion; 
it shows that-Aristotle is in fairness attempting to exhaust 
all the possibilities, that there is no sense in which the 
void necessarily and adequately explains motion. 
36Ross, Physics, ~ 12.£., p. 593. 
37Physics 4.9, 217a6ff. 
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is further only a .E§:!:! of Aristotle's refutation, the whole of 
which will show that there is .E-.2. way in which it can explain 
motion. 
Aristotle has thus shown that the void of the atomists 
cannot explain the movement of an object, in that it 'causes' 
the 'natural upward movement' of that object. And he further 
maintains that such void cannot account for the •relative 
weights' of objects, that is, that one object is lighter (or 
heavier) than another. Besides, such an explanation of the 
•relative weights' of objects in terms of the void which they 
contain involves one in contradicting empirical evidence. 
This matter of relative weight is ta....~en up at .Q!l ~ 
Heavens 4.2, 309alff. Aristotle readily admits that those who 
posit solid atoms (in contrast to those who claim that things 
are made up of geometrical figures--en(neoa) are better able 
to account for the relative weights of various physical ob-
jects. For example, the ato1!lists quite reasonably and consis-
tently propose to explain the fact that A is lighter than B, 
quite apart from their bulk--indeed, even when A is larger than 
B--by saying that A has more void than B.38 Thus 'more void' 
is for them in all cases the explanation or cause (both a'{ rr;, ov 
' and ot a 
object. 
1:ourr;o are used) of less weight in any given physical 
'I: But, as Aristotle says, this sort of account is not 
38This can be put into the form of a syllogism (and Aris-
totle is likely to have thought of it in those terms) as fol-
lows, with the 'middle term' as 'cause' or 'explanation': 
A has more void; more void means lighter; and therefore A is 
lighter. 
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precise enough to explain adequately even the relative weights 
of physical objects. In order to give this type of explanation 
the precision it requires, one must say that A is lighter than 
B not only because A contains more void, but also, one must 
add, because A contains less solid matter than B. Failure to 
make that addition will involve one in the absurd consequence 
that a large amount of gold, because it contains more void, is 
lighter than a small ~~ount of fire.3 9 All instance of A con-
taining more void than B do not coincide with those in which 
A is lighter than B; thus, Aristotle remarks, Democritus' ex-
planation fails, because of its lack of precision, to explain 
relative weight. 
Furthermore, even granting such precision, Aristotle 
shows at On the Heavens 4.2, 310al-15 that Democritus' expla-
nation in terms of atoms and void cannot adequately account 
for the phenomenon of 'absolute weight', the tendency of some 
bodies to move in a given direction, as fire moves upward nat-
urally and earth moves naturally downward. Aristotle has 
shown at Physics 4.9 that void cannot be a positive factor in 
the upward motion of things; and he repeats that argument here 
in~ the Heavens. 40 But, if void has no positive influence in 
39w. K. c. Guthrie, ~istotle On the Heavens (Cambridge: 
Harvard UnivePsity Press, ~60), p. jj6, note a, rightly ex-
plains against Stocks that there is no question here of the 
ratio of solid to void in a given physical object. 
404.2, 309a33-b29; Aristotle repeats some of the points 
he had made in the Physics and adds others--for example, the 
likelihood of the absolute separation of all void from all 
solid. 
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explaining lightness, then, although the atomists posit con-
traries as elements, they are no better off than those who ex-
plain weight in terms of only one natural element. 
But why should this be so? Aristotle's refutation of 
Democritus' attempt to account for absolute weight in terms of 
void is as follows (310al-14). Let us assume, as Democritus 
does, that there are two contraries, namely, atoms and void 
(310al), and that these are to be identified respectively with 
that which is absolutely heavy and absolutely light.41 The 
difficulties with this latter part of the assumption have al-
ready been outlined by Aristotle at 309b20-29, nai~ely, that 
this leaves us without an explanation of their motions (the 
void itself was to explain motion, and it leaves us in the 
unreasonable position of having to explain the motion of the 
void by means of the void). And so there is now no reason why 
these two contraries should not simply be and remain separate 
and distinct from one another, each in its own natural place. 
And so the only feasible alternative is to remove from 
the void any positive influence on the weight of the physical 
object; and so the only real factor in the weight of physical 
objects will be their atoms. 
But still, even granting the positive influence of both 
atoms and void on the wei~hts of objects, we will still be 
41r am assuming with Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 691, lines 
19-21, that this is an enthyme:ne with the specified assumption 
to be supplied as part of this areument. This assumption is 
expressed by Aristotle earlier in the text, at 309bl8-20. 
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without an adequate explanation of how the intermediate things 
between these two absolutes (that is, composite bodies) are 
heavier or lighter than one another (310a2-3), 42 neither in 
terms of the amount of 'full' and 'void' in such an object nor 
in terms of a proportion of •full' to 'void' in it. This 
Aristotle had already pointed out earlier in this chapter of 
On the Heavens; so let us take up these criticisms now. 
--
First of all, Aristotle had said, the quantity of atoms 
and void in two different elements will never explain fully 
their differences of natural motion. This, it seems evident, 
becomes quite clear when one attempts to work this out in a 
specific instance. Assume that the natural motion of a speci-
fic element is worked out in terms of the amount of atoms over 
against the amount of void; a given sample amount of water 
will have a downward tendency measurable in terms of the excess 
of full over empty in it. But, if this is the case, then there 
will be an amount of water great enough so that the difference 
between downward and upward pull (that is, the numerical excess 
of full over void) is greater than that excess in a small 
amount of earth, so that--contrary to evidence--the water will 
be heavier than the earth. Although Aristotle nowhere explic-
42Guthrie, On~ He~vens, p. 340, note 3 (evidently fol-
lowing Alexander--Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 692, lines 12-15) 
explains that what is meant bythe 'intermediates' here is air 
and water, on the grounds that two of the bodies have been ac-
counted for. But this implies that the full and the empty are 
being thought of in terr:i.s of earth and fire, which hardly seems 
lilcely. It is more likely that the reference is to all four 
elements (or, rather, to composite bodies); see Simplicius, 
loc. cit., lines 2lff. 
--
106 
itly makes this refutation (probably because no one had·ever 
held this hypothetical view), this seems to be the tendency of 
the refutation that he does make at· 309a31-b2. Thus purely 
quantitative excess or defect will not explain the differences 
of natural motions of the elements. 
But an explanation in terms of proportions of solid to 
void in the elements will not really help either, for, while 
it may satisfactorily account for.differences between ele-
ments, it will not explain a phenomenon that occurs in connec-
tion with two different quantities of the same element. Larg-
er amounts of the same element are seen to have faster natural 
motions; for example, a larger amount of earth will move down-
ward more rapidly than a smaller amount. And, since the pro-
portion of full to empty must remain the same in the two dif-
ferent amounts of the same element, proportion must fail here 
too to provide an adequate explanation (309b8-17). 
So Aristotle has introduced all of these considerations 
to show that, if full and empty are simply taken as contrary 
principles of motion, there can be no explanation of the 
weights of the elements relative to one another. He now goes 
on to show that with such principles of motion one could not 
explain either the weight of these elements relative to these 
two absolutes., that is, ts show precisely how each of the ele-
ments is heavier than the void and lighter than the full. 
Both full and void are absolutes (like zero), and so an atom 
moving through the void would have to move at an absolute 
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speed, which is inconceivable (Physics 4.8, 215a24-216a25) in 
relation to any known speed. But void as a contrary absolute 
must also move at an absolute speed (Physics 4.9, 217a6-10). 
Thus, since both are absolutes, it will be impossible to con-
ceive or formulate any relationship between either of them 
and the elements. 
Thus Aristotle is right when he says that an explanation 
of motion which takes the full and the empty as principles of 
motion--as absolute heaviness and absolute lightness--cannot 
in the end explain the relative weights of the elements. 
This means that the only view open to Democritus was 
that any natural motion or absolute weight--and the evidence 
that we have for such motion and weight--was only an illusion; 
it means that there is no such thing as that which is absolute-
ly light (µ~e' dTIAWs elva' µ~eev xou~ov--310a9-10), that ob-
jects 'move upward' because of some pressure ( UAA 1 ••• ~ 
ex8Al~6µevov--310al0). This is exactly what Democritus had 
done; the very term used here (ex8Al~oµevov ) is, with some 
variations, used repeatedly in an accoilnt of breathing which 
is specifically attributed to Democritus. 43 Such a view then 
denies natural motion and absolute weight altogether, and thus 
cannot in principle account for some of the phenomena which it 
had intended ~o preserve, for it must hold that a large amount 
of fire or air is heavier than a small amount of water or 
43on Breathing 4, 47lb24ff ., where the following forms 
are used: EX0Af~eooa,, ex8A(~ov~os, 8A(~lV, OUV8A~~ov. Com-
pare a similar account at Qg the Soul 1.2, 404al0-13. 
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earth, and this is contrary to empirical evidence, and thus 
impossible (310al2-14). 
Thus we have seen that as an internal principle of mo-
tion the void cannot in fact account adequately for the speci-
fic examples of motion it claims to account for, nor can it in 
principle account sufficiently for the weight of physical ob-
jects or of the elements themselves--either in a relative or 
in an absolute sense of weight. 
The Void Considered as Senarate 
-- -
We have thus far been considering the void as something 
internal to physical objects, as something conceived of as not 
separate from them; and we have seen that as such the void can 
not adequately account for phenomena. We pass now to a con-
sideration of the void as something separate, as that in which 
things are in motion ( ev ~ xiver~a&), no matter whether those 
things be atoms or the physical objects which are constructed 
from these atoms. And Aristotle will show that considered as 
such the void cannot account for locomotion--neither that of 
physical objects nor that of the atoms themselves. And he will 
further show that, since qualitative changes in physical ob-
jects are reduced by the atomists to the locomotion of the 
atoms, the void will not afcount also for such changes in phys-
ical objects. 
But before beginning with Aristotle's criticis::is it may 
be appropriate to point out that Aristotle seems to present a 
fairly consistent picture of the role of the void in the theory 
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of the atomists; he regularly describes it as the necessary 
, 
condition of locomotion, primarily for the atoms: ou ••• 
x(VT)OlV el µ~ xevov. 44 He, furthermore, explicitly denies that 
the atomists looked upon the void as in any sense an efficient 
cause of motion: 'tOlUU'tY)V ••• ouoeµ(av a{'t(av .45 In spite 
of the fact that there is no evidence to support the supposi-
tion that the void is anything more than a necessary condition 
of motion, Guthrie seems to feel that Leucippus and Democritus 
looked upon the void as being something more, something more 
like a "positive cause of motion. 1146 But, if this 'something 
more like a positive .cause of motion' comes close to being a 
concept of an efficient cause or of a 'final cause'--in the 
sense of that place to which an atom naturally moves--then it 
is inconceivable that Aristotle would not only have failed to 
44Physics 4.6, 213b5; see also 4.7; 214a24. 
45Physics 8.9, 265b23-24. The reference is to a type of 
cause like 1 Love' and 'Strife' in Empedocles and the 'Tiiind' in 
Anaxagoras. This is further supported b~ S~mp~icius, In Physi-
corum, p. 1318, lines 3lff.: ol no&TJ'tlxou Oe µY) µvriae€v-n;<;; 
a(rc(ou. 
46Guthrie, History, II, 398-399. In speaking of the void 
as a sine oua non of movement he says: "I would nevertheless 
doubt""""Yilietner ~appeared so to Leucippus and Democritus" (p. 
398, note 2); and then he speaks of their anmver as "corning at 
a stage in the history of thought when the need for a positive 
cause of motion was entani?led with the lack of a true concep-
tion of the void 11 (p. 399 Jt. The only evidence which he cites 
to support his supposition seems to be the passage in which 
Aristotle says that void is the cause of motion, Physics 4.8, 
214bl6-17: a't'tlov ••• x1v1jot:wc;. But this seems to say no 
more tnan 4.7, 214a24, where the void is a'{-rLov xlv1joeu)c; ourcwc; 
w~ EV ~ XlVEl'rQl. And this is the point that Simplicius, ..!.!!. 
Physicorum, p. 658, lines 16-20, and p. 664, lines 3ff ., makes 
in discussing this issue. 
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mention it, but also would have said so positively that the 
void was not an efficient cause and that the atomists deny any 
kind of final cause. So, in view of the lack of any evidence 
to the contrary, we have no recourse but to follow Aristotle 
and agree that the atomists likely looked upon their void as 
no more than a necessary condition of motion. Hor did they 
need any more than that, inasmuch as they claimed eternal mo-
tion for their atoms, as Guthrie rightly points out. 47 
But there is considerably more at stake here than simply 
the question of the locomotion of atoms; all other kinds of 
'motions' of physical objects are affected as well. For the 
void is conceived of as separate even when it is internal to 
what we call physical objects; it was posited as a response of 
Leucippus to the argu,~ent that there could be no motion if 
there were no separate void, and that there could be no multi-
plicity without that which keeps them apart. 48 And Leucippus' 
response was that the void does indeed exist, that there is a 
radical multiplicity of atoms ( a:rre:t pa .,-;o n/\T)8oi;;--325a30), and 
that there is no essential unity either of the universe in 
general or of physical objects. The only true unit for him is 
the atom, and there is no real unity apart from the unity of 
t I F. ~ "" I J. "\ .t.e ~ \ I 1\ he individual atoms: EX u~ 'tOU Xa't U~•J elaV EVO<; OUX aV 
ye:veo8al n/\~eo,, ouo' ex 't~ aA.D8wi;; no/\A.wv EV --325a36-37. That 
47History, II, 399. 
48Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 325a4-6: XlVD8f1VaL o' _oux tv ouva-
oeal µ~ "O"\i1:oi;;-Xt:~XEXWPLOµEVOU 1 ouo' au TIOAAQ ElVUl µ~ OV'tO<; 
't"OU 0 l E ( pyo V'toc; • 
-, 
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separate void in which the atoms move the atomists felt was 
essential to their explanation of the generation of physical 
objects and their passing away; 49 and they used it to explain 
every other kind of alteration of physical objects. 50 All mo-
tions are reduced by the atomists to the locomotion of the 
atoms in the void: "none of the other types of motion (except 
locomotion) belong to their primary bodies, but only to those 
objects composed of them, for they say that things increase 
and diminish and are altered ( aAAotouo8at) as atomic bodies 
join or separate" (Physics 8.9, 265b27-29). Thus a successful 
refutation of a separate void as an explanation or as a neces-
sary condition of the motion of the atoms is a refutation as 
well of any explanation of all types of motion as posited by 
the atomists. 
We have so far, in connection with conceiving the void 
as internal to physical objects and in some sense not separable 
fro~ them, seen that in Physics 4.6-7, although the atomists 
thought that void is necessary for locomotion, Aristotle valid-
ly contends that void is necessary neither for locomotion51 nor 
for an explanation of such phenomena as compression, expansion, 
49Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 325a32-b5: )<.~' ouv,o't"aµeva µev 
YEV£0LV TIO'Terv, OtUAUOµeva oe ~eopav ••• CLU 't"OU X£VOU ytvo-
µEVTJs 't"~~ otaAuoeW<;; xaL 't"D~ ~eopa~ 
, 
50Gen. ~t Corr. 1.8, 325b2-3: oo.,;w nCi.aav aAA.o(u)Otv xa'l 
nav 't"O 1LUOX£LV 't"OU't"OV y(vea8at 't"bV 't"ponov. 
5lsee Physics 4.6, 214a28ff. 
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and growth. 52 We had (at pae;e 100, above) postponed the·argu-
. ment and refutation of the void as explaining the locomotion 
of physical objects as something external and separate, for, 
inas~uch as the void inside of such objects is still a void in 
which locomotion takes place, it is for all intents and pur-
poses separate; and, as such, will be open to precisely those 
criticisms which tell against any separate void--whether in 
the universe at large or in physical objects. 
Aristotle's refutation of the atomist position on void 
as an explanation of motion is formulated most fully in Physics 
4.8 and in On ~ Heavens 3.2. And here, as Cherniss rightly 
points out, the refutation is for the most part formulated in 
terms of 'natural' and 'forced' motion. 53 Inasmuch then as 
physical objects do in some sense have weight, the refutation 
will apply more obviously to them. But, since there is a 
thorny question as to whether the atoms themselves have weight, 
its application to them is not so clear. And so, in view of 
the fact of this controversy, it seems inevitable that before 
proceeding with the refutation we come to some sort of conclu-
sion about the weight of the atoms and hence about the appro-
priateness of some of Aristotle's arguments to them also. 
52Fhysics 4.6, 213al5-21, and 4.7, 214a32-bll. 
53 l Op. cit., p. 194. Althoueh Cherniss does say that the 
difficultTes-wii'ich Aristotle raises depend for their validity 
on Aristotle's concept of these two kinds of motion, I will try 
to show that this is not necessarily so, that the difficulties 
are valid, independently of the uniqueness of Aristotle's con-
cepts of such kinds of motion. 
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There are two items in the doxographic tradition which 
seem explicitly to deny weight to the atoms of Democritus: 
Aetius Placita 1.3.18 and 1.12.6. 54 These statements have led 
various scholars to tamper with the statement of Aristotle at 
on Generation and Corruption 1.8, 326a9-10: xa(~oi ~apu~epov 
-
a1pe~wv--the most obvious meaning of which is that the weight 
of the atoms increases in proportion as their size increases. 
Cherniss, for example, interprets this as meaning that each 
atom has relative weight when compared to any other. 55 Both 
Brieger and Liepmann admit weight as an original property of 
the atoms; 56 Liepmann says that this weight only comes into 
effect in the vortex and in the world of physical objects. 
This is the view adopted substantially by most scholars. 57 
Although Zeller argues that if they do have weight they must 
54As cited in Hermann Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, reprinted in 1958), pp. 285 and 311. 
55.Q.E.. cit., p. 97, note 412. Cherniss is concerned to 
show that Aristotle says nothing about size in regard t9 the 
weight of atoms because he does not want size as a factor in 
the amount of heat a spherical atom may have. But their size 
may be inconsequential to that particular argument in Aris-
totle and may have been introduced to explain the weight of 
the atoms. But their size too is important, though not to 
the argument about heat in atoms, but to the softness and 
breakability of atoms; the larger they are the more vulnerable 
to division. 
' 56Brieger, Die Urbewe n der Atome und die Weltentsteh-fg bei Leucip"Q, uiiCrDemokrit 18ffi; Liepmann, Die Mechanik 
er te'Ucinp-Demokrrtischen Atome (1885). I have not seen 
these Y:orks; they are cited from Burnet, .Q.E.• cit., p. 345, 
and from others. 
57For example, Bailey, 2.E.• cit., and Alfieri, .2.E.• cit. 
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fall, the original fall of the atoms is likely to be a post-
Aristotelian correction of atomism, and may for that reason be 
discounted. 58 Burnet59 points out that Liepmann's view might 
be better expressed by saying that, since the weight produces 
no effect, it does not exist, that the concept of absolute 
weight as an essential attribute of body did not occur to the 
early physicists. Kirk60 basically accepts.this view; and 
this also seems to be the view of Guthrie, although he does 
not explicitly say so. 61 
In what sense then is weight to be attributed to the 
atoms? It certainly does not seem to function when they are 
simply in free motion in the void; their 'free motion' in the 
void is nothing but a mechanistic 'forced motion'. But even 
in this free motion it seems doubtful that Democritus felt 
that his atoms ceased to have weight simply because they did 
not tend to move downward. For the atoms obviously do have a 
weight which does function when the atoms form physical ob-
jects, for Guthrie rightly argues that otherwise Aristotle 
would certainly have criticized Democritus for forming heavy 
objects out of weightless atoms. 62 Their weight seems to 
function as well in the vortex, with atoms moving by size to 
58Guthrie, History, II, 401. 
' 59 . 
.Q.E.. cit., pp. 342ff., especially p. 345, note 1. 
60
rn Kirk and Raven, .2.E.• .£!!., pp. 415-416. 
61
see his History, II, 403, 410. 
62Ibid., p. 403. 
.. 
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different positions. To suppose that the atoms had weight 
only on those occasions when that weight functioned might in-
deed have given Aristotle reason to see here an anticipation 
of potency and act--with the non-fUnctioning weight being in 
effect a potential weight. Hence it seems more reasonable to 
agree more substantially with the position of Liepmann, that 
is, that the atoms have weight, although it does not always 
function. Thus these atoms can, when considered in isolation 
and apart from their free motion in the void, be said to have 
weight. Thus Aristotle's criticisms apply not only to physi-
cal objects, but in principle as well to the atoms. 
Furthermore, if we accept this view, the divergence of 
opinion on this matter in the post-Aristotelian era might be 
more readily explained as being due to Aristotle's own view of 
weight functioning as a natural downward motion. In this way, 
in one sense, Democritus' atoms had weight (when considered by 
themselves); but again, in another sense, they did not, in 
that such weight did not fUnction as the cause of an original 
motion, nor did it influence in any way the free movement of 
the atoms in the void. It is in this latter context of their 
movement in the void that the two passages from the Placita 
63 mention the weightlessness of the atoms of Democritus. 
To return to the qu~stion of an explanation of motion 
63At 1.3.18 it is mentioned that Epicurus added weight 
a~ a property Of atoms, UVQyXl') yap, ~no(, XlVEl08Ul ~a owµa~a 
~~ ~oo ~dpouc TIAl')y~. 1 .12.6: ~dpoc µ~v o6x 1XElV, XlVEio8al 
OE xa~' QAAl')Ao~un(av EV ~Q ane(p4l. 
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and the role of an external void in this explanation, Aris-
totle's most extensive treatment of this problem and the dif-
ficulties involved in using the void for such an explanation 
is at Physics 4.8. The beginning of chapter eight (214bl2-28) 
offers what Aristotle considers to be an overview of the gen-
eral difficulties with positing a separate void. Aristotle 
considers first the question of how void can explain motion 
(214bl3-23--this corresponds roughly to the more detailed 
criticism later in the chapter at 214b28-216a26). And this 
latter explanation involves conceiving of the void as a sepa-
rate place into which movement takes place (214b20-22). He 
then goes on to consider the basic question of the void by it-
self, apart from the question of motion, void as a separate 
and empty place (214b23-28--which corresponds to 216a26-
b21). 64 
Let us then consider first what Aristotle has to say 
about void as an explanation for motion in his 'general over-
view' at the beginning of this chapter (214bl2-28). Aristotle 
in effect asks here in what sense void can be an explanation of 
motion. He considers various alternatives and finds each of 
them inadequate. The first alternative which he suggests is 
that the void is to explain the natural motion of the elements, 
the type of lqcomotion whi~h is most important to Aristotle. 
It is quite likely that Democritus admitted some such move-
64r will be concerned here with the question of an expla-
nation of motion as presented in Phvsics 4.8 and in parallel 
passages, and will postpone the question of void in itself. 
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ments and attempted an explanation of them either in terms of 
' 65 
mechanical pressure or of an 'upward surge'. It is on this 
point that Aristotle feels that Democritus is particularly 
vulnerable; the question of natural motion becomes quite crit-
ical in the more detailed refutation to be taken up later 
(215al-24). Here Aristotle feels that it is quite sufficient 
to say that an external void offers no more an explanation of 
h t 1 t . ( s::.. -"\ u , ,, \ ' ,, ,, -sue na ura mo ion vD~ov 0~1 oux av ~o xEvov at~lov ElD ~D~ 
~opac--214bl5-16) than did the internal void (On the Heavens 
4.2). 
Well, if void, Aristotle says, cannot explain natural 
motion, What does it explain (~(voe oJv Ul~lOV eo~at ~O XEVOV; 
--Physics 4.8, 214bl6)? It seems most reasonable to assume 
that the question is general in nature ana is, not asking about 
void being an explanation of a particular direction or kind of 
motion. Aristotle continues after this question: "For it 
seems to be an explanation of locomotion, but it does not even 
explain this" (214bl6-17). His point seems to be that void 
was posited simply to account for locomotion, as a necessary 
condition of it; but, since it does not account for this, 
there is nothing left for which it can account, and hence no 
reason to assume its existence. 
W. D. Ro~s in his com!nentary on the passage seems to as-
sume two things in regard to this passage which tend to weaken 
65For an explanation of upward movement by pressure, see 
On the Heavens 4.2, 310al0, and On Breathing 4, 47lb24ff.; for 
the 'surge' see On the Heavens 4:b, 313al4ff. 
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~(vo~ (214bl6) refers to a specific kind or direction of move-
ment, for in his 'analysis' of this passage he summarizes: 
11 V1hat then can be the locomotion of which it is thoueht to be 
the cause?1166 Furthermore, he supposes that there is evident-
ly an ambiguity of the word ai~tov at stake, for, he says, the 
supporters of the void posit it as ano.'l~tov in the sense of 
•necessary condition', but Aristotle says that void cannot be 
an ai~tov in the sense of 'determining cause' of locomotion in 
any particular direction. This, he contends, makes Aristotle's 
argument here worthless. 67 But neither of these assumptions 
are necessary or warrented. 
As to Ross,· first assu,~ption, it has just been pointed 
out that it is not necessary to take ~(vo~ as referring to some 
· particular direction or kind of motion. Ross apparently would 
have Aristotle says: external void does not determine (cause) 
the direction of locomotion of a body (214bl7), and furthermore 
(eLt) void does not determine the direction of locomotion of a 
body placed in it (214bl7-24); all this in spite of the fact 
that Ross himself lists these two as separate arguments (p. 
380). But Aristotle's point is evidently that void v1as sup-
posed to be a necessary condition of locomotion. But it is 
not, and Aristotle had jus~ shown that it is not in the previ-
66Ross, Physics, p. 380. 
67Ibid., pp. 587-588; Cherniss' reference to the passage, 
.2.12.• cit., p. 151, offers no comment or explanation of the re-
futation. 
119 
68 
vious chapter. And he had done this by showing that locomo-
tion can be explained by a mutual interchange of bodies, and 
he had supported this by empirical evidence for such locomo-
tion. And this holds for any void. 
Now, as to the a,~biguities of the word ai~tov, Aristotle 
was quite evidently aware of the ambiguities of that word and 
is hardly likely to have traded on it, to have gone from one 
meaning of the word to another, simply for the sake of an argu-
ment. If anything, the void for Aristotle was a 'material 
cause' (see Metauhysics 1.4, 985b9-10, where the void along 
with the full is described as a'{~La ••• w<;; uA.T)v ) and not as 
any sort of an efficient cause, if this is what Ross means--as 
he seems to--by "determining cause. 1169 But the whole assump-
tion of an a..~biguity seems unwarrented; the passage, as has 
been shown, makes perfectly good sense without it. Aristotle 
is quite justified in saying that, although the void seemed 
68Physics 4.7, 214a28ff. 
691 see no difficulty if the 'determining cause' is to be 
explained in terms like 'the grain of the wood 11 determines 11 the 
structure of the wood-carving' or 'the density of the mediu..~ 
"determines" the speed of an object passing through it', for, 
as Aristotle points out, void is undifferentiated and cannot 
thus affect the direction or speed of movement of an object. 
Althoueh the void was not intended to give this sort of an ex-
planation of motion, it is certainly not inappropriate or 
"worthless" to mention this point, for, as we shall see, along 
with the other.parts of th~ refutation, it will tend to show 
that there is no sense in which the void is an explanation of 
motion. 3ut this matter of the void explaining the direction 
of motion is evidently not the point which Aristotle is making 
here; he rather begins to make it in the following argument 
(214bl7ff.), as had just been pointed out in the discussion of 
Ross' first assumution. This internretation seems more con-
. ~ ~ 
sistent with what Aristotle says in the whole passage. 
r 
' 
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only to be a necessary condition of locomotion, it is in· fact 
not--and that leaves nothing for the void to explain. 
Having now established that the void cannot explain 
natural motion and that it is not a necessary condition for 
motion at all, Aristotle goes on with a new point in his ref-
utation ('b: 1 --214bl 7): void, conceived· of as simply being an 
empty place (ofov ~ono~ eo~Ep~µfvo~ a6µa~o~ --214bl8), contri-
butes nothing at all to an explanation70 of the direction of 
locomotion. Aristotle asks, "Where will the body that was set 
t( ) ( - , .A ', \, ,, into i the void move? nou 01081JOE~a1 ~o E10~E8Ev El~ au~o 
oWµa--214bl8-19), for void is undifferentiated and the object 
placed in it cannot move into all directions. This is, in 
effect, to reduce the void to a separate place into which an 
object can move c~ov ~onov • • • 
~€pE~at--214b20-21), a place for an object--any object of any 
kind--and nothing more than that. 
Thus far, apart from the objection raised by Aristotle 
to the effect that the void is not a necessary condition of 
70Cherniss, on. cit., p. 151, without further explana-
tion, reduces the argument at 214bl7-24 to "but motion re-
quires absolute differentiation of direction which is impos-
sible in a void and inexplicable on the theory of separate 
position." 
But Aristotle's point here does not seem to be·that the 
void displays no differentiation of direction; it is the lim-
itless void which entails ~ denial of any such absolute di-
rection like ,·up' or 'down', i.e., toward or avmy from some 
specific boundary. Aristotle does not here bring up the no-
tion of the limitlessness of the void. His point is rather 
that the void, as that which is absolutely nothing, cannot 
contribute anything to an explanation of the direction or 
speed of locomotion--as a differentiated medium (like air or 
wood) might help explain the motion of an object in it. 
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locomotion, many of the other refutations may eeem to be 
pointless, or, as Ross puts it, "not convincing. 1171 Indeed, 
taken as separate 'refutations', they may be or border on 
being pointless or unconvincing. But we may need to remind 
ourselves that these separate points are not in fact to be 
taken as though they had nothing to do with one another; they 
are part of the fabric of one larger and whole refUtation. 
And this 'whole refutation' culminates (as does the brief 
overview given by Aristotle at 214bl2-28) in a consideration 
of the void as nothing but a place for a body and in a ques-
tioning of the validity of positing such a void or empty place 
as existing separately. But, before proceeding to that point, 
there is still more to be said in detail about the void as an 
explanation of motion. And that more detailed account occu-
pies the greater bulk of the central portion of this chapter 
on the void in the Physics (4.8, 214b28-216a26). 
And in this more detailed account at 214b28-215al Aris-
totle repeats substantially the same point that he.had made 
earlier in his refutation at 214bl7-22. Void, inasmuch as it 
is void, is materially undifferentiated (~ yap xevov, o6x 
'E:xe:' Bl acpopa~-214b33-215al) and hence cannot in principle 
contribute anything at all to our understanding of why things 
' . should have a tendency to move in one direction rather than 
another. But, if the void cannot explain that, then it does 
71Ross, Physics, p. 587. 
122 
not help us to understand as well why they should move at 
all. 72 Thus, if one is to eXplain at all the variety of mo-
tions that evidently take place, that explanation must lie 
somewhere other than in the void itself. And in this sense 
the void is completely otiose. 
At 214al3 Aristotle had pointed out in a preliminary way 
that the void could not account for the natural motion of the 
elements, namely, the movement of fire upward and that of 
earth downward toward the center of the universe. Now at 
215al-13 he takes up this position afresh and attempts to show 
more specifically how this fact of natural motion and the sup-
position of a void are incompatible. Aristotle introduces 
here an important distinction between natural and forced (which 
is one kind of unnatural motion) motions (215al-6). But the 
72AristotJe says at 214b30-31: µ~ evolxeoea1 µ~o~ tv 
x1veroea1, eav ~ X£Vov. This Cherniss, .21?.· cit., p. 151, 
takes to mean that motion is impossible (as contrasted to 'in-
explicable') in a void. Ross' position ia not as clear; in 
his 'analysis' or summary of the content of this passage he 
writes: "Instead of void being necessary if there is to be 
movement, it is incompatible with movement."(p. 380) This is 
milder than his statement in the 'commentary' section (p. 588): 
"The first reason why a void makes movement impossible was giv-
en in 214b3l-215al." Likely the latter statement is to be in-
terpreted in the light of the former, that is, to take 'impos-
sible' in the sense of 'unintelligible' (see Metathysics 5.12, 
1019b32-33 and Ross' comments on evosxoµEVOV as i ogically pos-
sible' in his Metaphysics I, 322. What Aristotle does indeed 
show is not that motion is impossible in a void, but that it 
is impossible to explain; it is unintelligible. 
And what.Aristotle points out here is that the atomists 
assume that the void is a necessary condition of locomotion; 
but, he further says, even if one does assume the existence of 
the void, one can argue as validly--and, indeed, with more 
cogency (µffAAov--214b30)--that in a void all things must be 
and remain at rest. The positing of a void not only does not 
help explain motion, but it impedes that explanation as well. 
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void, he shows, makes such a distinction impossible in prin-
ciple, particularly so if that void is boundless; for, inas-
much as the void is boundless, there is no point of reference 
from which we could say that any place was up or down or in 
the middle. And, inasmuch as it is truly void and undifferen-
tiated, there is no difference between up and down in it 
{215a6-ll). But natural motion, Aristotle points out, has 
such differentiation (D oe cpuae& cpopa 6ldcpopo, --215all-12). 
Thus the concepts of void and of natural motion are mutually 
exclusive; and it is for this reason that the positing of void 
denies the fact of natural motion and thus any real distinction 
between natural and forced motion. 
But it is precisely this sort of a distinction which one 
needs in order to explain the action under the influence of 
'forced motion'--x(vT)o&, '3(q. or napa cpuo&v--(215al4-24). Aris-
totle takes the obvious example of 'forced motion'--a thrown 
object. The movement of that object when the force is exerted 
against its natural motion is evidently the excess of the ex-
erted force over the natural motion.73· The 'forced motion' of 
such an object diminishes until it ceases altogether.74 But 
this sort of motion cannot take place in the void; it requires 
a positive medium, both to give some account of the mechanics 
( '' R I L , t ~ ' , J \. T) ul aV~lTI£pl0~00LV ••• ,, Ola ~o weerv ~ov ~aetv~a a€pa 
73see also On the Heavens 3.2, 30lbl8. The 'force', when 
it works in the same direction as the natural motion, acceler-
ates the motion (8a~~w no,~o£&--30lb22). 
74see Physics 8.10, 266b27-267al2. 
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ea~~w x(v~oiv--215al5-16, if these are actually two75 alterna-
tives) of such motion and to explain why the object should 
stop at one place rather than another; it would in the void 
simply continue moving on indefinitely (215al9-22). 
The object may indeed stop in a void if something more 
powerful gets in its way, and, in that case, it (either will 
stay stopped and unsupported in the void, which is impossible 
if it has weight, or) must start off anew in a different di-
rection. It will obviously move into the void because the 
void is that which will give way. But now there is no expla-
nation of the new direction of its motion; it might just as 
well move in all directions in an undifferentiated void. This 
(215a22-24) is still part of the refutation of an attempt to 
account for the two evident kinds of motion which present 
themselves in connection with a thrown object. 76 Thus the 
void not only fails to explain the gradually diminishing mo-
tion and eventual stopping of the thrown object, it fails as 
well to explain the 'new' motion that occurs after the object 
has temporarily stopped. 
75Ross, Physics, p. 589. 
76Ross, Physics, p. 589, suggests that Aristotle is ar-
guing as follows: the atomists say that objects move through 
air faster than they do thr~ugh water because there is more 
void in the aiF; but void is undifferentiated, and so the ob-
jects would move in all directions. Ross then labels Aris-
totle's argument as unconvincing. But Aristotle has been 
talking about an object for some reason coming to a halt; and 
now he adds that, once stopped, if the object is to move again, 
it must move in all directions precisely because the void is 
undifferentiated. 
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The previous part of this refutation of the existence of 
a separate void to account for motion (215al-24) was formu-
lated in terms that show void incompatible with the notion of 
natural motion and with any distinction between natural and 
forced motion. In this next part of the refutation (215a24-
216a26) Aristotle considers what the concept of the void can 
contribute to an explanation of motion quite apart from a di-
rect consideration of natural motion. There are, Aristotle 
says, two factors which contribute to an explanation of the 
motion of objects (6,a ouo a{~(a, --215a26): the first is a 
variation in the medium in which motion occurs (~~ o'a~€pt1v 
'\ I \ ~o Ol oU--215a26, which is considered more fully at 215a24-
216all); the second ie a variation in the moving object itself 
(~~ 5,a~~pttv ~o ~epoµevov--215a27, which is taken up again at 
216all-20). Both of these factors are matters derived from 
empirical evidence. 77 And Aristotle will show that the theory 
of the void is incompatible with each of these factors. 
Aristotle takes up first the matter of the medium as a 
factor in the explanation of the movement of an object (~o µ[v 
oJv lh' oJ ~€pe~al a'{~tov --literally: "that through which (an 
object) moves is an explanatory factor", 215a29), that is, an 
explanation of its speed. His discussion is lengthy and de-
' tailed, but there seems to be substantial agreement on what he 
says here. For Aristotle all the evidence that he had avail-
77one notes in particular the prominence of the word 
t ... 
opwµev at the beginning of each of the two sections, at 215a25 
and at 216al3. 
r 
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able to him points to the fact that there is an inverse rela-
tionship between the speed of the moving object and the den-
sity of the medium in which it is moving. Considering the 
evidence available to him, his conclusion is certainly reason-
able. 78 He further shows that there is in principle no pro-
portion between void and some specific density. Thus speed in 
pure void would exceed all proportion, and hence all calcula-
tion (Tiav~o~ ~TIEp~aAAEL Aoyou--215b22), and the time taken to 
move through some fixed distance of void will be small beyond 
measure. There is thue no way in which one can give a rational 
and understandable account of movement in a void. So, when we 
consider the medium as a factor in the explanation of the mo-
tion of an object, the theory of the void will abolish any idea 
of proportion between density and speed and time, and so will 
not only fail utterly to make motion understandable, but will 
also contradict empirical evidence. 
The second factor in an explanation of the movement 
(that is, in the rate of speed) of an object ie its bulk; and 
78stephen Toulmin, "Ideals of Natural Order" in Philo-
sophical Problems of Natural Science, ed. by Dudley Shapere 
1New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 112-117, points out 
rightly that Aristotle was not attempting to arrive at a theory 
of 'velocity' in the modern sense; and so it would be unfair to 
criticize his attempts in terms of modern science and modern 
concepts; Aristotle, he say~, may al:;so have been right about 
the void, for we can either create or find (in outer space) 
conditions which only approximate void. 
Cherniss, on. cit., p. 152, is concerned to find fault 
with Aristotle precisely because he did not arrive at a modern 
theory of velocity: "the real error in this argument is the 
assumption that velocity varies inversely with the density of 
the medium." 
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~ this factor is now considered in relation to the void at 
216all-20. Again there is empirical evidence which seems to 
warrent positing a fixed relationship between the size and the 
speed of objects composed of the same substance ( eav ~dAAa 
oµo(w~ ~X'Q--216al4). If there is to be any coherent and under-
standable motion in the void, this same relationship ought to 
hold there too. But it does not and it can not, for objects 
ought all, regardless of size, move at the same speed in void. 
But such a supposition flies in the face of all the evidence 
available. 79 
Finally, at 216a20-26 Aristotle summarizes this attempt 
to account for motion by positing the void by indicating that 
the concept of the void is totally incompatible with the two 
factors which all the evidence shows contribute to an explana-
tion of motion. In the light of both these factors the void 
fails to account for motion in any way; it only serves to make 
motion unintelligible. Democritus' void was meant, Aristotle 
says, to account for sense experience, one of the items of 
which is motion. But it cannot account for it, for the suppo-
79Ross, Physics, p. 591, says that what Aristotle thought 
absurd is now known to be a fact. But we must remember that 
this does not affect the validity of Aristotle's argument (on 
the basis of the evidence he had), but only the correctness of 
his conclusion. Ross also Jllentions here Cornford's statement 
that Epicurus divined this fact without experiment. But this 
is unlikely, for Epicurus probably got it from Aristotle (as he 
did some other variations on Democritus' atomism). One might 
compare Aristotle's use in this present passage of (ao~ax~ 
(216a20), which Epicurus apparently merely changed to the ap-
propriate feminine form {ao~axef~ when he proposed this doc-
trine in Epistle 1.61 (ed. Usener). 
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sition of a void contradicts sense-experience, contradicts all 
that we can see and know about the motion of physical objects. 
In the light of this failure to explain motion, the pos-
iting of a separate void can amount to nothing more than the 
positing of a separate place, which does nothing at all to 
account for motion. And this is the aspect of the void which 
Aristotle discusses.next· in this chapter (216a26-b21). But, 
before going on to thie, there are two further passages in On 
the Heavens which deal with the question of motion. 
-
The two passages in question do not deal directly with 
the problem of the void, but, inasmuch as the theory of the 
void has been shown to make impossible any account of natural 
. . 
motion, they do present further difficulties, as Aristotle 
points out, in explaining in terms of atomism motions which 
are seen to be natural • 
. In the first of these passages--.Q!! ~ Heavens 3.2, 
especially 300b9-30lb30--Aristotle presents a general refuta-
tion of a position which will not adequately account for natu-
ral motion. He begins by showing that we have empirical evi-
dence for natural rest. 80 But this, he says, implies a natural 
motion to that place of rest. And this is why Democritus ought 
to have specified what sort of motion--natural or unnat1lral--
' . 
the atoms have· ( ()& 0 xa) Aeux{rrn~ xa'l LiT)µoxp (,,;~,. 'tO r' A.tyoUOl v 
UE~ XLVeio8aL 'ta np&ta owµa'ta ev 'tQ XEVQ xai 't~ ane(py, 
A.ex,,;tov ,,;(va x(VTJOLV xai ,,;(' ~ xa'ta ~oa&v au,,;wv x(VTJOL' --300b9-
B0300a30: ~a(ve,,;a( 'tl µtvov eni 'tou µtoou. 
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11) and what is their natural motion. 81 . But Democritus had 
said that his atoms are in everlasting motion (net x1vetoeal--
300blO) and so made a prior natural motion impossible, for 
there is for him only an endless series of forced motions; and, 
since one cannot exhaust the series of forced motions, one can 
never arrive at a natural motion: aei ~o npo~epov p(q xlvou- · 
µevov XlV~OEl--"the earlier atom will always set the next in 
motion qua itself being in forced motion"--300bl6. 82 And so 
again the void and eternally actual motion in it involve a 
denial of any real natural motion, and hence a denial of our 
empirical evidence. 
But even more than this, there is a further sense in 
which this sort of motion denies sense-perception (300b32-
30lall), for there are as many different motions, Aristotle 
says, as there are movers; and this number in atomic theory 
would be boundless: el o' ~nelpa ~a xLvouv~a xa! ~a~ ~opa~ 
avayxatov ane(pou, e(val --30lal. And this boundless number is 
disorderly, for order and system require some limitation. But 
we perceive order in natural objects and the order that we per-
ceive there is natura1. 83 But Democritus, Aristotle says, 
81see also Metaphysics 1.4, 985b4ff. and 12.6, 107lb32ff. 
82simplicius' explana•ion, de Caelo, pp. 583-584, is sub-
stantially the ·same: the infinite regress that this generates 
makes it impossible that any atom can ~onceivably be (original-
ly) set into this 'forced' motion (ouoev xlv~e~oe~a1 ). 
· 
83301a6-7: ~ y~p ~asl' ~ olxe(a ~wv a{aeryi;wv ~uol~ eo~(~-"for that order which belongs properly to what is per-
ceived is their nature." ~wv aloerytwv, is evidently important 
here. 
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r claims in effect that the disorderly movement of the atonis is 
natural, and the order that we see is unnatural: ' ' 'tT)V µ E:Y 
301alO-ll. Thus atomism not only denies the validity of some 
items of sense-perception, but also the order that we perceive 
in nature. 84 
The second passage, which shows another difficulty with 
Democritus' account of what Aristotle would call •natural mo-
tion', is to be found at On the Heavens 4.6, 313al4ff •. There 
Aristotle attributes to Democritus what Democritus himself had 
evidently called a •surge' (oou~ ), 85 which Aristotle here 
seems to identify with upward-moving warm elements ('ta avw 
~e:poµe:va 8epµa--313a24). 86 With this 'surge', as Aristotle 
reports it, Democritus had attempted to account for the float-
ing of heavy, flat objects on water. But this •surge', Aris-
totle points out, ought--as Democritus himself recognized 
(~one:p ev(aia'tal xaxelvo~ UU't0~--313b4)--to occur to a higher 
degree in the air, for, since all kinds of atoms are in all 
elements, 87 air ought to contain more of such 'warm' elements 
84cherniss, on. cit., p. i94, claims that these difficul-
ties "depend for their validity upon Aristotelian concepts of 
'natural' and 'unnnatural' motion. 11 But they rather depend on 
empirical evidence for such a distinction between 'natural' 
and 'unnatural' motion. 
' 85see Kurt von Fritz, .2.E.· cit., p. 29. 
86
see also 313b5: AEywv aouv 't~V XlVT)OlV 'tWV ~vw ~e:po­
µevwv awµchwv. 
87see the use~of na~one:pµ{a; also Sim~licius, de Caelo, 
p. 730, line 10: e(val yap TIQV'tWV onepµa'ta ev TIUOl. 
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than water. But Democritus• reason for claiming that the 
•surge' does not cause heavy objects to float on air is that 
in the air the 'surge' is more scattered.88 . But this explana-
tion, Aristotle says, is weak ( AUel µaAaxw,~313b3) evidently 
because there are more spherical atoms in air {for breathing) 
than in water. Aristotle then goes on to show that there is a 
better and more consistent explanation if one does not suppose 
that void is a factor. Both the body in motion and the medium 
into which the body is placed are continuous; they have no 
void in them. The heavy body has a natural motion downward, 
but its natural downward motion is resisted by the continuity 
of the medium (water, for example). And when the resistence 
of the medium is greater--because of the flatness of the heavy 
body--the body will float (313b5-22). 
Thus Aristotle has shown that Democritus' attempts to 
explain motion in terms of void were abortive; they did not 
survive closer scrutiny, for either the explanation was weak 
and there was a demonstrably better and more consistent one, 
or it made motion unintelligible, or it contradicted empirical 
evidence. The objections raised by Aristotle against the void 
88Both Guthrie, On the Heavens, p. 369, ("the surge does 
not work in one direction only 11 ) and Cherniss, £:E.• cit., p. 
203, note 231, ("does not t~ke place in a single direction'') 
seem to be adding the idea of different directions of the 
'surge•, whereas the •surge' was supposed to be a specifically 
upward movement. But oux cC, £v ~pµffv ~ov oouv seems only to 
mean that the concentration of atoms in the •surge• is less 
unified; the atoms are more scattered. See also Simplicius, 
~ Caelo, ad loc., p. 730, lines 21-22: 0L£OTiapµ£vwv ouv au~wv 
OUX E(~ CV opµq ~ XlVDOl' UU~WV. 
r 
v 
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as any sort of an explanation of motion are cumulative and con-
vincing. We are now ready to abandon as untenable any use of 
the void to account for motion and pass on to considering the 
void as simple, separate place; that is, we are ready now to 
take up again and continue the refutation of Aristotle where 
we had left it at Physics 4.8, 216a26. 
Separate Void EI. Itself 
-
Throughout his whole detailed discussion of the void in 
Physics 4.6-9 Aristotle had been repeatedly concerned with the 
question of the simple, separate existence of the void, quite 
apart from its role in explaining motion or anything else. On 
each such occasion the matter of a refutation had been taken 
up quite summarily, if at all. The more full refutatio~ is 
·left for discussion primarily in Physics 4.8. The following 
then will briefly survey such preliminary remarks by Aristotle 
before taking up his fuller discussion of the question. 
Immediately at the beginning (Physics 4.6) of the excur-
sus on the void Aristotle points out that those who posit the 
void confuse it with 'place' ( ~6nov ~tva ••• ~o xcvov ~,ef-
a.en V--213al6), which, when it has no body in it, .is simply 
empty (o~aV oe O~Ep~8~, XEVOV--213al8). And Aristotle's pre-
liminary reply here is simptly that 'void' and place refer to 
essentially different things: ~o o' elvat au~or~ OU ~a6~o ov 
("they have an essence which is not the same")--213alg. 89 
89This is taken up at Physics 4.8, 214b23-28. 
r 
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The matter is again brought up at Physics 4.7, 213b31 
(Ooxer o~ ~0 xevov ~ono~ e?va1 EV ~ µ~6tv eo~t ), for void 
seems to be a place in which there is nothing, that is, no 
body. In order to substantiate this apparent identity of 
•void' with 'place' Aristotle then goes on (213b30-214a22) to 
show that void for the atomists fits quite well with that 
which he himself thinks of as place, only deprived of a body. 
Void, Aristotle says, is certainly not tangible (dn~ov),90 and 
thus would not have any kind of weight in one direction or an-
other (E:v ~ µ~otv E:o~L ~apu -fi' xouqiov --214a2-3). The only at-
tribute that can possibly be ascribed to it is that of exten-
sion (otao~Dµa--214a5-6),9l otherwise it would have a defini-
tion which would also fit a mathematical point, which would be 
absurd: a~onov el D O~Lyµ~ xevov --214a4-5. Thus Aristotle 
feels that he has now established as a logical fact (6.vayxD--
214al6) what earlier had only seemed (ooxei--213b31) to be the 
case: void, if it exists at all, is place deprived of body. 
90This is taken up at 4.8, 216bl3-20; though most of this 
passage has been bracketed by both Bonitz and Ross because of 
its doubtful support from the Greek commentators, I propose to 
consider it, since it does have universal manuscript attesta-
tion. But how it could have (as noted in the first Basel edi-
tion) come from Averroes (who lived in the twelfth century) 
when the earliest manuscripts (E and J) date back tQ the tenth 
century, is beyond me. 
91.Aristotle (214a9-10) half in jest, I believe, asks whe-
ther the void as such extension could contain something non-
tangible and yet perceptible. There is no doubt in Aristotle's 
mind that for Democritus all perceptible qualities are tang-
. bl A ~ S:. ' .._ ,L ' ' > ' ' i e~ uDµuxpt~o~ ue xa1 ••• nuv~a yap ~a UL08D~a dn~a 
no1ouo1v (On Sensation 4, 442a31-442b2). This is an essential 
and consistent part of Democritus' theory. 
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This brings us back to the preliminary remarks of Aris-
totle at Physics 4.8 (specifically, 214b23-28). There, in the 
process of his refutation of the existence of a separate void, 
he brings in an argument to show that 'place' and 'void'. must 
have meanings which are quite distinct. The subject of the 
argument is a continuous92 physical object in a separately 
existing place. Although, as such, this argument or refuta-
tion does not apply directly to the physical objects of the 
atomists, because for them physical objects are not whole and 
continuous (any atomic part of a physical object for them can 
at best be in contact and hence will not be continuous with 
other parts), still it applies to their atoms themselves, for 
these are what are for them precisely whole and continuous. 
The argument goes like this: any conceivable part of any 
whole object (or atom) must simply and only be in that object; 
its place there is coextensive only with the room it takes up 
in that object; its place there is not the room it takes up 
plus some surrounding area. The part is not inside of some 
surrounding area which is its place; it is thus not !!! a sepa-
rate place. If 'place' and 'void' are synonymous, if the 
statement •a part is in its place' means 'a part is within a 
·separate void', then--to apply the refutation specifically to 
' an atom--any conceivable part of an atom, since that part must 
92compare SiDplicius, In Physicorum, ad loc., pp. 665, 
line 36 to 666, line 1: 'ta ot µ6pla a6rcou --r;1lciDV'Exfi. It is 
important that the parts of the object be continuous, for, if 
each part were in a separate place (i.e., in a separate void), 
then the object could not be a continuous whole. 
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also be in its place, must also be separate, for it too must 
then be in a seuarate nlace. Thus not even the atom itself 
would be exempt from further analysis into an infinite number 
of sub-atoms. 93 Thus the outcome of Aristotle's argwnent is 
that, if unity is to be retained anywhere at all, at any level, 
whether in physical objects or in atoms, then 'place' and 
•void' must be kept di8tinct. This argument alone does not 
prove that there is no separately existing continuous exten-
sion, 94 but only that 'place' and •void' must refer to essen-
tially different things. 
The detailed argument against the void as a separately 
existing place is to be found at Physics 4.8, 216a26-b21. It 
seems to be presented in two parts.95 In the first the void 
is conceived of as occupied by a body; and when it is so con~ 
sidered the void is indistinguishable from the volume of that , 
.. 
body; it.amounts simply to the bulk of that body, the body's 
volume abstracted from all the other attributes of the body. 
93r suspect that it is from this· argument, among others, 
that some later atomists or commentators felt that the atoms 
cannot have parts • 
. 94cherniss, .2.E.• cit., p. 149 (especially note 28), ob-
jects that this is not a cogent argu.~ent against separately 
existing continuous extension and that it further compounds 
the difficulty by involving the problems of the whole and its 
parts. But I maintain that this particular argu..~ent was not 
by itself meant to disprove any separately existing continuous 
extension, but only to show that there is a real distinction 
between 'place' and 'void'. And it is precisely the concepts 
of 'whole' and 'parts' that make this distinction clear. 
95The second part I take to be the passage at 216bl7-20 
referred to above (note 90), which hae good manuscript evidence 
but is not cited by the early Greek commentators. 
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.Aristotle illustrates this by the example of a cube placed in-
to the hypothetical void; the cube would actually displace 
nothing (though it would displace some water or air, if it were 
place in one of them) and -the formerly empty void would then 
penetrate the entire volume of the body; the size of the cube 
would be exactly the same as the size of the formerly empty 
void. Thua we would now have two different thing~--void and 
volume--in the same place, or, more likely, these two things 
are the same, and void in this case is nothing more than the 
-
volume of a body. The void that the cube now occupies is in-
distinguishable from its volume. Furthermore, the cube con-
tinues to have that same size, bulk, volume, or place, no mat-
ter where it goes. For this reason it is more likely that we 
have throughout been talking about an attribute which belongs 
to a body rather than about something separate and distinct 
from that body. Thus, when void is occupied, there is no rea-
son for assuming that it is something distinct from the body 
occupying it; it amounts to nothing more than an attribute of 
that body abstracted from it, and so has only mental status. 
Secondly (216bl7-20.), when this hypothetical void is not 
occupied by a body, we have in principle no evidence for it at 
all. The only evidence that we can have is, on the principles 
" of atomism them~elves, that of touch, and that gives us evi-
dence only of that which is touchable (~~ d~~ yap ~ xp(crt, ~ou 
dn~ou--216bl9-20); and void is by definition not touchable. 
Thus Aristotle has shovm that whether it is filled or 
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not, there is in neither case any evidence for. the void. So, 
as far as evidence goes, it is clear that there is no separate· 
" ' I I ,, ~ 6 t .f void: O'tl µEV 'tOlVUV OUX EO'tl XEXWplOµ~VOV XEV v, ~X 'tOu'tWV 
lo-r l ofii\o v --216b20-21. 
But, if all this is reasonably accurate, if void is not 
necessary to an explanation of motion, if using the void in 
one's attempt to explain motion contradicts evidence and prin-
ciples derived from evidence, if there is indeed no evidence 
for the void, then perhaps there is some other justification 
for supposing that the void exists. And in refuting the posi-
tion of Democritus Aristotle also considers this 'other justi-
ficatipn' for positing an existing void; this he does in two 
places, the one in the Physics (1.3, 187al-ll), and the other 
in the Rietaphysics (4.5, 1009a22-38). 
On two separate occasions (though in the same works just 
mentioned) Aristotle attributes specifically to Democritus a 
teaching that the void exists as 'that which is not': ~riµo­
xpl'to' ••• XEVOV ••• ck oux o'v e'f va( cp'T")Ol v (Physics 1.4, 
188a22-23), and tiriµoxpl'to<;; ••• -ro xevov elva( cpaa', ••• 'tb 
' ' ,, oe µT") ov {i'.ietauhysics 1.4, 985b5-6). But in neither of these 
passages is there a refutation of the existence of· the void as 
'that which is not'; this refutation is taken up instead in the 
two passages just mentioneJ prior to these latter passages 
(namely, at Physics 1.3, 187al-ll and at I.Ietaphysics 4.5, 
1009a22-38); and both of these passages undoubtedly refer to 
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precisely this doctrine of Democritus.96 
Atomism, or, to be more specific, the teaching that there 
is a void, was formulated with a two-fold consideration in 
mind, a consideration engendered by Eleatic arguments:97 it 
was an attempt account for motion (the refutation of this 
aspect has just been considered), and it was an attempt to 
respond to Eleatic arguments on 'what is'. And it is now from 
this latter point of view that Aristotle criticizes those who 
assume that the void exists as 'that which is not•. 
The atomists,98 Aristotle says at Physics 1.3, were in-
fluenced by ('gave in to', 'made some concessions to'--tv€oo-
oa\L--l87al) to one particular Eleatic argument99 on the meaning 
of 'what is' (-ro ov). The Eleatic argument is the following: 
'what is' has one meaning (fv o~µa(vel --187a4),lOO namely, 
'what simply exists', and cannot .. at the $ame time refer to the 
contradictory of this, that is, 'what is not•. 101 But on the 
.· 96nemocri tus is mentioned specifically in the Metaphysics 
passage; no one ·is named in the Physics passage, but Ross*, .2.E.• 
cit., pp. 480-481, given in his commentary on this passage, are 
quite cogent and have been most recently accepted by Charlton, 
.212.· cit., p. 63. 
97see On Generation and Corruption 1.8, 325al-32. 
98see note 96, above. 
99This argument had ju.st previously been ascribed by 
Aristotle (186a24-25) to Parmenides. The whole argument is se-
parated in this passage into two parts (187al-2 and 4-5); I 
have put them together for the eake of convenience. 
,, 
100see also 186a24-25: dnt-wi; Aaµ~avel [napµev(o~<;;] rc6 
ov Aeyeo8al • 
101
charlton, .2.E.• .£l!., p. 7: "can both be and not be." 
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phenomenal level, the Eleatics would claim, such contradictory 
statements are possible; for example, at one time one can 
truly say 'this apple is green•, while on a later occasion one 
can, evidently referring to the same apple, say the contradic-
tory, 'this apple is not green' (when it has turned red). 
Since contradictories cannot in reality be true, 'what really 
is' is one and undifferentiated and refers to something only 
in the simple and absolute sense of 'is'. Furthermore, 'what 
is not'--as the contradictory to 'what is'--cannot therefore 
exist; all that tnere is is simply and absolutely 'what is'. 
This then is the argument to which the atomists made some 
concessions, in that the 'what is' of the atomists is evident-
ly formulated in terms of the Eleatic 'what is', as is now 
more generally admitted.102 'What is' in the atomist sense is 
something quite distinct, as we have seen, from physical ob-
jects; it is, like the Eleatic 'what is', simple and absolute. 
But for the atomists 'what is' (an atom), while it cannot be 
seen or, perhaps, felt in isolation, it can affect us physical-
ly and thus indirectly can be known. 
The Eleatics had further argued that if 'what is not' 
(that is, the void) does not exist, then motion is impossible. 
Here the atomists were more influenced by the empirical evi-
dence for motion than by di~lectic; 103 they contended that, if 
there is motion (which is evidently the case), then 'what is 
102see Guthrie, History, II, 389-392. 
l03comparc Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 316bl0-14; 1.8, 325a25-28. 
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not' must indeed exist just as much as 'what is'. And the· 
atomist 'what is not' is likewise used in a simple and abso-
lute sense of 'is not'. The atomists had under Eleatic influ-
ence argued from a simple and absolute sense of 'is' (and from 
empirical evidence for motion) to the existence of 'what is 
not': , ' ·' ,~ , v " ' ' el -ro ov ev oriµa.t Vel, o'O eO'tl -ro µT) ov --187al-2. 
But in the first place Aristotle points out in refuta-
tion of the atomists that they were misled by the Eleatic ar-
gument, because, as he had been showing throughout the chapter 
(1.3), the premise is not true, that 'what is' has only the 
one meaning of 'simple existence'. Hence the atomists are 
totally unjustified in drawing from such a premise the conclu-
sion that 'what is not' (that is, the void) exi·sts. 
And furthermore, Aristotle goes on to point out that. 
their conclusion is evidently false too ~187a5-6), for 'what 
is not' may in any case simply refer to what is not some spe-
( 
'\ II ) cific thing µT') ov 'tl ; it does not even follow from the fact 
that 'what is' has only this absolute sense that 'what is not' 
has it too. 
Aristotle presents a similar criticism of the existence 
of the void as 'what is not'--again, along with such a criti-
cism of the existence of 'what is' as he had in Physics 1.3--
" at Metaphysics·4.5, 1009a22-38. The 3ubject under discussion 
here is the various attempts to account for the contraries and 
contradictories which appear to be true of the same physical 
object. Then what is likely to represent Democritus' train of 
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thought in considering this question is presented at 1009a25-
30; and, as we follow that train of thought as presented 
here, let us consider at the same time an example as a case in 
point, a given identical apple in which we see contraries 
arise (OpWO&V ex ~a6~oU ylyVoµsva ~UVUV~(a --1009a24-25); it 
is now green, and then it turns red. Now there is a red apple 
where there was none before. But 'what is not' cannot come 
'. ' into being (µn evotxe~a& y(yveaea, ~b µ~ ov --1009a25-26), and 
evidently the atomists would take this 'what is not'--as in 
· Physics 1.3--in only an absolute sense. Furthermore, the 
atomists would go on to say, since such contraries are seen in 
the phenomenal world, there must be another level at which the 
'law of contradiction' holds, a non-empirical level which is 
accessible to the intellect. This latter level is the real 
level of atoms and void. Thus the full and the void, that is, 
'what is' and 'what is not', are to be found at any given sec-
tion ( xae' o~&ouv ••• µtpo~ --1009a28-29) of the phenomenal 
object; and these atoms and void can help to account for the 
occurrence of phenomenal contraries without themselves being 
in violation of the law of contradiction. 
Now Aristotle at 1009a30ff. begins his criticism of this 
view which led Democritus to suppose the existence of the void 
as 'what ie not'. He firsi admits that in a sense they are 
right (~ponov µtv ~&Va op8w~ Aeyouo& --1009a31), evidently in 
the sense that 'what is not'--in.the absolute sense of the 
word, 'what does not exist'--cannot come into being. But, in 
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another sense they are wrong (ayvoouotv--1009a31), inasmuch as 
both 'what is' and 'what is not' are used in two senses (Al-
ye~at otxw~--1009a32)104 and are not restricted to the single 
meaning which they give them. There is a sense in which some-
thing can come into being from 'what is not' ( evoexe~at y(-
yveo8a( ~' EX ~OU µ~ ov~o~--1009a33), that is, when 'what is 
not• is used in the qualified sense: a red apple can come in-
to being out of 'what is not' a red apple, but a green one.· 
Thus the refutation here in the Metaphysics, directed more 
.specifically at Democritus, is essentially the same one that 
had been raised at Physics l.3.l05 
Cherniss raises the objection to this refutation106 
that it is a logical analysis which does not affect the atom-
ist physical theory itself, though some others may have used 
this physical theory as a foundation for logical nihilism; 
Aristotle should not have claimed that the physics was false 
because the logical consequences mistakenly drawn from it by 
others were untenable. But Cherniss seems to be in error on 
l04The summary that Ross, metaphysics, I, 273, presents 
makes it seem that the tTio senses nentioned here are 'poten-
tial' and 'actual'; this is misleading at this point, for the 
distinction between potency and act does not come in unt~l 
the question arises about the same object being contraries 
simultaneously. · 
l05This evidently esttl.blishes even more firmly Ross' 
identification.of theevtot mentioned at Physics 1.3, 187al 
as the atomists, though no one, as far as I know, cites this 
passage in making that identification (likely because the 
citation from Qg_ Generation and Corruption 1.8, 324b35ff. 
makes it certain enough). 
106
.QE.. cit., pp. 78-79. 
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this point. Aristotle's attack is quite to the point and 
quite valid; the physics of atomism depended in part on the 
mistaken logical consequences drawn from an observation of the 
physical world in combinat-ion with Eleatic influence; and he 
is pointing out precisely where those principles of the Elea-
tics are in error. They are in error inasmuch as they without 
' 
warrent assume only an absolute and simple meaning for 'what 
is' and 'what is not' and in the end they force a denial of 
empirical fact. And, since the physics of the atomists is 
founded in part on that specific error, their theory rests on 
weak ground. 
Furthermore, Aristotle goes on to point out at 1009a33-
38, contradictories can be true of the same. thing at ~ same 
·-
time: the apple in question may be at the same time both 
actually green and potentially not green. And this is because 
of Aristotle's distinction between potency and act. For De-
mocritus 'what is' and 'what is not' were and remained forever 
actual; and it was this lack of a distinction between potency 
and act which kept Democritus from retaining the same contin-
uous substance in the midst of change; had he recognized this 
important distinction, he would have seen that there is no 
necessity at all for the absolute existence of 'what is not•. 
And so, beside .the fact thai th.e positing of the void as 'what 
is nott rests on a mistake and so is untenable, it is in addi-
tion absolutely unnecessary. 
Thus Aristotle's refutation of the existence of the void 
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is complete; he has shown that both as part of an account of 
motion and apart from accounting for motion, the void of Democ-· 
ritus is unnecessary, unempirical, and untenable. 
CHAPTER III 
ON THE STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS, SOUL, 
SENSE-PERCEPTION, AND KNOWLEDGE 
Introduction 
Democritus, in order to solve the difficulties posed by 
the Eleatic dilemmas, had posited the existence of atoms and 
void, and he thought that by doing so he had devised.a system-
atic explanation which was completely consonant with the phe-
nomenal world of motion, change, and its variety of objects. 
But, since the atoms and void were central to that systematic 
explanation, Aristotle by his criticisms of them--as we have 
seen in the first two chapters--had struck some telling blows 
against the very foundations of atomism as it was espoused by 
.Democritus. 
The importance of atoms and void to the theories of De-
mocritus is obvious enough, but Aristotle saw a third area of 
critical importance to atomism, the problem of the relationship 
of physical objects composed of atoms and void to our percep-
tion of those objects, the problem which essentially has come 
' 
up in connection with the British empiricists, that is, if we 
perceive only sense-data, in what sense--if any--do we perceive 
or know the physical object. Democritus thought that his ac-
count was consonant with phenomena, but, as Aristotle and 
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others have shown, it leads to a sceptical position about 
physical objects in this phenomenal world. 
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Aristotle quite explicitly says that Democritus took as 
the starting-point of his account of his theory the phenomenal 
world of nature just as it is ~Px~v not~oaµevol xa~a ~UOlV 
~nep eo~(v--Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 325al-2), that he was convinced 
by arguments founded on the nature of things (~uotxor~ Aoyo&~ 
nenefo8al--~. et Corr. 1.2, 316al3-14), that he was con-
vinced that his arguments were completely consonant with what 
we perceive, that is, with generation, corruption, change, and 
( ' \ ,, .. multiplicity npo~ ~~v ala8~o&v oµoAoyouµeva ••• ytveo&v • 
• • ~8op~v ••• x(v~o&v xat ~o nAD8o~ ~wv ov~wv --~. ~ 
Corr. 1.8, 325a23-25). 1 
It was this concern with the phenomenal world which Ar-
istotle says led Democritus to posit his atoms and void; his 
theory proceeded from what he had perceived. Like Anaxagoras, 
he was puzzled by what he saw; the same physical object seemed 
to take on at various times contrary qualities; but 'what is 
not' could not come into being, and so both 'what is' and 
'what is not' had already from the first to belong to the 
physical object in question, but in some sense other than the 
merely phenomenal one. Democritus' solution was to distin-
guish the physical from th~ phenomenal object and to identify 
1Paul Natorp, ..2.E• cit., pp. 164-179, denies this; see 
especially p. 178, "Aristoteles also referirt nicht uber De-
mokrits Lehre, sondern beurtheilt sie, und er beurtheilt sie 
aus einem falschen Gesichtspunkt, wenn er Demokrit zum Sensu-
alisten macht. 11 
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•what is' and 'what is not' respectively with atoms and void 
which make up the physical object. 2 
But Aristotle also tells us that Democritus argued from 
phenomena not only to the existence of atoms and void, but 
also to the shape of atoms and to their arrangements in ob-
jects, for he tells us that Democritus says that it is evident 
what sort of thing man is structurally, since a man is recog-
nized as such by his shape and coloration;3 and this, as we 
shall see more clearly later, is likely an argument from ap-
pearance to atomic structure. Or again, at Metaphysics 1.4, 
985bl3 we find that the differing shapes and arrangements of 
atoms were meant to account for all other objects and their 
qualities. 4 
Thus, since there is for Democritus a relation between 
the object as it is perceived and as it really is--that is, 
atomically structured--we shall be examining in this chapter, 
first of all, Aristotle's critique of the real structure of 
physical objects, as that structure is explained in the system 
of Democritus. 
We have indeed already considered briefly some of Aris-
totle's major objections to Democritus' teaching about the 
structure of physical objects in connection with both the doc-
' 
, 
2Meta. 4.5, 1009a22-30: EA~AUBE •• 
a&?8~'twv-:-:--•.. op~OtV EX 'tUU'tOU y&yvoµEVU 
XU& yap OU'toc;. 'tO XEVOV xa\ 'tO TIAnpec;. oµQ(W, 
"- L , ' ' 1' , ' upXE&V µtpo,, xa&-ro& 'to µEv ov 'tOU'tWV E&Va& 
3Part. Anim. 1.1, 640b32-34. 
4-ccic; tilacpopa<; a{-r(a.c;. 'tWV aAAWV Elva&• 
• r1 oosa Ex -rwv 
'ta Va V't (a • • • • 
xae' ~'tt ouv un-
' ' ' " 'tO OE µT) ov. 
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trine of the atoms and that of the void; there we have seen 
that Democritus, in positing atoms and void, fails to account 
for--and, indeed, denies--the obvious unity of the object, and 
that he does not give an adequate account of either the weight 
or the locomotion of objects. Furthermore, we shall see in 
the next chapter what Aristotle considers to be another fail-
ure in the attempt to give an atomic account of the structure 
of physical objects, that is, that it fails as well to provide 
an adequate 'formal cause' for the object. 
It hardly does justice at all to the total impact of 
Aristotle's criticisms to separate them under different head-
ings, if their separation from.one another gives the impres-
sion that they are to be taken in total isolation from one an-
other. But these are not totally separate criticisms, but 
varying aspects of a single criticism artificially isolated to 
give us a better understanding of the criticism as a whole and 
of its various implications. It is for this reason that I 
have chosen to err on the side of repetition rather than that 
of absolute isolation of arguments. 
Aristotle's major objection to the atomically structured 
physical object is basically that such a theory does not do 
justice to the physical object as it is, that is, as it is 
t 
perceived, as it is a matter of empirical fact. What we per-
ceive are in fact physical objects with certain qualities. 
Next we shall consider briefly the nature of soul for 
Democritus; since it is atomically structured, it suffers from 
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some of the same defects that Aristotle sees in other objects 
which Democritus explains by means of atoms: it is reduced 
for Aristotle to the absurdity of producing a purely mechan-
ical and primitive type of motion. 
Sense-perception next seems equally mechanical and 
should entail no error; but, as Aristotle points out, this 
mechanism breaks down and there is by this theory no real cor-
respondence between the object as it is and as it is perceived 
by the senses. 
Finally, knowledge in the atomic system is reduced to 
being another kind of sensation, and, although its object is 
claimed to be 'what truly exi~ts' as distinct from what is 
perceived by the senses, such knowledge as proposed by Democ-
ritus cannot judge truth in its object. 
The Structure of Physical Objects 
Democritus had explained the structure of physical ob-
jects and the phenomenal characteristics which are related to 
that structure in terms of three kinds of differences which 
th t • , -A F=. -A appear among e a oms: puoµo~, ~pon. 11 vlU8lY1J• Aristotle 
cites these very terms and rightly traces them baclr to Democ-
ritus. There is no question here of whether these are them-
selves terms loaded with ~istotelian implications, for they 
are not the ones which Aristotle himself uses; they are quite 
distinct and unique; and Aristotle does indeed offer an expla-
nation for each term and does give what for him would be its 
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equivalent. 5 All three of these terms, as von Fritz points 
6 out, are related to .concepts of motion, so that, if we ac-
cept Aristotle' e translations of oxfiµa, e ~al c;; , and ,,;<1.; L c;; , we 
are not to imagine these as characteristics of a solid and 
purely static structure, but rather imagine with Aristotle 
that we consider their 'position' and 'order' in a given iso-
lated instant of time.7 
Of these terms, the second (we have already considered 
puoµov oxf)µa) Democ~i tean word ,,;pon~ seems to indicate the 
direction in which an individual atom is turned at a given 
instant; 8 and it thus describes a relationship to another atom 
or to other atoms, and it is not to be considered as pertain 
ing to one atom in isolation.9 The idea of a 'turning' does 
not seem to make any sense at all if the atom is taken only 
with regard to itself and is to be thoug~t of completely apart 
from a reference to some other thing, whether object or atom. 
5tietaphysics 1.4, 985b4ff.; 8.2, 1042bllff. 
6von Fritz, .2.P.• cit., pp. 26-28. 
?Aristotle does not fail to do justice to this dynamic 
aspect of atoms in constant motion, for he describes their mo-
t~~n as an eternal actuality: ae1 8v~pyElav ••• UEl yap 
dva{ <pUCTl x(vT)otv--Metaphysics 12.6, 107lb32-33. 
8This is the way von Fritz, .2.1?.• cit., p. 28, uses the 
term: "Vielmehr wendet das,Atom jeweils eine seiner Seiten 
einem anderen Atom zu. 11 
9Bailey, .2.1?.· cit., p. 80, says it indicates "the position 
of an atom with regard to itself." Wilhelm Schmid, "Der Aus-
gang der altionischen Naturphilosophie: die Atomistik" in 
Schmid-Stehlin, Geschichte ~ ~iechischen Literatur (Munich: 
1943), Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 224- 9, simply says, 11 wie sich I 
Von H unterscheidet. 11 These descriptions are too vague. 
r 
' 
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In an absolute void there is no permanent place with refer-
ence to which the 'turn' can be made; and Aristotle's example 
as a distinction like that between H and I certainly requires 
that the term be thought of in relationship to something else. 
And, furthermore, Aristotle is here concerned with the posi-
tion of atoms in physical objects as an explanation of the 
phenomenal qualities of that object--such as color--and it is 
quite unlikely that most atoms taken in isolation give the im-
pression of any color at all, no matter which way they are 
turned. Thus, the only reasonable conclusion which one can 
draw i5 that both for Democritua' theory and Aristotle's un-
derstanding of it, this -~pon~ involves the relation of one 
. 10 
atom to another, as Ross had already rightly pointed out. 
The third term, 61a81y~, is more likely to be connected 
with the idea of 'touch' {81y) than with_8DxD/Oeo1~, as both 
Bailey and Ross have pointed out, 11 in spite of the fact that 
the relationship of 81yD to 8Dx~/8eo1c; might provide an at-
tractive connection with Aristotle's use of the term eto1c;in 
this context. ' But it is ~poTID that Aristotle translates as 
etaic;, not 61a81yfi. Bailey's reason for rejecting the connec-
lORoss, metaphysics, I, 140. 
11Bailey, £1?.· cit., 1'• 79, note 4; Ross, Metaphysics, 
~· cit. John I. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary: Cogni-
tion: from Alcmaeon to Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
'I"90'b'), p. 37, note 2, approves the relationship to G~xD • 
Liddell, Scott, Jones, Lexicon, citing Hesychius, note that it 
may be related to ct a8ijKrJ • Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. 7 .136 
(Diels-Kranz 68B9) uses the term 61aG1JxD, but there that term 
seems to be used in a meaning which combines both ~ponii and 
Ol0.8lYD· 
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tion of 81y with 8T}xT}--because "contact with neighboring atoms 
is so vital an element in Atomic composition"--seems a bit 
artificial and thus less satisfactory. Still, since the sup-
port for a connection with 8T}xT} seems weak and the relation-
ship to 81y is more obvious and likely, 12 our best course is 
simply to proceed from that point of view. The element 01a 
further indicates a movement 'through' something. So the pic-
ture presented by this term is likely to be as follows: as an 
atom moves on through another group, there is an instant in 
which the whole group is in a certain order or ~a~&~,quite 
apart from the 'side' which they turn to one another. 
Of these three Democritean terms which mark the differ-
ences which we see in physical objects puoµo<; -- oxfiµa, for 
Aristotle--seems to be the most basic. I shall, following 
Aristotle, translate it as 'shape'. In so doing I shall 
furthermore assume that it includes not only what we might 
call 'geometrical figure• or •outline•, but 'size' as well. 
Thus not only will, for exa~ple, a cube of a given volume dif-
fer 'in shape' from a sphere of that volume, but so also will 
a sphere of a greater or lesser volume or size. In thas sense 
then all of the traditional elements--particularly earth, air, 
fire, and water--will differ for Democritus basically 'in 
shape'. 
One issue which Aristotle sees as dividing the 'school 
of Empedocles' from the 'school of Anaxagoras' is the question 
12Ross, Metaphysics, loc. ill_. 
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whether the traditional four elements are simple or compo-
site.13 And on this particular question at least Democritus 
may certainly be reckoned as belonging to the 'school of Anax-
agoras'; for Democritus did take some account of the four ele-
ments, and for him these--just like every other physical ob-
ject--were composite, composed of indivisible bodies: ~x 
owµa~wv ao&a.&pl~wv ~JAAa ouyxeroea( aa - G t C 1 1 cp ' -- en. e orr. • , 
- -
314a21-22. 
Thus, since for Democritus there is no essential differ-
ence between the structure of the traditional elements, or 
simple bodies, and that of other physical objects (other, per-
haps, than complexity), and since Aristotle is more interested 
in and gives more information about Democritus' view of the 
elements, we might then use the structure of these elements as 
a prime paradigm of the structure of all _physical objects. 
And this will further imply that any valid criticism leveled 
by Aristotle against such a theory of structure will also ap-
ply with equal force against any and all physical objects so 
. 
structured. 
Of the traditional elements 'fire' for Democritus is a 
special case, for to it alone of the elements Democritus as-
signed a specific 'geometrical figure', the sphere. 14 But in 
" what sense then is fire to be characterized by the spherical 
l3Gen. et Corr., 1.1, 314a25-30. 
N 
14For example, Caelo 3.4; 303a14: µovov ~Q nup1 ~~v 
Ocpa&pav anlowxev. Also Anima, Eassim; for example, 1.2, 404a-
lff. and 405al2-13. 
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ehape? The spherical shape is the most mobile of the atomic 
shapes (eux,vrrro~a~ov --Anima 1.2, 405al2), and for that reason 
it above all is constantly in motion (o,a ~o ne~uxtvaL µnot-
no~e µ€veLV--Anima 1.3, 406b21); and as a sphere it has a par-
ticular ability to penetrate everywhere and thus to divide and 
impart some of its high mobility to oth~r atoms. 15 And it is 
likely in this sense--in the sense that it particularly ~ene­
trates, sets in motion, and divides--that the sphere is sort 
of an angle and so 'cuts•.16 
'Heat' is evidently for Democritus the sensation which is 
produced in us by the highly motive and dividing power of the 
spherical atoms; and this is in principle no different from 
making the flavors as we taste them effects in us of specific 
other atomic shapes.17 In hie Qg the Soul 1.2, 403b30ff., 
Aristotle rightly claims that Democritus made the soul, inas-
much as it is composed of spherical atoms, warm, because those 
atoms are particularly in motion and produce in us the sensa~ 
· l5Anima i.2, 404a7-8: 0,a ~0 µaA1o~a 0,a nav~o~ ou-
vaoeaL OL~60vELV ~ous ~o,co~ou~ puoµou~. One might note here 
the use of Democritus' ovm term for 'shape'; compare also 
David Ross, Aristotle De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 
p. 175; also W. K. C. Guthrie, History, Vol. 2, p. 430, note 5. 
16 8 8 .... , - . 
I , . Caelo 3. ' 307al7-l : w~ yWVlO. ~'~ ouaa ~~µVEl <1:.~ 
euxlv~~ov. The angle cuts because of its acuteness, but the 
sphere cuts because of its@obility and its ability to set 
other atoms into motion. 
17sensu 4, 442a3lff •. Schmid, .2.E· cit., p. 272, claims 
that this makes the spherical atom fiery and so negates the 
atomists' monism: "den Begriff des Monismus tatsachlich auf-
hebt." But the fact that the atom produces this .aenaation 
(heat) does not mean that the atom itself is hot. 
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18 tion o:f heat. Thus :fire.is hot because its spherical atom~ 
in abundance produce that sensation in us by their movement. 
The sphere is thus for Democritus precisely what makes the 
moving soul motive and what moves the animate body; the spher-
ical atoms in it give both fire and soul their primary charac-
teristics. 
This is not to say that any single small spherical atom 
taken in isolation is :fire or even a small piece o:f :fire, any 
. 
more than this was so :for Anaxagoras. Fire, like each of the 
other traditional elements was for both Anaxagoras and Democ-
ritus a composite. The small spherical atom taken individual-
ly was to be found as part of the air we breathe; 1 9 it is like-
ly to exist in the aqueous nature of the eye, if there is to 
be 'soul' there sensitive to visual images, 20 and to be in the 
. ~ 
sea: Meteorology 4.1, 379b4:ff. speaks o~ atoms left as a re-
sidue of 'putrefaction' which provide the basis for animate 
life, although there is here no explicit statement attributing 
-.., 18-i;,wv XlVouµeVWV 't"t 1 't~V IJ!¥X~V U'ITe/..a(3ov e{Val. o8EV • • • 
nup -rt xal 8epµov ~~01v au-i;~v Et vat. Thia is not to say that 
soul, fire, and 'what is hot' are in all respects identical, a5 
Cherniss, .2.E.• cit., p. 298, note 3, seems to assume that Aris-
totle wrongly "C:i'Oes, but only that they are in some respects 
identical. . 
There may indeed be an effect of 'heat' produced 1n us 
by a single spherical atom, although that effect may very well 
simply go unnoticed--and i"tt-may indeed be noticed only when 
there are a goodly number of such spherical atomic shapes pro-
ducing the same effect in us. 
l9This is to replenish the supply of 'soul-atoms' which 
are constantly escaping from us; on this matter see Reap. 4, 
47lb24ff. and Anima 1.2, 403b3lff. 
20sensu 2, 438b5:ff. 
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this to Democritus. 21 Indeed, their existence in the universe 
at large seems to' be pretty strongly implied. 22 Now this 
spherical atom, or any random number of them--inasmuch as they 
are part of air or water or any other element or compound--is 
not fire, nor does Aristotle say th~t it is. 23 Only in epeci-
21But compare Caelo 4.6, 313a24ff., where Democritus 
claims that warm particles rise up out of water. 
22And thus the criticism of Aristotle at Anima 1.5, 
4lla7ff. seems to apply to Democritus as well as to others. 
23cherniss, .2.E• cit., p. 289, note 3, claims that Aris-
totle does. But what Aristotle does say is that soul and fire 
are the same in that they contain the same matter, spherical 
at~ms (see ~· 4, 472a35), that soul is 'fire of a sort' 
(nup ~'), that soul and fire have some characteristics in com-
mon. But this does not imply total identity; and Cherniss 
seems wrong in assuming that Aristotle jumped to unwarrented 
conclusions. Nor does Aristotle say, as Cherniss says he does, 
that the atom was hot; soul and fire and the spherical atom are 
only 'hot' in the sense that they produce that sensation in us. 
The passage in which Aristotle seems to come closest to 
saying that the spherical atom is hot is Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 
326a5 (though Cherniss does not cite this passage here). This 
passage will be taken up later, but we might say this much 
about it now: what Aristotle does say is that Democritus as-
signs 'what is hot' (i.e., what produces the effect of heat) to 
the spherical figure; and what is illogical about that attribu-
tion is not that it is assigning a quality as a property to 
supposedly qualitiless atoms (that would have immediately pro-
duced a self-contradiction in Democritus which Aristotle would 
not have failed to notice), but that Democritus does not as-
sign 'what has a cold effect' to a contrary figure. 
Aristotle raises a second and separate objection to De-
mocritus' atomism at 326a7ff. .Aristotle there points out that 
if one assigns one set of contraries to atoms--such as degrees 
of heat and cold (and this Democritus did not do)--then it is 
illogical not to assign ot4er sets of contraries to those atoms 
as .. well. But Democritus, he says, did.assign varying degrees 
of weight to his atoms (with the weight increasing as the size 
increases). - And so, Aristotle says, if weight is assigned to 
them in degrees, then degrees of heat (apparently varying with 
the shape) ought also be assigned to them as a property; and 
if these properties belong to them in degrees, then so might 
softness and hardness; and, if the latter, the atom can be 
affected. 
r 
t 
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fic--though, as far as we know, unspecified--combinations do 
these spherical atoms become what we perceive as fire and call 
fire. And we might further asswne that such a combination in-
cludes their being rather highly concentrated, since their 
heat is obviously more intense than the warmth of the soul or 
of the air. 
The further question as to whether only spherical atoms 
-
constitute what we know as fire or whether such fire is com-
posed of non-spherical atoms as well~-with the spherical pre-
dominating--is unanswered by Aristotle and by later tradition 
about Democritus; and the answer to this question may not in-
deed be essential. It does, however, seem more likely--if 
Democritus had carried his inquiry about fire that far--that 
any given and observed example of fire, inasmuch as it is the 
burning and dissolution of some object, might grow both by 
releasing further spherical atoms already in the object and by 
setting non-spherical atoms into violent motion. And these 
latter non-spherical atoms may very well have been considered 
as part of the phenomenon which we call fire. In any case, 
the essential part of fire, that which primarily gives it its 
nature, is the spherical atom. 
The other traditional elements--earth, air, and water--
t 
are composite·as well, although, unlike fire (for which a spe-
cific geometrical figure determines the character) their na-
ture is determined by the size of the atoms of which they are 
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constituted. 24 But this does not prevent them from--like fire 
--being differentiated from one another by 'shape' ( puoµo_c.;). 25 
And, since it is the size of the atom which determines the na-
ture of the element, ite 'geometrical figure' may vary great-
ly, and so present a great variety of sense-data to us. Water 
may thus taste bitter or sweet depending on the 'geometrical 
figure' predominating in the atoms of the water tasted without 
really affecting its nature as water. 
The differentiation between 'elements' on the basis of 
the size of atoms making up any element is not to be taken to 
mean that a given element is composed of atoms all of one size; 
rather any one element must contain atoms in a variety of 
sizes. For Democritu~, air, for instance, must contain not 
only spherical atomic shapes, but also both larger and smaller 
atoms--enough of a supply and variety to provide for the gen-
eration of water from air, for it is precisely in connection 
with this differentiation by size that the mutual generation of 
elements from one another is formulated. 26 If one element is 
to be generated from another by the separating out.of the larg-
er atoms, as they claim, then each element must contain the 
2
,4caelo 3,.4.J 303a26-27: µc:y€ec:i xa't µ1xpo't"ryo 01acp€pov 
a€pa xat YDV xat uowp. 
25 On illeli·ssus, Gorgia~, and Xenophane s 2, 975b28 claims 
that Democritus said that also water and air and each of the 
multitude of things, though their material is generically the 
same, differ in shape: 't"~ oowp 't"E xa\ 't"OV a€pa EXOO't"OV 't"E 'tWV 
nOAAWV, 't"aU't"O ov, pueµy oia~EpEtV. 
' 
26
caelo 3. 4 t 303a27-29: 't"Ct µ Eyl C'tQ owµa't"a. exxp' voµ c:va, 
$:.I , e u~ ' L_, ' - I L_ ./.. <paoi u OU't"W yiyvEo at uuwp xat uEpa xaL YDV c:~ UAA1JAWV. 
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r sizes of atoms requisite for any other element; 27 and the dif-
ferentiation between the elements by size of atoms must mean 
that one element is distinct from another because one particu-
lar size of atom predominates among the variety, there being 
more of that particular size either than of all other sizes 
or than of any other size. So the nature of any element is 
determined by the proportionate mixture of the various kinds 
of atoms in it. 
Furthermore, the so-called elements in the traditional 
sense, Democritus claims, are not limited to four in number; 
indeed, there is a limitless number of them, as Aristotle re-
ports in a number of passages. 28 And this claim is quite con-
27Whether this sort of variety also holds true of fire 
is, as was mentioned, in doubt. Fire is not mentioned in this 
mutual generation. But the argument from silence, though 
strong--especially when taken together with the unique posi-
tion of fire in being assigned a special geometrical figure--
is still not absolutely conclusive. It is certainly likely 
that fire may be generated from other objects; but the reverse 
process is more in doubt. 
28rn some of these passages there may be some prelimi-
nary doubt vn1ether Aristotle's term o~o,xerov refers to the at-
om or to the •traditional elements' which for Democritus are 
composites; the latter seems the case in these passages. 
At Physics 3.4, 203a20 Aristotle says that_ Anaxagoras 
and Democritus make the elements limitless (ane,pa n:olouo' 1:a 
01:o,xera), and these, Aristotle says, Democritus forms from 
atoms: o o' lx 't~~ Tiavonepµ(a~ 'twv ox~µa~wv (what is meant by 
n:avon:epµ(a will be taken up later). 
· At Caelo 3.4, 303alJ Aristotle says that the atomists 
an:e,pa xa, 'tQ QTIAU owµa'ta ~~OlV e(val. The owµa'ta are evi-
dently not atoms here; their limitlessness had already been 
es~ablished (303a5-6), and this is an additional point (xaJ 
npo~ 'tou'to,~--303all); theowµa'ta must be the traditional ele-
ments, as what follows shows--a discussion of fire, water~ and 
such (again, interestingly enough na vcn epp. (a is mentioned J. 
At Gen. et Corr. 1.1, 314a22-24 Aristotle says that the 
atomists ex Ou)µCl'tu'V ao la l p£-rwv ~crAAQ ouyxercEJa( q:ao'' i;aiha 0 I 
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eistent with Democritus' view of the mutual generation of the 
elements; for any one element by the addition or subtraction 
of a single atom would have the proportion of atoms in it 
changed, and thus its essential nature would be changed; it 
would thus become a different element. Thus, with the wide 
variety of possibilities of change inherent in such a system, 
the number of possible elements would quite consistently seem 
limitless. 
In connection with Aristotle's explanation of Democritus' 
theory of the mutual generation of the elements at .Q!:! ~ 
Heavens 3.4, the term.navonepµ(a had been used and was seen to 
recur in other pertinent passages as well, indeed, more in 
' ' 
connection with Democritus than with Anaxagoras, with whom the 
term is more usually connected. Although it seems appropriate 
to the teaching of Anaxagoras as well, Trend~lenburg29 suspects 
anetpa XUL 'tO TIAD80s slvat xa) 'tas µopcpa,, ao'ta oe npos au'ta 
6tacp£petv 'Lou'Lots et;, wv do\ xa\ e£oet xa't 'tasn 'Louri;wv. The 
't'aiha, I take it, refers to 'LcIA.A.a ' and so does UO'La; mht is 
to be taken as aA.A.~A.a, compare Verdenius and Waszink, QE.• cit., 
p. 1. The 'LoD'Lots and 'Lou'Lwv obviously refer to atoms; thus I 
would translate this passage as: "It is out of indivisible 
atoms that they say (any) remaining objects are composed, and 
these objects are limitless in multitude and in their structure 
and they differ from one another in three respects, by the 
atoms which compose them and by the placement and order of 
these atoms. 11 And once again 'Jmvon epµ (a is mentioned in this 
context. Compare also Hermann Langerbeck, Doxis Epirhysmie: 
Studien ~ Demokrits Ethik"und Erkenntnislehre (reprinted at 
Frankfurt am. r1Iain: Weidrnann, 1967), P•'·-99. 
29rn'his commentary on De Anima, p. 214; as cited by G. 
R. T. Ross, Aristotle De Sensu and De ifomoria (Cambridge: 
University Press, 19061';-·p. lb"3. Joachim, QE.• .£!.!., p. 66, 
also agrees, although it seems that most modern scholars pre-
fer to connect the term with Anaxagoras, if they commit them-
selves at all to connecting it with one of the two. 
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r that the term is Democritean and is quite appropriate to·De-
mocritus' view of the traditional elements. 30 Therefore it 
seems fitting to survey briefly its use and its applicability 
to the teachings of Democritus, with the expectation that it 
will help clarify those teachings. 
outside of Aristotle and his commentators the word is 
used in philosophical contexts as early as Plato, Timaeus 73c, 
where the god mingled triangles capable of producing the four 
elements and thus contrived a navonepµ(a;31 thus, interesting-
ly enough, it refers here to a mixture in which the constitu-
ent parts of the four elements are present. Plutarch says 
that for Zeno the 8uµo~ was a navonEpµ(a of 'passions', a mix-
ture drawn from the various faculties of the soul.32 In 
Lucian's Hermotimus, 61, philosophy is like a navonEpµ(a, a 
sack with all sorts of grains in it; a seller may take out 
some of the grains to show a prospective buyer a sample, but 
one cannot tell what the other grains are like just from this 
sample;33 each part of the navonepµ(a shows something differ-
30Guthrie, Histort, II, 414, says that Aristotle used 
the term "somewhat care essly" in connection with Democritus. 
3l,;plyWVWV oqa npG'na • • • nup ~E xa\ UOWp xa\ aepa 
y~v ••• µaAtG~a ~v napaoxetV 6uva~a, ~a0~a o Geo~ ••• 
µEiyvu~ ••• navonEpµ(av nav~\ evryi;Q yevei µ~xavwµEvo~. 
32Iiioral:ia, De Cohi benda Ira, 463a. 
' xal 
33The point of the comparison is that philosophy is not 
like a skin of wine, the same throughout, from which you can 
take one sip and thus judge all the rest of the wine in the 
skin; but it is like a sack filled with all sorts of grain, 
all of which one must examine in order accurately to determine 
the nature of the whole. 
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ent, and one cannot tell about the whole until one examinee 
all of it. This passage is interesting in that the grains 
may provide close parallels with atoms in a conglomeration. 
In general it seems best to say that this term describes a 
mixture of a great number of various and distinct parts, some 
of which, when isolated, give us only an incomplete knowledge 
of the whole. Thus far it seems that the term can apply with 
equal appropriateness to the teachings of both Democritus and 
of Anaxagoras, and there is no reason in usage outside of 
Aristotle for applying it to one in preference to the other. 
Indeed, tradition has it that Democritus was a pupil of Anax-
agoras, and they may well be close together on this subject.34 
This brings us to the usage of that term in Aristotle 
himself. At ,Physics 3.4, 203al6ff. Aristotle is talking 
about the traditional elements fcwv Aeyoµ€vwv o'to&xe{wv, 
o~ov. uowp -fi\ <i~pa 1) 'to µe'tasu 'tmhwv --203al 7-18); and Aristotle 
then adds some information on how Anaxagoras and Democritus 
thought of these traditional elements; both held that they 
were composite. Anaxagoras taught that any such element was 
further composed of more basic bodies which Aristotle calls 
il .., 
oµotoµep~, bodies whose parts are like the whole; and the tra-
ditional elements for him were not such basic bodies. Democ-
't 
ri tus, on the· other hand, is said to ha:ve held that any such 
traditional element is a composite as well, consisting of the 
seed (or atom) combinati·on of all atomic shapes ( ~x 'tf1' n:av-
34see Diogenes L_aortius, Lives Q.:f Emminent Philosophers, 9.34. 
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~; a'IT tpµ( ac;; 'l:"WV oxriµ&iwv). 35 Aristotle then goes on to describe 
the nature Of the oµoLcµepf) and how the generation Of Objects 
(and 'elements') were explained in Anaxagoras' terms (203a23-
33); he then continues and does the same for Democritus' the-
ory very briefly (203a33-b2). But this description of Democ-
ritus' view, I believe, presents a difficulty which may be 
better postponed until we have considered at least one more 
passage in which Aristotle uses the term navontpµ(c. But, so 
far at least, we may say this much about navonepµ(a in Democ-
ritus: it describes for him the nature of the traditional 
element;36 navonepµ(a, it seems, ought to be connected with 
Democritus' theory of the mutual generation of the-elements,37 
for, since the element contains--as navanepµ(a--all the shapes 
or sizes necessary for its generating other elements, it was 
obviously meant to explain, for one thing, such mutual genera-
tion. 
At _Qg Sensation 4, 44la4-ll Aristotle gives three theo-
ries as to how 'tastes' may originate from water; the first of 
these is specifically connected with the name of Empedocles, 
and the second describes wat'er as a 1ravon tpµ(av xuµwv, but is 
35Note here that the term navonepµ(a is used explicitly 
in connection with Democritus and in contrast to Anaxagoras, 
with whom this word is mora usually connected. · 
36Ross mentions nothing at all about the nature of the 
'element' as related to navonepµ(a. 
37r have not seen in any of the modern accounts any at-
tempt to consider these two theories in conjunction with one 
another. 
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assigned to no one in particular. Tn both of these theories 
it seems implicitly agreed that the water in que3tion pre-
sents no particular flavor to us, but is itself still respon-
sible for flavors in other things, as, for instance, in the 
plants that 'feed on' it.38 Each of these two theories have 
been ascribed to Democritus. 
Although Empedocles is specifically mentioned in connec-
tion with the first of these theories, Cherniss argues that, 
since the second is obviously that of Anaxagoras, it is better 
to connect Democritus with the first.39 The first theory then 
is that "the water has in it (various) kinds of flavors which 
are imperceptible due to their size. 11•40 But, if this theory 
is to be distinct from the second, it implies, as nearly as we 
can tell from the statement of the theory and from Aristotle's 
criticism of it, that any given amount of water--for example, 
any amount of water from a specific source--has in it a speci-
fied and unvarying (as long as the general conditions are con-
stant) flavor in it; the 'kinds' of flavors may vary as the 
source of the water varies, but the flavor of that specific 
38The third theory, that the responsibility for the 
taste is to be sought outside the water, need not concern us 
here. 
39.QE. cit., p. 320, ~ote 116, probably because here the 
'kinds of flavors' are "imperceptible because of their small 
size;" there seems to be no real reason beyond this. But it· 
is also implied in the second theory that the taste in the 
water is too small to be perceived. 
40lv a~~Q ~0 uowp EXelV Ta y€v~ ~WV xuµwv ava(aeryi;a o,a 
µ' xpo-rryi; a --44la5-6. 
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I 
2!5Upply of water stays the same. This flavor 'comes out'. in 
the fruit of .the plant which gets its water from that source; 
and the flavor apparently becomes noticeable as it becomes 
more concentrated in the fruit. That which distinguishes this 
theory from the next is that the flavor lurking in any given 
source of water is constant. Aristotle refutes this by saying 
that any given fruit can by cooking, drying, and other proces-
ses acquire a great.variety of flavors. And this is the the-
ory which Cherniss would ascribe to Democritus. But it is 
quite well agreed that for Democritus contraries are present 
in the same object; and this was on the particular basis of 
empirical observation. 41 But this first theory seems to allow 
less lee-way on the variation of the flavor of the same water 
than would seem appropriate to Democritus' theory. 
The second theory is that water provides the material 
for flavors and so is an (atomic) seed-combination of all fla-
vors. Alexander in his commentary, although he admits that 
the theory is Anaxagorean, 42 still connects it with Democritus; 
and he is, I believe, right in doing so. Democritus is men-
tioned .in this same chapter of On Sensation as reducing the 
41meta. 4.5, 1009a23ff. Contraries may be true of an 
object because the full and the void (contradictories) are at 
any given part of the phys~cal object; any object may also pre-
sent contrari6s to us because the shape, placement, and order 
of the atoms may differ at any part of the object: 'e-r1 e~ae1, 
ox~µa-rl, -rasel. -ra\ha of; yeVT') cvavrc(wv --Physics 1.5, 188a23-
24. 
42Page 68 (as cited in Ross, Sensu, p. 163, and Cherniss, 
.2.E.• .£!.!., p. 320, note 116). 
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flavors to 'shapes'; 43 and, if we substitute crxTJµ&twv for 
xuµwv in 44la8, we have precisely the expression uaed in the 
above-mentioned passage in the Physics describing Democritus' 
theory of the elements: navanepµ(a crxTJµa~wv. Water, we have 
seen, is differentiated from other elements only by the size 
of its atoms, with the geometrical shapes likely remaining var-
•·. 
ied; this means that any given portion of water (no matter 
what the source) may have a variety of atomic shapes, with the 
... 
largest number of a given geometrical figure determining the 
flavor that we may taste in the water or in the ~lant.44 The 
atoms may differ from part to part in the water, and so one 
portion of water may give rise.to one flavor and another por-
tion to another flavor: UAAa a' ls aAAou µfpou~ --44la21-22. 
The theory and its refutation seem appropriate enough to Democ-
ritean atomism. 45 
Upon noting at Qg Sensation 4, 44la9 that for Democritus 
different flavors may arise at different parts of water due to 
there being a predominance of a specific kind of geometrical 
figure in one portion and a predominance of another kind of 
atomic figure at another portion of water, we are ready now to 
434, 442bl3. 
44compare Beare, 21?.· eit., p. 166. He agrees with Alex-
ander that this passage applies to Democritus and states that 
the atoms of taste have their noticeable effect as a group 
with "the predominating kind fixing the quality of the whole." 
See also Ross, Sensu, p. 163. 
45Ross, Sensu, p. 164, assigned the third theory mention-
ed in this passage to Anaxagoras. 
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return to the account at Physics 3.4, where at 203a33-b4 we 
have a parallel explanation of 'traditional elements' in gen-
eral for Democritus. There Aristotle claims: "But Democritus 
(in contrast to Anaxagoras) says that none of his primary bod-
ies (atoms) comes into being out of another. 1146 Now, in spite 
of this permanence of the atoms, we nevertheless do have some 
account of the 'traditional elements' quite like that of Anax-
agoras to explain the varied phenomena of the world. The 
text, according to Ross, is as follows: aAA 1 oµw~ ye au~y ~o 
XOLVOV owµa nav~wv EO~lV apxD, µeye8£l xa~a µ6pla xal OXDµa~L 
oia~epov. Ross, following Simplicius here, 47 takes ~0 XOLVOV 
owµa as 'the body that is common to all atoms' or 'the univer-
sal bodily subst~nce•, 48 and ~laims that this 'common body' 
differs in size and shape in its parts. This is indeed a 
strange way to say that atoms are one in kind, but differ in 
shape and size; and hence one might well hesitate to accept 
such an interpretation. Furthermore, neither Ross nor Sim-
plicius gives any really satisfactory explanation of what is 
46... , S:: I IS::.. ' <I I • , ' o~µoxpl~O~ u OUuEV E~Epov Es E~Epou YlYVE08aL ~WV 
np&r:wv ~~a(v. Or, perhaps, since the contrast is to Anaxago-
ras, a better translation would be: "No atom is composed of 
'sub-atoms'." The argument of Zeno might well have convinced 
Democritus of this. But in either case the point is that an 
atom is and remains the same, a permanent actuality. 
47Ross, Physics, p. ~46; see al~o Simplicius, In Physi-
corum, ~· 462, lines 12-13: xae6aov ~o xoLvov owµa ~o ~wv a~sµwv ev ~av~wv EAEYE ~~v Ola~opav a6~wv xa~a µeyeeo~ xai 
ox~µ a ~le£ l ~. 
48Ross, Physics, p. 363. 
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meant by xa~~ µop1a, 'in their various portions•. 49 Aristotle 
had told how for Anaxagoras the elements, being composed of 
. ... 
oµo&oµepD, can account for mutual generation and, from there, 
the generation of everything else; so what we are looking for 
here is some similar explanation in the case of the 'elements' 
for Democritus, as being constituted as a navonepµ(c of shapes; 
and this, I believe, we have at 203a34-b2. 
The navonepµ(a~ ~wv oxDµa~wv of 203a21-22 seems to be 
t k . •th th hr , ... ' ' - 50 a en up again wi e p ase atYtwv ~o xo, vov owµa • This 
navonepµ(a oxDµa~wv, this common body which contains (or, is 
shared by) a great variety of atoms, does indeed provide an 
explanation of the mutual generation of the elements--or, of 
the generation of anything else for that matter--and it can do 
so because any given portion of it contains a variety of atoms 
which differ in size and in geometrical figure. And this is 
precisely the kind of explanation which the context in this 
passage would lead one to expect to find; it justifies the 
linking of Anaxagoras and Democritus, and it points out as well 
exactly where the difference between their doctrines lies--
49simplicius says nothing at all about this. Ross, Phys-
ics, p. 363, in his 'analysis', writes: "whose parts differ 
only in size and shape," which I can only take to mean that the 
parts (i.e., atoms) of this universal bodily substance differ 
in shape. The Oxford trans~ation of Hardie and Gaye, "differ-
ing from part to part in size and shape," is of no real help 
either. 
50r accept, along with Henri Carteron, Arietote Physique, 
I, 97, the reading of manuscript E over against the reading of 
J, which Ross accepts. Simplicius, In Physicorum, p. 462, line 
12, seems to agree with E; he has: wxo&vov owµa 'to ~wv 6.~0µ0w. 
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primarily in the continuing actuality of the atom for Democ-
ritus.51 
There ia in the Generation of Animals another passage 
which involves navonEpµ(a; and I suspect that this may very 
well also belong to the teaching of Democritus; nothing that. 
I can see would prohibit it from being identified with him; 
it would be quite consistent with the rest of his theory. 
But, be that as it may, if this particular theory does not in 
fact belong to Democritus, it is at the very least an excel-
lent illustration of what navo'ITepµ(o: likely meant for Democ-
ritus as well as being a good indication of what this term did 
mean for Aristotle. 
Democritus had taught that a child is born a male or a 
female according ae the seed from either parent prevails; for 
instance, male, if the seed of the father is predominant 
(xpa~~o~--~. ~., 4.1, 764all). The semen of both mother 
and father are factors to be reckoned with in determining at 
least the sex of the offspring. And this theory is mentioned 
again at 4.3, 769al8-19. And several lines after this, though 
no specific theorists is mentioned, the matter of parental 
semen being a navo·1tepµ(a is introduced as a possible explana-
tion of a nu.i~ber of other differences which may occur in· the 
' 
5lcompare Schmid, op. cit., p. 229: "Von dernavonEpµ(a 
des Anaxagoras unterscheidet sich die Atomwelt dadurch, dasz 
die Teilbarkeit des anaxagorischen Stoffes unbegrenzt und 
dasz in jedem seiner Bestandteile die ganze FUlle der empir-
isch vorhandenen Einzelstoffe enthalten ist und aus ibm her-
auagebildet werden kann. 11 
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offspring, which is in some respects like the father and in 
other respects like the mother; so the semen of each is in 
fact a sort of combination of a larger number of ingredients. 
Peck translates Aristotle's explanation quite adequately:52 
"It is as though someone were to mix and blend a large 
number of juices into one fluid, and then take off some 
of this mixture; in doing so he could take off not al-
ways an equal amount of each juice, but sometimes more 
of this one, sometimes more of that, and sometimes he 
might take some of one and nothing of another: So, they 
say, it is with the semen which is a mixture of a large 
number of ingredients; and in appearance the offspring 
takes after that parent from whom the largest amount is 
derived." 
The parallels to the explanation of the constitution of water 
in On Sensation--as well as to the sack of all sorts of grain 
in Lucian--is striking. 53 A 1i:<:tvone:pµ(c:. would then be a com-
bination of all sorts of atoms, with the dominant kind deter-
mining the nature of the substance; one may take out a portion 
of these (at random) and thus have'a substance with different 
qualities on two different occasions--with some one kind now 
predominating and determining its nature, now some other kind. 
One can in this way account for a seemingly limitless number 
of differences in what appears to be basically the same sub-
52A. L. Peck, Aristotle Generation of Animals (London: 
William~Heinemann, 1963), pp. 415 and 417: 4.3, 769a29-36--
"- ' ,, , ' \ , 4,\ c. , ,, , 
wone:p ouv E:l ~l< xe:paOE:lE TIOAAOU< xuµou< E:l< EV uypov, XUTIE:l~ 
1 
-e "\ (.). L '- I I 1\ ,L " 11 1 , 1. I EV~EU e:v nUµpuVOl, XUl 6uvai~ av "Aaµ~uVElV µn lCTOV UEl u~ 
txdo~ou, a"A"A' ~~~ µEv ~oG ~~loG6e: n"Afov cl~~ 6~ ~oG ~oloG6e:, 
o~e 6e ~ou µEv t..a~e:iv ~oG Be µne£v "Aa~e:iv ~ ~oG~o ouµpa(ve:lv 
xai en\ ~~< yoV~< TIOAUµlyoG< OUOTI<" a~· 00 yap av ~~v ye:vvwv-
~wv nt..e:ro~ov eyy8v~al, ~OU~~ y(ve:o8al ~~v µop~~v EOlXO<· 
53compare, for example, El< EV uypov at 769a30. 
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stance. 
In .Qa Generation and Corruption 1.1 the term navonepµ(a 
is connected more closely with the name of Anaxagoras, and it 
is with this connection that most commentators feel more com-
fortable. In this chapter Aristotle raises the question as to 
whether the traditional elements are simple or composite. The 
issue is drawn between two 'schools'--that of Empedocles and 
that of Anaxagoras. 54 It is the school of Anaxagoras that 
claims that the traditional elements are composite (oov8e~a--
314a29): navonepµ(av yap e{va1 ~oo~wv --for each of these tra-
ditional elements, they•claim, is a "mixture of all sorts of 
seeds;" and for Anaxagoras himself those seeds are the 0µ010-
µEpD.55 That Democritus himself belongs to the 'school of 
Anaxagoras' in respect to the composite.nature of the tradi-
tional elements is certain enough; and he had indeed been men-
tioned immediately prior to this remark by Aristotle on the 
controversy between the schools, and there (314a22-24) Aris-
totle quite clearly claims that Democritus taught that every-
, 541.1, 314a24-26: fvav~rw, 6~ ~a(vov~ai Afyov~~' ot 
nepi 'Avasayopav ~or, nep\ 'EµneooxA€a. One might note that 
even in this passage Aristotle makes no specific and unique 
identification of the term with Anaxagoras. Verdenius and 
Waszink, .2.E.• cit., p. 1, specify A...~axagoras in spite of this, 
likely because-'both Anaxagoras and the oµoioµepD have been 
mentioned. But Aristotle,lI believe, sees the issue as a 
larger one than the debate between two pe~sons; two schools of 
thought are mentioned. 
55Following Verdenius and Waszink, on. cit., p. 1, and 
against Cherniss, .££.•£ii., p. 108, note 444, who takes the 
~ou;wv as referring to composite objects and not to theoµo10-
µcp~o 
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thing else beside the atoms--and that includes the 'elements•--
ie- a composite: ex awµ&rwv UCLO.Lpf,;wv 'tc:h.A.o. cuyxe:roea( q:>O.OL. 
So here, though the term navone:pµ(o. aeeme more closely connec-
ted with Anaxagoras, it i·s not specifically and uniquely iden-
tified with him; and Democritus even here is still connected 
with it as much as Anaxagoras is. 
In .Q!! the Heavens 3.4 the teaching about the element as 
a 1l:avone:pµ(a is a little more closely connected with the mutual 
generation of the elements. At 303al3 Aristotle mentions in 
regard to the structure of the traditional elements that Democ-
ritus had assigned the spherical atomic shape to fire; "but he 
and Leucippus distinguished air, water, and the other elements 
from one another by the largeness and smallness of the atoms 
Which Constitute them: afpa Oe XO.) UOWp XO.l ,;&A.A.a µey{80.L 
xa'L µL Y..po'tTJ'tL 6t d''A.ov. 56 This, as we have seen, means that 
Democritus distinguished the elements from one another by pos-
iting a predominance of a specific size of atom for a spebific 
element; and he did not differentiate them by claiming that all 
the atoms of a given element are of a uniform size or shape. 
And Democritus made this kind of a distinction between these 
elements "on the ground that each element is by nature a sort 
of a 'mixture of all sorts of seeds'--the seeds necessary for 
all of the traditional elem~nts. 1157 The matter of distinguish-
56303al4-15. 
57303al5-17. Guthrie, on. cit., p. 414, takes o't'oLxe(uw 
here to refer to the atoms and concludes that Aristotle is here 
using the term navcnBpµ(a somewhat carelessly. But I take it 
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ing 'elements' by size of atoms is repeated at 303a25ff. along 
with the claim that for Democritus there was a mutual genera-
tion of the elements by the separation out of the larger atoms. 
The elements thus were distinguished by 'size' and not speci-
fically by geometrical figure--except, of course, for fire. 
There were in any mixture which constitutes an element all 
sorts of geometrical figures; and the proportion of geometri-
cal figures in one element seems to remain pretty much the 
same when another element is generated from it by the removal 
of some atoms of a specific size.58 navonepµ(a is thus a term 
quite closely connected with the name of Democritus and indi-
cates a mixture capable of producing all the elements, for it 
has all the necessary kinds of atoms. 
This leaves us with one more important passage to account 
for, in which the doctrine of navcrnepµ(a. is connected with 
Democritus; the passage is at On ~ Soul 1.2, 404a4. I have 
. -~; 
postponed considering this passage because it is the subject 
of much controversy; the meaning of the passage is in doubt; 
that the seed-mixture needs to be thought of as one that at 
least in a preliminary way may supply seeds for all the ele-
ments in mutual generation and still have each new element re-
tain a roughly similar proportion of shapes (i.e., geometrical 
figures). Leo Elders, on. cit., p. 302 fails to explain this 
altogether, only indicating that the word has reference to some 
primitive state in which all kinds of atoms were together. 
58This s~ems to be what Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 610, 
lines 24ff ., makes of this passage: oux~'t~xa'ta -co oxDµa. 
Ol 0.<PEPOV'tWV, a"'AA. I tx 'JlUV'tOOO.'JtWV OXT)µ&rwv xai 'tWV a6-rwv £xt1o-
'tOU -rou-rwv Yl voµ~vou --"No longer [as is the case with fire] 
differing by geometrical figure, but composed of all sorts of 
~eometrical figures which remain constant when each of these 
Lelements) is generated. 11 Additions mine. 
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and, indeed, as a result of that doubt, a number of attempts 
have been made to manipulate and excise portions of the text. 
The following is the text as it appears in Ross' edition 
(403b31-404a6): 
~08E:V ~T)µoxpl'tOt; µev XOp 'tl XQl 8e:pµoV q>T)01V a6't~V 
e:{v~1· - crne:_lpwv '(clP OV'tWV O)fT)µa:wv xa1 a-roµ~v 'tel ocpai po-
E:l OT) xup Xf1 *UXTJV Aeye:i (oiov e:v 'tQ aepl 'ta XUAOUµe:va 
~uoµa.'ta, d cpa(ve:-rai EV -rai<; 01 a 'tWV 8up(owv <ix'tt01 v) ~v -r~v µ~v xavoxe:pµ(av o-roixe:ra A~ye:1 -r~<; OATJ<; cpuae:w~ 
(oµ~(wt; OE xa1 Ae:uxixxo<;), 'tOU'tWV oe 'ta acpa1poe:16D 
\j!UXTJV • • • 
Ross59 summarizes the dissatisfaction with this text as it 
stands on the grounds that the sentence is a muddle, because 
1) the antecedent of ~v ought to be 'spherical atoms' or 
'fire and soul', while the sense requires it to be 'atoms', 
and 2) it makes Aristotle say twice that Democritus identi-
fied soul and the spherical atom. Diels had tried to remedy 
the situation by excising most of the offending portion of 
the text: -ra xaAouµe:va ••• 6.x1:Tai v ~v • 6° Cherniss agrees 
that the passage is certainly corrupt. 61 Brieger has appar-
ently made a more constructive attempt62 by proposing that 
the suoµa-ra are to be pictures of the atoms in general, and 
not of spherical atoms specifically; thus the suoµa'ta are the 
antecedent of ~v. This thus meets Ross' first objection; but 
he is still left with assuming a lacuna in the text. Langer-
59Ross, .Anima, 
60niels-Kranz, 
610 •t ~· ~-, p. 
pp. 174-175. 
67A28, II, 78. 
290, note 4. 
62At Brieger "Demokri.tos' ~ngebliche Leugriung der Sin-
neswahrheit" Hermes, XXXVII (1902;, p. 12, note 1. 
r 
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beck63 has followed a similar course; the suoµa~a, he says, 
are atoms in general and, as such, are themselves in constant 
motion; and the special motion of the spherical atoms is due 
to their shape. Thus he manages his interpretation without 
assuming any basic change in the text as received. But even 
so he does not meet Ross' second objection to the text as it 
stands, and he neglects the meaning of navonEpµ(a here. 
Both of Ross' objections ought to be met; and I believe 
that this can be done without any real change in the text. 
Now the only way in which the second objection can be met is 
to extend the comparison--or, rather, illustration--through 
the second identification of the spherical atoms with soul. 
The first objection can be met, as has been pointed out, by 
takingsuoµa~a as the antecedent of ~v. But this means that 
we do not have here a comparison or simi~e, but an actual il-
lustration, meant to be taken literally. The sucrµa~a are not 
like atoms, but are in fact combinations of all kinds of atoms, 
including spherical; they are themselves navonEpµ(a1 contain-
ing spherical atoms which give them their movement. Thus the 
thought of the whole passage, including the context, would be 
something like this: Some have said that soul is primarily 
that which causes motion and can only do this by itself being 
l 
63.Qp_. cit., pp. 78-79. His interpretation avoids making 
the particles an equivalent of soul, as some Pythagoreans had 
done; and it was the fact that this made the teaching of De-
mocritus the same as the teaching of the Pythagoreans that 
gave Diels his excuse to excise the passage where this doc-
trine is attributed to Democritus. 
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in motion (403b28-31); this led Democritus to say that the 
eoul was a sort of fire (403b31-404al), because, though there 
is a limitless number of atomic shapes, the spherical shapes 
are what constitute both soul and fire (404al-3); this is the 
case with the (moving) particles in the air, for each part.icle 
has a 'mixture of all kinds of atoms'--a mixture which for De-
mocritus would be an 'element'--and in this mixture the spher~ 
ical atoms are what moves it, its 'soul' (404a3-6); and this 
is quite like what the Pythagoreans say, for some of them say 
that the5e suoµa~a are soul, and others that what moves these 
suoµa~a is soul, moving them even when the wind is calm 
(404al6-20). 64 Democritus has thus taken a Pythagorean doc-
trine and explained it in atomic terms. 
Thus the structure of the traditional elements is des-
cribed in Democritus' teaching by the term 11:avcrnepp.(a. as a com-
bination of atoms of a great variety of shapes (that is, both 
size and geometrical figure). While this is primarily true of 
64r would thus translate the passage cited above (p. 174) 
ae follows: "(Assuming that what is soul is in motion--oeev ) 
Democritus says that aoul is a sort of fire ~nd what is warm, 
for, although the number of atomic shapes is limitless, he 
claims that the s~herical atoms are both fire and soul; this is 
the case (he says) with the so-called particles (moving) in the 
air, particles which appear in sun-beams which come in through 
windows; he claims that the 'mixture of all sorts of atoms' of 
these particles are the elements of the whole of nature--Leu-
cippus does too--and that the ~pherical atoms in these parti-
cles are their soul (i.e., that which gives them their move-
ment).11 T:n;i.s ~ran~lation and interpretation has the advantage 
Of taking £.0v "L'T)V µEV 1taV01repµ(av O'tOl XElC!. A.~yel • • • X~t , 
Aeux1n11:0~ as appropriate to the context. By the other inter-
pretations the remark would simply need to be taken as repeti-
tious and parenthetical. 
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the elements, or simple bodies, other physical objects are in 
principle the same, only their structures seem more complex. 
All this is quite in keeping with what Aristotle says 
about the origin of atomism in the Eleatic problem of 'what 
is' and 'what is not' and in the problem of how contraries may 
be true of some physical object. 65 'What is' and 'what is 
not''may both be true of any given portion of a physical ob-
ject because one may find both atoms and void there. Further, 
at Phyeics 1.5, 188a24ff. Aristotle describes the three basic 
terms of Democritus--shape, placement, and order--as kinds or 
eenera of contraries: yEVT) EVOV't(uv. And it ia quite true of 
Democritus that he uses these contraries as principles for ex-
plaining physical objects ('tcivav't(a. n:u.i, nciV'te<; n:oloUoL 'ttr<; 
&pxd<; ), principles for explaining how it is that such contra-
ries arise; and this attempt is a quite reasonable one (xa1 
'tou'to e6Aoyw<; ). 'What an object is' in atomic terms means no 
more than giving a reckoning of the atomic shapes that consti-
tute it; it is or is not a specific object (e.g., a man, a pig, 
a stone, a fire) only because and inasmuch as it ha.s a speci-
fied number of various atomic shapes. 
But this still does not by itself explain how contraries 
may be true of the same physical object; we do need to use all 
' three of the basic terms. We have already mentioned how the 
first of these, shape (as geometrical figure), may explain some 
contraries. While the size of atoms which predominate in the 
65For example, Meta. 4.5, 1009a22ff. 
-
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mixture determines the eseential nature of the navcrnepµ(a, it 
may contain any variety of geometrical figures, so that some 
water may taste bitter and a different portion of that same 
water may taste sweet, depending on the predominance of a cer-
tain geometrical f~gure in the portion. And these are pre-
cisely the kinds of contraries that Aristotle specifies for 
ehape (geometrical figures): crx~µa'to' yeywviwµ.evov ~yWVlOV, 
I ' ~ eo8o nept~ep~'--Physics 1.5, 188a25-26. And likely all, or at 
.. 
least a large number, of these geometrical figures are mingled 
in everything. And thi8 seems to be evidently what Aristotle 
has in mind when he says that Democritus--as well as Anaxago-
ras--taught that everything wa~ mingled in everything. 66 
But these explain only some of the contraries, and we 
have not yet taken into account the contraries which may be 
\ generated by the other two terms,_o&a8lYD. and 'tpon~; they too 
are y~VD evav't(u)v. These have no role at all in determining 
for Democritus 'what a thing is', but only what might be 
called 'accidental qualities', such as color. With them we 
must begin to consider the void as well, for they indicate a 
given placement in the void in some position relative to other 
atoms; and there is both atoms and void at any given portion 
of a physical object67 to explain contraries in the -~ame ob-
66rbid., a27: µEµrxeat nav ev nav't( ~Dot xa~ 6Dµdxpi'to,. 
This is mentioned precisely in the context of attempts at ex-
plaining the presence of contraries in the same physical ob-
ject. And this is quite consistent with the teaching about 
navcnepµ(a. 
67Ibid., a28-29. 
.. 
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ject. Any 5hift in placement or order engenders only an ap-
parent change; though the object in question may 'look like' a 
different object, it is structurally, atomically, by nature 
still the same object, because it still has the same number of 
epecified atoms. When such a shift of placement occurs, other 
sets of contraries may become true of the 5ame physical object 
(e.g., it may be blue and then not-blue, soft and then 
hard). 68 Thus what for Aristotle would be generation and cor-
ruption is explained by Democritus in terms of adding and sub-
tracting atoms; and other changes are due to a shift in the 
placement of the object's atoms. 69 
All of this, the atomic structure of physical objects 
and the role of placement and order of the atoms, was quite 
obviously meant to explain physical object~ as we perceive 
them, to account for change, motion, and_multiplicity. Aris-
totle is quite right in saying that Democritus and Leucippu~ 
made their principle_ or beginning in accord with nature, that 
they presented accounts which accord with sense-perception, 
that Democritus was convinced by arguments founded on the study 
of nature. 70 
And it is precisely on this score that Aristotle criti-
68Gen. et Corr. 1.9,, 327al8-20; an.object becomes solid 
by 't'po7tf,ixal OTa(h yij, according to.Democritus;. at 1. 2, 316al-2, 
color is by 't'pon~. For a fuller account of Democritus' teach-
ings on such differences compare Theophraatus, De Sensibus, in 
Diels-Kranz 68Al35. 
69 Gen. !,! Corr. 1.8, 325a32-35. 
70ibid., 1.8, 325a3, 24; 1.2, 316a14. 
r 
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cizes the atomic theory of the structure of physical objects: 
it annuls or abolishes many of the opinions and impressions 
that we have by sense-impression.71 Democritus had made a 
proper beginning in starting with objects as they are perceived 
and known, 72 but he was in difficulty about contraries being 
true of the same object, and he saw no other alternative than 
to account for these in terms of atoms and void. And this 
means that for Democritus--for no justifiable reason--the phys-
' ical object is not at all what we perceive it to be; its uni-
ty, its being subject to alteration, its differentia, its per-
sistence while changing--indeed, all that we can really know 
about it--all of this he must deny about the physical object 
itself. These, as we shall now see in some detail, are the 
criticisms which Aristotle levels against this theory of the 
structure of physical objects. 
When we perceive an object, we perceive it as a single, 
continuous, whole object--a unity. The theory of the atomic 
structure of things, as we have already pointed out, denies 
that this is really true of any physical object, whether 'com-
lex' or a 'simple body'. To repeat one example, at On Genera-
~ and Corruption 1.9, 327a8ff. Aristotle cites the example 
of water freezing (or some similar phenomenon): we see that 
t 
the same object as a continuous whole (ouvext~ ov) is on one 
71caeio ~.4, 303a22-23: noAAa 'twv tvooswv xa& 't"wv ~a'­
voµtvwv xa'ta 't"TJV a'{o8T)OlV 6.vaq:d'v. 
72see especially, Phy~ics 1.1 (e.g., n~~uxE B~ ~x 't"wv 
yvwplµW'ttpwv Dµrv D ooo~ xaL oa~eo'ttpwv). 
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occasion water, on another occasion ice; Democritus claims 
that thie happens by a shifting of the individual atoms. But 
· thia means that the change must be occurring piece-meal, one 
part at a time, until the 'whole' object is finally changed. 
But this, Aristotle objects, is. contrary to the evidence of 
the senses, 73 for we see the object~~ whole on one occa-
sion liquid and then solid: &nav uyp6v, O'tE Oe OXAT)pov xal 
rcenwoc;; EO'r J V--327a22-23 • 
And furthermore, the atomic structure of the physical 
object in conjunction with its dynamic atoms, leaving, coming, 
.. ' . ! 
and rearranging themselves, leaves no permanent ouo(a for the 
physical object, no real grounds for continuing to call the 
object the same thing. And this is the criticism which Aris-
totle is making against Democritus and others at Metaphysics 
4.5, 1009a37: "And furthermore, we.shall demand of them that 
they suppose that there is some other kind of ouo(a which does 
not have the characteristics of change, corruption, or genera-
tion at all. 11 74 These men are so intent on explaining the 
73cherniss, .2.E.· cit., p. 105, says that Aristotle's cri-
ticism is naive, in tha=r-he should expect to see invisible 
atoms at work. But this is to miss the point of Aristotle's 
criticism. 
74_e'tJ o'~slWOOµEV au'tOU~ UTIOAaµ~~VElV xa1 ~AAT)V 'ttVa o~a(av d~o.l rcwv ov'twv ~ oo(E x(vT)al~ ~napxtl ou'tE cp9opa ou'te 
Yt.VEot~ 'to napchrnv. Philip Merlan, "Hintikka and a Strange 
Aristotelian Doctrine" in Phronesis, XV, 2 (1970), takes the 
~AAT)V -rtva oua(av as 'some other realm of being', that is, as 
the supralunary world referred to by Aristotle at 1010a25-32. 
But the major i5sue which Ari5totle is discussing in this chap-
ter (and we ought not lose sight of it) is the problem of 
change and permanence in the phenomenal world (in connection 
With the 'law of contradiction'). What seems to be required 
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contraries in the srune object that they lose sight of the as-
pect of 'the same object'; they need to recognize as well this 
aspect of permanence about an object. The whole context seems 
to require this interpretation rather than that of Merlan.75 
One may summarize the context in which this passage oc-
curs as follows. Democritus and others had noted the appear-
ance of contraries in phenomenal objects and had tried to ac-
count for them without violating the 'law of contradiction'. 
Democritus believed that he had solved the problem by propos-
ing that such contraries are properties only of the phenomenal 
object; the physical object, on the other hand, is not a uni-
fied object, but actually consists of .a large number of atoms 
in various positions in a void; and the contraries in the phe-
nomenal object are due to the contradictories (atoms and void, 
'what is' and 'what is not') in any given portion of the phys-
in this passage is the introduction of something permanent 
about a given physical object, something about the object 
which remains stable in the midst of accidental change. This 
permanent aspect of the object would seem to be its essence or 
fo,rm. Merlan himself discusses the .possi bil~ ty P~~ ta~Jng 
ouo(c,and cpuo'<; in this passage as e'Bo<; orrro 'H fiv dva' 
(p. 98)--which seems to me to be right; but he prefers to let 
a subsidiary point introduced later dominate his interpreta-
of the passage at 1009a37. 
75Indeed, Democritus did recognize a 'real of being' 
which--like Aristotle's supralunary world--has only locomotion 
(of the atoms in the void~, though the motion of the atoms 
does not present the regularity of the motion of the supra-
lunary realm. So evidently this recognition of such a realm 
of being is not what Aristotle has in mind to demand of Democ-
ritus. But the point that Aristotle is making against Democ-
ritu5 and other5 is that Democritus recognizes nothing perma-
nent and stable about the physical object; the addition or 
deletion of a single atom makes it a different object. 
r 
' 
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ical object (1009a22-30). But, Aristotle objects, 'what is' 
, 
is not limited to the simple and absolute sense of 'what ex-
ists'; it can also be used in a particular sense, as 'what ie 
some particular object'; and even the same object can both 
'be' and 'not be' at the same time, as long as it is not both 
actually. For example, the same apple can both 'be red' and 
'be not red' at the same time, provided that it is one of 
these contraries only potentially; it can be both potentially 
red and actually not red (1009a30-36). But this still does 
not solve the problem of contraries, for we also need to ac-
count for the identity of an object in the midst of change; we 
need some other ouo(a of the 'things that are' (i.e., of phys-
ical objects) which is not subject to change; and that perman-
ent aspect of a given physical object is its essence (1009a36-
38). 
Aristotle then goes on to speak about •truth in appear-
ances', the problem of recognizing and knowing what is perman-
ent about an object (1009a38ff.). The question of the supra-
lunary wo.rld is raised in this chapter only at 1010a25-32, and 
there only to make the point that what may be true in our sub-
lunary world may ~ot be true in another realm, that there may 
very well be (and evidently is) a realm in which there ie no 
' change from· one property to another and from one substance to 
another. The supralunary realm with its regularity belies the 
undue emphasis on change which Democritus and others had made 
in reference to the whole universe. 
Democritus then is liable to the criticism that, while 
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all the evidence points to something permanent about physical 
objects--and we also continue to speak of it as the same ob-
ject--his theory would reject such permanence. This, Aris-
totle seems to claim, is due to the fact that no one had yet 
developed the ability or inclination to distinguish properly 
the essence of an object from the contraries which may at var-
ious times be true of it.76 Democritus, Aristotle had said, 
made some attempt at defining the essence of an object; 77 and 
Democritus defined it in terms of a certain proportion of 
atoms of a .particular kind, and he also defined what is hot 
(this, he said, was due to spherical atoms). Democritus does 
seem to have made some beginning at distinguishing essence 
from the contraries, inasmuch as contraries were for the·most 
part due to the geometrical figures of the atoms and "their 
relative positions, while essence was basically specified in 
terms of the number of atoms of a certain size in that object •. 
This was indeed an attempt, but it still left the •essence• of 
an object as something quite variable--and this is contrary to 
our impression of something more permanent in an object. 
Furthermore, Democritus• theory of the atomic structure 
of physical objects, Aristotle says, neglected potency alto-
gether. A given whole object cannot in principle be something 
" else potentially. For instance, a given volume of water can 
76metaphysics 13.4, 1078b25-27, though Democritus seems 
to have made considerable progress in this direction. 
77Ibid., 1078bl9-20. 
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1 not change completely into air (vapor)--a change which quite 
obviously takes place. This, Aristotle explains, 78 is be-
cause the atomic theory itself of the structure of physical 
objects forbids it. On atomic principles the generation of a 
new element must stop short before the 'old' element is com-
pletely exhausted: avayx~ oe xat unohe(neiV ~~v ~s UAA~AWV 
ytve01v--caelo 3.7, 305b20. And the reason for the generation 
stopping short lies in Democritus' own theory of atomic struc-
ture; according to him one· element (e.g., water) differs from 
another (e.g., air) in that they each contain a different mix-
ture of atomic sizes--water evidently contains more larger 
atoms than does air, earth contains more larger atoms than 
water. Thus when water changes to air or when earth changes 
to water, there will always be a residue of larger atoms 
which cannot be accommodated into the new element. Thus the 
physical object as a whole cannot potentially be some other 
object. 
Democritus had thus neglected potency as a factor in ex-
plaining the problem of change. An object, Aristotle claims, 
may be one thing actually and at the same time be potentially 
something contrary, or it may be actually qualified in one way 
and potentially qualified in a contrary way (Meta. 4.5, 
' 1009a34-36). ·This means that the law of contradiction con-
tinues to hold for the physical object as perceived, and Democ-
ritus was in error when he felt that it was necessary to posit 
78
caelo 3.7, 305b20-27. 
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unperceived atoms, to deny the unity of physical objects, and 
to annul what sense-perception gives us. 
And, beside failing to account for complete generation, 
the generation which Democritus does describe is no real gen-
eration at all; it is only: apparent (~atvoµEVDV ytveotv--Caelo 
3.1, 305b3), for nothing new comes into being. The new ele-
ment is already actually there, present in the old element; 
and thus the process of generation amounts to nothing more than 
taking part of the old material out--like taking pieces of 
something out of a jar. or out of a sack full of various 
pieces. 79 Cherniss objects that this is not fair, for Aris-
totle "overlooks the fact that for the Atomists segregation 
would be only part of the process of which the moment of recom-
position is at least an equally important part" and that one 
cannot therefore trust this sort of an account~ 80 But the ac-
count of Aristotle is quite fair, for this is the way in which 
Democritus in his preliminary attempts at definition defined 
substances, the essential natures of objects; .and the 'recompo-
' . 
sition' which Cherniss mentions accounts for contraries,, for 
various and changing (secondary) qualities that the object ap-
parently has, and has nothing to do with its essential nature. 
With the reduction of all these changes to shifts of 
atoms, the atomic system r~duced all motions to locomotion. 
19wanep El=;, ayye(ou 'i;f)<;; ye:veaew<;; OUCD<;; (305b4-5). One 
might note the striking similarity to Lucian's descript·ion of 
a navone:pµ(c as a sack filled with all kinds of grain. 
800 ~· cit., p. 119. 
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Thus they unnecessarily neglected other kinds of 'motion'--as 
the alteration of a physical object. And this is the criti-
cism which Aristotle brings against Democritus at Metaphysics 
1.4, 985bl9, for Democritus, he says, neglected 'I(W~ [x(VT)oic;;] 
uTI<1pl;el 'Lo&~ oJo,--"how motion will be a property of physical 
objects." This has reference to the kinds of motion other 
than locomotion, and it is not the same criticism which is 
81 leveled at Democritus at _Qn; the Heavens 3.2, 300b8-16. 
Physical objects change at times without there being any ap-
parent locomotion; and Democritus might have accounted for 
this change without resorting to a non-apparent locomotion. 
It was thus unnecessary and unwarrented to assume an atomic 
structure for physical objects and to assume that all change 
was a change of place--assumptions which in effect do away 
with empirical evidence. 
Democritus had evidently been impressed by the unusually 
large number of differences in various phenomenal objects, and, 
in order to account for this vast variety in phenomena, he had 
l 
claimed that there was an indeterminately large number of 
'simple bodies'. But this, .Aristotle says, is where he and 
others are in error, 82 for an unlimited number of such prin-
ciples ('elements') is not necessary. Democritus could just 
' 
81As Cherniss, .21?.• cit., p. 171, note 120, claims. In 
the passage in On the Heavens locomotion seems to be as~umed, 
and the kinds of motion there in question are 'forced' and 
'natural' motions. 
82 . 8 I ' d L ' ' Caelo 3.4, 303al7-l : 't"au't"ov µup'LT)µa 'LO µT) 1(Enepacr-
µ€va~ Aa~£lV 'LQ~ apxa~. 
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as well have posited a limited number of such 'elements' with-
out any real inconsistency with the rest of his theory. 
Secondly, beside it being unnecessary to make the number 
of elements unlimited, Democritus' reasons for doing so are 
totally unwarrented if the specific differences are not unlim-
ited in number (Caelo 3.4, 303al9-20). But the atomists can 
not claim that either the differences in atoms or the differ-
ences in the phenomenal world are infinite. Atoms differ from 
one another in shape; but shapes can be reduced to a limited 
number of simple shapes (303a32-b2), and thus the kinds of 
atomic shapee will be limited too. 83 
And, further, the differences in the phenomenal world 
are limited too. 84 And, just as a large variety of atomic 
shapes can be successfully reduced by analysis to a compara-
tive few, this is true as well of the phenomenal world and the 
large variety of changes and differences that occur there. 
Those phenomenal differences can al~o be successfully reduced 
to a comparatively small number; and when these changes or 
differences are reduced to the simplest level, these will be 
83Aristotle seems to put this critici:sm in a way which 
is likely extreme, for he claims that on these grounds the 
atomic elemental shapes ought to be one or two or more. But 
whether all shapes can be so reduced or not~ the criticism 
that the numbe! will be limited is quite reasonable and proper. 
84303b3-8. The question of qualitative differences was· 
introduced by Aristotle at 302b33ff. (even though Elders, .2.E.• 
.£.!.!., p. 19, says that only locomotion is dealt with in On the 
Heavens), and this is precisely the question that leads im-
mediately to consideration of the atomists' theory of an un-
limited number of 'elements'. 
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changes or differences which are elementa1. 85 These types of 
change are limited because there can be only two directions 
of change (up and down, when applied to locomotion; toward or 
away from some point of ref erence--hotter or colder--when 
other changes are in question), and the number of place8 is 
limited as well (as points or degrees of change between con-
traries). 86 Thus the differences in physical objects cann~t, 
as Democritus assumed, be limitless, either when considered 
from the point of view of the atoms or from the point of view 
85Most commentators assume that this passage (303b4-8) 
deals exclusively with the question of locomotion. Cherniss, 
.2J2• El:.!·, p. 7, might be cited as an example; and he rightly 
sees that an argument by Aristotle only in terms of locomo-
_ tion would be naive and would not affect Democritus' position. 
Such an interpretation would have Aristotle argue thu3: 
there are only two directions of locomotion (up and down; see 
Simplicius, de Caelo, p. 615, lines 4-6) and a finite number 
of places; therefore the number of directions of locomotion 
are not infinite. This would indeed seem to be naive, for it 
has Aristotle argue from two simple motions to a finite number 
of motions. - - . 
But x(v~a'~ here evidently does not refer only to loco-
motion; Guthrie, de Caelo, p. 293, translates this as 'motion', 
which is properly vague. x(v~ot~ refers to qualitative change 
as well as to change of place (see Phzsics 3.1, 20la9-16) and 
might better be simply translated as change'. Phenomenal· 
changes seem to be numerous, but Aristotle claims that they can 
thus be reduced by analysis to a comparatively small number. 
I would translate the passage here as follows: 
"And furthermore, if, in the first place, each element 
has its own type of change, and the change of such a simple 
body is simple, and if, in the second place, these simple 
change3 are not limitless (because there are no more than two 
simple directions of chang~ and a finite number of degrees of 
change), thus the elements would not even so be limitless in 
number." 
86Aristotle at On Sensation 6, 445b24-33 makes the same 
point as he does here-;-that there are only a limited number of 
degrees of differences between two contraries. Stocks, as 
cited by Guthrie, ~ Caelo, p. 290, and Elders, .£.E.• cit., p. 
300, had rightly referred to this parallel idea. 
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of phenomena. 
Furthermore, the elements could not be limitless in num-
ber, Aristotle points out,# because of the very meaning of 
'what is limitless'. If they are 'limitless', then there 
could be no exact knowledge of 'what is': , 1' ~ OUX O&OV ~E • • • 
l. , !':. ' " • ' ' ' ,, ., uTIElpou, u , o~t oux ETI&O~~~ov ~o ov eo~a& --Physics 1.6, 
189al2-13. Indeed, such a limitless number is, besides, high-
ly suspect, because it always remains potential; it never be-
comes an actual number because one can always think toward a 
h . h b • ' -"' \ ... l. ' ., ... ig er num er: Ent vE ~o TIAEtov uE1 eo~1 vo~oa1 ••• WO~E 
ouvaµel µev io~1v, ~vepyE(q o' OU --Physics 3.7, 207bl0-12. 
The number can by definition never be attained. The infinite 
then is in principle beyond our experience and impossible to 
grasp, and cannot thus be used as a principle to explain 
things. 
Democritus' atomism had also forced him, Aristotle says 
at On Generation and Corruption 1.7, to a one-sided, limited 
view of action and passion. For Democritus atoms and void.are 
complete contraries; atoms cannot in principle affect the void, 
nor can void in any way affect the atoms. The only things in 
Democritus' atomic system which can either produce an effect 
or be affected are the atoms themselves; and they can act or 
' be acted upon only inasmuch as they possess the common proper-
ty of body; and atoms and void cannot in principle affect one 
another, for they have nothing in common (1.7, 323bll-15). 
Thus, Aristotle says later, Democritus belonged to that group 
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of thinkers who "with a view to matter thought that agent and 
patient must have some identical property. 1187 
But this view, Aristotle contends, is too limited, for 
it takes no account of contraries affecting one another--as, 
for instance, 'that which is hot' heating that which is cold 
or that which is one color coloring something of another color 
or that which is bitter making something else bitter. And 
these are precisely the kinds of effects that are given in em-
pirical evidence. Democritus had only considered the sameness 
of agent and patient, but had neglected the difference between 
them. And an account of both the sameness and the difference 
between objects which affect one another is necessary for a 
complete explanation. 
Furthermore, since these contrary properties and effects 
of physical objects can be explained without re5orting to an 
atomism of which we have no real evidence, Democritus' teach-
ing in this matter is unnecessary and unwarrented. 
For the most part this is what Aristotle's criticism of 
Democritus' explanation of the structure of physical objects 
amounts to. Democritus was unduly influenced by Eleatic argu-
ments on the meaning of 'what is' and 'what is not';- but he 
also--like Anaxagoras--felt that he must give account of phe-
' . 
nomena. But phenomena provided the problem of explaining con-
traries in the same object. These contraries, combined with 
87Gen. et Corr., 1.7, 324a23-24: of µ~v oJv e{, ixervov 
,,[i.e.,-r;!Jv ~'AT)V] 0"A€1.)lavrr.c:<;; -r;au'toV 'tl oeiv 4rfi8TJOUV 'to 'JIOlOUV 
exe'v xal -r;o Tiaaxov. 
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a limited Eleatic meaning of 'what is', seemed to Democritus 
to eliminate the possibility of explaining objects and their 
properties adequately on the phenomenal level and to necessi-
tate an explanation on a sub-phenomenal, atomic level. But 
Aristotle has consistently and in various ways pointed out 
that this 'leap' to a non-empirical level was not necessary. 
Its only apparent necessity rests on a mistaken notion of the 
meaning of 'what is'; one need not resort to an atomic struc-
ture, because objects and their properties are quite intellig-
ible without it. 
Once Democritus had begun his explanation on the atomic 
level, he was quite consistent in applying its various conse-
quences. Aristotle praises him for his consistent method: 
ev 'Cl~ 'TCW<; 01 acp Ep El ("he excells in his method of explanation" 
--Gen.~ Corr., 1.2, 3l5bl);ne:pl rcav't:wv lvl AOY~ 01~p(xao1 
("they have made distinctions about everything in a single ac-
countn--Gen. et Corr., 1.8, 325al). But, in spite of this ad-
mirable consistency, Democritus' system, Aristotle claims, it-
self breaks down when one tries to apply it. 
We have already touched on some of the aspects of the 
break-down of this system of atomic ~tructure. And one of the 
most obvious .examples already cited is that of the attempt of 
Democritus to.account for \he mutual generation of the ele-
ments. In Q!!. the Heavens 3.4, 303a25-29 Aristotle points out 
how the system itself contains an internal contradiction. De-
mocritus had claimed that this generation of one element from 
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another takes place by the separation out of the largest 
atome; but, Aristotle replies, since every element must con-
tain all the variety of sizes for mutual generation, the pro-
cess of separation out of the largest atoms will on each oc-
casion bring about either a lack of smaller atoms in the new 
element or a lack of larger atoms in the old element. 88 Under 
the specified conditions such a· mutual generati.on can in fact 
not take place. 
To stay for a moment with the criticisms presented in On 
~ Heavens, 89 Aristotle says that Democritus' system is fur-
ther not adequate, because it only accounts.for the dividing 
or destroying function of fire; it neglects and, indeed, must 
fail to account for fire's capacity to unite things. The 
sphere was assigned as a specific shape to fire precisely be-
cause of its power to penetrate and break things up. But fire 
obviously unites and welds things of the same kind; indeed, 
this to Aristotle is an even more essential function than that 
of separating: xat ~ µev auyxplOl(; xae' au~o ea~, ..• ~ Be 
Ol<ixplOl(; xa~a auµ'3E'3TJx6<;--3.8, 307b4-5. At the very least 
then Democritus ought to have assigned a shape to fire which 
would be consistent with both functions: npot;; ~µ~w zxpDV 
88u'ITOAE.(¢EL yap aE', --rn µ~yta-i;a--Caelo 3.4, 303a27. If 
the 'new element' is the residue left after the largest are 
separated out, the 'new element' will lack the largest atoms 
and thus not be an element capable of generating others; if the 
'new element' is to be composed of the largest atoms separated 
out, it will lack the smaller atoms. Thus in both cases the 
new element is not an element at all; it will lack the requi-
eite variety of sizes for mutual generation. 
893.8, 307a32-b6. 
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a~ooouvaL--307b4-5. Thus there is again a aeriou5 defect in 
this system. 
Again, in the same chapter, several lines later,90 since 
hot and cold are contraries, Aristotle points out, in the same 
category of temperature, and since Democritus had assigned· a 
shape to what is hot, he ought logically have assigned a con-
trary shape to what is cold. But he could not and wisely did 
not, for there are no contraries in shapes. Aristotle repeats 
precisely this criticism in .QB. Generation and Corruption 1.8, 
326a3-6 in connection with a more elaborate analysis of the 
logical consequences of Democritus' version of atomism. And 
it is now to this latter passage as a whole (1.8, 325b33-
326b6) that we turn our attention. 
It is often claimed on the basis of this detailed analy-
sis of atomism that Aristotle mistakenly claimed that for De-
mocritus the spherical atom was hot.91 But Aristotle is quite 
careful about his. language. He had just been discussing the 
matter of the atoms not being hard, and says: ou~e oxA~pov 
o~ov ~· el'v-a& (326a3--"nor can it be hard"); and a few lines 
further on he makes mention of heat and cold as examples of 
90307b7-10. 
91For example, Cherni~s, .21?.• cit., p. 97, note 409: 
"Democritus, evidently, did not believe that he was assigning 
a quality to the spherical atom ••• and the re5ulting quali-
ty amounts almost to making the quali:ty primary." Cherniss 
goes on to argue that Aristotle feels it established that for 
Democritus the atom itself has the quality of heat as a proper-
ty of it. Likewise also Verdenius and Waszink, .2.E· cit., pp. 
42-43. But this is premature; that is not established until 
later in the logical analysis. 
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qualities in sets of contraries as possible properties of 
atoms: d 'taih;a µE:v uTiapxe' (326a7--"if these are proper-
ties"). But in the passage primarily in question Aristotle 
speaks quite carefully about referring what is hot 12. the 
sphere: a:rrooouval '~Q nt:plcpepei' ox'Dµa'tl 'to 8epµov--326a4-5. 
Aristotle does not say that for Democritus the spherical atom 
was hot, though this may very well have been deduced as a log-
ical consequence of the theory. 
I believe that it is important to recognize that we have 
at 326a4-6 and at 326a7-14 two separate criticisms, each of 
which traces a separate consequence of Democritus' system, 
each introduced by the criticism, Ci'tonov --"it is paradoxi-
cal. 1192 
In the first criticism at 326a4-6, what Aristotle con-
siders as paradoxical or illogical is to assign a shape to 1what 
is hot, but none to what is cold, its contrary.93 We have al-
ready seen that Democritus did not attempt to do so, and wise-
ly, Aristotle thought, because there are no contraries in 
shapes. But it is nevertheles3 qu.i te right that it makes no 
sense to assign a shape to hot but none to cold; they are quite 
obviously degrees in the same category. 
But it is the second criticism at 326a7-14 that is the 
' 
92This term ie found at both a4 and a7; the next criti-
cism as well is introduced in this way at 326al5. 
93rf the atom itself were hot, the first illogical con-
sideration would certainly have been that Democritus makes· 
some qualitiless atoms have a quality such as heat; but that 
is not the case here. 
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subject of some controversy. The interpretations vary in the 
first place on the issue of whether the atoms themselves have 
weight and how that weight varies.94 A second point of vari-
ance is on Aristotle's argument itself, the question of how 
Aristotle can deduce logically atoms that are affectable from 
the concept of an atom which is anae£~ (326al).95 Let us 
then follow the argument and see how Aristotle can logically 
come to the conclusion that the atoms must be capable of being 
affected. We begin again with atoms which are incapable of 
being affected and use in the argument nothing but what is 
explicitly attributable to Democritus and its reasonable con-
sequences. 
Aristotle's first and major point is that it is unrea-
sonable for atoms to have a quality in one set of contrary 
properties, but none in other sets--or, if we may put it that 
way, there is no real difference between the sets of primary 
94cherniss, .QE• cit~, p. 97, note 412, concludes that 
"each and every atom has relative weight when compared (with 
any other);" Verdenius and W~szink, ~· cit., p. 42, rightly 
retain the relationship of size to weigh':f";°see my previous 
discussion of the question of weight in chapter two. 
95cherniss, .21?.• cit., p. 99, says that atoms yield to 
pressure bec~use of their 'hardness', and being hard implies 
some degree of softness and thus "the inconsistency here devel-
oped in the Atomistic theory is due to the implications of 
Aristotle's.technical terminology." Verdenius a~d Waszink, £12.• 
.£!.!., p. 43, see the reason as being the fact that the atoms 
themselves have temnerature and thus can interact. This may 
be indirectly so, but it seems to me to miss the point of the 
argument~ which hinges on the first sentence in this passage 
(326a7-8J, and not so much on the previous argument, which did 
not establish that the atoms are hot or cold--in which case 
Aristotle would not have needed the point he raises at 326a7-
8. 
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and those of secondary qualities. If atoms have one set, they 
can reasonably be expected to have the other sets as well 
(326a7-8). And yet Democritus does claim that they have qua-
lities in one eet of contraries. in that their weights vary; 
thus they evidently have other set·s, and one atom must there-
fore .!?!:_hotter than another (326a8-ll).96 But, if this is so, 
they must also be affected by one another, for they must then 
also have the set of contraries softness and hardness; and, if 
softness, then affectability (326all-14). I would thus trans-
late the passage as follows: 
"And it would aleo be strange if atoms have these sets 
of contraries (which I mentioned in the first argument) 
--I mean heat and cold--while other sets (heaviness and 
lightness, hardness and softness) are not going to belong 
to them. Now Democritus does say at least that each atom 
has a weight in proportion to its size; and so (with one 
set of contraries as inherent properties established) 
the others must also be, and so evidently the atoms must 
have heat in varying degrees. 'But, eince ·they are such 
(qualified by these different sets·of contraries), they 
cannot help but be affected by one another, for example, 
the slightly hot atom will be affected by one whose heat 
far exceeds it. Nay rather (being affected will be their 
very nature with these sets of contraries as inherent 
properties, for) if one atom ia (relatively) hard, it 
will also be relatively soft; and now what is soft al-
ready contains the meaning of suffering some effect, for 
what yields to some force ie soft." 
96rt is first here, as a logical consequence of having 
weight, that atoms also ought to ~ heat; this point further 
establishes the fact that logically that heat ought to vary in 
degrees among various atoms, just as the weight varies. Cher-
niss, .Q..E.~ cit.,- p. 98, note 413, and Verdenius and wa·f'mink, .2.12.· 
£!!., p. 42, rightly reject Joachim's contention of a specific 
reference to spherical atoms. It is not necessary to bring in 
here, with Cherniss, the point made at Caelo 3.8, 307al3-18 
that the degree of heat ought to vary as the shape approaches 
that of a sphere; the arguments are only parallel in that they 
are both concerned with varying degrees of heat •. J 
r 
! 
198 
Thus it is not the technical meaning for Aristotle of the word 
ox'AT)pov which allowed the affectability of the atoms, but the 
fact that hardness and softness are qualities in a set of con-
traries, and the admission of qualities in one set of contra-
ries as properties of atoms reasonably allowed the admission 
of other sets, there being no reason for admitting one set and 
refusing others. 
The third argument, at 326al5-25,97 presents a triple 
paradox, with all three of the elements of the paradox togeth-
er exhausting the possibilities of ascribing properties to the 
atoms. It is strange and paradoxical:· l)--326al5-16--if the 
only property that an atom has is shape (and this, as will be-
come more evident, is Democritus' basic position); 98 and 2)--
326al6-18--if an atom did have some other quality like hard-
ness or heat,99 (for then all atoms would not have the same 
nature: 060 ~ yap 6.'v µ (a 'Cl c; e:'l T) 1i cpuo l c; au-cwv --326al 7); and 
97verdenius and Waszink, .£.E.• cit., p. 44, divide this 
into two distinct objections to atomism; they had also com-
bined into one those which I refer to as the first and the 
second objections; I prefer to follow the divisions which Ar-
istotle himself made by introducing each with a~onov. 
gBAristotle does not raise any specific objection to 
this; likely the objection is taken to be self-evident, either 
on the grounds that Democritus himself felt uncomfortable with 
so bald a statement and indeed did ascribe weight as well to 
atoms, or, more likely, on the general grounds that such a 
physical objec.t, though at~m-sized, would without any other· 
qualities not seem to be a physical object at all, but a to-
tally abstract concept, like 'circle'. 
99with Verdenius and Waszink, .212• cit., p. 43, who pre-
fer the reading of the text to the suggestion of Joachim·and 
Forster to read wuxpov in place of OXAT)pov. 
3)--326al8-25--if any one atom had more than one of these 
qualities as properties, then, since atoms are indivisible, 
they would have these properties in the same place (ev ~~ 
a6~~~-326al9); and, if it was affected in one quality, it 
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would need to be simultaneously affected in all its qualities 
as a whole, for without any void in atoms they could not vary 
in density and so be more or less affected at one place in one 
quality rather than at another place; as indivisible they must 
be affected as a whole in all respects. Thus both the attri-
bution of some property--one or more--to atoms and the failure 
to attribute any property to them is paradoxical. 
There seems to be no problem of interpretation of Aris-
totle's fourth argument at 326a25-29; Democritus seems to have 
·made size a criterion of indivisibility.lOO But, Aristotle 
objects, there is no good reason for making only small objects 
indivisible. 
Aristotle's next objection to the atomism of Democritus 
(326a29-b2)lOl is raised in connection with the disjunction: 
either the nature of all the solids is identical or some of 
the atoms are of a different nature than others: µ(a nav~wv ~ 
lOOThis would seem to me to cast into doubt the teaching 
.attributed to Democritus that there might be atoms of extreme-
ly large size, a teaching which is referred to in Aetius, 
Placita 1.12.6.; see Hermanrl. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Reprint-
ed in Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Associates, 1958), p. 
311, lines 21-22. It seems likely that this attribution of 
the teaching was due to the criticism of Aristotle in this 
passage. 
lOlAristotle has now stopped using a~onov to introduce 
his new sets of criticisms. 
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~UOl~ £xe(vwv ~WV o~epewv ~ OLa~~PEl ea~Epa ~WV ~~Epwv; 
(326a30-3~. With the one alternative--if their nature is one 
and the same--there is no logical reason then for their stay-
ing separate and distinct parts: , .... ( ~ l ~o xwp oav;; (326a33). 
the other hand, if the atoms are different in nature--e.g., 
one group with fire-like qualities, another with earth-like 
On 
( \ ' ,, -~ ' \ 6 ) qualities ~a µEv EL~ nup1va, ~a OE YD&va--32 a32 --then these 
sub-groups of atoms will be the true basic constituents of 
things; they will be the principles and reasons for the things 
that come from them. In either case the. atoms cannot remain 
atomic; they will either merge and lose their identity or they 
are not themselves as such the most basic unit. 
Furthermore (326b2-7), if they are different in nature 
(with their differences describable either in terms of sets of 
contraries--as in the second criticism a~ 326a7-14--or more 
briefly-.-as at 326a32 as 'earthy', 'fiery' and such) then they 
mutually affect one another on contact. 102 But this also 
raises the question of what it is that brings about this 
change. If it is the other atoms, then atoms can be affected 
by something else. If it is the atom itself which is undergo-
102cherniss, .Q.12.• ..£!.!., p. 101, note 422, claims that 
Aristotle here disregards the attempt to distinguish mechani-
cal interaction and qualita~ive alteration. But if the atoms 
have qualitative differences--e.g., 'softness' and"'"'hardness', 
as above, or the 'fluidity' of water--they will certainly be 
affectable on contact. If one allows these qualitative dif-
ferences as real differences between atoms, one must allow as 
well for qualitative alteration. 
Cherniss is here right in rejecting Joachim's claim that 
Leucippus taught the mutual affectability of atoms. 
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ing the change that brings about the change, then, either the 
atoms will be divided with one part causing the change and 
the other part undergoing the change, or--with contraries 
103 . present in the same atom --the atoms will have a material 
base which is numerically one ~ only potentially one, not a 
real unity. Thus Democritus would in this case have to admit 
that such atoms different in nature are either capable of 
being affected or are not the solid and permanent units which 
he had supposed they were. 
Such are the reasonable consequences of Democritus' 
atomism; it cannot be held consistently without opposing stren-
uous objections; the consequences of this logical analysis lead 
to a more unified matter (326a33), elements with qualities 
(326a32) and divisibility (326a25-29)--all striking at the very 
roots of atomism. 
The Soul 
--
From Democritus• view of the atomic structure of physical 
objects and Aristotle's criticism of it we now proceed to con-
sider Democritus' ,teaching about the soul. For Democritus 
'soul' meant that which is uniquely capable of producing motion 
in the animate body and is as well extremely sensitive to mo-
tion. The production of motion in the animate body was evi-
l03we must remember that the one major thing that Democ-
ritus was trying to avoid in positing his theory of the atomic 
structure of physical objects was the difficulty posed by the 
presence of contraries in the same object. 
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dently the primary consideration.104 Democritus belongs to 
that group which claimed that the principle characteristic of' 
the soul was to set things in motion: xa'i npC:rtwc; wux~v elvaL 
~o XLVouv--Anima 1.2, 403b29. This group was further con-
vinced that the only thing which would produce motion was 
something which itself was in motion (403b30). 105 It was on 
the basis of this consideration that Democritus arrived at 
his theory of the nature of the soul (404al-3). 
Soul, Democritus said, consisted of spherical atoms, 
because these cannot really stop moving--it is indeed their 
very nature to be in motion106--and because of their being 
very sensitive to motion (Anima 1.2, 405all-12), and because 
of their ability to set others into motion (404a8). Thus, 
what made soul what it is for Democritus, that which was the 
one really essential ingredient, was the spherical atom. This 
meant quite rightly that what made the soul soul was the same 
thing that made fire fire, spherical atoms which have the ef-
fect on us of 'heat': "the soul is some sort of fire and is 
- ' , ' ' -warm"-..TIUp ~l xaL 8Epµov cpT)OlV au~T)V dvaL --404al. Aristotle 
nowhere assumes that the spherical atom for Democritus is hot 
l04Anima 1.2, 404a8-9: unoAaµ~avov~Ec; ~~v \jlux~v elvaL ~o 
napexov ~ofc; ~¢oL~ ~~v x(VT)OLV. Cherniss, .2.E• cit., p. 290, 
is right in maintaining t4at the atomist view of the soul was 
not formulated primarily to account for the warmth of the 
living body. 
105This was quite necessary with Democritus' reduction 
of all motion to what is purely mechanical locomotion; com-. 
pare Anima 1.3, 406bl6-21. 
106Anima 1.3, 406b21. 
or that Democritus taught the complete identity of soul and 
fire, 107 but only that they had the same essential ingredi-
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ents and some similar functions. It is furthermore not unlike-
ly that Democritus himself was quite aware of this similarity 
and may very well have used it to account for the warmth of 
the body. 108 
But 'soul' for Democritus does not exist in isolation 
from the body any more than the spherical atoms in the air 
function as fire. Fire is only fire when it is burning some-
thing, when penetrating some object and setting its constitu-
ent atoms into violent motion and breaking up. So soul is on-
ly soul when it is functioning as part of an animate body, for 
spherical atoms are likely to be found anywhere in the universe 
without their there necessarily constituting what we would 
strictly speaking call 'soul'. They are in the air, in fires, 
in water, and likely in other objects as well; and they quite 
apparently do not function as 'soul' in such combinations. 
But there is no further statement that really specifies 
at what point a group of spherical atoms really became 'soul'. 
They are present in and explain the movement of 'motes in the 
air' (Anima 1.2, 404a3-4); they are intermixed in the body with 
other 'body-atoms', apparently are in the various sense-organs 
' in various kinds of mixtures; they are, for example, in the 
aqueous nature of the eye and there are likely sensitive to 
l07As Cherniss, .£!?.• .£11., p. 289, claims. 
108compare Guthrie, _H_i_s_t_or~y_, II, 432. 
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visual images. 109 And it is quite likely that the particular 
formula for the mixture and arrangement with 'body-atoms' was 
intended to vary somewhat with the nature of the object or of, 
the organ in question; but no real formula for mixture seems 
to have been specified.llO 
It is likely that the high degree of mobility and the 
penetrating power of the spherical atoms, while perhaps more 
appropriate to the characteristics of fire, provided some dif-
ficulty in the body, for they would be very likely to escape. 
There is at both .QE. Respiration 4 and at .Q!!. ~ Soul 1.2 an 
account by Aristotle of Democritus' attempt to integrate this 
into his systematic explanation of the soui. 111 Soul atoms 
i 
are constantly escaping from the body due both to their own 
penetrating ability and to pressure from the air surrounqing 
the body; but the supply of soul-atoms is maintained by 
breathing, which brings in with the air the spherical atoms 
contained in the air. And this renewed supply restores the 
balance between the pressure from the outside and the counter-
pressure from within. Thus the animate body requires a certain 
proportion of spherical atoms not only for motion, but also for 
life itself; and it is only through breathing that this dynamic 
equilibrium is maintained. 
" 
l09sensu 2, 438a6-8. 
110' f Lucretius De Rerum Natura 3.372-373, gives a more gen-
eral account in saying that they simply alternate with the 
body-atoms. 
111The fuller account, followed here, is at Respir. 4. 
L· 
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If we may come to any conclusions about Democritus• 
teaching of the soul from this account, it is likely to be 
this, that no spherical atom by itself or in any random inten-
sity (i.e., a specific number of spherical atoms per specific 
volume) is likely to be soul any more than it is likely to be 
fire. For there to be fire the intensity of spherical atoms 
is likely to pe very great--as witnessed by the great heat of· 
~ 
fire--whereas the intensity of spherical atoms as soul in the 
body (that is, the proportion of spheres there) is likely to 
be less. Apart from that, the constituents of both fire and 
soul might well be the same. 'Soul' then is to be explained 
as a specific (though unspecified) proportion of spherical 
atoms in a body, sufficient to produce motion and offset the 
external pressure on the body, and yet not. great enough to 
break up the body (which is evidently what 'fire' would do). 
And now, as Aristotle begins his criticism of Democritus 
and others like him who say that soul produces movement by it-
self being in motion, his first concern is to show that this 
sort of an account is not necessary--and, indeed, may be impos-
sible--namely, that the soul have motion as an essential pro-
perty: ~v ~l ~WV a5ova~wv ~0 UTIUPXElV a6~~ x(V~OlV --Anima 
1.3, 406a3. First of all, Democritus had claimed that the_ pro-
" ducer of moti0n needed to be in motion. But this is not at all 
necessary; that one thing can cause motion in another without 
itself being in motion is not an impossible notion (406a3-4). 
Secondly, an object may be in motion only indirectly, as the· 
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passengers in a ship; the ship is directly in motion in the 
water, but the passengers are only in motion inasmuch as the 
ship is. Thus, even though the soul may indeed be in motion, 
it may be so only indirectly and in a way not essential to it 
or to its operations (406a4-12). Thirdly, its movement need 
not be locomotion, as Democritus specified, for there are 
other kinds of movement: alteration, decrease, and increase 
(406al2-14). Thus Aristotle legitimately concludes that it 
is certainly not necessary for the soul to be essentially in 
locomotion, even if it produces this in the body; its effects 
can be explained without recourse to the soul's being in lo-
comotion as an essential part of its operation. Democritus' 
conclusion was thus not justified (Anima 1.2, 403a29-31); and 
here at the very foundation of Democritus' atomistic explana-
tion is where the error lies. 
Furthermore, Aristotle claims, such a mechanistic expla-
nation of the action of the soul, aside from appearing more 
characteristic of the lines one hears in a good comedy (Anima 
1.3, 406bl5-20), has presented only one side of the picture of 
the soul, for such a theory will find it hard--if not utterly 
impossible--to have the ever-active soul-atoms account for 
the body's coming to rest. The same atoms whose nature it is 
never to stand still ( ne~~xevai µ~oeno~e µeveiv--406b21) can 
not cause rest ( TJP €µ~a' v no' e t--406b23). Such a limited view 
of the soul and its functions cannot be adequate. 
Beside the fact that the soul and its motion are not ad-
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equately explained in this account, there remains the defect 
that Democritus' theory of breathing, which is intimately con-
nected with the soul and its operation, is weak as well. In 
the first place, it totally neglects one obvious purpose of 
breathing--to cool oneself. For we breathe, Aristotle says, 
more heavily the hotter we get, whereas in cool weather we 
tend to check our breath and breathe less (Respir. 4, 472a31-
35). Thus, Aristotle concludes, we obyiously breathe in order 
to cool ourselves; 112 but, according to Democritus' explana-
tion, breathing would have the opposite effect--to bring in 
more spherical atoms which produce the sensation of heat, that 
is, to make us feel hotter, when we are already too hot in the 
first place: ~~ ava~OsEW~ xaplV avanvlov~e~, O~E ~0 AEyo-
µevov TIOlEi TIUp tTil TIUp --472b4-6. 
Secondly, such an account of the soul and of preathing 
admits at least in principle the possibility of resurrection 
of dead (Anima 1.3, 406a31-b5). With the ability of the soul 
at least in part to enter and leave the body, there is no rea-
son why it may not do this as a whole and thus allow for the 
dead to come back to life again: ~00~~ 6' ~TIOl~' a\ ~b av-
(o~aa8al ~a ~e8vEW!;a ~wv ~~wv (406b4-5); and such resurrection 
is contrary to the evidence which is available. 
' Then again Democritus claims that breathing is the mark 
112Thus Democritus is criticized here for neglecting the 
'final cause'; his neglect of this as a factor in explanation 
generated many mistakes, according to Aristotle. This matter 
will be taken up in more detail in the next chapter. 
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of animate life (Respir. 4, 472all-12). But Aristotle says 
that no.t even this is a valid claim, for not all animals 
breathe (µ~ nav-i;a -i;a .;4Xl. 6.vanverv--472a28), and hence this 
cannot be a real mark of animate life. Here at least Democ-
ritus was consistent, for he claims as well that they all do 
indeed breathe (~ nav-i;wv 6.var.:veov-i;wv --Respir. 2, 470b31). 
But Aristotle replies to this by showing that fish, obviously 
animate creatures, do not and cannot breathe in any way really 
identical to the way in which all other animate creatures do, 
by taking in air by alternately inhaling and exhaling (Respir. 
2-3). Fish are thus unique and what they do is distinct 
enough that we have good reason not to call it 'breathing'; 
at any rate they do not breathe in the way in which Democritus 
had described breathing. 
There is a further criticism by Aristotle at .Q.!! the Soul 
1.5, 4lla8-16 which affects Democritus' position, though De-
mocritus himself is not mentioned. If the universe in general 
and fire and air specifically have soul (that is, spherical 
•' 
atoms) in them, then logically the air or fire or the universe 
ought to be a living creature: Ola -i;(va yap al-i;(av €v µev ~Q 
atpL ~ ~Q TIUpl oJoa ~ ~UXD 06 noLet c;(iiov; --4lla9-10. Lines 
eleven through thirteen seem to be peculiarly appropriate to 
Democritus in view of his'connecting the soul so closely with 
air and breathing: "For one might ask why the soul in air is 
better and more deathless than that in living creatures." De-
mocritus (and others) are· caught on the horns of a dilemma: 
.. 
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it is unreasonable to call fire or air an animal, and unrea-
sonable as. well not to call them that if there is 'soul' in 
them. This criticisms assumes, inasmuch as it applies to De-
mocritus, that Democritus did not specify any real distinction 
between fire and soul--and Aristotle says precisely this very 
frequently--in terms of the amount of spherical atoms it took 
to make fire instead of soul. Thus, as far as we can deter-
mine, the criticism is justified, for.we have no information 
either in Aristotle or in any other part of later tradition 
as to whether or how Democritus made this distinction clear. 
It is reasonable to assume that he did not; he was likely 
satisfied with a vague and general principle of greater or 
less intensity of spherical atoms to distinguish soul from 
either fire or air. 
Finally, such a theory of the soul negates a series of 
obvious unities. First of all (Anima 1.5, 409a31-b4), the 
ensouled body is a unity. But Democritus claims that the body 
is moved by the soul and is thus distinct and separate from 
it; he claims' furthermore that the soul is scattered through-
out the percipient body: £v nav~\ ~~ aloeavoµ~v~ aWµa~' 
409b2. If soul, Aristotle replies, is a 'body'--even in Democ-
ritus• sense, though not itself a unity--then there must be 
' two bodies in·the same place (409b3), the soul-group and the 
body-group of atoms. Secondly, there seems to be in this pas-
sage a further implication that, since soul itself is like any 
oth~r body or physical object, it itself will not be a unified 
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thing. And last, but not least, Aristotle says in an earlier 
passage (Anima 1.4, 409al0-15), .even the soul-atom itself; 
inasmuch as it both causes motion and is moved, will be di-
vided and then endlessly sub-divided, one part moving and the 
other part being moved, as is the caee with anything continu-
ous (wonep ~v ~y ouvexer--409al4), anything which is a quanti-
ty.quite apart from how big it is: 06 yap o,a ~o µeytee 1 
\ ·. Bta~lpElV D µ,xpo~rytl ouµ~a(VEl ~6 AEX8fv, &AA 1 O~l nooov 
409al4-15. 
Thus, in general, Aristotle claims that Democritus' the-
ory of the soul is not an adequate one: it was based on the 
mistaken notion that the soul puts the body into locomotion 
inasmuch as it has that same k:ind of· motion its elf; it fails 
to recognize the purpose and scope of breathing; it neglects 
specifying the distinction between soul and fire and between 
soul and air; it· fails to make an ensouled body or the soul 
itself a single, unified object. 
Sense-nercention 
Democritus' theory of sense-perception113 is to be close-
ll3Langerbeck, ~. cit., pp. 100-112, is convinced that 
there is no developed theory in what we have of Democritus (p. 
112); it arose as Aristotle and Theophrastus examined the im-
plications of atomism for such a theory. In order to arrive at 
this position he must asffi:une that Aristotle is in effect simply 
combating· a theory that was not held in order to confirm his 
ovm theory; and he unnecessarily weakens the meaning of •true' 
and •truth' to 'distinct' and 'distinctness' (see Helene Weiss, 
"Democritus' Theory of Cognition" in Classical Quarterly, XXXII 
(1938), p. 48). This seems a totally unwarrented assumption, 
as I expect to show that what Aristotle says of Democritus does 
reveal a consistent theory. 
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ly connected with his positing of what come to be kno'wn as 
e&BwAa. 114 Aristotle himself says very little about these 
atomic eT5wA.a; he rather focuses his attention on the fact 
that because of them all perception is reduced to contact. 
The El ~wA.a are assumed; and those e'{ owt..a provide that contact 
between the perceiver and the physical object; they make it 
possible for atomic formations of the physical object to have 
an effect on the 'soul' of the sense-organ. To this ext.ent 
Langerbeck may be right in saying that Democritus' theory of 
sense-perception was not a highly developed one, in that, as 
far as we know, explicit details of the theory were not worked 
out; .but to suppose with him that most o:f what little we do 
have about the theory in Aristotle and Theophrastus is their 
reconstruction of what Democritus' theory would have been if 
he had developed one is going a bit too far! At any rate, 
that there were eiBwt..a coming from the physical object and af-
fecting the senses and causing sensations can hardly be in 
doubt and is generally acceptea. 115 
ll4More likely Democritus' term was oe:{><.EA.ov (see Diels-
Kranz 68Bl23), '~1ich·is likely broader and referred to an im-
age as something more than seen or visual; see also Beare, .2.E.• 
cit., p. 29, note 3. It likely indicated something more like 
a:-7"representation of the physical object' (von Fritz, .2.E.· ..£.!.!., 
p. ·23, SJ?eaks of an "Abbild der Struktur der Gegenstande 
sel bst. 11 J . . . · 
' 
ll5comp.are Guthrie, History, ,,II, 438ff. Langerbeck, .Q.I?.• 
cit., pp. 52-54, argues that the ElBwt..a are to be connected 
only with religious exp~riences: 11w8.hrend fur sie die Imagines 
nur die Funktion einer Ubermi ttlung vom .transzendenten Gott zum 
menschlichen Erkenntnisvermbgen haben." But it does not follow 
from the fact that the atomists used eiowt..a to explain reli-
gious experiences that this was their only function. 
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If sense-perception is to have any meaning at all in the 
atomic system, there must be some sort of effect of the phys-
ical object on the percipient, either direct or indirect. 
This is not to attribute to Democritus any sort of advanced 
notion of action and passion in Aristotle's sense.116 But for 
Democritus what 'action' and 'passion' there was was on the 
principle of 'like to like': ~~µoxpt~o~ ••• ~~o' yap ~o 
One atom 
could only affect or be affected by another atom, and the only 
kind of effect that the atom might have on another is to 
change its direction of locomotion or its position. So the 
effect involved in sense-perception must be the effect pro-
duced by the atoms of the physical object, directly or indi-
rectly, on the atoms of the percipient's sense-organs. 
We might first of all take a look at the effects pro-
duced by individual atoms which, though unnoticed because of 
their smallness, still do apparently produce an effect on the 
percipient. We have already noted that the effect of the 
spherical atom is the sensation of heat. 118 Now this is a 
general principle which Democritus followed through in regard 
116see Langerbeck, .<2.E.· .£.!.!., p. 102, "Der Einwand des 
Aristoteles ist f~r ~eden, der das Ut08avea8at als ein TIUOXe'V 
erkannt hat, vollig uberzeugend." The only real alternative 
to making sensation an effect of the physical object is to 
make it an effect of something incorporeal, and this would be 
totally inappropriate to Democritus' system. 
117~. et Corr. 1.7, 323bl0-12. 
118For example, Anima 1.2, 404al, 405al2-13; Gen. et 
.££!:!:. 1.8, 326a4-5; Caelo 3.4, 303al3. 
213 
to some other sensations of qualities as well. For instance, 
Aristotle claims at Qg Sensation 4, 442bl0-l3: "But these 
men refer 'specialized properties' to these (common properties 
of shape and size), just as Democritus does, for he says that 
what is white and what is black are (due to) what is smooth 
and what is rough, respectively, and he refers the flavors to 
the shapes of atoms. 11119 The various geometrical figures and 
sizes have certain consistent effects on us. This seems to be 
more specifically the case with flavors, where Theophrastus 
assigns a list of flavors to specific shapes (.Q!! the Senses, 
\ 
63-67). But it is not limited to these, for a few colors and 
at least one other effect--heat-- is due to a specific shape 
as well. 
Aside from the effects of individual shapes of atoms, 
there are furthermore effects which groups, patterns, or com-
binations of atoms have on us. This, for instance, is the way 
in which the unnoticed effect of a certain kind of a geometric 
atomic figure is in fact perceived: a sufficiently large num-
ber of atoms of a certain shape have their effect on us and we 
notice it. And, if that which makes an impact on our sense-
organs contains a variety of atomic shapes--which most objects 
ll9Theo~hrastus, De Sensibus 64-68 (on flavors) and 73-
78 (on colors.), expands-greatly on what Aristotle gives. Aris-
totle, although not going into detail, gives as much essential 
and basic information as anyone and enough, at any rate, to 
form an intelligent judgment about the theory. I shall here, 
as elsewhere, restrict myself to Aristotle's account (since 
this will best specify what is at issue), unless there is good 
reason to suppose that Aristotle is in error or that his infor-
mation is too scanty or misleading. 
r 
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apparently do--then the atomic shape which predominates in 
the group determines the perceived effect on us. But these are 
still mechanically fairly simple ways of producing an effect 
or sensation in us. 
Other qualities, as they present themselves to us, are 
due to specific patterns in which the atoms which have their 
effect on our sense-organs are arranged; and these patterns or 
arrangements are described in terms of 'tponTi and OL a8Ly~. One 
physical object differs from another not only in its constitu-
ent atoms (which gives the nature of the object as such), but 
also by 8€01~ and 'td~1~; 120 and it is by change in this place-
ment and order of atoms that Democritus claims alteration, 
change in qualities, takes place.121 And this is the reason 
(~O'tE--Gen. ~Corr. 1.2, 315bll) that the same object may 
seem (ooxerv) different to various people; some small shift 
may bring about a different appearance: xa\ OAW~ ~'tepov ~a(-
veoea, ~Vb~ µe'tUXLV~8EV'tO~ --315bl3-14. 
More specifically, a little later in the same passage· 
(315b33-316a2), Democritus is said to make (a change in) qual-
' ' i ty due to the 'tpon~ and o' ae' y~ of atoms--and here Democritus' 
own terms are used--and to assert that "an object takes on 
.color because of the placement of atoms": 'tpo11:i,1 yap xpwµa't ( -
~eoea,. Theophrastus' lis~ing of the various arrangements of 
120 ~· et Corr. 1.1, 314a24. 
121Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 315b9: 'taseL ot xa& etoel &AAo(-
~~1 v. This is im.~ediately thereupon connected with the claim 
that there is 'truth in appearances'--to be taken up shortly. 
atoms for various colors has already been cited; this list 
provides examples of what is simply stated here. 
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But it is not only color as a sense-impression that is 
so explained. The resistance of the physical object to our 
touch, the feeling of hardness and softness is as well due to 
the ~pon~ xai ota8ty~ of its constituent atoms; the resistance 
of the object varies as the arrangement of its atoms varies. 
An object may seem now liquid, now solid or frozen for that 
. 122 
reason. Again Democritus' own terms are used in the latter 
passage, and the identification is made more precise by the 
words xa8dnep ~fyet 6~µ6xpt~o,. 
To turn for.a moment to ~he matter of the passage about 
the image or representation from the physical object to the 
percipient, there is one place at which Aristotle indicates 
that for Democritus the medium through which the image must 
pass to reach the percipient affects the accuracy with which 
he 'sees the object•. 123 But Aristotle does not say in what 
122~. ~ Corr. 1.9, 327al6-19. 
123Anima 2.7, 419a15-21. The interpretation of and con-
fusion with this passage varies considerably. Its more de~ 
tailed meaning will be taken up later. 
But we may note here some of the divergence of opinion. 
Langerbeck, .£E.• .2.i!·' p. 102, contends that this has nothing 
to do with a theory of sense-perception, on the grounds that 
this says nothing about imqges from the object to the percipi-
ent; for, if that were the case, Aristotle's criticism of it 
on the grounds that there was no contact between the percipient 
and the object would be meaningless. Guthrie, History, II, 
443, feels the same difficulty in tha~air was for Democritus 
a medium and that Democritus for once must have been using the 
term xevov loosely to mean 'empty air'. Ross, Anima, p. 244, 
has a basically correct interpretation, but says nothing about 
the type of difficulty about the medium which had been raised 
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respect the 'accuracy of seeing' is affected. 
Perhaps one might nevertheless ask at this point what 
sort of an effect did Democritus think that the air as a medi-
um would have on the accuracy of vision. Cherniss assumes 
the 'second theory' which he finds in Theophrastus and con-
tends that the medium could "cause blurred and distorted im-
ages in the eye; 11124 but this would make nonsense of .Aristot-
le's claim that for Democritus there was 'truth in appear-
ances•, even-in Langerbeck's diluted sense of 'distinctness'. 
Cherniss then continues by saying that .Aristotle's objection 
to this is that the "intermediate body is necessary which • • 
• itself affects the organ of vision. 11125 But this is pre-
cisely what is involved in Theophrastus' 'second theory'--a 
by Langerbeck and Guthrie. 
There is what is called a 'second theory' ascribed to De-
mocritus apparently by Theophrastus in his De Sensibus, which 
seems to say that the image from the objectli°nd an effluence 
from the eye meet in the air and the image which enters the 
eye is not the original image from the object, but a 'stamped 
copy' of it. Tlugler (cited by Guthrie, History, p. 444, note 
1) asserts, rightly I believe, that Democritus had not taught 
such an effluence from the eye and suggests that Democritus 
made the claim about seeing an ant at such a distance to fore-
stall the criticism that the object would soon be exhausted 
with all the effluences necessary to account for seeing an ob-
ject. Guthrie may be right in feeling discomfort at the ac-
count, but the fault seems to me to lie in Theophrastus' 'sec-
ond theory' rather than in the accuracy or appropriateness of 
Aristotle's account or in Democritus' supposed 'loose usage'. 
124 . ' 
.QI?_. cit., p. 165, note 100. 
125Ibid., p. 165. One might also ask Cherniss what he 
thinks one saw in the void without his vision blurred, assum-
ing a 'second theory'. Surely not the atoms themselves! If 
simply a clear vision of an ant at that distance, why not the 
atoms themselves in things close at hand? 
medium. Thus it seems highly unlikely that Aristotle here 
knew of or made use of a 'second theory•. 
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But this still leaves unanswered the question of huw the 
air in general might affect the image. Perhaps one ought not 
attempt an answer, but there is a tempting solution that seems 
fairly obviously at hand to one who--like Democritus--took 
proper cognizance of the objects around him. And such an an-
swer might well be that the air somehow diminished or com-
pressed the size of the image--the greater the distance, the 
smaller the image. This would certainly allow images from 
obviously large objects like elephants--about which Guthrie 
wonders--to enter the eye; it would also explain the fact that 
images from such large things as planets might enter our eyes 
and why a group of them, although they are extremely far apart 
in space, might seem to us to merge and appear as a single 
comet. 126 This notion of the apparent size diminishing with 
distance is certainly not in disagreement with, and is more 
likely supported by, the reference in Vitruvius, who cites a 
composition by Democritus in which he describes in principle a 
theory of 'perspective' applied to scene-painting for tragic 
presentations.127 
126Meteor. 1.6, 342b28. The planets appear to be in con-
tact (ooswol StyyavElV ), ~emocritus claims. 
127De Architectura VII, pref., 11: "quemadmodum oporteat 
ad aciem oculorum radiorumaue extentionem certo loco centre 
constituto lineas ratione naturali respondere, uti de incerta 
re certae imagines aedificiorum in scaenarum picturis redde~ 
rent speciem et quae in directis planisque frontibus sint figu.-
rata, alia abscedentia alia prominentia esse videantur." 
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Now to get back to Aristotle's account, this means that 
under normal conditions an ant on the vault of heaven would 
give off an image, and the image passing through the air would 
be continually decreased, so much so as finally to be imper-
ceptible. But with no air--only void--intervening the image 
would remain the same size and so would be seen 'full scale'. 
Such a solution as to what here constitutes accurate ~xpl~~ 
--419al7) and non-accurate vision is certainly plausible and 
contradicts nothing else that we know about Democritus' teach-
ing in this regard. 
And so, in order now better to understand what is at 
issue in the so-called 'second theory' of images--as explained 
by Theophrastus, On the Senses, 50--we need first turn our 
attention to another passage in Aristotle, Qg Sensation 2, 
438a5ff. There Aristotle had just finished giving an account 
of Empedocles' theory of vision which, he says, at times in-
volves some light leaving the eye to meet the object: es&ov~o~ 
~oo ~u..Yto~--437b26. Aristotle then concludes his account of 
Empedocles temporarily by saying: "Sometimes he says this is. 
the way in which we see, but at other times he explains it by 
a theory of effluxes issuing from the objects seen. n 12:8 At 
this point Aristotle introduces the account of Democritus, 
apparently not. because Demcfori tus, like Empedocles, held a 
theory of something like light or fire issuing forth from the 
eye, but because Democritus--Aristotle claims--was right about 
128Ross, Sensu, p. 49; 438a4-5. · 
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the eye being water: O~L µEV u5wp e{va( ~~OL, Afyel XUAW~ 
438a5-6; and thus Democritus was presumably at odds with Em.-
pedocles on this point. The eye, Democritus would say, func-
tions as water (~ u5wp--438al4) and not as what is transpar-
ent, and thus displays in it what we call a 'reflected image', 
just as would be the case with water in general or, for that 
matter, anything else which displays such a reflected image. 
Thus far there is no hint at all of a teaching of Democritus 
that the eye emits its own fiery (?) image, 129 but a rather 
strong intimation that Democritus rejected that first alterna-
tive of Empedocles and simply adopted the latter. 
But what then does Aristotle attribute to Democritus in 
this passage? Democritus did believe--and in this Aristotle 
claims that he was wrong--that 'seeing is the appearance of 
the image in the eye': '"N •; ',, ~o opav eLVaL ~~v eµ~aotv ( 438a6 ), 
that is, that this visible image occurs in the eye because the 
eye, being water, acts the way water does in this case too. 
This is explained by Alexander as follows:l30 
129compare Ross, Sensu, p. 140; Robert B. English, "De-
mocritus' Theory of Sense Perception" in Transactions of the 
American Philological Associaton, XLVI (1915), pp. 218-220; 
Guthrie, History, II, 443, and note 1. But such an interpre-
tation involves the supposition that all water and reflecting 
surfaces emit such fiery effluxes as well, since the eye func-
tions as water. And it is highly unlikely that Democritus 
taught this or. that Aristotle thought or implied that he did. 
l30Diels-Kranz 67A29. The translation is basically that 
of Guthrie, History, II, 442. I have substituted for his "re-
flexion" "visible image" because 11 reflection 11 seems to me to 
anticipate the criticism of Aristotle and prejudice the mean-
ing and intent of Democritus. 
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"Democritus says that to see means to receive the 
visible image from what is seen. The visible image is 
the shape which appears in the pupil, just as it does 
also in any other bright things which are capable of 
retaining a visible image. He believed (like Leucippus 
before him and the Epicureans after) in certain images 
emanating from things and similar in shape to the things 
from which they emanate (i.e., the objects of vision), 
which enter the eyes of the beholder, and that this is 
how vision occurs." 
Again, there is no notion here of ari emission from the eye or 
of a 'second theory•. 131 Aristotle's remark at 438a26-29 
about a theory of something leaving the eye (~b ls&oV~l ~lVl 
\, II 4, N 
't"T)V 0 1~l v opav ) is a direct reflection of Empedocles' theory, 
and there is no reason to connect this with Democritus.132 
Thus vision for Democritus was to be explained in terms of an 
,, 
Eµ~ao&~, a visible image which results from the impact of the 
£'{ cwA.ov on the watery nature of the eye; and he likely felt 
that this was supported by the image (visible to others as 
well) which appears on the pupil of the eye--likely assuming 
that a person's sense-perception at a given time was the same 
in appearance as the image which others saw in the pupil of 
his eye. Thus there would be some significance which Democ-
ritus might attach to this visible image, this eµ~ao&~. 
We may now, I believe, more profitably return to this 
vexing matter of what is reported to be a 'second theory' to 
l3lAs Guthrie, Histo;y, II, 442, rightly implies. 
l32As Ross, Sensu, p. 140, does. Aristotle has finished 
with Democritus at 438al7 and--having established with the 
sup:Jtort of Democritus (which was his prime reason for citing 
him) that the eye is composed of water--continues simply with 
the criticism of Empedocles. 
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be found in Theophrastus' account. Theophrastus begins his 
account of Democritus' theory of vision in a way which is ob-
viously and quite precisely just the matter which .Aristotle 
had brought up in the passage from On Sensation 2: "Democ-
ritus explains vision by means of the visible image in the 
eye (opav µEV oJv 'JtOlE:l 'tf.} eµq>'10E:l )l33 but he gives a unique 
account of this 'visible appearance•. 11 Theophrastus then 
goes on to give an account of how this 'visible appearance' 
occurs at the eye and in the eye, an account which has no-
thing to do immediately with the passage of the ElOWAOV from 
the physical object to the eye, which is evidently assumed 
here. And what is assumed as well here, I believe, in Theo-
phrastus' account is that 'what is seen' ( ' t - ) 'to opwµe:vov is not 
the physical object, but the e:'{ o wAo v • 134 So, when the 
e:'{ OWAOV reaches the eye, some air betwee_n the water of the 
eye and the e1owA.ov is trapped there, compressed, and im-
pressed there by the e:!cwAov; this impressed air is then what 
'shows up' in the water of the eyes (as well as in other 're-
133Paragraph 50. 
l34This is the only way, it seems to me, that any sense 
can be made of the assertion that "the air is compressed by 
'what is seen' and by 'what sees' (i.e., i;he eye)": ouo-
'tEAAoµe:vov uno 'tOU opuµevou xal 'tOU opWV'tO~. The physical 
object out in space certai~ly is not to be conceived as it-
self contributing directly to the compression of the air. 
And it is this image (as something physical) that,~heophrastus 
feels obliged to explain in renarking that for Democritus 
anav'to~ yap ae:i y(yve:oea( 'tLva anoppo~v : some effluences or 
images are constantly being produced by every object (and 
this image for Democritus, but not necessarily for others, 
would be 'what is seen'). 
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fleeting objects', I suppose). Thus there is no warrant at 
all here for assuming a special effluence from the eyel35 or 
for any alternate theory which has the c.:'{ owA.ov meeting such 
an effluence in mid-air, but we only have a more detailed 
mechanical explanation of precisely how it is that the c.:iowA.ov 
affects the eye; at the eye the eiowA.ov compresses some air, 
and this compressed air 'shows up' in the moist pupil of the 
eye. It is only a description of what happens in the act of 
seeing, which is precisely what Aristotle had said Democritus 
was explaining by eµ~ao,~, and nothing more. Thus I would 
translate the passage in Theophrastus as follows: 
"So Democritus explains the process of seeing by his 
'visible appearance' (in the eye), but he gives a unique 
account of this. For he says that this 'visible appear-
ance' does not occur directly in the pupil of the eye, 
but that the air between the eye and the 'image' is 
compressed by the eye and the 'image' and imprinted by 
the 'image'--for some effluence (or 'image') is con-
stantly coming from every object; then this air which 
is now (more) solid and altered is what shows up in 
moist eyes." 
So Aristotle's account is quite accurate, though it is not 
nearly as detailed a description as we have in Theophrastus. 
,, i;:. "\ Furthermore, these e'uwAa are responsible, according to 
Democritus, not only for all instances of visual perception 
while awake, but also for the dreams that people see as well: 
eiowA.a xai a~oppo(a~ a{~,~µEY0~. 136 That people do have vis-
" 
ual presentations while asleep, that there is something which 
l35As Guthrie, Histor;y:, II, 443, does. 
l36Div. somn. 2, 464a6; the whole passage now under con-
sideration is 464al-12. 
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even then affects their sense-organs, the soul, or the spher-
ical atoms in them, seems quite certain; and that the physical 
object as such is not immediately present in such cases seems 
just as evident. And it is because of these facts, Aristotle 
says, that Democritus posits images and effluences--&~· ~v 
~xervo, ~h eYBwAa no, er x~ ~a, dnoppo(a, (464all-12)--as the 
reason why we have such visual presentations which we call 
dreams. And it may very well be that these considerations 
prompted Democritus to posit eYBwAa as the reason for all vis-
ual presentations, awake or sleeping; and Aristotle's state-
ment can certainly be taken in that sense. The problem of how 
to explain dreams in a mechanical and atomistic system might 
well have occasioned such a solution. Then, there being in 
effect no real distinction between dreams and other visual 
presentations from present physical obje~ts, that solution 
might well have seemed appropriate to the latter instances of 
seeing as well. 
We are now left with the task of considering the meaning 
of Aristotle's statements on a number of occasions137 that 
Democritus supposed that 'what appears is true'. One major 
attempt to come to grips specifically with this problem is 
that of Helene Weiss. 138 A number of observations which she 
~ 
l37Anim~ 1.2, 404a27; Meta. 4.5, 1009bl2; and Gen. et 
~· 1.2, 315b9-10. 
l38.QE.. cit., pp. 47-56. She is followed in substance 
by Guthrie, History, II, 454-465, who promoted the publication 
of her paper. 
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makes are worth considering. One might well share her dis-
trust of the validity of earlier attempts to solve the prob-
lem either by denying the reliability of Aristotle and so 
making Democritus out to be a rationalist pure and simple or 
by making of him a sensationalist and so denying any real con-
cern of his with reason or with Eleatic problems. She is 
certainly right in her attempt to do justice both to Aris-
totle's account and to that of Sextus Empiricus. And there 
is much to be said for the role of A6yo~ in the atomist the-
ory of knowledge. But her solution is not really satisfac-
tory either. She ends by saying that Aristotle did not really 
mean to imply that this was a Democritean proposition at all, 
that what Aristotle was doing in those passages was subjecting 
the 11 Atomists' views as a whole to thorough criticism," that 
Aristotle was really saying that, because the atomists had 
not come ·to his own understanding of vou' and.vorrr;a--as its 
non-perceptible objects--this meant that they were seeking 
truth in appearance. 139 In order to avoid the Scylla of di-
luting the meaning of •true', she steers into the Charybdis 
of giving it so precise and .Aristotelian a meaning that it 
cannot apply to Democritus at all. 
Granting for a moment that the meaning of 'true' might 
be in doubt in.the two majo'r passages which she considers 
(the ones at On the Soul 1.2 and at Metaphysics 4.5), she 
introduces the passage at On Generation ~ Corruntion 1.2 as 
1390 •t 55 56 ~· .21:,_.' pp. - • 
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parallel statement, but fails to explain what Aristotle means 
here by saying, "they think that what is true is in appear-
ing" (315b9-10), only assuring us that it is not a purely 
sensationalist meaning. Are we to suppose then that these 
atomists themselves thought that what is the object only of 
thought is in appearing? That is hardly satisfactory. How 
could Democritus have concluded from sense-appearance some-
thing about the atoms by supposing that connection alone? 
Her position is under the further disadvantage that she must 
outright deny any validity to the witness of Philoponus.l40 
What then? Perhaps it is best to begin with the passage 
at On Generation and Corruution 1.2, 315b9-10: "Since they 
thought that what is true is in appearing and that appear-
ances are both contrary and limitless, they made their (atom-
ic) shapes limitless." If we accept this statement, we need 
ask then what sense of •true' will allow us to make reasonable 
sense of this as a description of Democritus' theory. But to 
argue at all from sense-perception to atoms141 requires that 
they be related, that there be some sort of fixed and constant 
correspondence between the two realms; and this, I contend, is 
here the meaning of 'true' and 'truth'; it is a 'correspondence 
theory' of truth; it is somewhat like speaking of a proposition 
as being true.if it corresponds.!£, correctly represents, some 
140Ibid., p. 55. 
l4lThis kind of an argument from sense-perception 12, 
atoms and void is in the background of the parallel passage 
at Netauhysics 4.5. 
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observable fact. There is a correspondence between the spher-
ical shape and the feeling of heat that it produces, between 
a given pattern of atoms and the sensation of a specific 
color which it produces. And this 'truth' or 'correspondence' 
is insured by the eLOWAov, which is an accurate representation 
of the physical object.142 
And this meaning of 'true' is appropriate too to the 
passage at Metaphysics 4.5, 1009bl2: "Because they suppose 
that our knowledge of a phenomenal object is nothing more 
than our perceiving it, and that this is a (mechanical) alter-
ation, they claim that our sense-impressions must necessarily 
correspond to the object as it actually is" (or we have no 
way of coming to know its atomic structure). 
At .Q!! ~ Soul 1.2, 404a27 Aristotle ascribes to Democ-
142Much of this is also to be found in Cherniss, on. cit. 
But he describes this (p. 82) as a way out of a difficulty,~ 
that is, an ad h2.£ explanation. But it rather seems to me an 
essential and basic point in Democritus' teaching, as we may 
see by the background of the statement in Meta. 4.5. Cherniss 
further speaks of deducing atoms from sensation; Bailey, on. 
cit., p. 182, speaks of inferring them. But Cherniss alsO-
"falees back this meaning of •true' first by calling it acer-
tain degree of truth and then by reducing Democritus' meaning 
to "truth to be involved in perception." Bailey's account is 
closer to the mark (p. 184), but he restricts the meaning of 
'true' somewhat, in the sense that it gives us information 
about atoms, void, and atomic complexes, if we will only dis-
engage it from sensations that we get. I maintain that truth 
for Democritus is preciselJ" this correspondence; for Democri-
tus, in the midst of contrary sense-iapressions, claimed that 
no one set of them is more true than another, if indeed truth 
is to be sought simply and solely on the phenomenal level; 
and this is why Democritus said that either nothing is true in 
this sensationalist meaning of true, or, if it is true in that 
sense, we have no evidence at all for it (Dµfv y' &B~Aov )--
T!Ieta. 4.5, 1009bl0-12. So for Democritus 'what is true' must 
refer precisely to the correspondence of phenomena to reality. 
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ritus the teaching that 'what is true is what appears•, and, 
if we take •true• again in the sense indicated, that there is 
a persistent correspondence between sense-impressions and the 
state of atoms, then the identity of soul and mind in Democ-
ritus' theory is established inasmuch as the mind has no more 
to work on than simply is given to the soul in sensation. 
Thus, since the mind cannot perceive or judge truth as some-
thing special and distinct from what is given in sense-
impressions (it cannot judge the correspondence, for it cannot 
'perceive' or judge a resemblance when it is acquainted only 
with the 'picture' and not with the •real object•), it is in 
this respect reduced to being nothing more than the soul; in 
perceiving by the senses one already receives and has what is 
•true'. Hence Philoponus is right;143 Aristotle deduced the 
\ -identification of o/UXl) and vou~ from 'correspondence•, the 
truth of sense-impressions. 
There is one further passage which may lend some sup-
port to a meaning of •truth' as a correspondence between the 
object as perceived and as it is structured atomically; and 
this is at On Parts of Animals 1.1, 640b32-35: "(Democritus) 
says that the evidence is available to everyone (nav~i ofjAov) 
as to what sort of an object a man is in ftis (atomic) struc-
ture (~~v µop~Dv ), becaus~he is recognizable as such by his 
shape (oxfiµa) and his coloration." We do know that for Democ..;. 
ritus color was due to a certain pattern of atoms, and this 
l43Diels-Kranz 68All3. 
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correspondence does hold here; nor is there any reason why 
others should not hold as well. So, because these correspond-
ences exist, there is much that one can in:fer about the struc-
tures of physical objects; we can recognize a man for what he 
really is. But without precisely this theory there is no way 
to argue from sense-perceptions to atomic structure. Such 
•truth' was a necessary part of Democritus' atomism. 
Now to return to On Generation and Corru~tion 1.2 and 
- -
consider what directly follows upon the claim for truth in 
perceiving, the matter of appearances of contraries in the 
same physical object--which was a major concern in his posit-
ing this theory (r.Ietaphysics 4. 5 )--Democritus solved by pos-
iting minute shifts and changes in the atomic structure of 
those objects: ~o't"e 'tar, µe't"a~o"Aar, 'too ouyxetµ~vou 'to a6~o 
E:vav~(ov ooxerv aA.A.cy xa1 aA.A.<t)' xa'i µe't"ax& vei'aea, µ&xpou eµ-
L V1J ~V ' Y '"I " , 8 .l \ ~ . 144 µ Y µc ou xa& UAW' e't"epov ~a&vea a& cvo, µe't"axtv~8cV't"o' • 
An eiow"Aov from the object was at any given moment a represen-
tation of the structure of that object. Thus, when a given 
percipient sees an object at two different moments, the ob-
ject may have changed from one moment to the next and emitted 
two different ei6w"Aa, each an accurate representation of the 
structure of ·the object at the time they were emitted. Thus 
" visual contraries in the same object are explained. Differ-
ences in taste in a given container of water may well be due 
to the predominance of atomic geometrical shapes in the par-
l44Gen. et Corr. 1.2, 315bll-14. 
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ticular portion of the water tasted; and so, even under nor-
mal conditions, the same water may taste sweet to one, bitter 
to another. 145 Thus even in Democritus's theory the appear-
ance of contraries in the same physical object is not at all 
inconsistent with there being •truth in appearances•. 
Now Aristotle's criticism of this theory of sense-
perception rightly centers not only on the mechanics of ef-
fecting the sensation (the process of transfering the image 
into the resulting sensation), nor alone on some of the prin-
ciples involved in these mechanics, but as well on the fail-
ure of the theory of correspondence as a whole to account for 
phenomena. 
In reviewing this criticism we turn first to the pas-
sage in which Aristotle deals specifically with the etOwAa so 
necessary for sense-perception, On Prophecy in Sleep 2, 464a5-
20. Democritus had claimed that e'low/...a are responsible for 
dreams, and likely even, as we had noted, he had based his 
more general theory of t1owf...a on this explanation of dreams 
(if not that, he had at any rate used what he had said in 
this specific account of dreams in his more general theory of 
vision). And Aristotle's criticism on this specific issue 
strikes at the roots of the atomists' explanation of percep-
tion. What Democritus had' done, Aristotle claims in effect, 
is to bring the t1ow/...ov as the efficient cause of sensation 
l45This is not to deny that sickness or abnormality of 
the atomic structure of the person may also affect the sensa-
tion he gets; and even such a person's sensations are •true'. 
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right to the percipient; and this is unnecessary, for the 
•seen physical object• can affect a medium like air or water 
which can in turn produce the sensation in us; and this 
'chain reaction of motion' can make it possible for sense-
perception to take place without having the 'seen physical 
object' present: nauoaµevou exe(vou • • • ~OU XtV~aav~o, 06 
napov'"Co'--464a8-9. The precise fact that sense-perception 
takes place in sleep and when the 'seen physical object' is 
obviously not present had likely brought Democritus to the 
point of explaining dreams by t'{ owA.a which themselves are a 
present cause of perception, and thus to explain perception 
in general in that way. And so the whole theory rests on the 
mistaken assumption that the object of sight needs to be pres-
ent for sense-perception to take place. 146 
But, Aristotle further claims at On~ Soul 2.7, 419a9-
25, that not only is a continuous medium a better explanation, 
but is itself a necessary one. If the physical object is seen 
at all, it is seen in or through 'what is light': Oto xal 
o6x opa'"Cat UVEU <pW'rO(; --419a9. And this 'light' must be a 
potential characteristic of something continuous as a medium: 
~ o' EV'rEAEXElU '!;OU Cla~avocr, cpW<; ea~(v --419all. But why such 
a medium at all? Because what evidence there is seems to re-
quire it--oT)µ.Ei'cv ot ri;oth~u q>avtpov (419al2)--for if the 
146Aristotle's criticism here is thus much broader than 
is indicated by the interpretation of Cherniss, on. cit., p. 
166, for he claims that the t1BwA.ov is only unnecessary in the 
case of dreams. 
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'seen object' is placed onto the eye itself, 147 no 'seeing' 
will occur (oux owc~a&); and this means that the only alterna-
tive is to have the 'seen object• 148 affect th~ transparent 
mediUi~ which in turn affects the eye. And this is precisely 
why Democritus is wrong, he says, about seeing by c.'{ owA.a in 
the void; the eye needs to be affected, but cannot be affect-
ed by the 'seen object'--and that, for Democritus, was the 
c.iowA.o~ not the physical object. And so the only alternative 
left is to have the eye affected by the medium, which is thus 
established as necessary. And that is why with only void be-
tween the physical object and the eye, no vision at all will 
take place (oueev· o~e~at:.~a' ), because vision with the 'seen 
object' directly by contact affecting the eye results in no 
.vision at all (oux oo/t:.~at ). It is the evidence of no vision 
resulting when what is (to be) seen is put directly into con-
tact with the eye that refutes Democritus' theory and, inci-
dentally, serves to establish Aristotle's own. 149 
The very fact that the 'seen object' must directly af-
fect the sense-organ means that sensation is reduced to con-
tact with what is seen, the ciowA.ov (Sensu 4, 442a30ff.). 
l47Hett's translation in the Loeb edition, p. 107, 
nqlqse ~p ~o the eye" does not do sufficient justice to en:' 
au~DV ~DV Oo/t~. ' 
l48r use this term here for clarity, because for Aris-
totle precisely that which one 'sees' in the strictest sense 
is color (Anima 2.7, 418a29-30). 
149cherniss, £1?.• cit., p. 165, more simply makes it the 
necessity of the medium which refutes Democritus' position. 
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But it is not difficult to see how such reduction of all sen-
sations to contact is impossible (442b3-4). 150 But even be-
yond this, Democritus• system must use properties recognized 
by more than one sense-organ for each of the sense-organs. 
For instance, shape and roughness are obviously recognized by 
both sight and touch. But only in cases in which a property 
of the object is the peculiar function of only one sense-organ 
to perceive is there no possibility of error about it; there 
is no 'check' for it. But there is a possibility of error 
about what is recognized by more than one sense-organ; and 
these are the very properties which Democritus assigns to what 
is perceived, the very ones about which people make mistakes: 
' ' ' ~ .f L - • ' '- ,, 1 oto xat nept µev 'TOu'Tcuv una"CWV'Tat ••• ot OE: "Ca t6ta ett; 
"Cau"Ca civayouatv, C0onep ~~µoxpt'To~ --442b8-11. And this is the 
most damaging part of the criticism. Th~y use for all the 
senses the very kinds of properties about which there is the 
greatest general error. 
There is also here a second criticism (442b13-18), in 
that it is obviously more the function of sight than of any 
other sense to recognize and distinguish 'common properties•. 
But Democritus obviously would assign this function to 'taste', 
since he refers 'flavors' to the various shapes (442bl3), 
which are the-characteristics of the various atoms themselves; 
150There is no further explanation here as to how it is 
'impossible'. The reference here most evidently is to the 
passage in On the Soul 2.7, which we have just examined. The 
specific arguments presented here in Sensu 4 are presented as 
additional considerations--'£'T' o t. 
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and so it ought to be particularly sensative to all the other 
properties capable of being perceived by more than one sense-
organ: ~~€ exp~v ~~v yeuoiv xa\ ~WV UAAWV xo,vwv aCoea-
veoea, µaAlo~a--442bl7. The other common sensible include 
such characteristics as size, roughness, sharpness, unity, 
number, motion, and rest; and taste ought thus to provide the 
final criterion for these too. But this then is quite evi-
dently contrary to experience. 
When one comes to consider the sense-impression itself, 
Aristotle objects to Democritus' theory on a number of grounds. 
First of all, there is the mistake which lies at the very 
heart of atomism: the inability to deal with contraries at 
the phenomenal level. Democritus (and others) had gone on 
the assumption that, because contraries are perceived in the 
same object and because there is no reason to accept one con-
trary over the other, we cannot accept sense-impressions at 
face-value (I:Teta. 4.5, 1009bllff). But this is to malre a 
very basic mistake about the meanings of the word 'is'. A 
specific apple now green and later red is still the same 
apple; the apple, Aristotle would say, has not changed sub-
stantially, even though at one time it is a green apple and 
at another time it is a red apple. This is a mistake in that 
it fails to distinguish th~ object in itself, ~that object, 
apart from its accidental properties (Meta. 13.4, 1078b25-26). 
This mistake thus led to an unwarrented interpretation of 
sense-impressions. 
Furthermore, this mistake also led to another one, a 
one-sided view of action and passion (~. et Corr. 1.7, 
323bl0-324a9); it involves a denial that a thing can be af-
fected in some sense by something contrary to it. But this 
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is precisely what sense-impressions tell us is going on--some-
thing warm affects something cold. In opposition to what 
sense-impressions indicate, Democritus held that only like af-
fects like, only another atom can affect an atom; and for him 
evidently this is also the way in which sense-impressions are 
made on soul. 
While this, Aristotle says, may allow the soul to per-
ceive the elements of which things are composed (Anima 1.5, 
409b30ff.), still this atomic explanation allows no way of 
recognizing the phenomenal object as a whole object (409b32-
33). Nor does it account in any way for recognizing qualities 
in objects; and so it is unreasonable (a~onov--410a23) to say 
that like is perceived only by like (410a24). The atomistic 
explanation of the sense-impressions is defective in this 
sense too, for, while it assumes that our sensations of 'sec-
ondary qualities' are due to atoms, it does not--and, in Aris-
totle's opinion, cannot--show how those qualities are derived 
from atoms and how they are recognized as such qualities. 151 
' Moreover, in his only real attempt to account for such 
l5lThe attempt to do what Aristotle thought could not be 
done was impossible at the early stage at which biology, psy-
chology, and chemistry were at the time of either Democritus 
or Aristotle. 
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sensed qualities, Democritus had taught that the elOWAov~ 
when it reaches the eye, is made visible in the eye, and that 
the appearance of the e'C owA.a there is what constitutes Vi-
sion. In response to this teaching Aristotle shows at On 
-
Sensation 2, 438a5-15 that this must be wrong, for what De-
mocritus is talking about here is obviously only a case of 
reflection. But, he objects, the water of the eye evidently 
does not act primarily ~ water, as that which casts a reflec-
tion under such circumstances, but acts ~ transparent. Hence 
the reflection seen in the eye is quite incidental to the 
functioning of the eye in vision; if it were an essential in 
seeing, surely other water and other reflecting surfaces 
would 'see' as well, for such images become visible there too. 
This is one thing which makes his position an unreasonable one: 
a~onov oe xa& ~o µ~ eneA.8eiv au~Q anop~oa& B&a ~( d o~SaAµo~ 
opq µovov, ~WV o' aA.A.wv OUOEV EV ol~ Eµ~a(ve~a& ~a e&OwAa 
(438al0-13); Democritus uses a phenomenon which occurs in a 
variety of circumstances as though it were unique only to the 
phenomenon of seeing. Thus he has come to no clear differen-
tiation between 'reflection' and 'becoming visible in' 
(438a9-10). 
But there is one further problem raised in connection 
with Democrit~s' theory he~e, and that is that the image made 
• • bl ' ' " f:. "!. I , VJ.Si e--~o ~a e&uw~a eµ~a&veo8a&, or ~ eµ~ao&~--is said to 
exist in the eye ( ea~&V ••• EV exe(v~--438a8), which then 
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both reflects and sees it.152 But this, Aristotle claim·s, is 
wrong, for there is no e'l OCJ.:A.ov --as a physical object--there 
in the eye at all, inasmuch as what occurs as an image in the 
pupil of the eye is simply a case of reflection, and that is 
visible only to the man who sees it there (438a8) and not to 
the person in whose eye it appears. 1 53 What Democritus had 
taken for evidence for the existence of such a separate and 
visible image in the eye--and so evidence for what occurs in 
the act of seeing--has no reasonable basis at all. 
But beyond these special criticisms of Democritus Aris-
totle shows that his theory of 'correspondence' breaks down 
in various ways and so is wrong; and it now remains in this 
section to give an account of these criticisms as they affect 
the theory of Democritus. 
We may note first of all the way in which this corres-
pondence theory breaks down by outlining a portion of the 
criticism of it by Aristotle at .Q.g the Parts of Animals 1.1, 
640b29-64la9. Democritus had said that there was a correspon-
dence between the (atomic) structure (µopcp~ )154 of a human 
l52Thus again it is the e:iowA.ov in the eye which for De-
mocritus is the 'seen object' and not the physical object. 
153For.a discussion of various interpretations of this 
passage, see Ross, Sensu, pp. 138-139. 
. " 154cherniss, on. cit., p. 344, note 27, claims that the 
'form' here for Democritus is the outer limits of the body. 
But I take oxi')µa to refer to the outline of the body (when 
abstracted from color), ·w'hile µopcpl) refers to its structure. 
Thus Aristotle can speak here of a µopcp!) of the oxflµa , a 
structure that,belongs to the outlined shape; Aristotle had 
just used µopcp~ in that sense at 640a29. 
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being and the shape (oxDµa) and coloratiori which this struc-
ture presents to our senses (640a29-35). Aristotle objects 
that in that case a corpse (o ~e9vew~) has the same structure 
corresponding to that shape and coloration; the corpse and the 
man look alike, they present the same coloration and shape, 
but in that case they must be the same sort of physical object, 
have the same atomic structure; but they are obviously not the 
same: UAA 1 oµwc;. oux EO~tV avepwno, --640b36. Democritus would 
likely say that the corpse is different from the man in that 
the soul-atoms have left the corpse; but that would mean that 
the structure has changed without any visible evidence for it, 
and that too would leave him with no real correspondence be-
tween the physical object and its visible representation. 
Aristotle then goes on to list a number of other examples of 
correspondence; for example, the bronze hand--either abstract-
ed from consideration of color or, more likely, colored--
though it still bears the name 'hand', is not really a hand, 
even if it look ever so much like a hand; and these further 
illustrations of his point go on to show why in such instances 
correspondence fails. 155 But the point of Aristotle's criti-
cism is clear enough; such correspondence will not work, and 
such appearances cannot themselves tell us enough about an ob-
' ject and very little about its atomic structure. 
A further break-down is indicated by Aristotle at .Qg 
155we may just briefly note here in anticipation that 
this takes no account of the function, purpose, or final cause; 
this will be taken up separately in the next chapter. 
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Generation and Corruntion 1.8, 325b34-326b6, the whole point 
of which is to show the general unreasonableness with which 
Democritus says that sensible qualities are due to atomic 
shapes. It is not necessary to go through the argument again; 
an overview of the points Aristotle raises in opposition to 
the theory should be sufficient to show that these assignments 
of qualities do not in fact correspond with our sense-
impressions. 
First of all, our senses tell us that hot and cold are 
contraries; it is thus unreasonable to assign a shape to hot, 
but none to cold (326a3-6). Then too it is unreasonable to 
attribute to the atoms themselves the property of weight rela-
tive to their sizes without attributing other properties such 
as heat and hardness to them in the same way, so that one atom 
be harder or hotter than others. Or, why should one quality, 
weight, be due to a property of atoms while other qualities 
are not? (326a6-14); this certainly does not correspond with 
our sense-impressions. Nor again is there any reasonableness 
in attributing to them shape alone, for this is but one way in 
which they do correspond to larger physical objects; if in 
that one respect, why not in others (326al4-24)? Furthermore, 
our sense-impressions tell us of objects as divisible, and so 
it is also unreasonable no~ to attribute this too to atoms; 
size should be no objection (326a24-29). Our senses tell us 
of objects with a variety of qualities, reduced to their sim-
plest form in earthy or fiery or similarly qualified objects; 
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why then should atoms not correspond to this? Or we see 
things of a like nature merging, and yet the atoms show no 
correspondence to this (326a29-34). All in all, any real cor-
respondence between the world of atoms and void and the world 
of our sense-impressions breaks down completely. 156 
There is also a general criticism of this sort by Aris-
totle at Metaphysics 8.2; this is in general an accounting of 
the kinds of differentia in physical objects. The chapter is 
introduced by mentioning Democritus specifically and his reduc-
tion of the kinds of real differences in physical objects to 
three ~per~ Ola~opa~ --1042bl2), shape, placement, and order. 
In contrast to this teaching of his Aristotle says that our 
sense-impressions indicate a great many (more) differences: 
~a(vov'tal oe noAAaL OJa~opa& oJoal --1042bl5. He then goes on 
to list a great number of such specific differences; and he 
indicates that the perceptible ones present themselves as ar-
ranged in degrees in sets or categories of contraries: o~ov 
0 "\Tl ,L ' "\ ,L ' " ' ' ' ,... ' ' Xl\.,pu't~l xa' µal\axu't"T)'t:l ••• xal OAUX 'ta µev unepoxr,i 'ta Be 
~xAe(~El--l042b22, 24-25. These are the kinds of differences 
given us by sensation; and the implication here, particularly 
if we compare the passage to On Generation and Corruntion 1.8, 
325b34ff., 157 is that Democritus' atomism cannot and does not 
't 
l56This interpretation, which sees in the criticism of 
Aristotle a rejection of Democritus' theory of correspondence, 
has the advantage of providing a unified object for the appar-
ently wide range of criticisms offered. 
l57Especially on sets of contraries and Democritus' un-
reasonable account of them. 
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account for them or for any real and thorough-going corres-
pondence between the atomic system and our sense-impressions. 
We may now go back to further criticisms that Aristotle 
offers at On Sensation 4, 442bl9-26. Here the point is again 
raised about contrariety in sense-data, while there is no 
corresponding contrariety in atomic geometrical shapes: 
\ ' I \ ~ ) 
"While all the sense-data ('ta µev aicrGT}'ta nuv'ta have contrari-
ety, as, for instance, in the realm of color white is contrary 
to black, • • • while one shape does not seem contrary to an-
other (442bl9-22)." And a second objection which Aristotle 
voices here is that Democritus teaches a limitless variety of 
atomic shapes; thus, if each shape produces a specific flavor 
--and there is no reason to suppose that it would not--there 
should be a limitless number of flavors; and this is obviously 
not so. 158 So we have here two further ways in which the the-
ory of correspondence, as held by Democritus, breaks down. 
Finally, the irrationality of assigning perceived ef-
fects to shapes is the subject of the entire chapter at On the 
Heavens 3.8; though the chapter is devoted more specifically 
to a cr~ticism of Platonic views, especially as they are ex-
pressed in his Timaeus, some of Democritus' views are criti-
cized as well, for in this respect the views of Plato and De-
' 
l58chernlss, .££• cit., p. 316, objects that Aristotle 
simply refused to recognize the possibility of imperceptible 
variations in color. But Aristotle is proceeding on the 
grounds of empirical evidence; how could we see or taste the 
difference if it is imperceptible? Besides, Democritus' the-
ory is supposed to show correspondence to what we do perceive, 
and this is precisely where Aristotle says the theory fails. 
,. 
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mocritus are alike. For instance, the impossibility of assign-
ing cold to a shape contrary to the sphere is repeated (307b7-
10). There is as well the failure of the sphere to account 
for the uniting function of fire (307a32-b6). If anything at 
all the criticisms of Aristotle here show that by these theo-
ries there is no correspondence between elemental shape and 
phenomenal effect; they are totally inadequate to account for 
differences which we perceive in objects: o~l µtv oJv 06 ~or~ 
307b20-21. 
One might rightly extend this list of criticisms to in-
clude all the instances in which Aristotle shows that atomic 
explanations do not correspond to what is given in sense-
impressions. These, after all, are the most telling objections 
to a teaching that holds an atomic system of explanation and a 
theory of •truth in appearances'. 
~ Intellect and Genuine Knowledge 
Our information as to what Democritus taught about the 
intellect and its functions is even more sketchy than the in-
formation we have on his theory of sense-perpection. This has 
in recent years generated a number of attempts to reconstruct 
Democritus' theory of the intellect and the method of getting 
' 
at 'genuine knowledge', the knowledge of the world of atoms and 
void. I have already indicated in the section prior to this 
on sense-perception some of the framework around which I be-
lieve an intelligible theory of Democritus is likely to need 
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to be formulated; it centers around the meaning of 'truth in 
appearances', which on several occasions is attributed to De-
mocritus by Aristotle. 
But, since these attempts by various scholars at such a 
reconstruction offer some valuable suggestions, I propose in 
this section first of all to outline some of these attempts 
and the progress that has been made in this respect, and then 
to examine briefly Democritus' two kinds of yvWµ.~ of which 
Sextus Empiricus informs us, then also to examine the picture 
which Aristotle provides us of Democritus' teaching (under the 
conviction that there is no inconsistency between it and the 
later witnesses), and finally to examine Aristotle's objec-
tions to this theory. 
Langerbeckl59 proposed a gulf between 'genuine' and 
'bastard' knowledge; all that empirical fact tells us is that 
we are separated from what is really true; and in this sense 
he interprets the statement of Sextus Empiricus: "Der Mensch 
musz aus dieser alles bestimmenden Beobachtung lernen, dasz er 
vom Zuverlassigen entfernt ist. 11160 Thus he would hold that 
for Democritus empirical fact is a xavwv or criterion only in 
this sense, and not in the sense that there is some sort of 
logical relationship between the realm of atoms and void and 
' l59.QE.. cit., especially pp. 112-118. This and other re-
constructions are limited to the ones which tend to take seri-
ously both Aristotle and later witnesses; this seems to be the 
only reasonable course to take. 
160Diels-Kranz 68B6~ in Langerbeck, ££· cit., p. 116; 
his interpretation of xavwv as 'observed fact•-r8 on p. 115. 
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that of sense-perception; he denies the latter explicitly.161 
One comes to genuine knowledge only by instruction (5l5axfr--
Diels-Kranz 68B33); and, since he does attempt to account for 
Aristotle's information, he is driven to dilute the meaning of 
•truth' and 'true'--as we have seen--to 11 Deutlichkeit', an un-
usual and totally unwarrented meaning. 
Vlastos162 follows Langerbeck in the observation that 
teaching is instrumental in changing us physically, and indeed 
of 'changing our mind'. And this, I suppose, is a valuable 
insight, the strong emphasis on the physical alteration pro-
duced by teaching; this may very well be the means by which 
we come to understand the relationship between the realm of 
atoms and that of sense-perception. 
We have already said much about the article by Helene 
Weiss. She argues that what Aristotle means by 'what is true' 
is 'being gua being'--or, at least, as close as Democritus got 
to that notion--and that this 'what is true', as a body with 
size, is still perceptible, though not perceived. She intro-
duced a parallel passage from On Generation and Corruption 1.2, 
but had failed to show how her proposed meaning of 'what is 
true' applies to this passage, content to indicate that here 
161rn taking up the m~tter of a xavwv in this fashion he 
is forced to alter the text of the title given in Thrasyllus 
(Di els-Kranz 68Bl0b): TIEPI AOfIKQN to read TIEPI AAf\OI S!N, "da 
es sich eben nicht um 'Logik' sondern 'Naturphilosophie' 
hand el t. 11 (pp. 116-11 7) 
162Gregory Vlastos, 11 Ethics and Physics in Democritus" 
in Philosophical Review, LIV (1945) 578-592, LV (1946) 53-64. 
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Aristotle saw nothing wrong with speaking of 'truth in appear-
ances' and atoms together.163 Had she searched out the mean-
ing of this passage in more detail, she ought to have come to 
a clearer notion of what 'what is true' evidently means in 
these contexts. She rightly emphasizes the importance of 
A.oyoi in Democritus' system, but says that "the A.oyot are an 
indirect grasping" or a "faculty of cognition," though not 
identified with vou~ •164 But this meaning does not apply in 
the passage from Qg Generation and Corruption 1.8, which she 
uses to illustrate her point; there she more appropriately 
uses the translation "reasons" for A.oyot. One ought really 
take A.oyot in that sense consistently, and then the •reasons' 
would evidently be •accounts of correspondence' between the 
two realms, atoms and phenomena. 
Bailey, as we have already noted, is right about working 
from sensations to atoms to attain true knowledge by infer-
ence; but he proposes that the critical method of attaining 
that knowledge is the sense of touch; using it as the most 
valid, we must strip impressions gained by the other senses of 
their 'secondary qualities•, and thus by a method of abstrac-
tion and inference gain a 'genuine knowledge' of things. 165 
The idea of inference is certainly valid here as well as the 
' 163 : 
.QE.. cit., p. 52. 
164Ib"d 
__ i_.' p. 51; she takes A.6yot as being a Democritean 
term. 
165Bailey, E.E.• cit., pp. 182-185. But the sense of 
touch is itself in the same state as the other senses. 
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primacy of touch. But for Bailey 'what is true is in what ap-
pears' is reduced to 'appearances contain the data for true 
knowledge'; this is inadequate, for we require a meaning which 
will allow us to go from one realm to the other, that is, we 
require some sort of formal relationship between them. · 
Guthrie for the most part follows Weiss, but still feels 
dissatisfied with her account. Bailey had considered and then 
rejected the notion of atoms by-passing the senses and affect-
ing the mind directly. Guthrie takes up the principle, but 
speaks of atomic films after passing through the eyes and ears 
being dispersed throughout the body, and then he goes on to 
say that "something like this is perhaps what Bailey and oth-
ers have meant by. 'inference ' • ~• 166 · But again, some such 
process as this certainly cannot be of help in arguing from 
sensations to atoms, as the passage at .Qg Generation and £2.!:-
ruption 1.2 seems to require. 
Finally, Taylor indicates that 'truth in appearances' 
comes down to saying only that any one sense-impression is as 
true as any other--and this is entirely subjective--while the 
only non-subjective truth is the scientific (atomic) explana-
tion.167 But the 'scientific explanation' is itself always 
subject to correction by empirical evidence; whenever one has 
a sense-impression for which the scientific explanation fails 
166Guthrie, History, II, 465. 
167c. c. w. Taylor, "Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation 
in Democritus" in Phronesis, XII, 1 (1967), p. 24. 
to account, the scientific explanation must be corrected. 
Thus 'truth in appearances', while it here at last seems 
rightly to imply a real correspondence, is reduced to a to-
tally solipsistic sense:168 
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"Every individual has his own common-sense picture of 
the world, none of which is truer than any other; the 
only inter-subjectively true picture is the scientific 
one, which can however claim to be true only in so far 
as it provides an explanation of every common-sense 
picture, an explanation moreover which depends for its 
verification on the same potentially conflicting data 
of perception." 
Several objections can be raised against this interpre-
tation. One thing that seems to make Taylor's analysis sub-
ject to suspicion is its apparently artificial parallelism to 
the 'theory of pleasure'; he himself looks upon this as a con-
firmation of his analysis. Furthermore, there is no real evi-
dence that sense-impressions for Democritus were as private 
and totally subjective as Taylor makes them out to be; indeed, 
there is indication to the contrary. The very passage in· 
which Democritus claims that the 'secondary qualities' are not 
'real properties' of physical objects certainly implies that 
they are not merely subjective: v6µ~ xpot~, v6µ~ yAuxu, v6µ~ 
' 
1 
- ~ I 11 \ 1 I t b tt • t n'xpov, e~e~ v a~oµa xat xevov --'color, swee, i er ex1s 
only by convention, but atoms and void exist in reality. 11169 
This evidently implies tha~ there is some one kind of sensa-
tion that all (or a majority) call either 'red' or 'bitter• or 
168Ibid. 
169Diels-Kranz 68B125 (=B9). 
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'hot' or 'cold'; and the detailed account in Theophrastus·, De 
Sensibus, certainly confirms this, for this system was evi-
dently meant to account for all our sensations of red, bitter, 
and such. Taylor, I believe, was right about the truth of 
sense-impressions, but wrong about their being subjective; any 
number of people certainly can look upon the same green object 
and get the same sensation of greenness simply because there 
is an objective atomic configuration which accounts for all 
such sensations; there is nothing in Democritus to indicate 
the contrary. There is indeed an objective reality which sen-
sations represent directly. Sensation, Democritus would ob-
viously say, are indeed relative--relative to the objective 
structure of the physical object, relative as well (in cases 
of abnormality in the percipient) to the soul-structure of the 
percipient, and perhaps relative as well to some other fac-
tors; but it does not follow from the fact that they are rel-
ative that they are also subjective. 170 
Sensations are true for Democritus not because they are 
l70rncidentally, Taylor, .2.E.· cit., pp. 14-15, weakens 
the sense of Diels-Y:...ranz 68B33, emphasized by Vlastos, by 
down-grading the mechanical implications of "Teaching changes 
a man, and in changing him forms his character"--~ otoax~ 
µE~apuoµoi ~ov avepwnov µE~apuoµo0oa oe ~UOlOTIOtEi. Taylor 
prefers to take this simply as a traditional saying with lit-
tle distinctive meaning and apparently little or no connection 
with Democritus' physical theory. But then it is strange that 
Democritus wouid bother using a verb based on puoµo~ (a dis-
tinctive Democritean term), even though the term would not be 
here used precisely for 'atomic shape'. There may well be a 
sense in which 'teaching' forms our thinking in a sense appro-
priate to Democritean physics; it may for one thing form our 
thinking to recognize a correspondence between sensation and 
atomic structure. 
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subjective and private, but precisely because they are ground-
ed in objective reality, because they are a mechanical altera-· 
tion of a specific kind. 
According to Sextus Empiricus there are two terms which 
have come down to us from Democritus, signifying two kinds of 
knowledge, genuine and obscure: yvWµD YVDO(D and yvwµ~ 
oxo~(D. 171 There is little doubt about their meanings; both 
are instances of 'knowledge•, but each of a different sort. 
yvwµD axo~(D is the knowledge that comes through sensations 
(~DV oe Ola ~wv alae~acwv axo~(Dv ), which gives us all sorts 
of information on the phenomenal level. But there is a point 
in fineness beyond which this perception on the level of sen-
sation can not go, and it is beyond this point that the world 
of atoms and void lies, the world of things as they really 
are, genuine being and non-being. This latter is the world 
which yvwµ~ YVDO(D knows. 
But here is precisely where the problem lies: how does 
one get from 'obscure knowledge• to 'genuine knowledge'? I 
would briefly add here to the already long list of attempts to 
bridge that 'knowledge gap' by what seems to me can reasonably 
be learned about Democritus' teaching and from Aristotle's 
criticism of him. Evidently the existence of contraries in 
the same object provides dissatisfaction with 'obscure know-
ledge•. If Aoyol is a Democritean term, it is likely that it 
refers to accounts of correspondence between the two levels of 
171Diels-Kranz, 68Bll. 
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knowledge; for example, that sensation which we call 'heat' 
corresponds to the spherical atoms. It is somehow our nature 
--evidently by convention--to accept at face value the picture 
of the world received through sense-perceptions; but we may be 
trained by teaching (otoax~), perhaps by teaching the i\oyo&, to 
recognize that the correspondence exists between the two lev-
els, and thus to know by inference--the way one would know the 
conclusion of a syllogism, though he had no direct experience 
of it--the world of atoms and void. And this latter knowledge, 
including knowledge of the atomic structure of things, would 
be 'genuine knowledge'. 
As we now go on to the report of Aristotle on Democritus' 
teaching about intelligence and knowledge, we have a most 
striking statement made by Aristotle, that for Democritus mind 
and soul are the same thing; 172 and it is striking because we 
have thus far been led to expect that they would be· distinct 
for Democritus. On the other hand, Philoponus, in his .commen~ 
tary on _Q!! the Soul, says that Democritus had explici t·ly denied · 
their identity, and that Aristotle had only concluded their 
identity as a logical consequence of other teachings about 
mind. 173 While Philoponus is evidently quite right in his 
statement, this is not to say that Aristotle was evidently in 
' 172For i~stance, twice within a few lines in Anima 1.2, 
404e.28, ,31: _d'J'(A.w<; 'tau'tov wuxilv xa\ vouv, ••• 'tau'tb i\eyEL 
lJ!uxriv xa& vouv. 
_ ~ 73p ._ 71 l,ine,s .).9f:t;., Di els-Kranz 6§All3: 'cx.oµev ~Jv 
'tOU'tO EVEpyw<; ~ap aU'tWV ElPDµEVOV O'tl 'tQU'tOV VOU<; xa1 wux~ OUoaµw~, ai\A.'ex OUi\i\oy1oµou 'tOU'tO XU'taOXEUUsEt. 
r 
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error on this point. 'Same' for Aristotle does not necessar-
ily mean absolute identity; things may be the same inasmuch as 
they have some accidental or essential property in common;l74 
thus things may be 'the same' in~ respect. So this means 
that when Aristotle says that for Democritus mind and soul 
are the same, we are not to conclude necessarily their abso-
lute identity; we are rather first to inquire as to the re-
spect in which they are the same. Aristotle and Philoponus 
are not at odds on this point. With this in mind let us then 
examine Aristotle's report. 
According to Aristotle the intellect in Democritus' 
teaching is the same as the soul, in the first place, inasmuch 
as they are composed of the same material, the same kind of 
atoms--small and spherical. Aristotle says this twice. Soul 
and intelligence, he claims, are the same in the atoms of 
which they are composed, "moveable because of (the atoms') 
small size and shape, and the shape he (Democritus) claims is 
the most mobile of atomic shapes. 11175 This is repeated, 
though not as precisely, at On Breathing 4, 472a7-8, where 
Aristotle speaks of Democritus' teaching that we breathe in 
from the air those atoms which he identifies with intelligence 
and soul. Thus both are identical in their matter. 
" l74compare i'iietaphysics 5.9 on ri;au-r;a. This may be the 
problem as well when Aristotle says that two philosophers have 
the same teaching on some particular issue; we must then also 
be careful to distinguish precisely in what respect they are 
the same. 
l75Anima 1.2, 405al0-12. 
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Again Aristotle says that for Democritus the operation 
or activity of both the soul and the mind are of the same sort; 
they both consist of a mechanical alteration; thus, since the 
process is a purely mechanical one, the impression which the 
senses get must be true. 176 This statement of the mechanical 
relationship between sense-impressions and the object again 
gives Aristotle reason for declaring the identity of soul and 
intellect in On the Soul 1.2, 404a28-30. Here Aristotle adds 
the remark which to him seems to establish what he had just 
said, that for Democritus the vouc;; does not function as a spe-
cial capacity which can distinguish and judge truth: 06 o~ 
XP~~a' ~Q vQ we;; oovaµEl ~lVl TIEpl ~DV UA~8£tav,--404a30-31. 
What is true is the sense-impression itself; thus the soul 
takes from vouc;; a function which the latter should have if 
both are to be distinct, and vouc;; its elf simply infers atoms 
and void in certain positions. Bothvouc;; and ~ox~ are identi-
cal in their functioning mechanically by alteration. 
Finally, there is a third respect in which intelligence 
and soul are alike, in having the same 'object'--a body with 
size, and hence perceptible even if not actually perceived or 
noticed. Aristotle shows at On Sensation 6, 445b3-446a21 that 
even when one gets dovm to the atomic level (a~oµa ••• µe:yt-
" 8 ~--445bl9), as long as one is dealing with magnitudes, there 
are still objects perceptible at this level--whether or not 
they are perceived in isolation. Again, at .2£ the Heavens 3.7, 
176rnetaphysics 4.5, 1009bl2-15. 
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306a28-30 there is mention of some who will not yield divisi-
bility to what is perceptible: Ol OE ouoe ~b aloerp;ov anav 
In neither 
passage are the authors of the theory in question mentioned, 
but the remarks are quite appropriate to Democritus. Inas~uch 
as an atomic figure has size, it is at least potentially per-
ceived. And in that respect at· least, in that the object of 
intelligence is to some extent perceptible, the object of per-
ception and of thought is the same. 
Thus Democritus' soul and intelligence are the same, but 
the same only in the above respects, the same inasmuch as they 
are composed of the same matter, as their operation is of the 
same kind, and as their objects are basically the sa~e. But 
this ought not lead us, as Philoponus rightly warns, to assume 
a complete identity of both. 
There is at least some indication that Democritus argued 
from sense-impressions to atoms; and this may also be the way 
in which he thought that intelligence operates: it uses a 
phenomenon and, by the theory of correspondence, infers some-
thing about the atomic world. This is vflJ.at Aristotle describes 
as taking place at On Generation and Corruption 1.2, 315b9-ll: 
"Since they believed that what is true is in appearance, and 
since appearances are cont~ary and limitless, they suppose 
that the atomic shapes are limitless. 11177 It was the limit-
l77tn~ 6, ~ov~o ~&A~el, fv ~~ ~a(vEo9al, tvav~(a 6~ xa\ 
~~ ~alV6µEVa, ~~ OX~µa~a ~XElpa fXOlDOUV. 
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less variety of appearances which, in conjunction with the 
further premise of truth in appearances, allowed a conclusion 
about atomic shapes. 
Furthermore, later in the same book, Aristotle commends 
Democritus for "making his starting point accord with nature 
just as it is, 11178 that is, the object as it appears. In the 
world of nature just as it is he had found motion, and con-
cluded from that that on the atomic level of explanation there 
must be a V l.• d • .t,. I L' , T '1. - 179 And o • w~ oux uv x'vna'v ouaav uveu xevou • 
his argument in this passage goes exactly in the opposite di-
rection from the Eleatic argument (which goes from the non-
existence of the void to the non-existence of motion) from 
the fact that there is motion in the phenomenal world to the 
existence of void on the atomic level. 
And it may well be that this is how Democritus thought 
that intelligence in general operates, using the information 
of the senses--and assuming a correspondence (which amounts to 
a 'programming' of the mind as one might program a computer)--
to arrive at an atomic world which truly is. 
What then are we to make of Democritus' quotation with 
approval from Homer: ~~, eno(nae ~ov VEx~opa, w~ €s~o~n. ~TIO 
178 l. ' ' Gen • .£!. Corr. l.8i 325al-~: upxnv noLnoaµevo' ~a~a 
!fUO' v .Ypi: Epeo't.L v. There is, I believe, no need to read 'f.ln: e:p 
e:o~,v, as Joachim, op. cit., p. 159, suggests just to accord 
with Parmenides; what we have in the lines that immediately 
follow this remark is more of a contrast with.the Eleatics 
than a similarity with them. 
l79Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 325a27. 
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~n' nA~yn,, xer0ea1 aAAo~pov€ov~a?180 This citation with ap-
proval is presented in the passage from On ~ Soul as a con-
sistent consequence of 'what is true is what appears' c~o yap 
&Ane~, e{va& ~b ~atvdµevov, 6&~ xaAra, no&nca& ••• --404a28-
29), and so ought probably be connected with drawing infer-
ences from phenomena to the actual or real situation. What 
Democritus probably conceived to be the case with Hector was 
something like this: Hector was receiving sense-impressions 
just like anyone else might, but because of the unusual state 
of his physical condition (w, ~stc~~ ~n6 ~n' nA~n' ) he was 
drawing wrong conclusions from them about objective reality, 
as if an instance of false knowledge were an instance of know-
ledge: w, ~povouv~a, µev xat ~OU' napa~povouv~a, 4AA 1 OU 
~au~&--Meta. 4.5, 1009b30-31. One might conclude from this 
that each of the following were instances for Democritus of 
the functioning of vou' or ~povnc,,: intelligence inferring 
from phenomena the reality of atoms and void, intelligence in-
ferring from sense-data that physical objects have all the 
qualities as properties which we perceive them to have, and 
intelligence inferring from sense-data conclusions contrary to 
both appearances and atomism. The second is the common-sense 
view of the world, but, because of contraries in the same ob-
ject, cannot Qe the real sltuation; and men apparently are 
180rrieta. 4.5, 1009b29-30, though here there is no speci-
fic attribution to Democritus. The information, however, is 
repeated at Anima 1.2, 404a30, where this is more explicitly 
referred to Democritus. The quotation as made is not in our 
texts of Homer. 
r 
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habituated to this kind of inference. The first is the genu-
ine functioning of knowledge and must be instilled, likely by 
teaching, to change us and get us out of the habit of using 
the second kind of inference. The third, likewise mistaken, 
is due to a derangement of our atomic structure. The mind or 
intelligence then is not a special faculty concerned with 
truth; its functioning in this respect is not distinguished 
from the functioning of soul in general, for it too, like the 
soul, is liable to error--mechanical errors, but errors never-
theless: OU 6~ xpfrcal 'CQ vQ we;; ouvdµt:& 'Cl v'1 Tit:p) 'tlJV &.A.'D8el -
l.. 1\ ./.. '\, 'N 
av, uA.Aa 'tau'Co A.~ye& ~ux~v xa& vouv --Anima 1.2, 404a30-31. 
The above reconstruction of the teaching of Democritus 
on intelligence and genuine knowledge--though it remains only· 
a reconstruction--has the advantage of the consistency for 
which Aristotle praised Democritus, of taking the reports of 
Aristotle seriously, of being consistent with later witnesses 
to the teaching of Democritus, and thus of not giving Aris-
totle a •straw man' to 'knock down' without any difficulty. 
As we begin then to account for Aristotle's specific 
criticisms of this teaching, we may not that one important as-
pect of that teaching has already been taken into account. 
Aristotle, as we have seen, had raised his objections to the 
theory of correspondence ~etween sense-impressions and physi-
cal objects; he had quite rightly shown that this proposed 
correspondence breaks down at critical points. Without re-
peating those criticisms here we might yet note that this is 
probably the most telling objection which Aristotle raises 
against such a theory of knowledge. 
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Now aside from this, there is another criticism which 
Aristotle uses against Democritus, one which is probably the 
most well known, that is, that Democritus' teaching implies 
the identity of mind with soul and fire. This criticism was 
raised, for instance, at On the ~ 1.2, 404b27ff. As was 
mentioned above, this is not to be taken to say either that 
Democritus taught their complete identity or that Aristotle 
thought or implied that he did. 181 The point that Aristotle 
raises here is only the identity of their material--spherical 
atoms--and that these atoms are meant to explain the extreme 
mobility involved in explaining the operation of all three 
kinds of objects. But, in view of their sameness of material 
and of operation, this amounts to a practical identity of the 
three, especially since we--and Aristotle as well likely--lack 
any information on specific differences between them. This is, 
it seems to me, what allows Aristotle to identify them by syl-
logism; only their sameness was specified and expanded upon, 
but not their differences. Perhaps we may use here a state-
ment made by Aristotle in another context, for it does summa-
rize neatly the force of his criticism here: AEx~eov ~~v 
Ola~opav, UAA 1 • oux dnAW~ o\1t-w AEX~EOV w~ Aeyouo&v --"one ought 
to specify the difference and not make as simple a claim as 
they do 11 --Caelo 3.8, 307a23-24. The identity of mind with 
181As Cherniss, .££.• cit., p. 289, does. 
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soul and fire is a theoretical one, due to Democritus' failure 
to specify specific differences between them. Democritus is 
at fault for failing to make a distinction which is important 
to his theory. 
We now turn our attention to another passage in Qg the 
Soul where Aristotle offers a further major objection to De-
mocritus' teaching about mind and knowledge; this he does at 
1.2, 404a25-31. But, before proceeding with the major criti-
cism, this passage also brings up another matter: Aristotle 
mentions Anaxagoras and anyone else who has claimed that mind 
sets things in motion, and then Aristotle continues by claim-
ing that Democritus too taught the capacity and function of 
mind to set things in motion: xal e:1 'tt' &AAo' e:1pT)xe:v w' 
'tO nav ex(VT)OE: vou,· OU µnv naV'tE:AW' y' Wo1LE:p ~T)µoxpt'to, --
404a26-27. So for Democritus the mind is no better off than 
the soul in this respect; and the criticism which Aristotle 
had offered against this teaching of Democritus about the soul 
applies as well to the mind: since movement is a mechanical 
one, and since the spherical mind-atoms are naturally in mo-
tion, it will either be impossible or, at least, quite diffi-
cult for it to cause rest and cessation of motion: ~µe:r, o' 
lpun~ooµe:v e;{ xa\ ~pEµT)OlV TIOtE:i 'tOU'tO au't6· nw, OE TIOt~OE:t, 
"\ ' 1\ \. I , I ' .., XU/\E:TIOV T) xat .QO\JVU'tOV E:lTIE:l V --Anima l.J, 406b22-24. 
Now to return to the major objection at On the Soul 1.2; 
we have there the statement that for Democritus what appears 
is what is true, Democritus' approval of the Homeric descrip-
.- ..... •·· 
r 
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tion of Hector lying wounded with his thoughts elsewhere; and 
it is in this context that Aristotle makes the simple critical 
statement that Democritus does not use the mind as a faculty 
or power concerning the truth (404a30-31), with no further 
explanation other than the fact that vouc; is the same as \lmx'h 
in this respect. So we need to turn to the parallel passage 
in the Metaphysics for details and elucidation of this criti-
cism. 
At metaphysics 4.5, 1009bl2ff. the claim that for Democ-
ritus there is truth in what appears is repeated, then the 
quotation from Homer is cited a number of lines later. There 
then follows a more detailed account of Aristotle's objections 
to this teaching. And his objection is generally this: by 
Democritus' theory no more is given from the object than what 
is given to the senses, or, in another w~y, that what intelli-
gence has as its object is precisely the same--no more, no 
less--as what sense-perception has as its object; or again, 
more simply, that as to its object intelligence is sense-
t . , \ ' ,, 1009bl3 182 percep ion: ~pov~o'v µev ~~v a,oe~a'v -- • 
More specifically Aristotle claims on the basis of the 
approval of the passage from Homer that this teaching involves 
the claim that an instance of mistaken knowledge is an instance 
" of knowledge, ·or, perhaps, that error is an instance of truth: 
182cherniss, £.P.• .£!!., p. 83, assumes that it is only on 
the grounds of the material of which vouc; is constructed that 
Aristotle claims the sameness of soul and mind. It is not a 
matter of material, and the intellect does not stand "in judg-
ment over sensation," as Cherniss claims; it uses sensation. 
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1009b30-31. But this means further that, since both are ac-
tivities of the mind and each 'sees' truth as something con-
trary to the other, contraries are in fact and actually true 
of the same physical object at the same time: xa\ ~a ov~a 
~µa ou~w ~e xa\ oux ou~w~ EXE' --1009b32-33. Thus they are no 
closer to any fixed truth than they were before, when just 
using sense-perception; the pursuit of truth, of what physical 
objects are really like, on this theory is a 'wild goose 
\ .. ' ..t _,_ ' - Pv ' chase': ~o yap ~a Tit~uµeva OLwxeJv ~o ~rytetv u tin ~~v 
Furthermore, Aristotle goes on to say, the reason for 
their mistaken point of view is that these men assumed that 
only perceptible objects exist: ~a o' ov~a ~TIEAa~ov e(vaL ~a 
alo8ryta µovoV--1010a2-3. 183 This undue emphasis on sense-
perception brought on a neglect of that in a physical object 
which remains constant in the midst of accidental change, its 
essence; they look only at what is changing about an object, 
not at what is permanent about it in the midst of such change, 
and therefore they can find nothing true about the object which 
' presents itself to the senses: OpWV~E~ ~ao~nv XLVOUµevnv ~nv 
~UOLV • • • Tiep( ye ~o nav~~ TiaV~W' µe~a~UAAOV oux tvoexeo8al 
to,neeutLV--1010a7-9. But'it is the distinctive function of 
the intellect to 'percefve' that permanent nature of a physical 
lB3s Ch . 1 "t " ee ern1ss, oc. c1 • , • • • assumed that only 
sensible things had real existence." 
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object--and that, for Aristotle, is what is true and lasting 
about a given physical object. And in this sense Democritus 
fails to use the intellect as a power concerning truth; his 
intellect had no distinctive power to 'perceive' what is true 
and permanent about an object--in contrast to what is changing 
about it--precisely because intelligence had absolutely no 
more to work with than was already given in sense-
perception.184 
If what is true is to be permanent and the attainable 
object of intelligence, then Democritus' theory is thus defi-
cient on two counts: it allows two contrary truths about the 
same object at the same time if both a correct and a mistaken 
<pp6v~ol, are instances of real intelligence; and, secondly, it 
allows for nothing permanent about an object, although this is 
the way we see the object and speak of it; on Democritus' the-
ory the apple now green and later red is not the same apple, 
but is on each occasion a different object. 
Democritus' theory of knowledge and of correspondence 
breaks dovm and cannot arrive at a sure truth, and thus on this 
critical point the whole world of atoms and void is thrown in-
to doubt along with his theory of knowledge. 
184The point about there being no knowledge of what is 
merely perceptible, and so,' changing, that there must be some 
more permanent nature (qioot,) of an object which is given to 
<ppoVT)Ot' (or vou,) is repeated at i.Ietauhysics 13.4, 1078bl2-17. 
r 
r 
CHAPTER IV 
ON FORMAL, EFFICIENT, AND FINAL 'CAUSES' 
Introduction 
The final fundamental issue which divides the teaching 
of Aristotle from that of Democritus revolves around the ques-
tion of the kinds of explanations they give of physical ob-
jects and events. To put this into traditional Aristotelian 
terminology, this is the issue of the four causes--material, 
formal, efficient; and final--all of which the natural philo-
sopher must consider, Aristotle says, if he is to render an 
.adequate account of the world about us. 1 
Immediately at this point we run into a difficulty; 
there is still active discussion on precisely what is meant by 
'cause' in Aristotle, particularly in reference to the 'final 
cause'. On the one hand, Ross, for example, tends to describe 
the 'final cause' as one of "the external conditions of natu-
ral process," and, at that, as a force working on a par with 
the efficient cause. 2 This interpretation makes in effect a 
1Physics ·2. 7, 198a22-~4: br e 'i o' at .. al re ( ai 't t-rrcap ec;;, 
\ - - - ·~ \I~ I~ \s:,\ nepl naowv -rou ~uotxou e1o~va1, xat_etc;; nuoac;; avuywv rco vla 
-r( &noowoet ~uo1xwc;;, -rDv ~ADV, -ro elooc;;, -co xivnaav, rco ou 
'Evexa. 
2Ross, Physics, p. 36; also W. D. Ross, Aristotle: A 
complete exnosition of his works~ thought (New York: meri-
dian Books, 1959)s p. 7b,where the final cause is a '~'· 
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second sort of efficient cause out of the 'final cause'.3· On 
the other hand, Charlton contends that is is misleading to 
talk of these Aristotelian causes as all being ones which ac-
tively operate and produce effects, that .Aristotle's doctrine 
of the "'four causes' is an attempt to distinguish and clas-
sify different kinds of explanation, different explanatory 
roles a factor can play. 11 4 
It is this latter sense of 'cause' which seems to me to 
come closer to what is meant by the term in Aristotle's doc-
trine of the 'four causes'. The word 'cause' has come to mean 
for us in ordinary language something more nearly like what we 
shall see it meant for Democritus--an 'efficient cause•. But 
it is obvious that its meaning for Aristotle is much broader: 
whatever can contribute to the explanation of a physical object 
or event would for Aristotle be an al~(a, a reason, an exp1~-
3There is, of course, a sense in which the efficient 
cause may be at times identical with the final cause, just as 
a particular musician may be identical with a housebuilder, 
when he builds a house. But in that case the musician is not 
acting ~ musician, but qta housebuilder. Similarly the ef-
ficient cause qf~ efficien must be kept intellectually dis-
tinct from the ,in~l ~a~se ~ua,final. ~ee also Gen. et Corr. 
1.7, 324bl4: ~o 0 OU EVExa OU TIOl~~lXOV. 
4.QE.. cit., p. 99. This same sort of c?ntention is also 
the substance of a very recent article on Aristotle's 'unmoved 
mover', which by this interpretation is not a personal force 
and thus an efficient causet! but is simply "an explanation for 
orderly rational motion 11 --Dimitri z. Andriopoulos and James M. 
Humber' II Aristotle's Concept of TO ITPQTON KINOYN AKINHTON: 
A Reexa'llination of the Problem" in Classical Journal, LXVI, 4 
(1971), p. 293. This article raises the basic question as to 
whether for Aristotle the •unmoved mover' is to be conceived 
as a personal god. 
r 
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tory factor. 5 This interpretation has the advantage of making 
more sense of what Aristotle says, for instance, where he 
criticizes Anaxagoras' vo0~ as not being an adequate explana-
tion as 'final cause•; Anaxagoras' vo0~, though taken as 'the 
good', still is only that which sets the universe in motion 
originally as something separate and mechanical ( 'Avasayopa~ 
' - ""' - - ' ' # 
-re yap w11xavr.i XPY)'t"al -ry vy 1tpoi; 'tl)Y xooµo1toL l av --I1Ietaphysics 
1.4, 985al8-19); although it is 'the good', it still does not 
explain the present functioning and purpose of the universe, 
that for the sake of which that original motion as well as the 
present motion takes place. Cherniss' objections to Aristot- . 
le's criticism only hold when efficient and final causality 
are confused, only when the 'final cause' is in effect another 
kind of efficient cause, when there is no distinct purpose for 
the motion: &.A.A.a Xlver eYEXU '!;lVO~, W<ne_ £rcepov --Metaphysics 
6 12.10, 1075b9. Thus, what Aristotle is saying against An.ax-
5This meaning has been found for a('t(a already in Plato 
and applied by Gregory Vlastos to Aristotle in his "Reasons and 
Causes in the Phaedo" in Philosonhical Review, LXXVIII, 3 
(1969) 291-325. 
6cherniss, .2.E· cit., p. 235, says: "To complain that he 
lJi.naxagorasJ identified final and efficient causality in the 
voui; is not only unhistorical but also inappropriate for Aris-
totle whose God, pure intellectual activity, is at once the 
efficient and final cause of movement in the universe." Cher-
niss' criticism implies th8tt Aristotle is wrong in criticizing 
Anaxagoras, beeause Aristotle's own teaching is the same. But 
this fails to distinguish their differences. The fact that 
vo0i; may be the only primary efficient cause of motion in gen-
eral for Anaxagoras and not the proximate cause of any other 
motion is in itself immaterial to the question as to whether 
it is to be labeled as an efficient or final cause (contra 
Cherniss, loc • .£1.!.). 
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agoras is that his vou~ only explains the order in the uni-
verse from the point of view of giving an efficient cause, 
albeit a 'good efficient cause', but fails to give an explana-
tion which takes into account its present order from the point 
of view of its purpose and proper functioning. The confusion, 
it seems to me, is due to an interpretation which fails to 
keep the final cause, gua final, distinct from the efficient 
cause. And this can likely best be done by remembering that 
•cause' has a much broader meaning for Aristotle than it has 
for us, that its meaning more closely approximates 'explana-
tion' or 'explanatory factor' than 'cause' in the strict 
sense. 
But, if one does take all 'causes' in Aristotle--and 
particularly the 'final cause•--to be in some sense 'efficient 
causes', those which actively produce an object or an event, 
there may indeed be some problem in establishing any positive 
evidence for, for example, a 'final cause' qua final as active 
in such production. And it is quite certain that this might 
seriously weaken some of Aristotle's own assertions and argu-
ments, particularly against Democritus, against whom he levels 
the criticism a nu.~ber of times that he neglected the 'final 
cause'. Not only that, but it would also seem to make Aris-
' totle's criticisms at a number of places much less intellig-
ible. 
But Aristotle does indeed adduce positive evidence 
against Democritus, even when he criticizes him for neglecting 
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this 'final cause'; Aristotle never simply and arbitrarily 
says that Democritus was wrong in his assertions only because 
he had neglected it. But rather, Aristotle, as we shall see, 
does regularly claim that Democritus' neglect of a 'final 
cause' had seriously hampered his investigation, because it 
had led him to some doubtful conclusion or apparent error in 
some other respect, because it had led him to neglect some ob-
vious and necessary factor in giving a fuller and more satis-
factory explanation of the phenomenal world. Thus not only 
will the interpretation of 'final cause' as a factor in expla-
nation be more firmly established in Democritus' case, but 
also Aristotle's arguments will not give the expected evidence 
of any noticeable weakness in this connection. 
On the other hand, any argument which would hold against 
Democritus, establishing a material, formal, or final cause, 
gua material, formal, or final, as 'quasi-efficient' and ac-
tive, will also hold a fortiori for 'cause' in the broader 
sense of 'explanatory factor'. Thus, in fact, the position of 
neither Aristotle nor Democritus is unnecessarily weakened by 
this approach and interpretation of the meaning of •cause' in 
Aristotle. And, indeed, this promises to give a fairer treat-
ment to the positions of both philosophers, and we shall be 
able to get down more effic~ently to what is really at issue 
between them in this matter of 'causes'. 
On the whole, Democritus' position on this issue of 
'causes' is a purely mechanistic one: any object or event can 
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be explained simply and absolutely in terms of permanent atoms 
and void in a specific arrangement, which may be moved or 
changed only in a predetermined way when bombarded from the 
outside by another atom or set of atoms; this means, as we 
shall see upon closer examination, that there is in Democri-
tus' teaching an accounting to some degree of material, for-
mal, and efficient causation. This, Democritus is convinced, 
is the only type of explanation feasible or possible. 
It is, on the contrary, Aristotle's position on this 
issue that this sort of explanation obviates and, indeed, de-
nies not only an explanation by 'final cause', but also a 
more important distinction between 'artificial' and 'natural' 
objects. This latter distinction seems to Aristotle obvious 
enough, and he thus persistently tries to show how Democritus' 
theory falls short of accounting in this respect for the phe-
nomenal world; and the reason for the deficiency in Democri-
tus' theory is regularly that he did not explain things from 
a point of view of their 'natural development' and of their 
proper functioning and purpose. 
Of the four 'causes' of Aristotle we have already con-
sidered in some detail the 'material cause' in chapters one 
and two; so not much more need be said about it.. Thus, though 
' we have already in fact touched on the matter of efficient and 
formal cause, these, along with the matter of the 'final 
cause' remain for fuller consideration. As was mentioned, it 
will be the contention of this section of this paper that 
there are specific counterparts in Democritus' teaching t'o 
both efficient and formal causes; and to these, as we shall 
see, Aristotle objects on the grounds not only of their in-
trinsic inadequacy, but also of their failure to be supple-
mented by any analogue to 'final cause'. 
Furthermore, the discussion of this chapter will also 
involve us in the question of what is meant in Democritus' 
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teaching by 'necessity' and by 'chance', both of which, along 
with Aristotle's criticisms, will be seen to find their proper 
place within the question of causation. 
The Formal Cause 
The teachings of Democritus do evidently contain an ac-
counting of physical objects which is analogous to Aristotle's 
'formal cause'. Aristotle himself testifies to this fact on 
a number of occasions, all of which are aptly summarized in 
the Physics where Aristotle in a parenthetical remark says: 
"For to a certain extent Empedocles and Democritus touched 
slightly on the matter of form and essence. 117 And to further 
assure ourselves that this is really the intention of .Aris-
totle, he uses terms which are for him technical phrases for 
'form' and 'essence': ~o £{00, (Physics 2.2, 194a21), ~o ~~ ~v 
£{vai (Physics 2.2, 194a21t; Part. Anim. 1.1, 642a26), and ~6 
4. , ' , # 
op1oao8a1 ~~v ouoiav (Part. Anim. 1.1, 642a26; and this term 
7Physics 2.2, 194a20-21: br\ µ1xpov yae ~1._µ€po' 'Eµ-
neooxA~~ xa\ 6~µ6xp1~0' ~ou e&oou' xa1 ~ou ~( ~v e(vai ~~av~o. 
The other passages in which this is said are r,Ietanhysics 13. 4, 
1078bl9-21 and On the Parts of Animals 1.1, 642a2b-28. 
seems to be the one implied in the passage at Metaphysics 
13.4, 1078bl9-21). 
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But there is some difficulty in determining the nature 
of Democritus' attempt to specify a 'formal cause' or 'define 
the essence of an object'. Ross, in his commentaries on the 
passages both in the Physics and in the metaphysics, says 
nothing to indicate the nature of Democritus' attempt; but in 
his 'analysis' of the passage in the Metaphysics he does in-
dicate that the attempt amounted to nothing more than Democ-
ritus' definition of heat and cold. 8 Cherniss agrees.9 But 
it hardly seems appropriate to describe Democritus' account of 
heat and cold as a substantial contribution to the development 
of the concept of 't~ clooc:;,, 'to 't( ~v tlva,, and 'to opfoaoeai 
' I # 
'tT)V ouoiav. Aristotle's use of these terms in describing the 
attempt' leads one to expect more than that, in spite of the 
qualification I \ t'JU µt xpov. 
Langerbeck, on the other hand, begins his consideration 
of the problem with the passage at On the Parts of Animals 
1.1, 10 but he does not see any real connection between this 
account and Democritus' teaching about atoms; it is only con-
cerned, he says, with phenomena, and for this reason Democritus 
8Ross, 11Ietanhysics, II, 419. The text at Metaphysics 
13,4, 1078bl9-21 reads: enl µtxpov ~T)µoxpt'tO(, ~WU'tO µ6vov 
XUt ~p ( oa'to 'JU.l.l<;. 'tO e Epµo v x.a'i 'to wuxpov. Under Ross t inter-
pretation the first xai here is taken to be explanatory rather 
than conjunctive. 
9.QE.. cit., p. 227, note 44. 
10
.QE.. cit., pp. 83-84. 
had really failed to give the -r ( ~v ·; f:LVat • 
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Democritus, Lang-
erbeck further claims, was primarily interested in physical 
theory--atoms and void--and so did not pursue this matter of 
definition by appearance any further. 11 But this seems not to 
do sufficient justice either to Aristotle's witness to the 
unity of Democritus' account ( nEpt nav'twv ev\ Aoycr-~. et 
Q..Q.E.!:• 1.8, 325al) or to Aristotle's claim that Democritus did 
indeed touch on 'T.( ~v elva& (Part. Anim. 1.1, 642a26). 
Thus neither of the above views on the 'touch on form' 
by Democritus is entirely satisfactory; the former, as was 
said, because it seems too limited and narrow to apply at all. 
And that this undue limitation of this view of 'definition' is 
even more suspect is supported by Aristotle's statement that 
Democritus' attempts at definitions applied to everything: 
ooQ oe µ~AlO'ta xa\ nepi T(QV'T,WV €v\ ACY~ 6twp(xao& Aeux&nno, 
xaL 6~µoxpt'to,--Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 324b35-325al. 
It will be helpful to examine a little more closely the 
context in which the claim is made that Democritus 'touched on 
form', in order to see more clearly what Aristotle likely had 
reference to when he made that claim. First of all, in the 
passage just mentioned from On Generation and Corruution 1.8, 
Democritus' attempt is closely connected with that of Empedo-
cles; and the .link with Em~edocles is reiterated in two of the 
11Ibid. "Da Demokri t nur das norQv nicht aber das 't( 
bestimmt hat, hat er das Wesen, das 't( ~v e{va&, ebe~ ver-
fehlt" (p. 84). "Aristoteles sieht bei Demokrit Ansatze zum 
op(seo8a&, die aber nicht durchgefUhrt sind--wohl weil Demo-
kri t in der cpuo t x~ e ewp (a sein eigentliches Gebiet hat." 
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other passages in which Aristotle deals with the question.12 
One point of contrast between Empedocles and Democritus in 
this passage in On Generation and Corruution--emphasized by 
' the µev • 
• • 
' Be, is that Empedocles used his type of defini-
tion in a few cases, while Democritus is said to have done so 
for everything: oi µev oJv ~n( ~&VWV ••• ooQ Be µaA&O~a 
' ' lWl 1l Ep l TIQV~WV 
• • • Otwp(xaot • • • ~~µoxpt~o' --324b32-
325al. 
What then was the nature of Empedocles use of 'form'? 
Aristotle describes Empedocles use of it as more or less un-
intentional (au~~ ••• neptn(n~El ) in On the Parts of Animals 
-- -----
1.1, 642al8ff. And it is in this passage that an example of 
his 'definition' is described: it consisted of accounting for 
something by means of a ratio of mixture of specific elements 
(Aoyo' ~~' µ(sew' au~wv [o~otxe(wv] ); and the specific example 
cited is that of the 'form of bone•. 13 A specific ratio of 
mixture of various kinds of elements--this is precisely the 
kind of an account which we have seen that Democritus gave· of 
some substances. 14 Thus, if the link with Empedocles is as 
12Both in Physics 2.2 and Part. Anim. 1.1. In the only 
other passage on this matter there is a reference to the 
Pythagoreans (Eeta. 13.4). 
l3This is substantiatlY repeated at :Meta. 1.10, 993al8-
22; and the precise formula for bone is given by Aristotle 
from Empedocles himself at~· 1.5, 410al-6. 
l4The fact that Aristotle.linked Democritus' attempt at 
form with the Pythagoreans (see note 12, above) is equally 
striking. If one were to transfer the Pythagorean numbers to 
(atomic) units, we get the same kind of attempt at 'defining 
form'. 
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significant as seems likely, the analogue to 'form' or •es-
sence' in the system of Democritus was an accounting of the 
various sized atoms which make up that object; and this is 
evidently what Aristotle recognized as 'form' in the teaching 
of Democritean atomism. 
In spite of the earlier reluctant attempt of Empedocles 
at defining the form of bone, Aristotle describes Democritus' 
efforts in this regard as those of a pioneer: ~~a'to µev 
6~µoxpt'to~ npWi;o~--Part. Anim. 1.1, 642a27. It may be well 
then to suggest a little more fully and clearly the steps for-
ward which, from Aristotle's point of view, Democritus had 
taken in his 'touch on form and essence'. 
One reason that Aristotle saw which brought about the 
ultimate failure of previous efforts to deal with form and 
essence was the inability of philosophers to make any real 
distinction between the essential form of an object and the 
contrary accidents which may at various times be true of it: 
'\ '\, \ - ' ' O&UAEX't&X~ yap &oxu~ ounw 'tO't 1 ~v WO'te ouvao8a1 XUl XWPl~ 
'tOU 't( EO'tl 'tUVUV't(a enioxonerv --Iil:eta. 13.4, 1078b25-26. But 
this is precisely the problem that Democritus had considered 
and attempted to solve by positing atoms and void as those 
things which truly exist, one as •that which is' and the other 
as 'that which. is not•, and by making the appearance of con-
traries in the physical object due to shifts in the atoms. 15 
In this respect he had gone beyond Empedocles and might right-
l5Meta. 4.5, 1009a27-30; Q!:E.• et Corr. 1.2, 315b9-15. 
272 
ly be called a pioneer. 
Furthermore, Empedocles--in contrast to Democritus--had 
only applied his definition to a limited number of objects 
(en( ~tvwv--~. ~ ~· 1.8, 324b32), evidently because he 
had only hit upon it unintentionally ( evtaxou ••• nep&-
n(n~et--Part. ~.· 1.1, 642al8); 16 whereas Democritus' at-
tempt was likely a conscious one and applied more consistently 
to a large number of objects ( 1t Ep\ 11:dv~wv ~v) A.oyc.y--Gen. ~ 
Corr. 1.8, 325al), even though it was not really essential to 
his physical theory (w~ o6x avayxa(ou OE ~~ ~UOlX~ Sewp(~ --
Part. ~· 1.1, 642a27-28), likely, as we shall see, because 
it was not constant in the ever-changing structure of physical 
objects. Thus not only Democritus' attempt to deal with the 
basic problem of an object as distinct from its contraries, 
but also his conscious, consistent, and wide application of 
this kind of 'essence' justify the prominent place which Democ-
ritus has in this matter in Aristotle's eyes. 
The broad scope of Democritus' attempt at definition is 
indicated in connection with his treatment of the 'traditional 
elements'. As we have already se.en, Democritus had attempted 
to account for the mutual generation of the 'elements', and in 
so doing had evidently proposed a definition of those elements 
in terms of set ratios of a'toms of specified sizes; a new ele-
ment is formed by the addition or subtraction of atoms of a 
16The instance of Emuedocles' definition of bone seems 
to be unique, according to.1Ieta. 1.10, 993al7-20, although 
Aristotle says that Emuedocles would have applied it more wide-ly. ~ -
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.f. . 17 speci 1c size. Thus this definition of simple bodies and, 
by implication, more complex ones as well is in terms of cer-
tain proportions of atoms; and this is obviously the way in 
which Democritus defined what physical objects really are, 
that is, what their essential form is. 
And this is evidently also the way in which he defined 
the essence of man according to Aristotle at On the Parts of 
-- -
Animals 1.1, 640b28-35; what is given is not simply a 'mate-
rial explanation•, 18 but a 'formal' one--the whole point of 
the specific mention of Democritus' attempt being that he had 
indeed given more than a simply 'material explanation': 
"For the nature of a physiqal object which takes ac-
count of the structure (µop~~) is more essential that 
its material nature. And so, if every animal and each 
of their parts were determined by their outward shape 
and their coloration, Democritus would be right, for 
this is what he seems to suppose. At any rate, he says 
that it is evident to everyone w4at sort of a thing a 
man is as to his structure (µop~~) inasmuch as he is 
known by his outward shape (axflµa) and coloration." 
Thus Democritus would say that a man's real atomic structure 
.. (µop~~) can be determined by correspondence to the appearance 
17see Caelo 3.4, 303a24-29; 3.7, 305b20-25. This matter 
is taken up in chapter three in the section on "The Structure 
of Physical Objects. 11 This atomic structure, apparently sim-
pler in the case of the 'elements', is thus evidently meant to 
apply to other objects as well, although in those cases the 
structure would obviously be more complex. 
18c · · ' 25 tl · th· · herniss, .£12.• .£1:.!., p. 9, apparen yin is in-
stance follows Langerbeck in seeing a definition in terms only 
of outward appearance and says that Aristotle's objection to 
it is that this is an asnect of 'material cause'. But Aris-
totle does not here raise this objection, whereas he does 
praise Democritus at the end of this chapter for his pioneer 
attempts at a formal cause; and this latter point seems deci-
sive. 
that he presents. 
It seems evident from the above that the xa\ at Meta-
physics 13.4, 1078b20 is not explanatory, but conjunctive; 
Democritus had touched on definition and 'formal cause• far 
beyond the scope of merely defining heat and cold. 
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Thus we may summarize in the following way what is in 
Democritus' teaching the analogue of 'essential form•, that 
which Democritus used in giving explanations of objects as 
they essentially are, from the point of view of 'form', and so 
in giving 'formal causes'. The essential form for Democritus, 
that which indicates precisely 'what an object really is'--
apart from what it appears to be--is a fixed ratio of atoms, 
with the size atom predominating determining more specifically 
its nature. 
Aside from this Democritus is said to have defined after 
a fashion both 'what is hot' and 'what is cold'. 'What is 
hot' is likewise defined in terms of atoms, this .time atoms of 
a specific geometrical figure--spherical atoms which prqduce 
in us the sensation of heat. But what is meant by a defini-
tion of 'what is cold' is a bit more obscure; Democritus evi-
dently did not define it in terms of atoms of a specific geo-
metrical figure, thus providing a definition in the same cate-
gory as 'what ~s hot•. 19 !he only indication that we might 
have for such a definition--though it is highly conjectural--
19compare Gen. et Corr. 1.8, 326a3-6, where Aristotle 
specifically notes-Democritus' failure to do so in spite of 
'hot' and 'cold' being contraries in the same set. 
r 
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is to be found at Q£ Generation ~ Corruption 1.9, 327ai6-19, 
where Aristotle describes the same body being now liquid, now 
frozen solid (o~e µev uyp~v 0~£ oe nen~y6,--327al7). If, as 
seems likely, thenen~yo' refers to ice, and cold is indeed 
to be connected with the 'contraction' which seems to take 
place, 20 then 'what is cold' is likely to have been defined 
by Democritus in terms of the arrangements of atoms in an ob-
ject: ouot ~pon~ xa\ 5ta8ty~, xaeanep Atyel 6~µoxpt~O' 
327al8-19. 
Since this type of definition of the physical object's 
'essential form' is made in terms of the real atomic structure 
of such objects, we have in fact already considered a number 
of Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus' theory of 'formal 
cause', when in the last chapter we considered the theory of 
the atomic structure of physical objects. To review them 
briefly, they are the following. 1) Such 'form' is inadequate 
because it denies in fact the real Unity of physical objects; 
for example, in the last cited instance of 'definition' Aris-
totle objects on the grounds that "we see the same body ~ ~ 
(
t ..., " ' I ' continuu.m now liquid, now frozen solid" opwµev OE ~o au~o 
- ' ,, • \ ' • ' • \ ' , ) 21 owµa ouvexe' ov o~e µev uypov o~e oe nenr)Yo<; • 2) Then 
there is the objection at Metaphysics 4.5 that such an 'essen-
tial form' leaves no persi~tent aspect of the physical object, 
20Guthrie, History, II, 441, indicates that there is a 
tradition for such a connection. 
21~. et Corr. 1.9, 327al6-17. 
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because each minute change in the object makes it in fact a 
different object: e~L o' &~lWOOµEV a6~ou~ UTIOAaµ~aVelV xa1 
UAADV ~•Va o6o(av ElVal ~WV ov~wv ~ OU~E x(VDOl~ ~Tiapxel ou~e 
' " L ' ~eopa ou~e ycVEOl~ ~o napanav--1009a36-38. So on Democritus' 
theory to seek a permanent truth about a physical object would 
be like seeking something which is constantly fleeting: ~a 
TIE~oµEva OlwxElV--1009b39. 3) Finally, in the same chapter of 
the metaphysics, by Democritus' view there would be no real 
way to know such a persistent truth or 'essential form' be-
cause only what is sensible really exists: ~a o' ~v~a un~\a-
'j ' I ' ~ov el Val ~a a•a8n,rt:a µovov--1010a2-3. In these criticisms 
Aristotle's position seems certainly to be justified. 
The second type of· criticism which Aristotle levels 
against Democritus' theory of 'formal cause' is one apparent-
ly not leveled against Democritus' 'form~ gua form, but one 
which is made on the grounds that it is inadequate and hence 
unsatisfactory because it is not related to an attempt to ex-
plain in terms of 'final cause'. Thus the basic charge made 
is that this sort of explanation is incomplete and misguided 
by the neglect of the 'final cause', that knowing what an ob-
ject is for and what is its proper functioning does indeed con-
tribute something substantial to our knowledge of that object. 
' But since this ·type of criticism will be taken up in more de-
tail in a separate section, it seems appropriate here simply 
to point out this sort of reaction on Aristotle's part as it 
occurs in contexts where Democritus' theory of 'formal cause' 
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is brought up as an issue. 
First of all, in Physics 2.2, after mentioning Democri-
tus• touching on the 'formal cause•, Aristotle points out that 
aside from knowing the matter and the form, it is also the 
place of natural knowledge to know the purpose and end of any 
object: 'b;l 1:0 oJ EVO<.a xal 't~ 1:EAO<,; rrvwp(t,;e,v] -rii<;; au-rfj<,; 
[cpuolxiii;; buo-r~µ-r)<,;] (194a27-28), because artificial -objects 
are used to some purpose and natural objects are in the pro-
cess of development to some end and are indeed (or, have) an 
I ' L \ "" -end in themselves: eoµev yup nw<,; xat IJµEt<,; -r€A.o<,; --194a35. 
Again, Democritus' attempt at 'form' is mentioned at 
Metaphysics 13.4, 1078bl9-21, but there is here no immediate 
criticism or apparent reaction on Aristotle's part; but, 
though it is not specifically directed against Democritus, 
there may well be a reaction to his type of 'form' at Meta-
physics 14.6, 1092b26-28: "What is the good when things are 
composed of numbers by the mixture being in a certain number, 
whether that number is calculable or a complex ratio?1122 Such 
an account of form has no account of the object's good, its 
usefulness for something, its proper function--and hence it is 
not an adequate account. 
And finally, at On the Parts of Animals 1.1, Democritus• 
definition of form is agaitl mentioned, and, where an instance 
is· given of Democritus' application of form to physical ob-
jects, Aristotle criticizes it on the grounds that if fails to 
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consider the function of that object: 
~o tau~n~ epyov--64la2-3. Then later in this Chapter, when 
Democritus' general attempt at 'form' is mentioned (642b26), 
Aristotle immediately points to the contribution of Socrates 
. ' 
and his view of the 'useful excellence' <~nv XPDOtµov ape~~v 
--642b29) and the advantage of explaining things like respira-
tion from the point of view of their purpose: oe'x~eov o' 
v "<' v •!.. \ L ' \ L OU'tW~, OlOV O~l ~O~t µEV uVUTIVO~ ~OUOt xuptV --642b31-32. 
The Efficient Cause 
The account which Demo.cri tus gives of 'efficient causa-
tion' is really quite clear and consistent; it is all reduced 
to a mechanical, forced locomotion--one atom or set of atoms 
in motion strikes another atom or set of atoms, and this in-
duces in the latter either a movement or a new movement in the 
void. 
Since the atoms of Democritus are not capable of being 
affected in themselves, they are only subject to change of 
place; and so all real motion such as change, increase and 
decrease, generation and corruption are reduced to a matter of 
the locomotion of atoms. This, Aristotle rightly recognizes 
in a passage in the Physics; though the passage does not men-
tion the atomists specific~lly, it obviously refers to them. 23 
23Physics 8.9, 265b23-29. Motion is explained by these 
men in terms of the void (eta ~o xevov--265b26) and the move-
ment is that of atomic bodies ( 'tWV a-toµwv OWµ(h:;Jv--265b29) • 
Simplicius, In Physicorura, p. ,1318.t line 32, describes them as 
the 'school of Democritus•--c~ nept ~nµ6xpt~ov. 
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These atomists, Aristotle points out, claim that the only real 
motion that takes place is locomotion, movement in place: 
oJ~o• ~~v .xa~a ~onov x(v~o1v x•vercea1 ~~v ~uo1v Afyouo 1v 
(265b25); all other types of motion are reduced in reality to 
locomotion of atomic bodies: "They suppose that none of the 
other types of motion are properties of their primary atomic 
bodies, but are only connected with those objects which are 
composed of these atoms, for they say that increase, decrease, 
and alteration occur when atomic bodies join and disperse"--
265b27-29. 
This means, furthermore, that all accounts of motion are 
accounts of 'forced' motion in the strict sense; there is in 
Democritus no natural motion of atoms, as there is a primeval 
and primary 'down-ward rain of atoms' in the systems of Epicu-
rus and Lucretius. In spite of the fact that Democritus' 
atoms have weight, their weight in the vast, directionless, 
infinite expanse of void does not give them a 'natural motion' 
in some direction (Physics 4.8, 215a8-9) in and of themselves. 
They are in fact under the influence of 'forced motion', with 
'squeezing out' (ex8A1po~1evov--Caelo 4.2, 310al0) describing 
not only their accounts of upward motion, but also such physi-
cal processes as breathing (Resp. 4); one atom is only affected 
in that it is qtruck by anoiher: UAAO un' UAAOU x1ver~a1 
~(q ~wv 0~01xe(wv--Caelo 3.2, 300bll-12. 
And this sort of mechanical, forced locomotion is held 
by Democritus to apply consistently at all levels of complex-
ity of structure; and it is in his view the only one which 
really applies as an efficient cause. 
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This is most obviously true at the level of the individ-
ual atom, as Aristotle points out, for example, at _Q!! Genera-
tion ~ Corruption 1.8; an atom has no absolute heaviness or 
lightness as an inherent property ( ~ap~~~~ oe xa) xou~o~~, 
... µn ~napset--326a7-8), and hence no natural upward or 
downward motion; it likewise has no hardness or softness so 
as to be inherently affected (326a8); it is indeed unable to 
be affected (anaee,) apart from the fact that its locomotion 
can be changed. Any action and passion that occurs on this 
level occurs by contact, 24 and is thus a 'forced', mechanical 
change of motion. 
It applies as well to such physical objects as complex 
as human beings. Democritus had said, according to Aristotle 
at On the Soul 1.3, 406bl5-22, that the soul's own motion and 
its setting the body into motion are to be described in such 
terms of mechanical, forced motion, much like the wooden 
statue of Venus is said to have been given movement: the 
spherical atoms in locomotion drag the whole body with it and 
thus set it in motion. 25 
There ~re, furthermore, a whole series of natural proc-
esses which D~mocritus described as being caused precisely in 
24 8 "' i;\ \ L Gen. et Corr. 1. ' 325a32-33: TIOlElV vE xat TIUOXElY 
:J. L - - ---r---~J ~uyxuvouotv an~oµeva. 
25406b20-22: xtvouµcva~ yap cp~ot ~~~ ~otatp~~ou~ a~a(pa, 
• • • OUVE<pt°AXElV.XUl XtVELV ~O OWp.a nO.v. 
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this way. All the way from conception and the cradle to. their 
death animate creature and the natural processes that take 
place in them are described by Democritus in terms of such 
mechanical and artificial efficient causes reminiscent of the 
'wooden statue of Venus' at On the Soul 1.3, "just as if they 
were animals made of wood or stonen (wonep suA(vwv ~ At8(vwv 
~~W'iL.-Gen. Anim. 2.4, 740al5-16). 
And Aristotle also says in the same chapter (Gen. Anim. 
2.4, 740a36-38) that Democritus claims that the foetus stays 
in the womb because there its parts are mechanically formed 
and modeled (6LanAa~~~al--740a38) after the corresponding 
parts of its mother. 26 
Later in the same work, at On the Generation of Animals 
4.3-4, Aristotle cites explanations in the area of genetic 
development which are likewise described in this same mecha-
nistic way. First of all, in the latter portion of book four, 
chapter three of this work Aristotle describes a theory which 
he fails to identify specifically with any individual; it is 
an explanation in terms of navonepµ(a, which most probably be-
26cherniss, ou. cit., p. 288, note 255, conjectures--on 
the grounds that Aetius, Placita 5.16.1, says that Democritus 
claimed that the foetus is nourished in the womb--that what 
Democritus likely really said was that the foetus merely re-
quired food derived from its mother that it may grow into hu-
man form. But this interp~etation is only a supposition on 
Cherniss' part; the citation from Aetius in itself does not 
justify Cherni.ss' interpretation of Aristotle; and Aristotle's 
statement is quite clear and is not at all inconsistent with 
that of Aetius--the specific food that the foetus gets from 
its mother as nourishment might very well determine mechanical-
ly the way in which it develops. 
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longs to Democritus. 27 The term navonepµ(a certainly seems 
strongly to suggest Democritus, and so does the context. At 
769al7-20 Empedocles and Democritus are distinguished from 
those who cannot in principle show why a daughter may in cer-
tain respects take after her father; and one type of explana-
tion which can account for such genetic developments is the 
one in which the semen from which the child develops is de-
scribed as a navonepµ(a (769a26-29). This account, Aristotle 
says, seems quite artificial (nAaoµa~(a~--769bl), a remark 
which is certainly reminiscent of what Aristotle had said 
about Democritus' reason for the foetus staying in the womb 
( 01anAa~~rp;a1). This theory, Aristotle continues (769b3-10), 
though complex, does attempt to explain a number of genetic 
developments; and the last on the list which this theory ex-
plains is the reason for monstrosities. Then, after an expla-
nation of what is meant by 'monstrosities', the first theory 
which Aristotle mentions is that of Democritus--4.4, 769b33ff. 
All of these factors seem to make it highly likely that the 
theory of navorrepµ(a here in question is indeed that of Democ-
ritus. 
This theory of navonepµ(a explains family resemblances 
to either father, mother, or oore remote ancestors by taking 
the semen to b.e a 'seed-miiture' of great variety (navcrnepµ(av 
elva( ~iva noAAWV--769a29); the semen is thus a random sampling 
27cherniss, op. cit., p. 284, note 243, denies that it 
belongs to DemocritUs and would rather attribute it to Plato. 
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of a large variety of ingredients (769a31-34); and the off-
spring's (atomic) structure resembles that of the ancestor 
from whom the largest proportion of ingredients was derived: 
a~' oJ yap ~v ~WV yevvwv~wv TIA£ro~ov £yy€vryta, ~OU~~ y(veo8al 
' \ I ~~v µop~~v eo,xo~--769a34-36. Just as the predominance of 
atoms of a certain size determines the nature of the element, 
so the predominance of seeds of a given kind in a certain pro-
portion determines the nature of certain features of the off-
spring28--and the explanation is purely mechanical. 
And Democritus' explanation of 'monstrosities' is equal-
ly mechanical; it is now taken up at the beginning of .QE.. ~ 
Generation of Animals 4.4, at 769b32ff. Such monstrosities, 
in Democritus' view, are the result of two copulations; when 
the foetus has begun to develop as a result of the first copu-
lation, the semen from the second comes and joins With it, and 
some parts of the body are thus fused and altered. 29 The 
efficient cause in this instance is again external and mechan-
ical. 
28The constituents of the semen represent constituents 
from each part of the body (compare Gen. Anim. 4.1, 764a6-ll) 
and so it is likely that the nature of each part of the body 
is determined by the predominance of a specific kind of atom 
in that part. And, since both parents contribute materially 
to the offspring, Democritus can thus explain why this off-
spring can resemble one parent in one respect and another in 
another respec~. ' 
29The text seems corrupt here, but the sense of the pas-
sage is clear enough. This citation certainly supports the 
view of the mechanical formation in the womb as described at 
Gen. Anim. 2.4; if the foetus were thought to have an internal 
principle of development, it is not likely to be affected by 
the semen of a second copulation. 
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Once more in On the Generation of Animals Aristotle 
-- -----
cites a further instance of this type of explanation by Democ-
ritus. The matter under discussion is the 'falling out' of 
front teeth in animate creatures. Aristotle cites Democritus' 
remarks on the subject (~. ~· 5.8, 788bl2-14) as follows: 
these teeth grow prematurely, and the explanation which Democ-
ritus gives for this is an external efficient cause--the suck-
ling of the offspring is the cause of it (~o e~A~'E'v al~t-
a~a'--788bl4); and this early growth of these teeth--a growth 
which was mechanistically induced--is also the reason for 
their 'falling out•: £xn(n~ElV µtv Ota ~0 npo wpa, y(VE08aL 
(788bl2). 
And this same sort of explanation is seen too in Democ-
ritus' account of breathing, which we have already outlined 
in connection with his theory of the soul; this account is 
found most fully at Q£ Respiration 4, 47lb30-472al6. The ef-
ficient cause of breathing, according to Democritus in Aris-
totle's account, is external pressure from the environmental 
air: ouyxpLVOµEVWV oJv ao~wv uno ~OU neplEXOV~o' ex8A(~ov-
~o,.30 Thus the entire process of breathing in and out is 
described in terms of pressure, relief of pressure by the 
counter-pressure of the spherical atoms which enter, and then 
' again by the external pressure from the air. 
Furthermore, in this same context Aristotle gives witness 
30472a5-6; see also Aristotle's remark on this at 
472a23-24: EOW8EV ~ apx~ ~YJ~ avanvo~~ y(VE~Ql xa' ~~' XLV~OEW' 
oux ~, ~,a,oµfvou ~oG nEptfxov~o~. 
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to a similar, utterly mechanistica1 explanation of death 
(742al2-16) by Democritus. Death, according to Democritus, 
occurs when this dynamic equilibrium between pressure and 
counter-pressure fails, when the pressure of the environmental 
air gains the mastery (o'tav yap xpa't~ 'to nepllxov cruveAr~ov --
472al2) and such soul-atoms which were once useful in maintain-
ing the counter-pressure are squeezed out. 
So in the system of Democritus not only the atoms, the 
elements, and inanimate objects are subject to only a 'forced', 
mechanistic efficient cause, but so too are animate creatures. 
From the cradle to the grave even human beings are subject to 
it alone--so consistently and persistently did Democritus ap-
ply this manner of explanation in terms of 'efficient cause'. 
But not only does Democritus say that this is the kind 
of explanation which applies now, but it has elso applied from 
eternity. For time, Democritus claims, is ungenerated; it 
always was: 'tOV yap XPOVOV ay€Vryt"OV elva' --Physics 8.1, 
25lbl7. And so, although the phenomenal objects of this world 
are seen to come and go--to come into existence and to pass 
out of existence--this cannot be so in the case of all things; 
there must be some things which did not come into existence: 
oia -i;o{ho tiT)µ.oxpl'to<; ye oe(x.vuoiv we; 6.ouva'l:oV ll.nav'ta yeyovf.-
vai __ 25lbl5-17. And these'ungenerated things--existing from 
all eternity--are evidently Democritus' atoms; and their re-
action on impact under the same circumstances has always been 
the same. And it is to this principle that Democritus refers 
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the Causes Of natural objects: E<p 1 o' llT)µox.pl'tO<; avc1y£l 'tat; 
', ,, .. " ' ' # l( TIEPL cpuoew<; Ul'tlU<;, W<; OU'tW XUL 'tO npo'tepov ~y VE'tO --252a34-
35. What is happening now on the real, atomic level has been 
happening from eternity--this same mechanistic, forced motion: 
any time.combination A of atoms collides in a given way with 
combination B, C always has resulted. 
This system of explanation does indeed go back to infin-
ity; there is according to Democritus no prior efficient cause 
of this motion of the atoms--none like the vou<; of Anaxagoras 
or like 'Love' and 'Strife' in Empedocles system: 'tOLUO'tTJV 
' 10 ( I , µev ou £µ av UL'tLUV--Physics 8.9, 265b23-24. There is in this 
system no original source of the mechanical motion of the 
atoms, and the remark of Aristotle at ivTetanhysics 1.4, 985bl9-
20 does in this sense apply to Democritus: the atomists neg-
lected the question of the source of motion.31 
This statement about neglect of a primary efficient 
cause is taken up again by Aristotle at Qg ~ Heavens 3.2; 
and this deliberate neglect means, as Aristotle there points 
out and as Democritus was evidently aware, that, since all 
movement is forced, there is an infinite regress in looking 
· for the primary efficient cause: A's movement was caused by 
B's, which in turn was caused by C's ••• ad infinitum: el, 
. ' 
3lThe significance of this statement of Aristotle--nepl 
0 E: XL VDO £W<; oe EV • • • UTCapl; E: l 'tO r <; oJa l • • • &.cpd. aa v--I be-
lieve is broader and, as we shall see, will apply to Democri-
tus' failure to distinguish natural from artificial objects; 
the former have their source of motion internal to them, and 
the latter have it external to them. 
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11. '\ J I .f., II .. .f 
UTietpov yap ElOtV, El µ11 'ta EO'!;Ul xa-i;a <pvOlV XlVOUV 'ITpmov, 
aAA 1 ael -i;o Tipo-i;epov ~(q XlVOUµEVOV XlV~OEl --Caelo 3.2, 
300bl4-l6. 
This means in turn that this series of forced movements 
is 'natural' (with a meaning which for Aristotle is somewhat 
broader than his own); that is, he recognizes it in Democ-
ritus' system as that which is analogous to his own use of 
'natural'. He says at Qg the Heavens 3.2, 30la7-9: "for the 
'natural' state of affairs is that which most objects have 
over the majority of time." Thus for Democritus--as paradox-
ical as it sounds in Aristotle's terms--the 'natural' kind of 
motion is 'forced' motion; and there is thus in fact no dis-
tinction at all between natural and forced motion. 
We have already touched to a certain extent on Aristot-
le's criticism of forced motion in Democritus--and thus on the 
efficient cause in Democritus--in the second chapter in con-
nection with the void. It will thus be appropriate here sim-
ply to recapitulate some of the objections which we have seen 
that Aristotle had already raised against this kind of an ac-
count of efficient cause and then proceed to further criti-
cisms of his particularly in terms of the efficient cause in 
... 
animate objects. 
First of all, Aristoile points out that a theory like 
that of Democritus, which recognizes only forced motion and 
takes no account of its sources, offers in fact no rational 
explanation of the motion in the universe. With an infinite 
number of movents, there will also be an infinite number of 
motions, as Aristotle points out at Q!! the Heavens 3.2, 
300b34-30lal: d 6' U'ITEl pa -ra Xl vo0v-ra, xa\ -rue; cpopac; 6.vay-
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- I # 'j 
xatov ane:tpouc; e:tvat. This is--inasmuch as an infinity is in-
volved--in principle unintelligible and irrational; it amounts 
to a claim for disorderly motion over an infinite period of 
time. Thus, in this respect, a primary movent like the 
of Anaxagoras is more appropriate to the order that we see in 
the uni verse: 'tot xe: o 'E -ro0-r6 ye a6-ro xaA.wc; 'Avac;ayopac; 
A.a~erv· tc; axtv'f)'rwv yap ~pxe-rat xooµonoterv --30lal2-13.32 
The idea of xooµoc; in xooµono t e:rv is important, for we do see 
orderliness of motion in the universe; and this orderliness 
manifests itself, for one thing, in natural motion: ' ' -ra µe:v 
L " I ' ' L ' ' ' L ' ~upoc; e:xov-ra E'ITl 'tO µ~oov, -ra OE XOU~O'tT)'tU UTIO 'tOU µ£oou• 
.t 6 I ~ , ., ' L 6 
'tUv'tDV o xooµoc; e:xe:t 't~v 6tuO'taOlV --300b24-2 • We see 
ordered and natural motion, but Democritus posited disorder 
and forced motion as the only motion there is; and so Democ-
ritus' explanation has less basis in empirical evidence than 
that of Aristotle. 
Leucippus (and hence also Democritus) is said to have 
posited motion as an eternal activity (Meta. 12.6, 107lb32--
aet lvtpye:iav ), but does not explain motion: aA.A.a 6ta -r( 
' # I L I I t I ~ " 1\ .\ # ' I # 1 71 3 xat 'tlVU OU A~youotv, ou6 , El WOl ~wot, 'tDV Ul'tlUV -- 0 b 3-
32This is brought up again by Aristotle at metaphysics 
1.4, 985a18-b2, bl9-20. The contrast with Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras is taken up in the remark toward the end of the 
' ' "' u chapter in regard ta_ the atomists: ne:pt oe: xtv. 1oe:wc; oee:v 
• L (: - ' ••• UTiup...,,et 'tOl<; OUOl. 
r 
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34. But Aristotle objects that motion is not simply random: 
OOOeV yap~~ E~UXe X&Vel~Ul--107lb34-35; but it does indeed 
show some distinction--and precisely a distinction between 
natural and forced motion: ~~TIEp VUV ~UOEL µev wo(, p(q oe 
~~TIO vou ~ &AAou w6(--107lb35-36. We have already cited 
Aristotle's evidence for such a distinction; it is to be 
found, for example, at Qg the Heavens 4.2 and at Physics 4.8. 
In the former passage it will be recalled that Democritus' 
theory of atomic immutables and absolute void cannot in prin-
ciple account for the obvious natural movements of the tradi-
tional elements, either in terms of proportions of solids or 
in terms of proportions of void in the object under considera-
tion. 33 At Physics 4.8 the objection is raised that a thrown 
object will display characteristics of both natural and 
forced motion: a higher rate of speed if the forced motion 
is in the same direction as the natural motion, and an in-
creasing take-over by natural motion when it is not thrown in 
the same direction as its natural motion (215al4-l7). 
But the evidence thus far adduced by Aristotle has been 
related to inanimate objects and elements; but there is a fur-
ther and more particular issue on the matter of the ·efficient 
cause involved in the case of animate creatures. These more 
' obviously and more uniquely have their principle of movement, 
33see especially Caelo 4.2, 309a2-18. Even the mechan-
istic explanation of 'squeezing out•· (ex8AtPoµevov) is seen 
to be obviously unsatisfactory, for it means that a large 
quantity of air will be heavier than a small quantity of 
earth; and this is contrary to available evidence--310al0-13. 
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their immediate efficient cause, within themselves--whether 
this be of mere growth, of locomotion, or of rational and 
ethical activity. But the consistent and mechanistic system 
of ·Democritus seems regularly to deny this, since his explana-
tion of efficient causality seems to operate primarily as 
something external even to animate creatures. And herein lies 
a fundamental point of issue between Democritus and Aristotle. 
In the first place there seems to be some real evidence, 
Aristotle claims, to indicate that for animate creatures an 
external and purely mechanistic efficient cause is not an ade-
quate explanation of some events and processes which occur in 
them. This Aristotle points out in two separate but related 
instances at On the Generation of Animals 2.4; there in the 
latter part of the chapter the matter under discussion is the 
development of the embryo in the womb. 
The order in which the parts of the embryo are formed 
Aristotle sees as important, for the development is obviously 
a natural process with an internal principle of developmental 
formation into something specific. Democritus had, he says, 
wrongly held that the external portions of an embryonic animal 
are formed first, and the internal portions only later: ~nEp 
6T)µch.pt'to~, 'ta 'tt;,w np<i'nov 6taxp(VEa8ai 'tWV t;;~wv, UO'tEpov oe 
' ' I ~ 
"(;U EV'tu~ -740al3-14. But Aristotle objects that animals evi-
dently have an internal principle of development; and that 
principle of development Aristotle sees as supplied by the 
heart or--in the case of bloodless creatures--its counterpart 
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in them. 34 But not only does reason demand that some internal 
principle be the first f ormed--because this internal principle 
is what distinguishes it as a natural object--but this devel-
opment of the heart first is also substantiated by empirical 
fact: 
--740a3-5. Thus Democritus, he justifiably claims, is wrong 
not only in principle, but also in fact; Democritus' mistaken 
principle, Aristotle would claim, had led him to make a state-
ment which upon closer examination is contradicted by fact. 
Aristotle again raises a similar objection a little lat-
er in this sa.rae chapter. Democritus, as we have seen (740a36-
38), had claimed that the embryo stays in the womb because 
there it has its parts mechanistically molded to resemble its 
mother. This again is a denial of an internal principle of 
the development of the embryo, and, furthermore, it runs count-
er to another piece of empirical evidence ~avepov--740bl): 
animals produced in eggs have their parts developed inside the 
egg quite apart from the direct mechanistic influence of their 
mothers (740bl-3). Thus in these two respects Democritus' 
system of explanation by efficient cause in the case of animals 
is directly contradicted by empirical evidence. Evidently then 
' both in principle and in fact there is likely something wrong 
34740al7-18: ~a ~ev yap ~Olau~· o6x EXEl ~PXDY OAW~, 
~a oe ~Qa nav~· EXEl xaL EY~O~ EXEl. OlO npWi:ov ~ xapo(a 
~a(ve~a' OlWplOµev~ TIUOl ~or~ eva(µol~. Similarly at Gen. 
Anim. 2.6, 742b35-38; one mi~ht note here that in the a'iirmal 
realm this is a question of oeev ~ x(v~o(~ £o~Lv. 
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with this sort of explanation. 
Again roughly the same sort of criticism is.raised by 
Aristotle at On the Generation of Animals 4.4 against Democ-
ritus' account of the development of monstrosities. Democri-
tus had chosen to name the male sperm from a second copulation 
as the external efficient cause of monstrosities. But, Aris-
totle retorts, such monstrosities seldom occur in the case of 
animals that produce only one offspring at a time and are much 
more frequent in animals that produce a number of offspring at 
a time--and that from one semen and one copulation: ~s ~vo~ 
on~pµa~o~ nAe{w y(veoGat xa1 µ&ff~ ouvouo(a~ --770al. Thus, 
Aristotle says, it seems preferable to suppose an internal 
cause for the developing of the foetus also when monstrosities 
occur: 
auvto'taµevoi~ wJ-f)p.aotv e{va& --770a6-7.35 Furthermore, when 
conjoined fetations do occur--as in twin eggs--these frequent-
ly develop into separate chicks and grow quite normally, while 
a single f etation in an egg still does at times develop as a 
monstrosity (770al4-24). 
And finally, there is a similar neglect on Democritus' 
part with respect to the cause of death. There is an obvious 
distinction between dying naturally of old age and dying con-
' 
35cherniss, .21?.· cit., p. 285, claims that Aristotle's 
objection is that this theory makes the male sperm responsible 
for imperfection. Aristotle does not, however, see this ob-
jection as the most basic one; but it is considered because it 
raises the larger issue of an internal principle of develop-
ment and because the evidence points to the likelihood that 
the cause is elsewhere than external. 
for Democritus. Hence it seems to Aristotle that any attempt 
to explain things--particularly in regard to animate crea-
tures--whi ch does not use purpose and function as explanatory 
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factors is unduly limiting itself in its attempt to make 
nature more intelligible to us. So on these grounds too 
Democritus' type of explanation by 'efficient cause' is inade-
quate; but such further inadequacies due to a neglect of pur-
pose and functioning will be taken up more properly in connec-
tion with a separate section on the 'final cause'. 
Thus Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus' 'efficient 
cause' are in summary that Democritus' system of explanation 
offers in fact no rational explanation of the motion in the 
universe, that it fails to recognize an obvious distinction 
between natural and forced motion, and that in animate crea-
tures it persists in failing to use and internal efficient 
cause which is evidently that which marks them off from non-
natural objects. And finally, Democritus' system of explana-
tion unduly limits itself by not considering the function and 
purpose of an object or a process in connection with 'efficient 
cause'; indeed, most of Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus' 
accounts of 'efficient cause' in animals are raised in conjunc-
tion with an insistence on the importance of considering the 
'final cause' along with it. 
Chance and Necessity 
Closely related to Democritus' teaching on 'efficient 
' 
cause' is his teaching on 'necessity', for it is the motion 
and impact of the atoms on one another and the mechanical 
reaction of those atoms which are most precisely described by 
Democritus as being 'necessary'. Goedeckemeyer rightly dis-
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tinguishes three kinds of contexts in which 'necessary' is 
used in reference to the teachings of Democritus: the mechan-
ism of atomic impact, an eternal and indeterminate necessity, 
and the necessity of the primeval whirl.36 And these three 
types of usage of the term 'necessary', though distinguishable 
in thought, are interrelated and are consistent parts of the 
same teaching. 
In this regard Democritus' general principle is formu-
lated by Aristotle at Physics 8.1, 252a32-33 as "it is a suf-
ficient principle if something either always exists in a cer-
tain way or always happens in a certain way" (apx~v e{vat 
.l c ./.. ti l. ' ,, ,, .., ,, " ) 3 7 i· f ~au~~v ixav, 1v, 0~1 uet ~ ea~iv ou~w~ ~ y1yve~a1 ; thus, 
atoms and void and motion are eternal, they are simply and 
absolutely necessary; one does not and ought not seek a fur-
ther principle for them. And the same is true of the mechani-
cal impact and reaction of atoms (under the same circumstances 
they always happen the same way); this too is simply and abso-
lutely necessary. And, furthermore, Aristotle claims that 
Democritus also refers his explanations concerning nature to 
I ' c\ ~ I L " ' .( this principle: e~ o ~~µuxp1~0~ avuyet ~a~ nepi ~vaew~ 
a{~(a~--252a23. So, since the phenomena which we observe are 
36Albert Goedeckemey~r, Epikurs Verhaltnis zu Demokrit 
in der Naturnhilosophie (Strassburg: Karl J. Trllbner, 1897), 
pp. 32-34. He cites for each of these respectively Aetius, 
Placita 1.26.2, Aristotle, Gen. Anim. 2.6, 742bl7, and Diogenes 
Laertius 9.45. ~ 
37This passage does not contain the term 'necessary', 
but for a similar statement of principle in which the term is 
used see~· Anim. 2.6, 742bl7ff. 
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in truth nothing but atoms moving mechanically in a certain 
way in the void, phenomenal objects and processes obey the 
same law of necessity; the fact that a given phenomenon has 
occurred in a certain way under a specific set of circum-
stances in the past is a sufficient principle for establishing 
its necessity: w~ ou~w xal ~o np6~cpov ey(ve~o --252a35. 
But we need to examine some of the more specific evidence 
in the light of this general statement of principle. Among 
those things which in Democritus' theory are necessary is the 
motion of the atoms in the void; indeed, Democritus' claim for 
the simple and absolute necessity of that motion provides the 
reason for Aristotle's having mentioned Democritus' general 
principle in the first place at Physics 8.1; this is the 
subject-matter of the entire chapter--the question of the eter-
nity of motion. And motion is for Democ~itus eternal, but, 
unlike Empedocles and Anaxagoras, he refused to attempt to ex-
plain it; it is one of those things which simply always is, 
and any attempt to trace any particular motion of an atom or 
the motion of all the atoms back to a beginning leads only to 
a prior motion and impact of the same kind, and this again to 
another of the same kind ad infinitum.38 
Thus a further simple and absolute necessity is the law 
' of motion which mechanically governs the atoms. And this is 
what is described by Aetius in the Placita 1.26.2: ~~v av~i-
38see the discussion of this above in this chapter at 
pages 285ff.; see also Caelo 3.2, 300bl5-17. 
r 
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'tun(av xa't cpopav xa'l nA.rwTiv 'tf)~ \JA.TJ<;; --"the rebound, motion, 
and impact of the atoms." If this means anything at all, it 
means that for any atom A which strikes atom B in a certain 
way, a distinct and fixed kind of motion results; and this is 
equally true for groups of atoms, whether simple or complex. 
This endless series of motions and derived motions operates 
under fixed mechanical laws which are described as absolutely 
necessary; they are the ultimate and fundamental laws of na-
ture; they are simply given as a first principle, and there is 
no further reason for or explanation of them. 
Now this absolute and fundamental atomic necessity mani-
fests itself in phenomena and in the observable processes of 
nature, for it is to this absolute principle of atomic neces-
sity that Democritus refers his explanations about nature 
(Physics 8.1, 252a34-35). These natural phenomenal processes 
are evidently true representations of the processes on the 
atomic level, and so display an equally valid necessity; this 
is a direct corollary to the 'truth by correspondence' theory: 
. 
just as the phenomenal object is a true representation of the 
object as atomically structured, so phenomenal processes are 
true representations of atomic processes of movement. 
This means, furthermore, that the other parts of the 
' general principle on atomic explanation ought to hold as well 
on the phenomenal level of explanation. One arrives at such 
necessity on the phenomenal level by observing a number of 
regularly occurring instances of the same phenomenal process; 
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and when a given process occurs with sufficient and consistent 
regularity, this may be taken as necessary, for it simply al~ 
ways happens in this way.39 In these cases one ought to look 
no further for an explanation, because, as Democritus says, 
the instances of this process are limitless and indeterminate: 
"the number of instances of what alvrays happens is limitless, 
and to ask for a reason for such things is to seek a principle 
for what is limitless (and so indeterminate). 1140 It is in 
this way that on the phenomenal level one arrives at an ulti-
mate and universal law of nature--something which is simply 
'necessary'. 
And it is thus quite likely that all of Democritus' ex-
planations of natural processes--where they could indeed be 
reduced to such a law of nature--were precisely of this kind. 
Aristotle cites at least two such instances where such expla-
nations were intended to be of a universal character. In the 
first such citation Democritus is said to have explained the 
sterility of mules on the grounds that the mules' genital 
39 11 ~t regularly happened so in the PE}St"--ou'tw xa) 'to 
7tpO'tEpov £y1yve~o (Physics 8.1, 262a35). avayx~ ••• O'tl 
OU'tW<; ae\ y(VE'tU1 --Gen. Anim. 2.6, 742bl9. 
40 ' I L ' " u ' I - ' ' ( ' -
'tO o, UE~ anE1pov,,_WO'tE 'tO epunuv 'tO 01u 't 7tEpl 'tWV 
'tOlOU'tWV 'tlVO~ 'tO ~rytElV e(va( ~~01 'tOU ane(po~ aP.X~V --~. 
Anim. 2.6, 742b22-24. It,seems evident that apx~ here does 
not mean 'beginning', but 'principle'; the former meaning 
would make nonsense of Aristotle's retort that in the instance 
of a triangle there is some 'principle' and reason for its 
having its angles equal to two right angles. Cherniss, .2£· 
cit., p. 179, note 146, feels that Aristotle is tampering with 
Democritus' meaning of cl Et. But there is no real reason to 
suppose this. 
r 
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passages were destroyed by the joining of two animals of dif-
ferent species (~. Anim. 2.8, 747a30-32). And this explana- · 
tion Aristotle specifically says was meant to be a universal 
one (tni nav~wV--747a28). And again at On the Generation of 
-- . -
AniCTals 5.8, 788bl2-14 Democritus is said to have claimed 
that suckling causes the front teeth to develop prematurely 
and hence later to drop out; and this too was a universal 
statement: xa8oAou AEyEL ~~v a(~(av--788bl2. And beside 
these, it is implied at Qg the Generation of Animals 2.6 that 
Democritus' account of the progressive development of the foe-
tus was this sort of an explanation. Democritus is said to 
have held that the external parts of animals develop first, 41 
and then several lines later (740a36-38) Aristotle notes that 
according to Democritus the embryo stays in the womb in order 
to be mechanically formed like the mother; and finally at 
2. 6 ,; where the matter of the development of the foetus is still 
under discussion, Aristotle raises the question of Democritus' 
principle about explanation of things which always happen in a 
certain way (742bl7ff.). Thus it is certainly strongly im-
plied that all of Democritus' explanations of the development 
in the womb of the mother were precisely of this nature--a 
universal law of nature on the phenomenal level. 
' Finally; the cosmic whirl ( o(v~) as a necessity referred 
to by Diogenes Laertius at 9.45 is a special case. It is quite 
41Gen. Anim. 2.4, 740al3-15; Aristotle remarks that this. 
leaves them vii th no internal principle of development, and this 
is the error of Democritus' 'necessity' at 2.6, 742b34-38. 
r 
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likely that it was described by Democritus as 'being the re-
sult of chance', and so the matter will be taken up shortly in 
connection with a discussion of 'chance' in the teaching of 
Democritus. But, to anticipate slightly, there is no .reason 
to believe that it was any exception to the utterly mechanical 
laws of impact and rebound of the atoms. And if that law 
holds, then this universe, according to Democritus, is and was 
and evermore shall be from the lowest rock to the highest crea-
ture an unbelievably complex machine-like structure, a perpet-
ual motion machine. And this is indeed the tenor of Democri-
tus' teaching on necessity; and this is precisely the way in 
which Plutarch summarizes it: e~ ane(pou XPOVOU npoxa~txeo8al 
42 
• 
Now Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus' teachings on 
necessity are quite clear and hardly very complex. First of 
all, Democritus had claimed to be giving universal explana-
tions, but for those examples of universal explanation cited 
the facts do not warrent the claim for universality. Democri-
tus had apparently made the claim universal that animals devel-
op their external parts first. And Aristotle's response to 
this is that it just is not factual, for empirical evidence 
tells us that the heart is the first part which becomes dis-
tinct: ' Oto UTibxp(ve~aL np&'rrov D xapo(a evepye(q. ' -xal ~ou~o 
00 µovov ent ~Yi~ alae~aew~ O~AOV--Gen. Anim. 2.4, 740a3-5. 
42l?lutarch], Stromateis 7 (Diels-Kranz 68A39). 
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Again Democritus made a universal statement about animals 
cross-bred between different species being sterile; and Aris-
totle's reply is again that this is simply not the case; 
other animals beside mules cross-breed between species, and 
yet their offspring do in fact produce progeny: ouµ{3a(ve, o' 
e~' ~~EpWV s~WV 't'OU~O µev unapXELV, yevvav oe µ~oev ih"'toV 
~· Anim. 2.8, 747a33-34. And once more Democritus had made 
a universal statement about the mechanical development and 
later dropping of front teeth; and again Aristotle's counter-
claim is that Democritus had simply not considered all or 
( I ' I ' L L 88 ) enough cases OU yap ETil TiuV'tWV OXEWuµEVO~ --7 bll ; Aristotle 
then simply goes on and cites a number of cases in which Democ-
ritus' claim just does not hold true. Thus in general Democri-
tus' mistake in this respect lay precisely in that he had made 
universal statements which were simply not universally true: 
'tou'to µev oJv 'fiµap'te xaeoA.ou A.eywv, ou oxe1Jtc1µevo~ 'to ouµ{3ar-
, ' ..t vov ETIL nuv'twv __ 788bl7-18. 
In the second place, Aristotle says, Democritus' very 
principle of necessity is itself a categorical statement: 
there is no further explanation beyond the fact that something 
either always is or always occurs in a certain way. But Aris-
totle on two separate occasions shows that this very categori-
cal statement is not unive;sally true. 43 In both instances 
Aristotle cites propositions from geometry--the angles of a 
43Physics 8.1, 252a35-b5; see especially 252bl-2: o'tt 
o' en\ nav'twv, oux opew~. Also~· Anim. 2.6, 742b24-30. 
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triangle equal two right angles, and the side of a square and 
its diagonal are incommensurate--which are always true and for 
which there is a reason, an explanation, and demonstration. 
And, lastly, at On the Parts of Animals 1.1, 642a3lff., 
as Democritus' theory and meaning of 'what is' and 'what is 
not' was too limited, so, Aristotle says, is his notion of 
'necessity' too limited. Democritus' theory of necessity had 
neglected a meaning of 'necessary' which involves purpose, 
function, or 'final cause'. There is, Aristotle claims, a 
meaning of 'necessary' that does involve purpose: if object 
A is to have purpose or function or goal B, it is necessary 
that it have or be characterized by C; if it is the purpose of 
man to contemplate, it is necessary that he have a certain or-
gan or capacity which will perform that function: ~ 0 1 avayxn 
&'' ( u 11 - " '\v -o~e µev onµa veL o~L et exetvo eo~at ~o ou evexa, ~au~a 
avayxn ~O~tY exetv--642a32-34. Necessity is not at all incom-
patible with purpose or final cause, and Democritus' neglect 
of the latter unduly narrov7S his view of 'necessity'. But 
more on that soon. 
Now, in returning to the teaching of Democritus, we need 
to consider briefly the further question of vn1ether in this 
absolutely determined universe there is a factor like 'chance'. 
' And this question is further complicated by the fact that Aris-
totle at Physics 2.4--though he does not mention Democritus by 
name--presents three apparently different views of the working 
of 'chance'; and all three of these views have been identified 
r 
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with Democritus' teaching by later authors. 
The first of these views is outlined at Physics 2.4, 
196al-7; there Aristotle mentions the view that we would most 
naturally connect with the teachings of Democritus in the 
light of his relentless determinism, that 'chance' is not 
really a factor at all in the operation of anything in the 
universe, that in all the instances in which one ascribes 
something to chance, one can in fact attribute it to some def-
inite cause other than chance: oµo(wc; oe xai ~Tit 'tWV UAAWV 
'tWV ano 'tUXT)c; Aeyoµlvwv ae( 'tL elvat AU~efv 'tO Ul'tLOV, aAA 1 
oo 'tUXT)V--196a5-7. This is the view which is attributed to 
Democritus by Eudemus; 44 and this attribution is likely a cor-
rect one. 
The second view is presented by Aristotle in the same 
chapter at 196a24ff. And this view is that the heavens and 
the whirl (or vortex) which produced the universe (or univer-
ses) is a result of 'the automatic' and hence is due to 
'chance'. 45 The meaning of this statement is in question. 
44According to Simplicius, In Ph1sicorum, P.· 
14ff.: 'tO 0£ xaeanc:p 0 TIUAUL~c; A6yoc; 0 &:vat pwv rcr)v 
\ A ..t " I - Is:,. , TipO<; ui)µuxpt'l:OV eOLXEV ELpT)OOat • • • OUuEVO<; <pT)OL 
'tUXT)V a{rc(av ava~£pwv £le; UAAU<; a{rc{ac; ••• oorcwc; 
E'uoT)µoc; io'topd'. 
330, lines 
1:~XT)V ' d vat 'tT)V 
' ' yap o 
45r translate 'taurcoµ~1:ov as 'the automatic', following 
Charlton, ££•·cit., p. 105, rather than as 'spontaneity' to 
avoid "misleading connotations of acting out of free will." 
Charlton, citing only the discussion of 3ailey, ££• cit., feels 
that only this second view is to be attributed to Democritus. 
The witness to the fact that this view also represents the 
teaching of Democritus is again Simplicius, ~ Physicorum p. 
331, lines 15ff. 
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Kirk and Raven suppose that this means that the whirl does not 
occur by the usual necessity and atomic laws of motion; they 
claim: "a vortex would presumably not necessarily arise out 
of the circumstances of the first stage alone. 1146 And thus, 
they say, the "whirl is called necessity because it produces 
the necessary 
• • • collisions and unions of atoms"(p. 412, 
note 1). This view represented by Kirk and Raven seems to be 
inadequate, for it does not explain why the heavens too as 
they now are (~oopavou ~ouoe--Physics 2.4, 196a25) are also 
and apparently in the same sense said to be due to 'the auto-
matic' or 'chance'; indeed, Aristotle makes much of the con-
trast between plants and animals close to us on the one hand 
and the heavens on the other hand more remote from us in 
space, of which Democritus teaches that the former are not due 
to chance, while the latter is (196a28-b5); and the contrast 
that Aristotle makes is not between 'necessity' and 'chance', 
but between 'chance' and 'not by chance'. And therefore, if 
the whirl is called 'necessity' because it produces the neces-
sary collisions of atoms, as Kirk and Raven claim, then this 
certainly contradicts Aristotle's statement that 'the automa-
tic' is responsible for the present heavens and universes 
(196a25). But surely we are not to suppose that both the 
' whirl and the·operating of the present heavens are not subject 
to the laws of atomic motion and are not the result of them! 
And besides, what then are we to make of the statement that, 
46Kirk and Raven, .2.E.· cit., p. 411. 
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according to Democritus, "everything from eternity is abso-
lutely subject to necessity 11 (Diels-F..ranz 68A39)? Certainly 
this would have developed an irreparable inconsistency in the 
system of Democritus, and Aristotle would surely have remarked 
on it. 
By far the most reasonable explanation of this statement 
is that of Goedeckemeyer and the one accepted by Bailey;47 
and that is to accept as well the third view listed by Aris-
totle at 196b5-9 as substantially that of Democritus too--that 
'chance' is indeed a cause, but one unclear to human intelli-
gence. That this, as well as the first two views, represents 
the teaching of Democritus is supported by a citation in Theo-
doret, stating that Democritus, among others, had named ~UXD 
a cause, but one unclear to human reason: a6DAOV al~(av 
avepwn(v~ Aoy~.4B What then did Democritus really mean by 
'chance'? It evidently has a subjective meaning for an objec-
tive process which either because of its extreme complexity or 
remoteness or both cannot be specifically attributed to atomic 
movements and reactions of a definite kind. Goedeckemeyer 
describes it as a cause which 11 wegen der ari;al;(a ihrer objectiv 
durchaus determinierten Bewegung dem Menschen zu einem Schluss 
47Goede.ckemeyer, .Q.E.,cit., pp. 37-40; Bailey, El?.· cit., 
pp. 139-143. . 
· 
48Theodoret 6.15, as cited in Diels, Doxographi Graeci, 
p. 326. One might note the striking similarity in formulation 
to the passage in Aristotle vn1ich reads: a{~(a ~ -i;uxD, 
a6DAO~ OE avepwn(v~ 6tavo(~ --196b6. 
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auf ihre Wirkung keine Anhaltspunkte gewahrt. 1149 And quite 
evidently the disorder or chaos which preceeded the whirl was 
precisely of this nature; hence the whirl can certainly be de-
scribed as being due to the 'automatic' or 'chance'. The 
heavens then also quite evidently presented for Democritus 
such complex motions that he could present no comprehensive 
account of their complexity; they were, besides, far removed, 
and this would in his view further complicate things, for, as 
we have seen, their remoteness impairs our accurate observance 
of their functioning: comets themselves, although they appear 
to be single objects, are really complexes of stars (r1Teteorol-
2irY.. 1.6, 342b27-29). Thus Democritus' view of chance and ne-
cessity are not at all incompatible; they are precise and 
technical terms quite consistent with one another. 50 
Aristotle's primary criticism of this view of 'chance' 
is one which applies to the whole theory, including all three 
of the aspects of that theory which he had listed. It is di-
rected precisely against 'chance' as a mechanical necessity; 
this theory, Aristotle claims, is simply contrary to empirical 
fact: "it is even more illogical to make these claims when 
people see nothing in the heavens happening as a result of a 
49 . Ou. cit., pp. 39-4Q. 
50see also the account of Gregory Vlastos, "Ethics and 
Physics in Democritus, II" in Philosophical Review, LV (1946), 
p. 63, where he defines Democritus' 'chance' (1:\5XTl) as "events 
uncontrolled by art. 11 Democritus' term for 'chance' in matters 
not concerned with human endeavors and art was likely 'to au'to-
µa'tov. see Goedeckemeyer, .£!?.• cit., p. 37. 
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(complex) 'automatic' chance, while among things which they 
claim are not a result of chance, many things do occur as a 
result of chance. 1151 It is not a matter of the heavens' by 
Democritus' view having an inferior cause, as Cherniss sug-
gests,52 but there is simply more order and regularity evident 
in that realm there than there is here on earth with plants 
and animals;53 the laws of motion should certainly more appro-
priately apply up there than among us where there is more evi-
dence of complexity. Democritus' theory, Aristotle thus says 
with some justification, is not warrented by the observable 
facts. 
Furthermore, Aristotle says that Democritus' use of the 
word 'chance' is contrary to ordinary usage; we do not, he 
claims, use 'chance' in connection with things which always 
happen in a certain way or which so happen for the most part 
(Physics 2.5, 196bl0-13); and so ordinary usage is the direct 
contrary of the way in which Democritus has been seen to use 
the term, for, for him, 'chance' is indeed one of those factors 
which really is a subdivision of 'what always happens', what 
51Physics 2.4, 196b2-4: E~l a~on&tepov ~0 AEYELV rraurra 
dpwv~~s ty µ~v,~Q oupavQ ovoev ang ~a6~0µ,a1ou ytyvoµevo~, ~v 
ot ~ot~ oux ano ~ux~~ noAAa ouµ~atvov~a ano ~ux~s· This is 
repeated at On the Parts of Animals 1.1, 64lbl6-23 in more de-
tail, but with the same cl~im for empirical evidence (~a(ve~at 
--64lbl9). . 
52.Q.:E.. cit., p. 247, though I am in substantial agreement 
with most of the rest of what he says on necessity and chance. 
53Part. Anim. 1.1, 64lbl9-20: ~o youv ~e~ayµtvov xal ~o 
wptcrµtvov nOAU µciAAOV cpa(ve~al EV rroi~ o6pav(ots fl ne:pl 1)µffs. 
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happens of necessity.54 
Indeed Aristotle says that we ordinarily use the term in 
connection with some set purpose or end--whether this is in-
tention on the part of human beings or a normal end of devel-
opment in natural objects. For example, we may go to market 
for some purpose, meet someone whom we wanted to see for some 
other purpose, and thus be diverted from that original pur-
pose; or a foetus may usually grow into a human being, but due 
to some accident be diverted from that end and develop into a 
monstrosity; and in both instances we call that which happens 
accidentally 'due to chance'. Thus, Aristotle says: "as many 
things as are done as a result of intention or happen as a re-
sult of a natural process, are for the sake of something; in-
deed, whenever such things happen accidentally, we say that 
they happen as a result of chance. 115 5 Thus, it is Aristotle's 
claim that Democritus' use of 'chance' not only fails to ac-
cord with ordinary usage (in that Democritus applies it to the 
category of 'what always happens'), but it also fails to ac-
count for the factor of purpose or end in our ordinary usage 
of that term. And it is this very matter of purpose, end, and 
'final cause' which we shall treat next. 
54Physics 2.5, 196bl~-15: 6,r._r._' b:et6~ 'eo'"t"tV a' y(yve'"t"al 
' ' - ' - ~ ' J I ' --~ ( • t 1 • XUl TIUpa '"t"UO'"t"U~ XQl '"t"UO'"t"U TIUV'Te' ~UOlV eLVUl UTIO 'TvXnC 1 a 1CS 
mine, in order to indicate Aristotle's claim for 'ordinary 
usage' of the term. 
55Physics 2.5, 196b21-24: 'E:orct o' 
OLavo(a, 6.'v xoaxee(n xai oaa UTIO ~U0£(1.)C. 
' ' ~ • ' ( f xarca ouµ~c0nxoc y~vrrtat, ~ rcuxnc paµev 
eVEXQ 'TOU OOa 'Te ~TIO 
' \. - u ~a on rcoiaurca orcav 
dval (italics mine). 
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The Final Cause 
Democritus' teaching on this 'final cause' as a factor 
in providing an explanation is not hard to indicate; he quite 
evidently did not use it at all. At best the only analogue 
to 'final cause' in the teaching of Democritus is simply that 
A results from B. And precisely this is indicated at Qg ~­
piration 4, 47lb30-472a2: "Democritus says that~§:. result 
of breathing some specific thing happens to creatures which 
breathe, and he mentions that it prevents their soul from be-
ing squeezed out; but he has said nothing at all about the 
fact that it was for this purnose .2£ end that nature did 
this. 1156 Further instances of Democritus' analogue to 'final 
cause'--or, better, his failure to take purpose or end into 
consideration--will be given in connection with Aristotle's 
criticisms, where they more properly belong. It seems quite 
evident that Democritus' failure in this respect was general 
and consistent. 
Inasmuch as Democritus had no posi-l;i ve teaching on this 
point, it will be the burden of this section of the chapter to 
show Aristotle's own justification for considering the 'final 
cause' as an essential element in the explanation of the world 
of nature and, in regard to Democritus specifically, to show 
" how his neglect of this factor rendered Democritus' theory in-
56 ... 'Y'l Q p_ I U ' I - /._ - , u.Jµ xp&~o~ u o~& µev ex ~Tl~ uvanvon, ouµ~a&Vel ~' 
~ore avanVEOUOl AEYEl, ~aoxwv XWAUElV EX8A(~eo8Ul ~~v *ux~v· 
I /. t # I u -1, - ' .t I ' ou µ~v~o& w~ ~ou~ou y evsxa no&,Joaoav ~ou~o ~riv ~votv oueev 
e'{ prixev. There is an obvious contrast between ~x ~fl<; avanvo'fic; 
and ~ou~ou evexa, each placed at the beginning of its clause. 
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adequate. 
Aristotle's general case for including the 'final cause' 
as an avenue of explanation is presented at Physics 2.8. 
There is, Aristotle there claims, a purpose or an end in the 
functioning of art (~exvD); things are done for some specific 
purpose: npu~~E~al o' evExu ~ou--199all. The example to 
which Aristotle refers here is that of house-building (a fair-
ly frequent example); its purpose is realized when the house 
is in fact built. Another favorite example is the skill of 
healing (mentioned briefly at 199a34-35), and its purpose is 
fulfilled when the person is in fact restored to health. So 
there are indeed things which are done for the sake of some-
thing, for some purpose or end. 
And this 'doing something for some purpose or end', Aris-
totle further claims, is evident even among the lower animals, 
such as spiders and ants--though on this level there is no 
question of doing it as a matter of art or technical skill 
(~exvD) or of deliberate intention (199a20-23). 57 And, as one 
goes down the scale of nature to plants, the growth of plants 
is a continuing process, and things that happen to it as part 
of that process, happen to it in relation to some end or goal 
of that process (ylyvoµtva npo, ~o ~€Ao,--199a24-25); and thus 
' here too there is an end or goal with reference to which cer-
. ~57rn the light of this remark we ought to divorce from 
the ou evtxa as such any idea of intention or deliberate pur-
pose; thus, i~the proverbial acorn succeeds in growing into 
an oak tree and thus fulfilling its 'purpose', we ought not 
anthropomorphize it or attribute to it any real intention. 
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tain things happen in certain ways in the process of growth--
thus its roots grow dovmward with reference to the goal of 
constantly obtaining nourishment. Thus considering the goal 
or function of a plant or a part of a plant contributes to our 
understanding of the process of its growth as a whole (199a23-
30). 
More specifically, a consideration of the goal, end, or 
purpose of a given natural physical object can help us to a 
better understanding of that object or its parts; it can give 
us clues to its matter, form, and efficient causes as well. 
And this is the point that Aristotle makes about the hypothet-
ical necessity which involves the final cause at On the Parts 
of Animals 1.1, 642a31-34. There might be some doubt, for in-
stance, about the constitution of some organ or part of a 
natural object or about some other factor in some natural pro-
cess; thus, by considering the end or purpose of that process 
or the proper functioning of that organ or part, one might by 
using the hypothetical necessity formula come to some conclu-
sion about these other doubtful factors: if its purpose or 
end or function is A, then it is necessary that it have B. 
Hence this 'final cause' too is one of which the natural phi~ 
losopher must be aware and for which he must account (Physics 
2.7, 198a21-24) and thus give a complete explanation of the 
physical object in question (198b4-5). 
A parallel which to some extent illustrates this ap-
proach to scientific explanation turns up somewhat unexpected-
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ly in a symposium devoted primarily to quantum mechanics· and 
is worth quoting:58 
"We are not aslrnd to look at what we cannot yet see 
but only told to look at the given elements of the pr~b­
lem in a particular way, namely as putative clues to the 
unlrn.own solution. By concentrating our attention on an 
unknown end in terms of the clues by ·which it may be 
achieved, we may succeed in reorganizing these clues in-
to a satisfactory solution of our problem; and we may 
add that if we looked at the clues themselves, without 
any purpose in mind, they vrnuld mean nothing to us." 
Similarly for Aristotle, the end or purpose of a process can 
give us valuable insight into other factors involved; it can, 
as Polanyi in his own instance points out, help us to know 
particulars focally; it can help us to settle what is in doubt. 
And this is precisely the point on which Aristotle crit-
icizes Democritus in regard to the 'final cause'. Nowhere, as 
far as I know, does Aristotle simply say that Democritus was 
wrong only because he did not consider the 'final cause'; but 
on all occasions of Aristotle's criticism of Democritus in re-
gard to the 'final cause' Aristotle regularly says that Democ-
ritus' neglect of the 'final cause' led him to an accounting--
which is on other grounds inadequate--of the matter constitut-
ing a part of an organ or an object, of the structure or form 
of an object, and of the operation of a natural process. 
58r1Iichael Polanyi, "Beauty, Elegance and Reality in Sci-
ence" in Obse:rvation ~ l'hternretation in the Philosophy of 
Physics: Vii th snecial reference to auantum mechanics, ed. by 
s. Korner (New York: Dover Publications, 1957), p. 104. The 
aim or end of a process, he says, can tell us much about the 
given facts or particulars. The specific reference here in 
this quotation is to a mathematical problem, and for this rea-
son the parallelism breaks down at some points. 
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Thus, according to Aristotle, in all instances Democritus' 
failure to consider the 'final cause' is not wrong in and of 
itself, but precisely because it generated other mistakes, as 
will now become evident as we examine the instances in which 
Aristotle does mention Democritus' neglect of this avenue of 
explanation. 
First of all, we have already noted that at On ~ Parts 
of Animals 1.1 Democritus is said to have defined man's real 
atomic structure as his form or essence and said that phenom-
enal man is an accurate and true representation of this real 
form (640b29-35). And Aristotle's reply was that on those 
grounds the corpse and the man are actually the same thing 
inasmuch as they look exactly alike (640b35-36). Then Aris-
totle goes on to show in some detail that, had Democritus con-
sidered the problem from the view-point of 'final cause', he 
would have obviously avoided this error; for the wooden hand 
or the portrait of a physician are 'hand' and 'physician' by 
courtesy of name only; they are not in fact the same as a real 
hand or physician. And this is made obvious by the fact that 
they do not perform the proper function of a hand or of a phy-
sician: 06 yap 5uv~aE~at xotErv ~~ ~au~~' 1pyov (64la2-3); a 
wooden hand or couch has its ovm purpose (r(vo' £vExa --64lal3), 
' and so does a· real hand. And this means that there is an ob-
vious distinction between them which must be made and which 
Democritus in principle could not make. Democritus' neglect 
of 'final cause' had led him to make an obvious mistake, a 
mistake which he could have avoided, had he considered the 
matter from the point of view of purpose and function. 
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Again, at On the Parts of Animals 3.4, 665a31-33 Democ-
ritus ia said to have thought that bloodless animals have vis-
cera just like blooded animals do, but in the former they are 
invisible due to their smallness. This, Aristotle says right-
ly, is an unwarrented conclusion, because 'size' in other 
cases is not a factor; such organs are visible in blooded ani-
mals as soon as they are formed and still very small--in eggs 
as early as the third day, and in aborted embryos when very 
small (665a33-b2). Thus Democritus seems to be wrong in his 
assumption c~~µoxpt~O~ o' EOtXEV OU xaAW~ 6taAU~ELV 1tEpl 
ao~wv __ 665a31-32); but a consideration of the use (XPDOt~) of 
different parts for different creatures relative to their ovm 
life and movements--a consideration of the functioning of these 
organs in relation to the cardio-vascular system--would have 
helped Democritus to avoid making his unwarrented assumption 
(665b2-17). 
At On Resuiration 4, 47lal6 Democritus is represented as 
having given an account of breathing which gave the 'efficient 
cause' as an external pressure and specified that spherical 
soul-atoms which produce the effect of 'heat' in us are in-
' haled by animals as an essential part of the continuance of the 
process of breathing. There is some legitimate doubt as to 
whether this account is in principle correct or not, for the 
'efficient cause' of breathing seems to be more likely inter-
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nal than external, and Democritus' related proposition that 
all animals breathe is not in fact true (472a21-29). Further-
more, Aristotle says in criticism of Democritus' theory, a 
consideration of the purpose of breathing would have kept De-
mocritus from this apparently wrong account, for evidence 
points to the fact that we breathe to cool ourselves; and this 
consideration would have led Democritus to reformulate his ac-
count of the material which we breathe, for by his theory what 
we breathe has the effect of adding heat (472a30-b5).59 And 
these considerations would perhaps as well have led him to re-
formulate his whole theory of the soul. 
At On the Generation of Animals 2.4 Aristotle cites De-
mocritus' view that the external parts of the embryo are devel-
oped first and the internal parts only later (740al3-15) and 
that the embryo stays in the uterus because there it is mech-
anically formed like its parent (740a37-38). The former view, 
Aristotle says, is wrong on the grounds of empirical evidence 
that the heart is formed early (740a4-5), and the second on the 
grounds that some embryos receive their formation quite apart 
from the mother, as is the case with those developing in eggs 
(740bl-2). But, even aside from the empirical evidence for 
the early development of the heart, reason would have helped 
' Democritus avoid his mistake; and the reason referred to is 
precisely the hypothetical necessity involved in earlier crit-
59see especially 472b4-5: a\t:asOV'tE(, 6e TIOA\dxl~ ava-
nvfouOl V, W(, 6.va~1ut;c(;)(, xoplV 6.vmi:vfov'tt:<;, O'l:E 'to A.eyoµevov 
- N j ' -TIOlEl nup ERl nup. 
r 
' I 
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icisms. Once the embryo starts developing, it begins to func-
tion independently like seeds sovm in the ground (739b34-35); 
and the independent development of an embryo in an egg should 
have shown Democritus that. But, if it is to be such as to 
function independently, it ~ therefore have an internal 
principle of development (740a6-9). 60 
Aristotle further criticizes Democritus at Qg the Gener-
ation of Animals 4.1 for his view of the determination of the 
sex of an offspring. Democritus had apparently said that 
'semen' in both parents comes from all parts of the body, and 
sex is determined in the offspring by whether the semen repre-
senting the genital organs of the father or the mother predom-
inates (764a7-12). This view, Aristotle feels, is v.rrong be-
cause male and female are not only different in their genital 
organs, but are different as whole persons; and so, if that 
which determines gender does so by predominance, this ought to 
affect the whole person; and thus there would be no accounting 
for how daughter can take after father in some respect and son 
can take after mother in some respects (764b21-31.). 
And in further response to this teaching Aristotle sug-
gests first that a more satisfactory view could be arrived at 
by an accounting of the relationship of the blood vessels to 
' the genital organs in terms of a natural process--and thus with 
60
.Aristotle's hypothetical proposition here in the text 
is a bit more complex, for, as he states it, he is also draw-
ing an analogy to a son becoming independent and setting up 
his own household. 
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a view to their proper functioning as part of the whole per-
son. And this would account for the determination of sex and 
the development of organs of sex as something contingent upon 
a prior principle (764b32-38); and this Aristotle goes on later 
to describe in terms of the functioning of male and female as 
such (765b9-766b26). And this approach allows Aristotle to 
give a broader and more satisfactory accounting for all the 
facts. And from this point of view of accounting for all the 
facts the approach which Aristotle took and which Democritus 
neglected is certainly justified. 
The same is true with regard to Democritus' account of 
the development of monstrosities as outlined by Aristotle at 
On the Generation of Animals 4.4. There Democritus had been 
-- -----
said to have attributed their development to a second copula-
tion which resulted in the superfluous growth onto the devel-
oping embryo (769b32-34). This view seems wrong in the light 
of the apparent development of monstrosities in animals as the 
result of a single copulation. But a better avenue of ap-
proach, Aristotle says, is to examine the function of the se-
men from each of the parents; and again such an approach seems 
to Aristotle to explain more of the facts in a variety of spe-
cific instances (770a6ff.). 61 
" Finally·, at On the Generation of Animals 5. 8, 788bl0-14 
61The matter of interpretation in the light of function 
goes back to chapter one of this book; it is simply intimated 
here by reference to ascribing the reason for such monstrosi-
ties to the material constituting the embryo; the material is 
what Aristotle sees as the proper contribution of the female. 
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Democritus is cited as having explained the early development 
of front teeth as being due to suckling. And Aristotle imme-
diately points out that Democritus' universal statement in 
this regard is simply not warrented by the facts (788bl5-20). 
And furthermore Aristotle retorts that Democritus was mistaken 
because he failed to consider the development of teeth from 
the point of view of the 'final cause'; and such a considera-
tion would have led him to a more adequate account. 
In the first place, with regard to his universal state-
ment about the development of teeth, he would not have made 
the error he did, if he had considered the fact that these 
teeth do not have only one purpose or function. Not all ani-
. mals have them for the same reason or purpose: ou6E nav'ta 
'tou a6rcoG' ev EXEV -ra C";;Qa '£xouo l v --788b3-4. In some cases these 
teeth serve for obtaining nourishment, and in other cases they 
are there with a view to self-defense (788b5); and the facts 
of the case for each animal or kind of animal should be con-
sidered before drawing any general conclusion. 
Secondly (788b20-29), in those cases, Aristotle says, 
where such dropping of the front teeth does occur, it is impor-
tant to remember that the development of those teeth is a nat-
ural process, and their end or proper function is performed 
' when they are ·used as instruments for obtaining nourishment. 
Whereas, on Democritus' theory, if they ordinarily developed 
later in life, there would be a long period of time in which 
the growing animal would have no means for obtaining nourish-
319 
ment after the period of suckling stopped. The growing animal 
therefore must have these teeth early in life, if he is to ob-
tain nourishment: avayxi) Oe • • • 1EXE'\I opyava 'ITpO<; 'tTJV ep-
yaa(av 't~~ 'tpo~~<--788b23-24. A consideration of the purpose 
or function of these teeth would thus have led to a correct 
interpretation, that is, that they are developed naturally at 
that time of life. In this respect too Democritus was led 
astray by his neglect of 'final cause'. Aristotle then goes 
on to show how a consideration of function or purpose is bet-
ter not for its own sake, but because it contributes to a 
broader and more satisfactory explanation of the mechanics of 
the growth of teeth (788b30-789b2). 
This chapter of On the Generation of Animals (5.8) and, 
indeed, the whole work ends--as does the first chapter of On 
the Parts of Animals--with a criticism of Democritus' view of 
- -----
'necessity' as something in all cases absolute, though the 
criticism is still made here with reference to the matter of 
'dropping of front teeth'. It is necessary that they drop, 
but there is a contrast between absolute and hypothetical ne-
cessity; and Aristotle says: 11 It is of course true that they 
are determined by necessity, but at the same time they are for 
the sake of some purpose, some final cause, and for the sake 
of that which.is better in' each case. 1162 There is, Aristotle 
625.8, 789b4-6; the translation is that of A. L. Peck, 
Aristotle Generation of A..~imals (London: William Heinemann, 
1953), p. 559, although I refuse to follow Peck in capital-
izing 'final cause•. 
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claims once more, a use of hypothetical necessity which can 
lead to a more satisfactory explanation of form, matter, and 
efficient cause; and Democritus had consistently neglected it. 
Thus Aristotle has shown the ways in which that neglect had 
led him into error on other counts, and has shown as well that 
a consideration of that factor or an approach to explanation 
from that point of view has proved fruitful in a broader, more 
detailed, and thus more satisfactory explanation of the given 
facts. 
But even beyond all this, there is in Aristotle one fi-
nal criticism of the position of Democritus; it is a criticism 
which is never quite made explicit, but is certainly strongly 
implied. 'Final cause' implies for natural objects a natural 
internal process to some end, goal, or function; and so Democ-
ritus' failure to take any account at all of the final cause 
leaves him with no basis for any real distinction at all be-
tween animate and inanimate objects, between natural and arti-
ficial objects. Charlton suggests--and the point is well 
taken--that when Aristotle attempts to distinguish an internal 
from an external final cause at Physics 2.8, he is attempting 
to make precisely this distinction; Charlton says: "Aristotle 
is in effect trying to give an account of the difference we 
feel there to. be between fiving things and the processes of 
life on the one hand, and inanimate nature on the other. 1163 
Granting this distinction on Aristotle's part, his crit~ 
63
.QE.. cit., p. 126. 
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icism of Democritus becomes almost explicit in the light of 
the expressions which he uses in connection with Democritus' 
theory. At ~ ~ Generation of Animals 2.4, 740al5-16, in 
connection with Democritus' teaching on the development of 
the embryo, Aristotle says that it is as if Democritus were 
speaking of animals made of wood or stone: ~TI£p sUA(vwv ~ 
Al8(vwv ~~wv. And this is likely taken up again in connection 
with the theory of navonepµ(a cited at 4.3; the theory is de-
scribed as a 'fabrication' (rrAaoµa~(a~ --769bl). It is taken 
up again at On the Parts of Animals 1.1, where on Democritus' 
principles there is according to Aristotle no real distinction 
between a man and a corpse, that on this theory one could not 
distinguish a bronze or a wooden hand from a real one: o~ov 
[xet'pa] xat..x:~v 1)' su"A(VTJV --640b36ff. All of these instances 
render even more significant the more familiar passage at On 
~Soul 1.3, 406bl7-20: "Democritus' account is quite like 
that of Philip the master of comedy, for the latter says that 
Daedalus made a wooden statue of Venus move by pouring in 
quicksilver." Animate life in Democritus' view is no different 
from the mechanical and artificial 'life' induced into 'gim-
mick' statues. Democritus in .Aristotle's view had come to the 
point of denying one of the most obvious facts of the phenome-
nal world--na~ural life. 
Thus all of Democritus' accounts of causes and of neces-
sity had without sufficient warrent at all led him to deny 
that there are in fact such real things as natural objects 
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which could in principle be distinguished from artificial ob-
jects. And Aristotle had shown in case after case precisely 
how he went wrong and that the weight of the evidence certain-
ly did point to the fact that Aristotle's account was more 
satisfactory and more justified. 
' 
SOI\lill CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It may be well at this point to append a few words in 
retrospect, to see what--if anything at all--has been gained 
by this review of Aristotle's accounts and criticisms of De-
mocritus. The fundamental issues--as Aristotle himself saw 
them--dividing the teachings of these two significant philoso-
phers of the ancient world have now been raised. And these 
are issues which are still of living concern to philosophers 
today--the problem of 'what exists' and 'what does not exist•, 
of what constitutes a 'physical object', of sense-perception 
and knowledge, the problem of how we are to go about explain-
ing and describing the world around us, and the very problem 
of the meaning of life. 
Admittedly, in regard to the basic thesis of this paper, 
the reliability of Aristotle's accounts and criticisms of De-
mocritus, there is no answer or resolution of the problem in 
terms of absolute certainty--nor can there be short of finding 
Democritus' ovm writings on physical theory substantially in-
tact. The fragments that we do have, although they are in fact 
numerous, tell us even les~ upon which we can rely with abso-
lute certainty; they have been torn out of context, and with 
the context much of their meaning and significance has also 
disappeared. And perhaps with the passage of time, when these 
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fragments were finally written down by the ancient authors who 
preserved them for us, even their words and significance has 
been contaminated with new meanings and related but foreign 
teaching. And so, when we consider them, we are still reduced 
to engaging in a great deal of conjecture and sheer specula-
tion. 
But the distance between Abdera and Stagira--either in 
terms of time or space or in concern for philosophic issues--
is not so great. Aristotle is indeed our first and fullest 
explicit witness to the teachings of Democritus; he had evi-
dently read Democritus thoroughly and he presents Democritus' 
teachings in a philosophical context. And it is here in Aris-
totle that the meaning and significance of the teachings of 
Democritus take shape and form--to such an extent as they 
could not possibly do from only the fragments. If we are to 
understand Democritus at all, we must go to Aristotle. And, 
though even here there is no absolute certainty, at least we 
can by using Aristotle with caution arrive at what is most 
likely and probable in regard to the teachings of Democritus. 
And if Cherniss' book has taught us anything at all 
about Aristotle's witness to the Presocratics, it has rightly 
taught us caution, it has taught us to read Aristotle more 
closely, and ~t has taught' us not to take Aristotle's reports 
and criticisms out of context. And this is wholesome, for it 
does indeed help us to a more reliable view not only of Aris-
totle himself, but also of Democritus and of the.other earlier 
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philosophers. 
More specifically though, in regard to Cherniss' charges 
against Aristotle of misrepresentation of various sorts, we 
have seen that Cherniss--at least as far as Democritus is con-
cerned--certainly does not prove misrepresentation. Indeed, 
in all cases the likelihood rests with a reasonably accurate 
representation by Aristotle of the theory of Democritus. And 
Aristotle's criticisms--in spite of some objections by Cherniss 
--were seen to be warranted by the facts of the case and by 
the evidence available. 
Although the primary value of this paper is to counter-
balance some of the extreme views critical of Aristotle's 
treatment of his predecessors, there are several respects in 
which our closer reading of Aristotle has, I believe, led to a 
fuller and more complete understanding o~ the teachings of De-
mocritus. The first of these is the fuller integration of the 
meaning of navoncpµ(a into the teachings of Democritus--as a 
term used not only in connection with the atomic structure of 
physical objects and the mutual generation of the 'traditional 
elements', but also in coIL~ection with Democritus' solution to 
the problem of the presence of contraries in physical objects. 
And the other is a theory of 'truth in perception' which does 
' sufficient justice not only to all that Aristotle says about 
Democritus' teachings, but also to the witness of later writers 
and the fragments--taking 'true' to mean an accurate correspon-
dence between what is perceived by the senses and the actual 
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atomic structure of physical objects, a correspondence which 
holds as well for the physical processes, and thus establishes 
a connection between the 'necessity' which governs the atoms 
and their movements and the •necessity' which we observe in 
the phenomenal world as the objects in it move and change. 
Thus, on the whole, this paper, I hope, has led to a 
greater appreciation of Aristotle as a philosopher with integ-
rity and to increased insight into the consistent and method-
ical teachings of Democritus. 
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